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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this study was to determine whether a training intervention would be 
sufficient to produce a cultural change. A comprehensive review of literature on 
culture and climate indicated that these separately studied constructs could be 
integrated; thus, an integrated model of culture and climate, and the associated 
theory, was developed. Three studies were conducted within the obstetrics 
practice in Ontario, Canada. The specific training intervention used in this study 
was the MOREOB program (Managing Obstetric Risks Efficiently), which was a 
proprietary program developed by the Salus Global Corporation, Canada. This 
program sought to improve safety culture in the field of obstetrics through a 
strategic approach to knowledge-building and team-training. Over the past 
decade, more than 300 hospitals across Canada have implemented this program. 
However, the impact of this program on the culture of respective obstetrics units 
had not been evaluated. The sample for this research consisted of 68 hospitals 
from Ontario that had implemented the MOREOB program.  
Overall, this study used a mixed-methods approach, consisting of both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses, and explored five research questions and 
two hypotheses. The study was structured in terms of three sub-studies: Study#1 
focused on quantitative assessment of knowledge gained through the training 
intervention, changes in clinical outcomes, and changes in the patient safety 
climate; Study #2 focused on qualitative assessment aimed at analyzing interview 
narratives and artifacts to develop a deeper understanding of how various external 
influences as well as internal factors and the MOREOB training may have shaped 
the organizational culture at the subject hospitals. Study #3 took a longitudinal 
approach and presented an integrated analysis of culture and climate at two 
subject hospitals.  
Ultimately, the three studies arrived at the following conclusions: 
1. Contemporary environmental factors such as economics, geo-social 
conditions, legal requirements, and professional coalitions played a vital 
role in influencing organizational values as well operationalizing them. 
By asking the study participants how external environmental factors 
might have influenced their organizational culture, the researcher was able 
to map the role played by the changing external conditions in shifting the 
participants’ unquestioned assumptions.   
2. Leadership’s role in shaping organizational culture was not limited to 
imprinting of his/her personal values on the organization. First, key 
influencers outside the organization raised awareness about critical issues, 
questioned the norms, and presented ideas and test-cases about best 
practices that could be used to solve the issues. Next, formal leaders 
within the organization interpreted these external signals in the context of 
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local conditions and engaged internal mechanisms to revise or reinforce 
corresponding organizational values. Internal key influencers, on the other 
hand, took the signal from their formal leaders and developed group-level 
standards of practice, enforced those standards, and served as role models. 
3. Three levels of shared experiences were noted: (a) experiences resulting 
from external influences (e.g., the experiences resulting from placing one 
subject hospital under supervisory control); (b) experiences resulting from 
internal implementation mechanism (e.g., the use of the Lean 
methodology across one of the subject hospitals); and (c) experiences 
resulting from the MOREOB program as a training intervention aimed at 
improving the patient safety culture in obstetrics.  
4. A 2x2 matrix of internal versus external and formal versus informal 
feedback mechanisms was noted. External mechanisms, whether formal 
or informal, were aligned with external influence factors. For example, 
overall transparency regarding every hospital’s clinical performance 
provided means to compare hospital performance across peers and 
enabled patients to choose their care providers based on quality of care 
metrics. Since patient volume was linked with financial health of the 
hospital, the benchmarked performance measures received significant 
attention from senior management. Thus, the study of feedback 
mechanisms revealed how such mechanisms could work in concert with 
external factors and have substantial impact on the organizational culture. 
5. There was a positive influence of training on participants’ knowledge, 
clinical outcomes, and safety climate factors. Additionally, the training 
was aligned with shared organizational values. However, it was evident 
from the low-to-moderate relationship between improvements in clinical 
knowledge (the focus of the training intervention) and the safety climate 
improvements that training alone was not sufficient to cause a climatic or 
cultural change. Results of the qualitative analysis were helpful in 
understanding the influence of MOREOB training on shared values, 
practices, leadership commitment, and use of feedback mechanisms. 
Thus, while training may improve the organizational climate, its impact 
on culture is dependent on its alignment with shared organizational 
values, leadership commitment, and appropriate use of feedback 
mechanisms (including alignment of incentives).  
The emergent model of culture and climate was revised to better represent the 
various mechanisms that influence organizational culture and climate. As a 
macro-level integrative model, it presents an alternate perspective compared to 
other models that generally tend to focus on specific elements like values or 
leadership. Future studies should consider different domains and different 
planned interventions in order to test the transferability of the proposed integrated 
model of culture and climate.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, the interest in organizational culture, particularly in the 
context of patient safety, has spiked in the United States, Canada and the United 
Kingdom. In the United States, the severity of the problem of medical errors was 
brought to light in arguably the most factual and compelling manner by the 
Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) report, To Err is Human (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000). The Institute of Medicine is a division of the National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, a highly prestigious group of 
scientists that advises the United States Government and informs public policy. 
Thus, when it estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year 
due to medical errors, the claim was taken very seriously.  While the volume of 
such deaths was shocking, the range of the estimate also pointed to the fact that 
medical errors may not be measured, or accounted for, consistently. A more 
recent report on high-performing healthcare systems points out that among six 
developed nations (Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom, 
and United States), although the United States spends the most on healthcare per 
capita, it ranks lowest in the overall quality of care, access, efficiency, equity, and 
life expectancy (Baker et al., 2008). Among eleven countries (Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and the United States) the United States and the United 
Kingdom reported the two highest number of avoidable deaths per 100,000 
population: 96 and 83, respectively (Thomson, Osborn, Squires, & Miraya, 
2013). In a more focused study of 10 hospitals in North Carolina, harm to 
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patients was common and there was no decrease in this harm during the five-year 
study (Landrigan et al., 2010). This study recommended that future studies 
should focus on developing programs and protocols that begin the cultural change 
necessary. Also, according to a 2016 study at Johns Hopkins University, medical 
errors are the third leading cause of death in the United States (Cha, 2016). Thus, 
patient safety continues to be a formidable challenge in the United States.  
In Canada, residents receive comprehensive health care at about half of the cost 
of healthcare in the United States and at about one-third more than the cost of 
healthcare in the United Kingdom. The Canadian healthcare system could be 
described as a “publicly-funded, privately-provided, universal, comprehensive, 
affordable, single-payer, provincially-administered, national health care system” 
(Bernard, 2013, p.2). As a result of the provincial-federal partnership (both in 
cost-sharing as well as power-sharing), individual provinces have substantial 
autonomy in adopting certain practices and funding them; their outcomes can also 
vary considerably. Table 1 presents an overview of comparative healthcare 
expenditure across Canada, United States, and the United Kingdom. It is also 
important to note that in all three countries majority of the population is in urban 
areas, which tend to have relatively more advanced care facilities; thus, majority 
of the population has access to relatively high quality medical care. 
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Table 1: Comparative healthcare expenditure across Canada, United States, and 
the United Kingdom 
 Canada United States United Kingdom 
Total Population 1 35,524,732 322,583,006 63,489,234 
1 Year Change1 0.98% 0.79% 0.56% 
Urban 1 81% 83% 80% 
Per capita Health 
Expenditure2 
US$3,850 
(10.4% of GDP) 
US$7,349 
(16.9% of GDP) 
US$2,904 
(8.9% of GDP) 
Notes:  
(1). 2014 Data; http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/ 
(2). 2012 Data; per capita spending in US$ at 2005 PPP rate (OECD, 2015) 
 
In spite of the high per capita spending and majority of the population having 
access to relatively high quality medical care, the 2013-2014 Health Care in 
Canada Survey (HCIC, 2014) of a sample of the Canadian adult population, 
doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and administrators (n=1,405) reports the following: 
 Fifty-eight per cent of the public claim to be receiving quality health care; 
38 per cent claim that they do not receive quality health care. 
 The doctors’ perception of quality of care has been generally positive, in 
the 70-76 per cent range over a decade; however, the administrators’ 
perception has dropped from 91 per cent in 2007 to 73 per cent in 2013. 
 The biggest issue with healthcare in Canada is wait time—the survey 
respondents believe that it is already bad and will get worse in the future 
with a net negative momentum of as high as 24 per cent, and the quality 
of care is also perceived to get worse by about 4 per cent. 
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Although not as serious as the wait time issue, the perception of quality of care, 
among Canadians, is dropping and patient safety and adverse events are part of 
the metrics for quality of care. Thus, it is useful to review the definitions of 
patient safety and adverse event per the Royal College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Canada. Patient safety is defined as “the reduction and mitigation of 
unsafe acts within the health care system, as well as through the use of best 
practices shown to lead to optimal patient outcomes,”  and adverse events are 
defined as, “unexpected and undesired incidents directly associated with the care 
or services provided to the patient” (RCPSC, 2003). 
On the quality front, there seems to be a paradox: on the one hand, new scientific 
breakthroughs are enabling innovative interventions and improving both quality 
and expectancy of life, while on the other hand, avoidable medical errors are 
causing deaths and disabilities. Acknowledging this paradox and keeping sight of 
the overarching goal of striving toward improvements in both quality and 
affordability, the Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2015) released a core set of metrics 
for health and health care progress—Patient Safety is one of those metrics:  
Avoiding harm is among the principal responsibilities of the health care system, yet 
adverse outcomes are common. Ensuring patient safety will require a culture that 
prioritizes and assesses safety through a reliable index of organizational results. (p.3). 
With respect to cost, it is clear that an increase in per capita spending on 
healthcare is neither viable nor proven to be correlated with superior quality of 
care (Baker et al., 2008; Thomson et al., 2013). Thus, in order to address the 
challenge of affordable, quality healthcare, one may have to seek innovative 
solutions that leverage the lessons learned by other industries and customize them 
to the unique needs and environment of healthcare.   A number of such 
interventions have already proven to be successful. Some examples include the 
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use of checklists (HRET, 2013), team training (Weaver, Dy, & Rosen, 2014), and 
simulation-based training (Aggarwal et al., 2010). It is essential to continue the 
quest toward systemic and sustainable enhancements to patient safety concurrent 
with cost containment—thus, there is a demand for a “culture of safety.”  
Today, high-quality healthcare at an affordable cost has become a scientific, 
financial, and political goal in the United States (Blumenthal, Malphrus, & 
McGinnis, 2015), Canada (Verma, Petersen, Samis, Akunov, & Graham, 2014), 
and the United Kingdom (NPSA, 2011). In order to address this goal, academic 
researchers and clinical practitioners are seeking sustainable, long-term solutions, 
which will constitute a cultural transformation. However, in this pursuit, there has 
been unabashed enthusiasm for survey-style assessment (Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, 
& Bryden, 2000; Fruhen, Mearns, Flin, & Kirwan, 2013; Guldenmund, 2007) and 
training-based interventions (Aggarwal et al., 2010; Grunebaum, 2007; Pratt et 
al., 2007; Weaver et al., 2014) with the hope that the survey results would 
identify problem areas and the corresponding training programs would address 
them. Unfortunately, many of these survey instruments have not been 
psychometrically validated and the training interventions seemed to be episodic 
rather than grounded in a broader commitment toward cultural transformation. 
Thus, the overarching research question of this study was as follows: 
 Would an intervention, such as training, alone be sufficient to produce a 
cultural change?  
In response to the above research question, this study reviewed the current 
literature regarding the complex constructs of culture and climate and applied a 
systems lens per the principles of systems thinking outlined by Checkland (1981).  
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This approach resulted in framing of internal organizational culture as an open 
system influenced by the external environment in which the organization operates 
and constituting of several interdependent components; on the other hand, 
organizational climate served as the psychological response to the underlying 
culture.  
Although the proposed integrated model of organizational culture and climate 
could have been tested in any domain, there was compelling practical need to 
find ways to improve the patient safety culture in Canada, United States, and the 
United Kingdom; and the researcher had access to extensive datasets and key 
personnel from obstetrics practice in Ontario, Canada. Furthermore, Canada’s 
medical facilities were comparable in technical sophistication and quality of care 
to those in the United States and the United Kingdom, but its single-payer 
insurance system provided an opportunity to control for variations in practice due 
to different payment schemes at different hospitals, regions, or for different types 
of patients. Also, obstetrics practice is considered a high-risk area and due to long 
periods of care (pre-conception through postpartum care) there are many 
opportunities for lapse in quality of care. Thus, obstetrics practice in Ontario, 
Canada, was chosen as the domain for this study.   
1.2 The Chosen Domain: Obstetrics Practice in Canada  
The healthcare industry has achieved numerous scientific breakthroughs in new 
drug discoveries, improvements in treatment protocols, as well as new and 
improved medical instrumentation. Concurrently, however, the global population 
is projected to rise by 38 per cent by 2050 (Kochhar, 2014) and 66 per cent of the 
population is projected to be urban, creating unprecedented stress on urban 
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healthcare facilities while leaving the rural facilities with limited expertise and 
resources (UN, 2014). Thus, it is not difficult to visualize a pattern wherein if the 
rate of medical errors does not decrease, the avoidable deaths will increase 
exponentially. While such errors and consequential injuries and/or deaths may 
have a direct financial impact on the healthcare facilities and on the clinicians’ 
ability to practice, they will not reduce the need to seek healthcare services. 
In ongoing efforts to improve the quality and affordability, the healthcare 
industry has been creating new technical solutions (e.g., electronic health records 
and automated medication dispensing devices), developing human factors-based 
communication and teamwork protocols (e.g., CRM-based team training, specific 
communication-based interventions to prevent hospital-acquired infections and 
trips and falls, and improvements to patient discharge protocols), and using an 
outcomes-based approach to identify risks in specific practice specialties and 
appealing to the professional and organizational values to infuse and sustain 
longer-term cultural changes (e.g., practice guidelines focused on patient safety, 
educational techniques to encourage team training, and policy changes such as 
legislation, accreditation, and reimbursement rules) (Pratt et al., 2007; Kaveh 
Shojania, Duncan, McDonald, & Wachter, 2001) .   
In the case of pregnancy and child birth, a woman is probably under medical care 
from a certain period prior to conception through the first few weeks postpartum. 
During this period, she is under medication, goes through several medical tests 
and screenings, visits both family physician and obstetrician/gynecologist several 
times, is hospitalized, and after delivery, the baby (or babies) is also under 
medical supervision, including medication, hospitalization, and possibly some 
form of neonatal treatment. Thus, there are many opportunities for lapse in 
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quality of care or adverse events, but “everyone expects a perfect outcome; 
anything less is unsatisfactory; anything tragic is unforgiveable” (CRICO, 2010, 
p.6). In fact, over “1,700 birth traumas per year were reported between years 
2003-2004 and 2005-2006 in Canadian hospitals outside Quebec…obstetrical 
trauma during childbirth was suffered by 1 out of every 21 women having a 
vaginal delivery” (CIHI, 2007), p.18). For 2013/2014, 385,937 births are  
estimated across Canada, out of which, Ontario accounts for 142,448 (about 37% 
—largest  among the provinces) (StatisticsCanada, 2015). Thus, this study of a 
safety program in obstetrics focused on the data from Ontario. 
1.3 The MOREOB Program  
In order to empirically test the viability of an integrated model of culture and 
climate and also determine whether a training intervention could be used to effect 
a long-term cultural change, it was essential to identify a training intervention 
that met the following criteria: (a) its goal was to improve safety culture; (b) it 
was implemented across at least three organizations and in a domain where safety 
culture was of high significance; (c) pretest/post-test safety climate data were 
available; (d) third-party performance data were available; (e) a representative 
sample of those involved in the implementation was accessible for interviews; 
and (f) the intervention was initiated at least 10 years ago. After a review of 
multiple intervention programs and access to data, the MOREOB program 
(Managing Obstetric Risk Efficiently) was selected for this study. Since the 
MOREOB program was a highly specialized intervention, a case-study approach 
was used to analyze its effects on the organization, as well as understand the 
general context within which it was employed.   
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The MOREOB program for obstetric clinicians was a safety strategy, which was 
aimed at reducing specific undesirable outcomes in maternal, fetal, and neonatal 
care (group-level outcomes). This program was a strategic intervention because it 
conforms to Henderson’s classic definition of a strategy (Stern & Deimler, 2006):  
All competitors who persist over time must maintain a unique advantage by 
differentiation over all others. Managing that differentiation is the essence of long-term 
business strategy. (p.1) 
Most change programs or interventions are developed within the firm and are 
exercised to achieve specific tactical goals like improving productivity, reducing 
accidents, or developing better systems of communication, etc. The MOREOB 
program, however, was developed by the Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC) and was implemented as a continuing medical 
education (CME) program (Milne & Lalonde, 2007; Milne, Walker, & Vlahaki, 
2013) at most birthing centers across Canada. It was founded on the principles 
from High Reliability Organizations (Roberts, 1993) and was aimed at building a 
non-punitive, learning organization similar to that proposed by Senge (1990). 
Based on the published literature on the MOREOB program (Milne & Lalonde, 
2007; Milne et al., 2013; Thanh, Jacobs, Wanke, Hense, & Sauve, 2010), it offers 
strategic differentiation from most other patient safety programs as follows: 
a. The overall strategy is to focus on one practice specialty (obstetrics), but 
include all the interacting professionals (physicians, nurses, midwives, 
administrators, etc.). It begins with a signed commitment by an 
interdisciplinary core team consisting of the hospital management and the 
clinicians involved in leading the implementation of the program. It goes 
deep with an extensive awareness and behavioral training programs aimed 
at improving specific clinical outcomes. 
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b. It was designed and developed by a national professional society; thus, it 
is a peer-to-peer program rather than a management-driven program or a 
regulatory compliance program. By focusing on clinical outcomes at both 
maternal and neonatal levels, this program appeals to the innate desires of 
the clinicians to excel in technical aspects and it appeals to their intrinsic 
motivation to serve their patients. It is not driven by external incentives 
such as rankings or insurance reimbursements. Furthermore, by making 
this program available at minimal direct cost to the participating hospitals, 
the cost barrier is lowered. 
c. It involves both awareness training through interactive presentations and 
multidisciplinary group activities including workshops, skills drills, 
emergency drills and simulations; thus, it addresses both the attitudinal 
aspects as well as the behavioral aspects of patient safety. By identifying 
clear clinical goals at both maternal and neonatal levels, it emphasizes 
operational excellence.  
d. It is focused on one specific specialty; thus, given the diversity of 
specialties in the medical profession and their respective needs, this 
program is narrowly applied, but deeply committed to improving clinical 
outcomes in the specific specialty. 
e. Its initial implementation was funded by an insurance company—a major 
stakeholder in patient safety—leveling the playing field for all its clients 
and possibly creating a competitive advantage for itself. Once the clinical 
and financial outcomes had been demonstrated, the program was funded 
by provincial ministries; again, lowering the direct financial burden on an 
individual hospital or a rural healthcare facility.  
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f. The developers of this program made a financial case for the professional 
society, insurance companies, and provincial health ministries to invest in 
the program. Ahead of their estimate, the program produced a positive 
return by the end of three years. 
g. Fundamentally, the MOREOB program presents a different cultural 
intervention model. While most cultural intervention models have focused 
on organization-level (e.g., Safety Management System) or discipline-
level programs (e.g., Crew Resource Management), the MOREOB 
program uses an inter-professional model to influence the professional 
culture among all clinicians engaged in the practice of obstetrics. Also, 
while most cultural intervention models focus on the changes in employee 
perceptions (climate) or outcomes (performance), this model presents an 
opportunity to assess the influence of, as well as influence on, values and 
unquestioned assumptions.   
Thus, assuming that the MOREOB program provides sustainable clinical and 
financial advantages, it seeks to position the adopting hospitals (firms) at a 
competitive advantage against those who do not: improved clinical and financial 
outcomes will be perceived as better quality of care at a lower cost, thereby 
increasing patient volume and overall reputational and revenue gains. 
1.4 Two Comparable Studies of Safety Climate and Outcomes in Obstetrics 
In a longitudinal study of effects of a series of interventions, Grunebaum (2011) 
reviewed the effects on safety climate and clinical outcomes. The intervention 
process started with a consulting review in 2002 and proceeded with team 
training, electronic medical records implementation, and communication training 
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in the labor and delivery unit in 2003. In 2004, a dedicated gynecologist was 
added to serve as the attending physician on call and limitations were placed on 
how the labor was managed in the case of nonviable fetus. In 2005, they 
proactively identified higher risk cases to ensure additional checks-and-balances 
were attributed to such cases, standardized key medication procedures for all 
cases, and color-coded certain medications that were prone to administration 
errors. In 2006, they focused on improving team communication and 
coordination, enhancing the clinical knowledge of all staff, adding necessary staff 
to provide help in critical clinical areas, and developed additional protocols to 
proactively manage certain high-risk conditions such as ante-partum hemorrhage. 
In 2007, the position of laborist was created and recruited. In 2009, an oxytocin 
initiation checklist was developed, a postpartum hemorrhage kit was built, and 
online training with knowledge tests was implemented. In summary, this program 
involved multiple interventions like  training, addition of personnel, 
implementation of customized toolkits and safety aids, and use of technology for 
communication and record-keeping. In terms of impact on clinical and financial 
outcomes, Grunebaum reported a decline in sentinel events from 1.04 per 1000 
births in the year 2000 to zero such events in the years 2008 and 2009; the 
compensation payments declined from $50 million to less than $5 million. All 
these elements potentially contributed toward institutionalization of emphasis on 
patient safety. The progressive implementation of different interventions over 
time also illustrates the cumulative benefits of the interventions. 
Another outcomes study, focused specifically on the effects of the MOREOB 
program, demonstrated improvements in clinical outcomes as well as reduction in 
insurance costs (payouts) (Thanh et al., 2010). The goal of the MOREOB program 
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was “to achieve a uniform degree of excellence in all delivery centers” (Thanh et 
al., 2010). The program consists of three modules (learning together, working 
together, and changing the safety culture) that include online modules, lectures, 
simulations, drills and practice sessions (Milne & Lalonde, 2007). The MOREOB 
implementation process began with a pilot program funded by the Healthcare 
Insurance Reciprocal of Canada (HIROC) at HIROC’s client hospitals (Milne et 
al., 2013). Thereafter, the program was funded by the Alberta Ministry of Health 
and Wellness and the program was implemented across the province of Alberta. 
By 2013, the MOREOB program had demonstrated improvements in clinical 
outcomes as well as reduction in insurance costs, thereby producing the projected 
return on SOGC’s investment within the first three years instead of the projected 
five-years (Milne & Lalonde, 2007; Milne et al., 2013). However, there has not 
been a comprehensive study—beyond the clinical and financial performance 
outcomes—linking all aspects of a safety culture involving the MOREOB program 
or a similar training intervention. The study presented in this thesis is 
substantially different in scope and scale from the Thanh et al. study. While the 
Thanh et al. study focused narrowly on the clinical and financial outcomes of the 
MOREOB program within Alberta, this study focuses on the effect of the 
MOREOB program on the broader safety culture within obstetrics units in Ontario. 
Also, this study used both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to 
triangulate the potential impact of the MOREOB program on culture and climate.  
1.5 Philosophical Assumptions and Interpretive Frameworks  
This study used a post-positivist framework, employing a social science 
theoretical lens and recognizing that cause-and-effect is a probabilistic 
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relationship that may or may not manifest in every interaction or may not be fully 
explainable with quantitative data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). The researcher’s 
early training has been in physical sciences and technology and later training in 
education and business. Thus, the researcher’s views have evolved from a strictly 
positivistic perspective to post-positivistic perspective, acknowledging that       
(a) the researcher’s bias influences what is observed, analyzed and reported,     
(b) the relationship between an intervention and its impact is probabilistic at best, 
(c) while probabilistic tools and techniques provide a certain degree of 
objectivity, there is often additional information—in terms of qualitative 
narratives—that adds context to the phenomenon observed through quantitative 
analysis, and (d) together, the quantitative and the qualitative analyses provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under study.  
Ontologically, the researcher recognized reality from multiple perspectives and 
therefore, used multiple qualitative and quantitative tools to report findings. 
Epistemologically, the researcher gathered subjective evidence from the 
participants by engaging in direct observations, interviews, and deep dialog to 
lessen the distance between himself and his research subjects; however, in order 
to balance this approach of knowledge generation, the researcher organized the 
narratives in the form of themes and coded data and used quantitative data 
collected by third-party agencies. 
As an engineer and an educator, the researcher believes that (a) a particular social 
or socio-technical environment could be engineered—thus a certain type of 
organizational culture could be produced or changed from one form to another 
and (b) a properly designed intervention can be effective in changing both 
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individual and communal behavior and thereby result in sustainable changes to 
focus areas such as safety, productivity, service, or quality.   
1.6 Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis follows the conventional five-part model in social sciences: 
introduction, literature review, methodology, results, and discussion and 
conclusions. A thorough review of relevant literature on culture and climate was 
used to develop an integrated model of organizational culture and climate. The 
narrative describing this model forms the overarching theory and provides two 
fundamental propositions. For the purpose of this study, the MOREOB training 
was selected as the intervention. Research questions and hypotheses were drawn 
from the theoretical propositions and in the context of the MOREOB training 
intervention. Research questions were pursued using qualitative data and 
corresponding analysis; whereas, hypotheses were tested using quantitative data 
and corresponding analysis.  
The Results section is split into three parts (chapters 4, 5, and 6) and is followed 
by the Discussion and Conclusions section (chapter 7). In order to help the 
readers track the various research questions, hypotheses, and the associated 
findings, the research questions and hypotheses are presented first in Chapter 2 
and again in Chapter 7.  
1.7 Summary 
The healthcare sector in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom is 
faced with the dual mandate to improve quality of care and affordability. It is 
generally believed by leading researchers and practitioners that this mandate 
 18 
 
could be addressed by improving the safety culture in healthcare, and training 
seems to be the most frequent intervention hoped to succeed in bringing about a 
sustainable, long-term cultural change. However, the enthusiasm for a solution 
may have raced past the development of a robust theoretical foundation. Thus, 
this research reviews the current literature on organizational culture, 
organizational climate, and integrated models of culture and climate. It proposes 
a new integrative model as the theoretical foundation for a case-study in the 
obstetrics practice in Ontario, Canada. Training, as a planned intervention, is used 
to assess the mechanisms by which organizational culture and climate could be 
influenced.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Researchers in the fields of organizational studies and management have long 
been fascinated by the constructs of organizational culture and organizational 
climate; particularly, there has been tremendous enthusiasm to link organizational 
culture with organizational performance. However, over the past three decades, 
several leading researchers have also called for both a more disciplined approach 
to the study of organizational culture/climate and also to the integration of these 
two concepts. This chapter seeks to start with a clean slate and progressively 
construct an integrated model of organizational culture and climate comprised of 
the key elements of culture and climate as well as their mutual influence. It takes 
an incremental approach to theory building (cf. Corley & Gioia, 2011; Dubin, 
1969). While such an approach may not normally lead to particularly insightful or 
surprising theoretical contribution (Corley & Gioia, 2011), it could enable 
extending and connecting previously established constructs (Dubin, 1969), giving 
rise to potentially insightful propositions regarding the relationship between the 
various constructs contained in the theory. Also, by way of a fresh start toward 
the integrated model, this approach seeks to incrementally build on past studies in 
the form of models 1-7. Thereafter, this chapter extends the integrated model to a 
more specific focus on safety, thereby bounding the theoretical framework. A 
training intervention is used as an independent variable in Model 8. In order to 
test the effectiveness of such a planned intervention on the safety culture and 
climate at subject hospitals, a brief discussion of key theories regarding training 
interventions is also presented. Finally, since the case-based approach tends to 
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build an in-depth narrative about each case, the insights derived from one case 
could be compared with those from another and new conclusions could be drawn 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This chapter concludes with a proposed theoretical model, its 
propositions, and related research questions and hypotheses.  
2.2 Organizational Culture 
2.2.1 Model 1: Shared Experiences Lead to Shared Values 
Schneider and Barbera (2014) present 35 chapters illustrating the latest thoughts 
of leading researchers studying organizational culture and climate. Schneider and 
Barbera’s definition of culture, which is used as the working definition by others 
throughout the book, is rooted in shared values within an organization, and it 
includes mechanisms used to reinforce and revise such values through a broad 
range of acculturation processes, management decisions, and transmission of 
legends and stories across the organization.  
Ployhart, Hale, and Campion (2014) attribute Schneider and Barbera’s definition 
to the school of thought that regards culture as an enduring  set of characteristics 
that guide the routine operation of an organization (DiMaggio, 1997; Sewell, 
2005); alternatively, another school of thought uses a toolkit paradigm, wherein 
culture is temporal, transferable, and a matter of choice (Swindler, 2001). It 
seems certain practices may emerge indigenously within a group based on their 
shared experience and consistent with their values—this would be aligned with 
the former perspective on culture—and another group may borrow certain aspects 
of another group’s culture, artifacts like checklists for example, adapt them for 
their context and use them to the extent they meet their needs, thereby supporting 
the toolkit paradigm. However, based on Ployhart et al.’s assessment, the various 
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definitions and perspectives on culture overwhelmingly converge on three 
dimensions: (a) artifacts, (b) values and beliefs, and (c) underlying assumptions, 
which have been the foundation of Schein’s theory of organizational culture 
(1988, 2010, 2015). Additionally, Ployhart et al.’s review claims that                 
(a) organizational culture is historically determined and socially constructed,    
(b) culture is stable, but can be changed under appropriate circumstances, and    
(c) culture should be studied at a group level, whereby it would acknowledge the 
heterogeneity observed across groups within the same organization as well as 
enable comparison across similar groups in different organizations. Schein (1988) 
defines artifacts as manifestations of the underlying culture and hence they can 
take the form of language, symbols, stories, as well as implementation 
mechanisms like policies and procedures. The role of organizational history and 
social construction of meanings within that historical context is captured by 
Schein (1988, 2010, 2015) in terms of “shared experience and learning.”     
Schein (2015) draws upon previous research to offer the description of culture as 
state of shared beliefs and values as well as a dynamic process of constructing 
shared meaning (Frost, Moore, Louis, Lundberg, & Martin, 1985) through a 
shared learning process, wherein this dynamic process is used to regularly 
reaffirm or revise the state of the extant culture. The balance between the stability 
of the existing shared beliefs and the influence of new shared experiences and 
their meaning presents both emotional security or “avoidance of catastrophic 
anxiety” (Weick, 1995; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) as well as opportunities for 
meaning-driven shifts in shared beliefs (Sahlins, 1985). Thus, Schein (2015) 
reaffirms that culture is both a state and a process in his definition of culture:  
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A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group has learned as it solved its problems 
of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.  (Schein, 2010, p.18). 
 
In effect, Schein’s model has two influence vectors: one vector connects shared 
experience to shared values as a reinforcement mechanism, giving a degree of 
stability to the shared values; the second vector also connects shared experience 
to shared values, but it tends to create new meanings and new values and 
therefore, it tends to revise the state of the extant culture.  
Figure 1 illustrates this dual-vector concept as Model 1. The blue arrow 
represents the reinforcement of existing shared values through routine 
experiences and learning and the red arrow represents revision of existing values 
as a result of new shared experiences and learning.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model 1. Shared experiences and learning reinforce and revise shared 
values. 
2.2.2 Model 2: There are Four Types of Organizational Values 
Cultures are often defined solely in terms of a group’s shared values, beliefs, and 
unquestioned assumptions (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Hofstede, 1984; Schein, 
1988). These groups could be categorized as belonging to a certain profession 
(professional culture), organization (organizational culture), or nation (national 
culture). Within each major group, different subgroups are compared with respect 
to the relative importance they ascribe to a specific value. For example, with 
respect to national culture, Hofstede discovered that Europeans were more 
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individualistic than Asians (who are more collectivistic). Similarly, Helmreich 
and Merritt discovered that pilots were more individualistic than surgeons and 
Patankar and Taylor (2004) discovered that mechanics were more individualistic 
than pilots.  
Schein (1988, 2010, 2015) used the combined term, “beliefs and values,” while 
Hofstede (1984) used “values” only. The emergent model in this study chose to 
use “values” rather than “beliefs and values” or “beliefs” because there was more 
consistent use of the term “values” in culture literature (e.g., Argyris & Schön, 
1974, 1978; Bourne & Jenkins, 2013; Hofstede, 1984; Rochon, 1998; Schwartz, 
1992). Simplistically, the distinction between beliefs and values seems to be that 
beliefs are relative to the context in which they are applied and values are more 
humanistic and absolute. Thus, one could argue that there is a greater likelihood 
of agreement among people on values rather than beliefs. Bourne and Jenkins 
(2013) criticized this traditional view of organizational values as “unitary or fully 
formed and stable entities” and presented an alternate perspective. Accordingly, 
values can be classified in terms of different levels as well as in terms of present 
versus future contexts: espoused, attributed, shared, or aspirational with a certain 
degree of overlap. Espoused values are those that are formally espoused by top 
management, attributed values are those that the members of the organization 
readily attribute to their organization, shared values are the aggregate of 
individual values as rated on a Likert-type scale, and finally aspirational values 
are the values that the members believe ought to be the organizational values. 
Dissonance between these values creates three types of gaps: expectation gap, 
dislocation gap, and leadership gap. Expectation gap arises when attributed and 
shared values are consistent, but sufficiently separated from espoused and 
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aspirational values; a dislocation gap arises when attributed and espoused values 
are consistent, but sufficiently separated from shared and aspirational values; and 
a leadership gap arises when the espoused values are sufficiently separated from 
the cluster of attributed, shared, and aspirational values. Each form of gap creates 
its own set of challenges and they have to be resolved differently. (Bourne & 
Jenkins, 2013).  Awareness of such gaps is relevant to the choice of both the 
intervention strategy as well as rate of adoption of the change program. For 
example, an expectation gap would indicate the degree to which the organization 
would be willing to change if the members were made aware of this gap. On the 
other hand, with a dislocation gap, the internal perception of the organization 
would be significantly different from the external perception—thus, public 
acknowledgement of such a gap could be risky for leaders, and bringing about an 
alignment in these perceptions would be a delicate task. Finally, if there is a 
leadership gap, it would indicate a significant challenge in building a coalition in 
support of the espoused values because the leader may be the only one 
championing the espoused values. 
Based on this expanded view of values, Model 1 could be expanded to include all 
four types of values. Thus, shared experiences and learning would influence 
espoused values, attributed values, shared values, and aspirational values; 
however, the degree of influence on a specific type of value would likely depend 
on the nature of the shared experiences and learning. This expanded view on 
values leads one to Model 2, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Model 2. Shared experiences influence four types of organizational 
values.  
 
2.2.3 Model 3: Only Some Shared Experiences Cause Learning  
The concepts of shared experience and learning deserve a closer look. 
Experiential learning is defined as a form of learning in which “a learner is 
directly in touch with the realities being studied” and distinct from traditional 
academic learning which takes place detached from the practical, real-world 
operational setting (Keeton & Tate, 1978). Over the past 50 years, several 
scholars have contributed to the development of the Experiential Learning 
Theory; however, the foundation was laid by notable scholars like John Dewey 
(democratic values, pragmatism, and personal development), Kurt Lewin (T-
groups, action research, and democratic values), and Jean Piaget (personal 
development, dialectics of learning from experience, and epistemology) (Kolb, 
2015). Kolb defines experiential learning as, “the process whereby knowledge is 
created through the transformation of experience” (p.49). This definition and the 
general approach to understanding human learning is particularly important to 
cultural development because the emphasis in experiential learning is on the 
experience of being part of an activity, cognitive reflection, knowledge 
generation, and adaptation—such that there is individual-level transformation 
resulting from the experience and it sows seeds for organizational or systemic 
transformation. Miller, Riley, Davis, and Hansen (2008) discovered that the post-
Shared 
Experiences and 
Learning 
Reinforce 
Revise 
Espoused Values 
Attributed Values 
Shared Values 
Aspirational Values 
 26 
 
simulation debriefing was most influential in participant-learning and process 
improvements. Thus, shared experience can lead to learning and this learning can 
lead to process improvements. Senge (1990) defines organizational learning as an 
integration of four core disciplines (building a shared vision, fostering consistent 
mental models, team learning, and achieving personal mastery)—the integration 
itself, however, is the fifth discipline of systems thinking. Thus, he claims,  
At the heart of a learning organization is a shift of mind—from seeing ourselves as 
separate from the world to connected to the world, from seeing problems as caused by 
someone or something “out there” to seeing how our own actions create the problems we 
experience. (p.12-13)   
Model 3, illustrated in Figure 3 splits shared experiences and learning to highlight 
the learning that may be derived from shared experiences. It is also important to 
note that, according to Senge (1990), most organizations suffer from at least one 
of the seven learning disabilities: (a) exclusive focus on one’s position and not on 
one’s role in the network of roles played by everyone in the organization; (b) the 
natural human tendency to blame others for failures; (c) the reactive urge to take 
on the external enemy; (d) fixation on certain visible events or outcomes rather 
than the deeper, slow-burning issues; (e) inability to respond to gradual rise of 
threats; (f) being delusional about learning from experience when one has not 
fully experienced the consequences of one’s actions; and (g) the myth of a 
cohesive management team. Collectively, these learning disabilities reinforce an 
organization’s resistance to learn. Thus, Model 3 acknowledges that the actual 
learning from shared experiences is likely to be less than optimal. 
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Figure 3. Model 3. Some shared experiences cause learning and influence 
organizational values. 
 
2.2.4 Model 4: Leaders and Key Influencers Play a Critical Role  
While the preceding literature discusses the role of shared experiences and 
learning on the reinforcement and revision of organizational values, it does not 
delve into the role of people and the mechanisms that drive, maintain, or 
influence organizational values. Pettigrew’s (1979) study of a founder of a British 
boarding school has been quoted widely as catalyst in stimulating the study of 
organizational cultures using qualitative tools that are more commonly used in 
anthropology (Ehrhart, Schneider, & Macey, 2014; Schneider & Barbera, 2014b; 
Wright, 1997) as well as noting the influence of leaders, particularly founders, of 
organizations (Ehrhart et al., 2014; Schneider & Barbera, 2014b; Waterson, 
2014). At this point, it would be important to focus on Pettigrew’s explanation of 
how founders inculcate their personal values and beliefs into the organizations 
they create. Pettigrew defined entrepreneurship as a leader’s ability to transform 
“individual drive into collective purpose and commitment” (p.573). Thus, 
leaders’ efforts to build mission statements, organizational structures, policies, 
and procedures are essentially implementation mechanisms to achieve their 
operational objectives (achieving business success) as well as to create a certain 
organizational culture. Schein (2010, 2015) calls such mechanisms “norms” and 
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the physical evidence of norms, such as the organizational policy document (e.g., 
a policy on non-punitive self-reporting of errors) a cultural artifact. Although 
most of the literature on the influence of leadership uses a top-down leadership 
model, in organizational cultures that rely on highly-trained professional experts 
who are trained and paid to think or are regarded as “knowledge workers,” a 
progressive view of leadership—in the form of key influencers—might be more 
appropriate (Davenport, 2005; McDonald, 2005). Figure 4 presents Model 4, 
which extends Model 3 by adding leaders and key influencers to impact 
implementation mechanisms like strategies, policies, programs, and processes. 
The relationship between values and leadership is expressed with a bi-directional 
arrow to convey that leaders are both influenced by, and influencers of, 
organizational values. For example, in mature organizations, it is more likely that 
leaders are selected to fit the organizational values (e.g., Schneider’s, 1987, 
Attraction-Selection-Attrition model), while in the formative stages of 
organizational development, it is more likely that the founder(s) inculcates their 
own personal values into their organizations. For example, the influence of 
founders’ values on their organizations have been documented with respect to 
companies like Southwest Airlines (Freiberg & Freiberg, 1996), Hewlett-Packard 
(Packard, 1996), the Tata Group (Lala, 2006) and many other high-performing 
organizations (Collins & Porras, 1997). 
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Figure 4. Model 4. Organizational values inform implementation mechanisms 
 
The following two examples illustrate how implementation mechanisms tend to 
influence individual behaviors and reinforce or revise organizational values.  
Human Resources Practices: It is quite common to find a range of policies and 
practices involving the realm of attraction-selection-attrition (ASA Theory) 
(Schneider, 1987) of personnel, which starts with attracting potential employees 
whose personal attributes are compatible with the corporate aspiration, 
acculturation of the new employees into the organizational culture, and attrition 
of employees that do not fit within the extant or desired organizational culture. 
The ASA theory extends Lewin’s work on Person-Environment concepts (Lewin, 
1935, 1951) and applies it to the specific mechanisms used to attract individuals 
with certain desired KSAs (knowledge, skills, and attributes) type of individuals 
into an organization, retaining and rewarding certain behaviors that are consistent 
with the organizational values, and rejecting or punishing behaviors that are not 
consistent with the shared or espoused organizational values. 
Safety Practices: In high-consequence industries, catastrophic incidents are 
relatively rare. Thus, it is generally believed in these communities that reduction 
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of precursor events, such as errors that are caught and adverse outcomes that are 
averted, will reduce the catastrophic/fatal accidents (Taxis, Gallivan, Barber, & 
Franklin, 2006). Consistent with this theory, the Threat and Error Management 
model emphasizes regular peer-observations of operational performance to note 
threats faced and recognized or not, errors made, and the overall outcome 
(Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999). This model uses regular observation and 
correction of the smallest deviations in order to maximize the overall safety and 
reliability of the system.  
Thus, one could conclude that various implementation mechanisms are designed 
to influence individual behaviors (minimize at-risk behaviors and errors), which 
in turn contribute toward a desirable firm performance. It is important to note that 
(a) the relationships between values, implementation mechanisms, behaviors, and 
firm performance are probabilistic and not causal and (b) observable individual, 
group, and firm-level outcomes form a feedback loop that creates new shared 
experiences, which feed into new learning (Aboumatar et al., 2007; Bagian et al., 
2002; Battles, Dixon, Bortkanics, Rabin-Fastment, & Kaplan, 2006; Berenholtz, 
Hartsell, & Pronovost, 2009; Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002; Deis et al., 
2008; Latino & Latino, 2006; Rex, Turnbull, Allen, Vande Voorde, & Luther, 
2000; Vincent, Taylor-Adams, & Stanhope, 1998; Wald & Shojania, 2001; 
Wilson, Dell, & Anderson, 1993; Woolf, Kuzel, Dovey, & Phillips, 2004; Wu, 
Lishutz, & Pronovost, 2008).  
2.2.5 Model 5: Feedback Loops Influence Shared Experiences and Learning  
In Model 5, Figure 5, the emergent model of organizational culture includes both 
the outcomes as well as the feedback loop. 
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Figure 5. Model 5. Structure of organizational culture 
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Table 2 summarizes the key structural elements comprised in the construct of 
organizational culture as follows:  
a) Shared Experience 
b) Learning 
c) Organizational Values 
d) Implementation Mechanisms  
e) Leaders and Key Influencers (Heroes) 
f) Individual, Group, and Firm-level Outcomes 
g) Feedback Loop 
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Table 2. Key elements of organizational culture 
Key Cultural 
Element 
Context/Key Findings Source 
Shared experiences 
and learning 
 
 
 
Experiential learning 
and organizational 
learning 
Shared history of experiences result in 
identification of patterns of success of a 
group’s response to challenges. These 
patterns are reinforced and automated with 
practice and lead to shared values and 
unquestioned assumptions. 
People learn through experience (outcomes 
of their actions) and reflection on those 
experiences; organizations learn from 
experience of success/failure and 
adaptation of strategies. 
Schein (1988, 
2010, 2015) 
 
 
 
Kolb (2015); 
Senge (1990) 
Organizational 
Values: shared beliefs 
and unquestioned 
assumptions 
Cultures can be defined in terms of values 
and beliefs shared by a group of people: 
national, organizational and professional 
cultures. 
Hofstede (1984); 
Helmreich & 
Merritt (1998); 
Schein (1988) 
Four types of 
organizational values 
Organizational values can be classified into 
four types: espoused, attributed, shared, 
and aspirational.  
For organizations to be transformed, there 
must be a value-level change. 
Bourne & Jenkins 
(2013) 
 
Rochon (1998) 
Implementation 
Mechanisms: 
processes used to 
implement and 
reinforce or renew 
organizational values 
Processes used to attract, select, and 
attrition (ASA model) employees that 
might fit (or not fit) with the organizational 
culture tend to reinforce values held by 
existing employees. 
Schneider (1987) 
Leaders and key 
Influencers 
Anthropological perspective on study of 
how leaders inculcate their personal values 
into their organizations 
Pettigrew (1979) 
Implementation 
Mechanisms: 
Structures, Policies, 
Procedures 
Leaders institutionalize their values 
through formal structures, processes, and 
procedures in the organization 
Schein (2010, 
2015) 
Individual, group, and 
firm-level 
performance  
The just culture focuses minimizing at-risk 
behaviors; debriefings are routinely used as 
learning opportunities. 
Dismukes & 
Smith (2000); 
Marx (2001); 
Reason, 1997) 
Feedback in response 
to Individual 
Behaviors/ 
Performance and 
Group or Firm-level 
Performance  
Knowledge of individual and 
organizational factors that may have led to 
performance lapses serves as a feedback 
loop and can result in changes in policies, 
procedures, and practices—a measure of 
organizational learning 
Reason (1997); 
Clarke (2006); 
Putter (2010); 
Senge (1990) 
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2.2.6 The Role of Artifacts 
One aspect that is notably absent from the list of key structural elements of 
culture is the role of artifacts. Many scholars, particularly Schein (1988, 2010, 
2015) and Rousseau (1990), have noted the value of artifacts. Schein’s model 
considers artifacts as a part of the organizational culture construct and Rousseau’s 
model views artifacts as the most visible aspect of an organization’s culture. 
However, since artifacts are products of culture, the emergent structure of 
organizational culture proposes to study artifacts as outcomes or manifestations 
of culture rather than the culture itself. Vilnai-Yavetz and Rafaeli (2012) argue 
that artifacts are much more than evidence of organizational culture. They 
incorporate relevant literature and provide an expansive definition of artifacts:   
Artificial products, something made by human beings and thus any element of a work 
environment…perceived by senses and that they have certain intentions, aiming to 
satisfy a need or a goal…include intangible notions such as names, language, and 
contracts, as well as tangible notions such as inanimate objects introduced by 
organizational members into their organizations. (p.10).  
  
Considering the broad range of tangible and intangible notions that could be 
included within the scope of an artifact, Vilnai-Yavetz and Rafaeli present three 
dimensions from which artifacts should be analyzed: instrumentality, aesthetics, 
and symbolism.  Instrumentality refers to the utility (or lack thereof) of the 
artifact—many physical artifacts such as tools, checklists, policies and 
procedures would have a positive influence on the outcomes and hence would be 
considered to have positive instrumentality. The degree to which such an artifact 
is useful or effective in accomplishing the intended goal and minimizing mistakes 
could be further evaluated with an evaluation rubric and a corresponding numeric 
rating. Aesthetics refers to the sensory reaction to the artifact—is it pleasing, is it 
appropriately used (graphic or symbolism in the context of local customs and 
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traditions), or does it evoke generally positive emotional reactions? Symbolism 
refers to the meaning of the artifact—it could mean something entirely different 
to the ones that create the artifact versus those that see it or observe it. Thus, 
“artifacts can have both intended and unintended symbolic consequences” (p.14). 
Once the scope and nature of an artifact is defined, the next question is about its 
role in organizational culture. As products of organizational culture, one must 
consider the various structural elements of an organizational culture as presented 
in Table 2 and consider their corresponding artifacts. Table 3 presents examples 
of such artifacts and the context in which such artifacts have been studied and/or 
key findings relating to these artifacts. This is neither exhaustive nor exclusive 
list of artifacts and their corresponding studies; it is a list of examples to illustrate 
the concept that each cultural element could have a corresponding artifact and 
that artifacts include tangible and non-tangible items.  
Table 3. Artifacts of organizational culture 
Cultural 
Element 
Sample 
Artifact 
Context/Key Findings  
Shared 
experiences 
and learning 
 
Organizational 
history; stories; 
legends and 
heroes 
 
Stories of the circumstances under which the firm 
was founded, the challenges it faced as it grew, the 
factors that led to its success, and the qualities of 
individuals that made the firm successful in the past 
and are therefore likely to make the firm succeed in 
the future—all serve to transfer core values and 
vision from the founders, leaders, and key 
influencers to the next generation of leaders and 
new employees. Vivid examples are noted by 
several researchers (Collins & Porras, 1997; 
Freiberg & Freiberg, 1996; Lala, 2006; Schein, 
2010) 
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Table 3 (Continued). Artifacts of organizational culture  
Cultural 
Element 
Sample Artifact Context/Key Findings 
Experiential 
learning and 
organizational 
learning 
Uniforms, checklists, 
kits/bundles, manuals, 
etc. to institutionalize 
learning from past 
experience 
Uniforms provide legitimacy and status 
and they paradoxically make the 
individuals distinctive or 
unapproachable (Fiol & O'Connor, 
2012); learning from previous errors, 
checklists are used to institutionalize 
practice of key behaviors and minimize 
recurrence of same/similar errors 
(Gawande, 2009); bundles or kits 
developed by the clinical teams were 
used to consistently improve clinical 
outcomes across multiple specialties 
(Hendrich et al., 2007) 
Organizational 
Values: shared 
beliefs and 
unquestioned 
assumptions 
Value or Belief 
Statements; potential 
evidence of change or 
stability over the long-
term 
Clearly articulated and well-publicized 
organizational values or belief 
statements can help “preserve the core 
and stimulate progress” or “maintain 
ideological control and provide 
operational autonomy” (Collins & 
Porras, 1997, p. 137-139, 236-239); 
evidence of long-term (over 150 years) 
stability in core values and adaptation to 
changing business , political, and socio-
economic environment led the Tata 
Group from centralized control to 
decentralization, and globalization 
(Sarkar-Barney, 2014) 
Four types of 
organizational 
values: 
espoused, 
attributed, 
shared, and 
aspirational 
Stories of how 
dissonance in values is 
handled 
When there is a dissonance between 
what is espoused versus what is 
experienced, it is not unusual to 
discover this gap in the stories told by 
the management (more closely aligned 
with the espoused values) versus those 
told by the frontline personnel (more 
closely aligned with the shared or 
attributed values). Replaying the stories 
from the frontline to the executive team 
could trigger acknowledgment of the 
value gap and provision of resources 
and support needed to bridge the gap 
(Patankar, Brown, Sabin, & Bigda-
Peyton, 2012, p. 162-166). 
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Table 3 (Continued). Artifacts of organizational culture  
Cultural 
Element 
Sample Artifact Context/Key Findings 
Implementation 
Mechanisms: 
processes used 
to implement 
and reinforce or 
renew 
organizational 
values 
Group/team-level 
symbols and rituals; 
new employee 
orientation programs 
“Routinized behaviors reflect the common 
sense understandings about the meaning 
and use of artifacts;” artifacts from the old 
culture can remain in the residual 
institutional memory (old processes, 
policies, tools, etc.) and resist the 
adoption of new practices demanded by 
the new culture (Kaghan, 2012)  
Logos as symbols: “logos are to 
companies what flags are to countries” 
(Baruch, 2012) 
Employee socialization rituals as well as 
corresponding artifacts such as training 
materials, evaluation tools, incentive 
mechanisms, and performance standards 
form a system of artifacts that collectively 
shape the individual behaviors to fit with 
the organizational cultural expectations 
(Ehrhart et al., 2014, p.153-160). Culture 
survives through teaching of shared 
assumptions to newcomers (Schein, 
1990). 
Individual, 
group, and firm-
level 
performance 
Performance 
dashboards, award 
programs, error 
investigation reports, 
briefing and 
debriefing tools 
Focused dashboards, proactive use of 
accident investigation reports to identify 
latent errors in the system, and well-
managed pre- and post-event 
briefing/debriefing can lead to improved 
quality of care (Kroch et al., 2006; 
Lindberg, Hansson, & Rollenhagen, 2010; 
Papaspyros, Javangula, Adluri, & 
O'Regan, 2010) 
Leaders and key 
Influencers 
Stories about legends 
and heroes; criteria 
for award programs 
What leaders pay attention to, how they 
react to positive and negative incidents 
(particularly crises), how they allocate 
resources and rewards, what is their 
evidence of selecting, promoting and 
coaching, and how do they recruit, select, 
promote, as well as excommunicate or 
terminate other leaders (Schein, 2010). 
Stories themselves are powerful enough 
to institutionalize values in the psyche of 
the employees because they “give 
concrete context to abstract values” 
(Wilkins, 1984, p.59) 
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Table 3 (Continued). Artifacts of organizational culture 
Cultural 
Element 
Sample Artifact Context/Key Findings 
Feedback from 
Individual 
Behaviors/ 
Performance and 
Group or Firm-
level 
Performance  
Annual reports; use 
of performance 
dashboards; 
incentives to drive 
key performance 
indicators; stories of 
how mistakes and 
under-performance 
are handled; changes 
in the  environment 
within which a firm 
operates 
Well-aligned electronic dashboards can 
become living artifacts that increase 
transparency, improve goal and incentive 
alignment, and give a sense of ownership 
and control to the employees at large 
(Dover, 2004); ethical dilemmas arise 
when a particular experience places 
individual values in conflict with 
organizational values—the role of 
professional societies, labor unions, and 
regulators could be leveraged to influence 
organizational practices and bring them in 
alignment with values of the profession 
(Patankar, Brown, & Treadwell, 2005); 
reflection on stories about practices 
within one’s own discipline against the 
stories of practices from other disciplines 
could lead to self-realization and 
borrowing of tools across disciplines—a 
checklist is such an example in healthcare 
(Gawande, 2009); at DuPont Chemicals, a 
combination of regulatory and community 
pressures led to transparent, community-
company partnership to address 
environmental issues (Knowles, 2002) 
 Communication 
materials (internal as 
well as external)—
print, online, and in-
person 
communication  
Creators of communication artifacts tend 
to be more focused on the knowledge; 
whereas, the observers or readers tend to 
focus more on knowing—the socially 
constructed meaning of the artifact; thus, 
they may give similar or contrasting 
meaning, depending on how they feel 
about the creator(s) of the artifact or their 
past experience with similar symbolism 
(Cunliffe & Shotter, 2012) 
 
Freiberg and Freiberg (1996) tell the classic story of Southwest Airlines: “It is 
virtually impossible to understand the people, the culture, and the inner workings 
of Southwest Airlines without first understanding its past” (p.14). Rooted in this 
history are values of hard work, individuality, ownership, and fun (p. 147 lists 13 
such dominant values), as well as numerous stories of legal battles to survive in 
an industry dominated by legacy carriers. The napkin on which the first three 
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service airports were drawn by the founders—Dallas, San Antonio, and 
Houston—serves as the foundational artifact symbolizing both humble 
beginnings as well as entrepreneurial spirit and the personal struggle that the 
founders and the early employees endured to start the airline. One of the lessons 
learned in the early days of the airline was to capitalize on the secondary airports 
serving major cities—for example, Houston’s Hobby Airport instead of the 
Houston Intercontinental Airport—and that learning was repeated across the 
nation to develop a highly successful strategy for Southwest’s financial success 
as well as regional economic development. Herb Kelleher, now retired, has 
become the living legend and he has epitomized the Southwest spirit symbolizing 
freedom, loyalty, passion, and the unquestioned assumption: “never give up” (p. 
36). These personal values of the leader were modeled, customized, and re-told 
through numerous stories across the airline—ranging from opening of services to 
new cities to handling of passenger complaints.  With each legal battle and 
operational challenge to survive came new lessons that were implemented 
primarily through inspiration rather than dogmatic policies and procedures, yet 
core practices survived and many—like the 10-minute turnaround from arrival to 
pushback—became the “signature moves” or culture defining practices (p. 34). 
Limited resources led to creativity, making every employee the brand 
ambassador, particularly the flight attendants and anyone who came in direct 
contact with the customers. Employees were hired for their attitude and trained 
for the required skills. Also, the traditional Human Resources Department was 
called, “the People Department” and placed its employees at a higher priority 
than its customers, engendering the belief that if one takes care of the employees, 
then, the employees will take care of the customers.  Thus, the new employee 
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attraction, selection, and attrition processes were all focused on personal attitude 
and fit with the corporate personality. Southwest also uses firm performance as a 
mechanism to employee performance: “When you talk to a ramper or a flight 
attendant, they’ll tell you what the stock price is that day” (p. 97). Such 
dedication and intense focus on firm performance is not just a result of employee 
ownership (since 1973), but the core value of encouraging every employee to act 
like an owner so they take more responsibility for the success of the airline. This 
focus on employees is a daily task and not just during award ceremonies or union 
contract negotiations. The leaders’ commitment to employee job security and 
profitability is also a non-negotiable assumption—employees know and sincerely 
believed that Herb Kelleher’s word was good enough; his commitment did not 
have to be on paper. Southwest Airlines is arguably one of the select companies 
to deliver on consistency in its espoused, attributed, shared, and aspirational 
values—it has won the “Triple Crown” demonstrating its excellence in 
operational performance (most flights with on-time performance, fewest 
customer complaints, and smallest number of missed bags), no fatal accidents, 
celebration of its people—both employees and customers—as evidence of its 
commitment to service to its customers through its employees, and firmly rooting 
its organizational values in the hearts of its employees. 
2.2.7 Role of External Environment 
Model 5, representing the structural elements of organizational culture, is 
consistent with three of the five elements of culture developed by Deal and 
Kennedy (1982): values, heroes (leaders and key influencers), and rites and 
rituals (norms or implementation mechanisms). Deal and Kennedy’s fourth 
element is environment: “the environment in which a company operates 
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determines what it must do to be a success” (p.13). This element is similar to 
Schein’s concept of “shared experience and learning,” which is presented in 
Model 5. However, in order to fully incorporate Deal and Kennedy’s model, the 
shared experience in Model 5 must consider the experience of operating the 
business in its environment—the external influence of social, economic, and 
political factors (among others) on the success of the firm—and not just the 
internal experience of employees within the firm or just in the context of actual 
versus desired outcomes. This aspect is incorporated in the integrated model of 
culture and climate (Model 6, Figure 6). By including the influence of external, 
environmental factors on culture, the organization—as a system—becomes an 
open system and acknowledges that factors external to the organization will 
influence the values held by the individuals within the organization. Such 
influence of environmental factors has been studied extensively under Hofstede’s 
(1984) model of the influence of national affiliation on the individually-held 
beliefs and values—called the national culture. The emergent model, however, 
goes beyond the influence of national environment on individually-held values. It 
is open to a broader range of environmental factors and is concerned with their 
influence on the shared values of the organization. Thus, factors that threaten the 
survival of the organization or provide unique opportunities to thrive are likely to 
have significant influence on the internal culture of the organization.    
Deal and Kennedy’s fifth element is “cultural network” (p.15). It is a network of 
people who are responsible for communicating the corporate message and hence 
(a) the message is subject to their interpretation and (b) the recipients of the 
message may react differently to different messengers—or even sabotage or 
contaminate the message to the extent that the intended change program fails. In 
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order to accommodate this perspective, Model 5’s “Leaders and Key Influencers” 
must consider both positive and negative influencers—one cannot assume that all 
key influencers are positively disposed toward the organizational values and 
goals.   
2.2.8 A Reflection on the Emergent Model of Organizational Culture 
The emergent structure of organizational culture is an illustration of both what 
culture is, as well as how it is manifested or influenced. It is integrative of most 
other models of culture, but it also extends and connects other models in a unique 
way. For example, Schein’s (1988, 2010, 2015) model of culture is focused on 
the influence of shared experience on organizational values, but it does not 
further classify values as shared, aspirational, and attributed. Thus, issues related 
to gaps in alignment between the various types of values and various groups of 
people in an organization cannot be explored within Schein’s model. Also, while 
Schein incorporates the construct of learning in the form of “internalization” of 
values, Senge (1990) provides a more helpful description of organizational 
learning through experience; yet, these two constructs—organizational learning 
and organizational culture—have remained largely unconnected in culture 
studies; instead, “learning culture ” (Reason, 1997; Senge, 1990) has emerged as 
yet another descriptor of organizational culture without formal linkage with 
traditional culture studies. Similarly, the role of implementation mechanisms is 
addressed in different ways. For example, Westrum (1995) uses information flow 
characteristics to classify organizations as pathological, bureaucratic, or 
generative. This approach focuses on how organizations transmit and receive 
information to accomplish their operational objectives, which could be 
interpreted as nature of the mechanism used to implement its shared values and 
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accomplish the operational objectives. Leadership, on the other hand, is arguably 
the most studied construct. There are numerous studies about how leaders 
influence organizational culture (e.g., Hendrich et al., 2007; Knowles, 2002; 
Pettigrew, 1979; Schein, 1988, 2010; Zohar, 2002b). Most of these studies, 
however, perceive formal leaders (founders or managerial title holders) as 
primary drivers of organizational values and culture, while missing the role of 
informal leaders and key influencers in shaping and maintaining organizational 
culture. The studies on individual-, group-, and firm-level outcomes are scattered 
across different academic siloes. Individual-level performance outcomes are 
typically addressed in human resources literature (e.g., Schneider, 1987) or 
training literature (e.g., Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006); group-level outcomes 
are typically addressed in organizational climate (Ehrhart et al., 2014) or broader 
social behavioral literature (Ployhart et al., 2014); and firm-level outcomes are 
addressed with respect to financial performance or brand/reputational value 
(Sarkar-Barney, 2014; West, Topakas, & Dawson, 2014; Wiley & Brooks, 2000). 
While some models of culture mention the influence of performance outcomes on 
organizational climate (Putter, 2010; Wiley & Brooks, 2000), rarely are these 
outcomes connected with structural elements of culture. Feedback is also covered 
extensively in experiential and organizational learning, but it is mostly in the 
context of learning as an organizational value and whether or not an organization 
has a learning culture (Kolb, 2015; Senge, 1990).  
In conclusion, Model 5 presents a positivist perspective using a mechanistic 
“input-output” paradigm to represent a “technical” or hardware-like system 
consisting of inter-dependent components that have achieved convergent 
consensus among leading researchers. Therefore, these components form the 
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units (the what component) of the overall theory, and the relationship between 
them seeks to explain the rationale, the conditions, and the nature of their 
interactions (the why, when, and how aspects of the theory) (c.f., (Bacharach, 
1989). For one to fully grasp the notion of culture, however, the entire system 
needs to be understood as a holistic construct arising out of not only the 
constituent elements, but also from the unique interactions among those elements. 
The next two sections use a similar approach to develop the current 
understanding of organizational climate and the integration of culture and 
climate.  
2.3 Organizational Climate 
Ehrhart, Schneider, and Macey (2014) present an exhaustive review of over 50 
years of research studies on organizational climate. This review provides a strong 
historical background, areas of conflicts among the various researchers, the 
different disciplinary and philosophical perspectives, the disagreements, and the 
gradual convergence on key concepts related to organizational climate. 
Ultimately, these converging concepts are listed in the form of five themes that 
collectively provide both a working definition of organizational climate as well as 
opportunities to explore the structure of this complex construct from multiple 
focus areas: 
1. Organizational climate emerges through various mechanisms, 
including leadership, communication, training, and so forth; 
2. Mechanisms themselves are not climate, but the experiences they 
produce and the meaning attached to them creates climate; 
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3. Organizational climate is not an individual property, but a property of 
workgroups or organizations; it is based on shared experiences and 
shared meaning within that workgroup or organization; 
4. Shared experiences, and meanings attached to them, emerge from 
natural interactions in workgroups or organizations; climate is shared 
in the natural course of work and the interactions happen at and 
surrounding work; 
5. Organizational climate is not an affective evaluation of the work 
environment in its existential form—it is not mere satisfaction with 
what exists—but rather a descriptive abstraction of people’s 
experiences at work and the meaning attached to them. (p. 64). Thus, 
the emphasis is on the people’s experience resulting from their 
interaction with their environment and the meaning attached to that 
experience. 
 
Synthesis of these five themes leads Ehrhart et al. to offer the following concise 
definition of organizational climate: 
Organizational climate is the shared meaning organizational members attach to the 
events, policies, practices, and procedures they experience and the behaviors they see 
being rewarded, supported, and expected. (p. 69).  
 
This definition of organizational climate is not without its challenges. For 
example, some authors argue that climate is an individual-level construct 
(Rousseau, 1990; Virtanen, 2000) and refer to it as “psychological climate” 
(Ehrhart et al., 2014; Parker et al., 2003); others argue that it is the attitude/affect 
of the employees (Ashkanasy, Wilderom, & Peterson, 2000; Michela & Burke, 
2000; Wiley & Brooks, 2000). Nonetheless, Ehrhart et al.’s emphasis on climate 
as the meaning assigned by a group of people (unit of assessment) to the events 
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and procedures that they have experienced, has sustained the test of a broad range 
of studies as reported by Schneider and Barbera (2014).  Further, Schneider and 
Barbera classify climate studies at two levels: molar and focused. Molar studies 
refer to organizational climate, not specific to a particular performance outcome 
such as safety, quality, or service. Five studies are considered key in mapping the 
evolution of the structure of molar climate studies: Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, 
and Weick, 1970; James and James, 1989; Jones and James, 1979; Litwin and 
Stringer, 1968; and Schneider and Bartlett, 1968. Of these, the study by James 
and James (1989) presents six components that were supported in most of the 
preceding studies, and they further aggregated those components into four major 
dimensions of climate: “role stress and lack of harmony; job challenge and 
autonomy; leadership support and facilitation; and work group cooperation, 
friendliness, and warmth” (Ehrhart et al., 2014, p.81). In a subsequent study, 
Ostroff  (1993) reviewed the preceding literature and organized the molar climate 
components into three categories: affective, cognitive, and instrumental. The 
affective aspects included issues of harmony, group cooperation, friendliness and 
warmth; the cognitive aspects included job challenge and autonomy, innovation 
and intrinsic rewards; and the instrumental aspects included involvement in 
actual tasks, effectiveness of work processes, and extrinsic rewards (Ehrhart et 
al., 2014, p.81-82). According to James et al. (James et al., 2008), the various 
dimensions of molar climate collectively measure “the degree to which the 
[organizational] environment is personally beneficial or detrimental to one’s 
[personal] sense of well-being.” Thus, there is evidence to support that the molar 
climate provides a foundation on which strategic, focused climate could be built 
in support of safety, quality, service, etc. (Ehrhart et al., 2014): “At its core, the 
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focused climate concept is about alignment” (p.86). Thus, focused climate studies 
are generally geared toward the performance outcomes such as quality, safety, 
innovation, service, etc. The underlying assumption in such studies is that if the 
policies, procedures, practices, as well as leadership support and behaviors are 
aligned, they project a consistent message regarding what is important to the 
organization (elements of organizational culture, as discussed in the previous 
section). 
In the context of safety, many of the safety climate survey instruments can be 
linked with the works in High Reliability Organizations (La Porte & Consolini, 
1991; Roberts, 1993), influence of national cultural differences on safety climate 
(Hofstede, 1984), the influence of national, professional and organizational 
cultural differences on safety climate (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998), climate 
studies in industrial safety (Zohar, 2002a, 2002b); impact of information flow on 
safety climate (Westrum, 1995), and the characteristics of learning organizations 
(Senge, 1990).  
Safety climate is also described as a snapshot of the extant state of employee 
attitudes and perceptions about safety policies, procedures, and practices 
(Denison, 1996; Guldenmund, 2000; Harvey et al., 2002; Mearns & Flin, 1999; 
Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001; O'Conner, O'Dea, Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011; 
Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2004). By extension, 
climate regarding another focus area such as service, quality or innovation could 
also be described as a snapshot of the extant state of employee attitudes and 
perceptions about that focus area. 
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Thus, organizational climate is a psychological response or an outcome measure 
(manifestation) of the underlying organizational culture, and it refers to member 
attitudes and perceptions about shared experiences, organizational values, and 
implementation mechanisms, as well as reactions to observed behaviors of 
fellow-employees, leaders and key influencers.  
Tables 4 summarize the structural elements of organizational climate from a 
molar perspective, which are generic and applicable at the organizational level 
and across industry sectors.  
Table 4. Elements of molar organizational climate 
Climate Element Key Indicators Source 
Molar: 
Affective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instrumental 
 
Participation (perceived influence in the 
joint decision-making process, participation 
in setting goals and policies), cooperation 
(perceived helpfulness of supervisors and 
co-workers, emphasis on mutual support), 
warmth (perceived feeling of good 
fellowship, prevalence friendly 
workgroups), and social rewards (praise and 
informal recognition by peers and 
workgroups) 
 
Growth (perceived emphasis on personal 
growth and development on job, emphasis 
on skill development), innovation 
(perceived emphasis on innovation and 
creativity, acceptance of change), autonomy 
(perceived freedom to be own boss, plan 
and control over own work), intrinsic 
rewards (formal recognition and awards 
based on ability and effort) 
 
Achievement (perception of challenge, 
demand for work, and continuous 
improvement of performance), hierarchy 
(perceived emphasis on going through 
channels, locus of authority in supervisory 
personnel), structure (perception of 
formality and constraint in the organization, 
emphasis on adherence to rules), extrinsic 
rewards (rewards of pay, assignments, and 
advancement based on ability and time 
spent on work) 
 
Ostroff (1993) 
synthesized 
preceding literature 
on molar analysis 
of organizational 
climate and 
developed these 
three categories. 
The subsequent 
theoretical 
implication is that 
molar climate 
influences the 
focused climate and 
thereby impacts the 
success of strategic 
objectives like 
safety. Also 
Ostroff’s research 
supports the notion 
that molar climate 
(as a whole) has a 
stronger influence 
on organizational 
(firm) performance 
than individual-
level perceptions of 
the affective, 
cognitive, and 
instrumental 
aspects. 
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So far, organizational culture and organizational climate have been discussed as 
separate constructs. Per Model 5 discussed previously, organizational culture 
could be presented as a system consisting of shared experiences and learning 
which lead to revision and reinforcement of organizational values; leaders and 
key influencers who institutionalize their values through formal implementation 
mechanisms; and performance outcomes that are experienced at the individual, 
group, and firm levels enable a feedback loop that tends to modulate the voracity 
of the implementation mechanisms in order to achieve the desired performance 
outcomes. Thus, the cultural elements seem to be primarily concerned about how 
an organization achieves its functional objectives and tend to explain why certain 
functional objectives may be important to the organization.  Organizational 
climate, on the other hand, focuses on the meaning attached to the underlying 
cultural framework and the collective feeling arising out of shared experiences of 
the people in the organization. Typically, climate is assessed using survey 
instruments that seek to determine the degree to which the people in a particular 
group agree that certain values are shared, there is a consistent commitment by 
the leadership, there is interpersonal trust between employees and management, 
communication is open and two-way, there is good teamwork among people from 
different disciplines, individuals are respected, people are encouraged to learn 
from their experience (evidence-based practice), and adverse events are viewed 
as genuine learning and systemic improvement opportunities.   
Acknowledging that culture and climate are derived from different intellectual 
traditions, they have been analyzed with different tools and techniques; however, 
there has been a tendency to employ climate methodology (survey 
questionnaires) for culture studies. There are many persuasive arguments to 
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integrate the constructs of culture and climate and conduct a more holistic 
analysis of organizations. Thus, the next section presents the key arguments in 
support of an integrated model of organizational culture and climate.  
2.4 Integration of Organizational Culture and Climate 
The roots of “climate” versus “culture” debate could be traced back to the 
seemingly independent emergence of these two terms, one from Gestalt 
psychology (climate) and the other from anthropology and sociology (culture); 
cross-utilization of the two terms in the organizational context; overuse of the 
term “culture” ahead of the science; and the quest to link culture with 
performance (Schneider & Barbera, 2014a). While many scholars have differed 
in their definitions of climate and culture, there seems to be a general agreement 
that (a) climate refers to surface level or temporal phenomenon while culture 
refers to a deeper, longer-term phenomenon, and (b) due to the etymological and 
epistemological differences between the two terms, the methods to study climate 
tend to be dominated by quantitative means such as survey instruments and the 
methods to study culture tend to be dominated by qualitative means such as 
ethnographic observations, interviews, stories, and artifact analysis (Denison, 
1996; Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003; Rousseau, 1990; Scott, Mannion, 
Davies, & Marshall, 2003). Thus, studies that focus on organizational culture 
tend to be “narrow and deep” while those that focus on organizational climate 
tend to be “broad and shallow.” More recently, there has been an increasing 
interest in integrating the two approaches and applying mixed-methods 
techniques to (a) study both the short- and the long-term aspects of culture and 
(b) gain a more complete understanding of how both climate and culture could be 
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influenced to improve organizational performance (Braithwaite, Paula, & Pope, 
2010; Driscoll, Appiah-Yeboah, Salib, & Rupert, 2007; Ehrhart et al., 2014; 
Patankar et al., 2012; Rousseau, 1990; Schneider & Barbera, 2014a; Waterson, 
2014). Such an approach could serve as the starting point for new studies that 
seek broader and deeper analysis of organizational culture and climate. 
An integrated model of organizational culture and climate would provide a broad 
framework which could be applied to a particular focus area such as safety, 
quality, or service. In such a focused context, the interpretive lens would consider 
the various elements of culture and climate from the perspective of that particular 
focus area. This study focused on the patient safety aspect of organizational 
culture and climate. As previously noted, (a) the healthcare industry in the United 
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom is challenged to address the dual 
mandate of quality and affordability; (b) a growing number of studies assert that a 
long-term cultural change is required; and (c) most of the change programs tend 
to focus on assessment of organizational climate. Thus, this section attempts to 
first integrate the separate constructs of organizational culture and climate and 
present an integrated perspective. Table 5 presents the two separate definitions of 
culture and climate, and summarizes five integrative models.  
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Table 5: Integration of culture and climate 
Culture  Climate 
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that 
the group has learned as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration that has worked well 
enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as 
the correct way to perceive, think, and feel 
in relation to those problems.  (Schein, 
2010, p.18). 
Organizational climate is the shared meaning 
organizational members attach to the events, 
policies, practices, and procedures they 
experience and the behaviors they see being 
rewarded, supported, and expected. (Ehrhart 
et al., 2014, p. 69).  
 
Integrative Models 
A competing values framework (CVF) could be used as the underlying or foundational 
organizational orientation (a measure of culture) upon which climate dimensions could be 
mapped. Such a cross-mapping results in the placement of employee welfare, autonomy, 
participation, communication, emphasis on training, integration, and supervisory support 
(as climate dimensions) within the human relations quadrant (internal focus, flexible 
orientation per the CVF model of culture); formalization and tradition dimensions could be 
mapped within the internal process quadrant (internal focus and control orientation per the 
CVF model); flexibility, innovation, outward focus and reflexivity could be mapped within 
the open systems quadrant (external focus and flexible orientation); and clarity of 
organizational goals, effort, efficiency, quality, pressure to produce, and performance 
feedback could be mapped within the rational goal quadrant (external focus and control 
orientation). (Patterson et al., 2005). 
 
Culture and climate follow parallel paths with leadership and organizational effectiveness 
forming the two bookends of this model while culture influences the climate. At the one 
end of this model, leadership is tasked with simultaneously valuing people (culture) and 
promoting a specific operational strategy (climate). At the other end, organizational 
effectiveness measures the success in attracting and retaining talent (culture) and success in 
the competitive marketplace (climate). (Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2011, p.405). 
 
Organizational culture and climate both focus on the shared meanings of the organizational 
context: climate focuses on the perceptions of what happens in the organizations 
(behaviors, support, and expectations) and culture focuses on why those things happen 
(basic assumptions, values and beliefs). This model takes into account the influence of 
external business (Barney, 1986) and national environments and how they might influence 
both individual-level and organization-level values, assumptions, and social cognitive 
processes.(Ostroff, Kinicki, & Muhammad, 2012).  
  
A multi-layered approach can be used to integrate the concepts of culture and climate. 
Accordingly basic assumptions and core values form the deep layer of culture, which 
gives rise to espoused values, priorities, policies, practices, norms and artifacts—which is 
essentially organizational culture. The interpretation of the consistencies/gaps, and the 
consequential internalization of meaning of the current environment from an individual 
employee perspective and from a strategic context such as safety, quality, innovation, etc. 
give rise to the extant climate. (Zohar & Hoffman, 2012) 
  
Another multi-layered perspective is the Safety Culture Pyramid (SCP) model, which 
places values and unquestioned assumptions at the base, followed by strategies, policies 
and practices. These two layers are consistent with the preceding definitions and models 
of organizational culture. The next layer in the SCP model is climate, an employee 
perception of the underlying cultural elements, and the final layer represents the 
performance outcomes at individual, group, and firm levels. (Patankar et al., 2012)  
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Reflecting on the structure of organizational culture presented in Model 5 (Figure 
5) and the five integrative models of culture and climate presented in Table 5, 
brings to light the following differences between the five integrated models and 
the emergent model: 
1. The Competing Values Framework (CVF), as the name specifies, is 
limited to values; however, the emergent integrated model of culture and 
climate contains more than just values. The use of CVF as the 
foundational model of culture would necessarily eliminate the 
consideration of shared experiences, leadership, implementation 
mechanisms, outcomes, and feedback mechanisms. Therefore, although 
Patterson et al.’s model is psychometrically robust and paves the way for 
comparative studies of organizational culture and climate across multiple 
organizations and industries it seems limited by its grounding exclusively 
with the underlying organizational values. Also, methodologically, it 
relies exclusively on self-administered survey data rather than a 
combination of externally collected outcomes data, ethnographic 
observations, artifact analysis, and narrative analysis of stories embedded 
in the organizations. 
2. Schneider et al.’s model presents climate as a reflection or result of the 
underlying culture; however, it seems incomplete if it is limited to the role 
of leadership (in valuing people and promoting strategy) on one end and 
organizational effectiveness (in retaining talent and achieving market 
success) on the other end (Ehrhart et al., 2014, p.220). This model does 
not consider the influence of shared experiences in shaping culture; 
neither does it explain how or why new values are formed and how an 
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organization learns from its different types of shared experiences. 
Methodologically, this model is limited to survey questionnaires.  
3. The strength of the Ostroff et al. model is that it takes into account 
external influences on culture: national and business contexts (Barney, 
1986). It also incorporates the notion of “sensemaking” (cf. Weick, 1995) 
as a pathway to influencing individual values through learning. However, 
it continues to use artifacts as part of culture rather than products of 
culture, and it clusters organizational culture, structure and practices, and 
climate under the meta-category of leadership. While it could argued that 
leadership has influence over shared organizational values and 
assumptions, as well as organizational structures and practices, the almost 
exclusive focus on leadership discounts the role of shared experiences of 
the frontline personnel. The emergent model of culture and climate 
proposes that there is a causal link between structures and practices and 
behaviors, which in turn tend to influence climate. Also, Ostroff et al. mix 
elements that are external (such as industry and business environment and 
national culture) with those that are internal (such as vision, strategy, and 
organizational goals) to the organizational system; they also mix 
structural elements of organizational culture (such as values and 
organizational structures and practices) with psychological response 
(organizational climate) in the construct of culture. Again, the role of 
shared experiences in shaping organizational values gets lost in the final 
model, while leadership assumes the primary responsibility for building, 
maintaining, and changing organizational culture and climate. 
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4. Zohar and Hoffman revive the early notions of culture as a multilayered 
construct with artifacts being the most visible layer and the unquestioned 
assumptions being in the deepest layer. However, their model focuses 
almost exclusively on the gap between espoused versus enacted values as 
the defining characteristic of organizational culture. In this model, there is 
no mention of how and why organizational values are shaped. Thus, 
shared experiences, leadership, performance outcomes and feedback 
mechanisms yield to the focus on the nature of the gap between espoused 
and enacted values.  
5. Patankar et al.’s pyramid model is an integrative, multi-method model 
that is consistent with the structure of organizational culture presented in 
Model 5: values form the base of the pyramid and implementation 
mechanisms form the next layer; and the individual, group, and firm-level 
outcomes form the top layer of the pyramid model. However, in the 
pyramid model, climate is presented as a mediating element between 
implementation mechanisms and performance outcomes. Based on the 
latest literature, discussed previously, climate is now seen as a 
psychological response to the underlying culture, and behaviors and 
performance outcomes are part of culture; thus, climate must be an 
outcome of the total culture and not just a response to the implementation 
mechanisms. Also, like most other integrative models, the pyramid model 
does not consider the role of feedback mechanisms, learning resulting 
from shared experiences, and the role of external environmental 
influences.   
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An enhanced, integrative model of organizational culture and climate is presented 
in Figure 6. This model fills the deficiencies noted in the earlier version by 
incorporating the influence of the external environment within which a firm 
operates, the role of shared experiences and learning in forming the core 
organizational values and unquestioned assumptions, and the role of feedback 
mechanisms that are used to interpret performance outcomes and create new 
meanings of shared experiences. It also acknowledges the bi-directional influence 
between values and practices and it highlights the role of leaders and key 
influencers in both influencing organizational values and being influenced by 
them, as well as in influencing various implementation mechanisms.  
So far, the literature review has focused on the broad concepts of organizational 
culture and climate and their integrated models. Next, literature that is more 
specific to the safety aspects of culture and climate—hence, called safety culture 
and climate—is presented. A review of this literature will further inform the 
development of the emergent model. 
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Figure 6. Model 6. Integrative approach to organizational culture and climate 
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2.5 Safety Culture and Climate  
It is generally agreed that safety culture or safety climate are focused studies of 
organizational culture or organizational climate, respectively, in the context of 
safety (Clarke, 1999; Cooper, 2000; Glendon, Clarke, & McKenna, 2006; Griffin 
& Neal, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000). Cooper (2000) adds one exception to this 
notion: in high-consequence industries, safety should be the dominating 
characteristic and therefore, there should not be much distinction between 
organizational culture and safety culture. Although numerous definitions of 
safety culture have emerged over the past decades, they appear to be 
characterized as either an interpretive perspective that seeks to characterize “the 
way people think and/or behave in relation to safety” or a functionalist 
perspective that seeks to characterize safety culture as a “product” intended to 
serve a specific purpose (Cooper, 2000, p.114). Nonetheless, five models or 
categories of models, as characterized by Glendon, Clarke and McKenna (2006), 
are presented for comparative discussion: (a) Reciprocal Safety Culture Model; 
(b) Multi-layered Models of Safety Culture; (c) Behavioral Safety Culture 
Models; (d) Information Flow Models of Safety Culture; and (e) Work Climate 
Model 
Reciprocal Safety Culture Model: Cooper (2000) argued that the functionalist 
perspective of characterizing safety culture provides an opportunity to link 
personal (e.g., values and beliefs), behavioral (e.g., competencies and patterns of 
behavior), and situational (e.g., organizational systems and subsystems) aspects 
of safety culture. Thus, he proposed the Reciprocal Safety Culture Model. This 
model is rooted in Bandura’s Social Learning Theory and Social Cognition 
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Theory, which assert that an individual’s psychological state, external 
environmental conditions within which the individual operates, and the behaviors 
that the individual exhibits are bi-directionally interacting. While this model 
enables one to collect empirical data from three measures, psychological, 
behavioral, and situational, and also accounts for the dynamic relationship 
between various cultural elements, it would be difficult to link the three measures 
at the individual level and further difficult to develop valid aggregation of those 
measures at the group level.   
In comparison, the emergent model offers some similarities and extends the 
viability for validation. For example, the core theory underpinning the reciprocal 
safety culture model is the interactivity among three elements: psychological, 
behavioral, and environmental. The emergent model is consistent with this 
theory. The shared experience and learning among individuals and groups is in 
the context of their external environment as well as feedback received from past 
performance outcomes and the internal implementation mechanisms. However, 
the emergent model adds the role of leaders and influencers and incorporates the 
influence of performance outcomes. The role of leaders and key influencers is 
consistent with the overall organizational culture models discussed previously; 
moreover, the incorporation of performance outcomes enables the assessment of 
relative importance placed on business performance goals versus safety 
performance goals, sometimes referred to as the “speed-or-accuracy trade-off 
(SATO)”(Drury & Gramopadhye, 1991). Methodologically, psychological 
responses to values, implementation mechanisms, outcomes, and leadership could 
be assessed through safety climate surveys; performance outcomes could be 
assessed through incident/accident data associated with the specific workgroup, 
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and individual-level outcomes could be assessed via peer observations of work 
performance; and the influence of external environmental factors could be 
assessed through focus groups and interviews. Together, these methods would 
enable a triangulated assessment of organizational culture and climate.      
Multi-layered Models of Safety Culture: Similar to safety culture being regarded 
as a subset of organizational culture, many researchers tend to view safety culture 
as a multi-layered construct. Typically, three layers are considered: unquestioned 
assumptions as the core, beliefs and values as the intermediate, and norms and 
artifacts as the most visible layer (Rousseau, 1990; Schein, 1988; Zohar & 
Hoffman, 2012). This approach is generally rooted in the theoretical assumption 
that an organization’s safety culture is primarily, if not exclusively, represented 
by its relative valuation of safety. Thus, the greater the value placed on safety (as 
compared to the value placed on profit maximization, for example), the stronger 
the safety culture at that organization. While this approach is not in conflict with 
the emergent model, it does not help explain when and under what conditions the 
core assumptions, values, and beliefs could be changed; how some of these 
assumptions, values, and beliefs are reinforced; and due to its emphasis on the 
interpretive view, it falls short of providing practical guidance as to how one 
could improve the extant safety culture. 
If one were to frame the emergent model from a multi-layered perspective, it 
would be skewed toward a functionalist view, describing how values and beliefs 
are formed, reinforced, and revised. Thus, the shared experiences and learning 
derived from those experiences would form the core, which would inform and 
influence the formation of assumptions, beliefs, and values—the second layer. 
These assumptions, beliefs, and values would be enacted through implementation 
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mechanisms—the third layer—and generate the corresponding individual, group, 
and firm-level performance outcomes—the fourth layer. Both implementation 
mechanisms and the performance outcomes would generate artifacts, which are 
commonly viewed as the outermost layer of a multi-layered model. Three 
elements that are typically absent from multi-layered models are the role of 
leaders and key influencers, feedback mechanisms, and external influences. By 
incorporating these elements, and enabling triangulation of analytical methods, 
data sources, and longitudinal measurements, the emergent model extends the 
traditional multi-layered models as well as responds to the call for holistic 
triangulation by (Cooper, 2000; Jick, 1979; Rousseau, 1990), among others.  
Behavioral Safety Culture Models: Behavior-based safety culture models are 
rooted in the antecedents-behavior-consequences model with feedback loops 
designed to trigger positive reinforcement for desirable behaviors and negative 
reinforcements for undesirable behaviors (Komaki, Barwick, & Scott, 1978; 
Krause, 1997; Zohar & Fussfeld, 2008). Over a period of time, the participants 
learn to perform in accordance with the desirable behaviors, and the consistency 
as well as longevity of such behaviors is a function of feedback loops acting as 
consequences rather than antecedents of behavior (Grindle, Dickinson, & 
Boettcher, 2000). Geller (1994) calls it the “total safety culture,” presumably 
because its disciplined approach is somewhat similar to a Total Quality 
Management approach. These models have been successful in a number of 
industries such as food manufacturing (Komaki et al., 1978), construction 
(Krause, 1997), mining (Qing-gui, Kai, Ye-jiao, Qi-hua, & Jian, 2012), trucking 
(Hickman et al., 2007), and manufacturing (Grindle et al., 2000); however, most 
of the empirical evidence is from top-down implementation of safety programs 
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and the desire for safe operation is linked with financial outcomes (worker 
injuries lead to loss of productivity and compensatory expenses). Nonetheless, 
there are some examples where behavior-based programs have achieved success 
through employee ownership of the program (Geller, 2005). While these models 
acknowledge the interactivity between the individual worker, the work 
environment, and the worker behavior, they do not explicitly consider conflicting 
incentives. For example, if there is an incentive for overtime or longer work 
hours, but a disincentive for working under fatigue, how would a behavioral 
safety culture program help manage such a dissonance? Issues with variations in 
implementation processes and uncertainty about the influence of internal 
organizational as well as external factors have also been noted (Wirth & 
Sigurdsson, 2008). 
The emergent model of culture and climate did not specifically focus on 
participant behaviors; instead, it relied on the feedback from performance 
outcomes to moderate participant behaviors as a function of learning and 
internalization of their work experience. Thus, although the emergent model is 
consistent with behavioral safety culture models in the sense that it also relies on 
feedback loops to reinforce or penalize individual behaviors, it could be 
strengthened by explicitly including individual behaviors prior to the 
performance outcomes state. See Figure 7 for the updated model. This addition 
enables the emergent model to include the assessment of underlying behaviors 
regardless of the outcomes. Also, since the emergent model claims that learning 
derived from shared experiences influences values and these values influence 
future behaviors, mediated by various implementation mechanisms and 
leadership influence, the role of feedback mechanisms is to appeal to a deeper, 
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internal value-system within the individual rather than just the reward/penalty 
mechanism. While some behavioral safety programs emphasize the role 
managers play in engineering the environment for safe operations, most programs 
focus on worker behaviors. 
 
 
Figure 7. Model 7. Integrative model with individual behaviors   
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The emergent model, on the other hand, explicitly incorporates the influence of 
leadership and external factors. Also, per the behavioral safety culture model, a 
person is likely to be discouraged from violating any rule even if that rule 
happens to be detrimental in a particularly unique circumstance, thereby leaving 
the opportunity for accidents resulting from a unique combination of rare 
circumstances or latent failures. Thus, it seems that the behavioral safety culture 
model is more suited to address “individual accidents” rather than “organizational 
accidents” (Reason, 1998, p.295); while the emergent model can handle both 
types of accidents.  
Information Flow and Learning Models of Safety Culture: Information flow 
within an organization could be regarded as its lifeblood, and thus, the culture of 
an organization has been classified according to the patterns of information flow: 
pathological, bureaucratic, and generative (Westrum, 1995). In the context of 
safety culture, the information being processed by the organization is about 
safety. For example, in a pathological safety culture, safety-critical information is 
likely to be guarded and people who report safety issues are likely to face some 
type of punitive action.  
In a bureaucratic safety culture, safety-critical information is available, but may 
not be utilized due to internal siloes and lack of communication pathways 
between departments. In a generative safety culture, safety-critical information is 
openly shared, people who report safety issues are recognized, and past failures 
are used as learning opportunities. Such classification of safety cultures paved the 
way for a state function or a maturity model: safety culture could now be viewed 
as not only an inherent quality of an organization, especially in high-consequence 
industries, but also a quality that could be improved from one state to another. 
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Subsequently, Lawrie, Parker, and Hudson (2006) conducted studies in the oil 
and gas industry and discovered five levels of cultural maturity: pathological, 
reactive, calculative, proactive, and generative. Reason (1997) used a variant of 
this approach based on how errors are reported and managed: blame culture, 
reporting culture, and just culture. Patankar et al. (2012) called this classification 
an accountability scale and noted the existence of a fourth category: secretive 
culture. Overall, in a secretive culture, errors remain hidden out of fear of 
reprisal; in a blame culture, people who commit errors face punitive actions; in a 
reporting culture, people are encouraged to report their errors under a non-
punitive error reporting program; and in a just culture, there is a clear distinction 
between unintentional errors, which are forgiven, and intentional acts with 
disregard for safety, for which people are punished (Marx, 2001; Patankar et al., 
2012; Reason, 1997).  Another variant of information flow model is the learning 
model. In such a model, the emphasis is placed on how information is used to 
prevent future failures. Thus, there are four states of a learning culture: failure to 
learn, episodic learning, continuous learning, and transformative learning (Senge, 
1990). At the low end of maturity on this scale, organizations fail to learn from 
their mistakes (or mistakes of their employees)—they tend to blame individual 
employees and terminate their employment with the hope that the accident would 
not occur again. Thus, as an organization, they fail to learn. At the far end of this 
scale, organizations not only take failures very seriously and seek systemic 
solutions, but they actively investigate the potential for other, latent failures in the 
system and strive to address them before they manifest themselves into 
accidents.(Patankar et al., 2012; Reason, 1997; Senge, 1990).  
 66 
 
The emergent model of culture and climate incorporates the notion of information 
flow both as implementations mechanisms (policies, procedures, practices, and 
role models) as well as feedback mechanisms (how outcomes are used to derive 
learning from shared experiences). Thus, the implementation pathway could be 
studied in terms of information flow or accountability based models and the 
feedback pathway could be studied in terms of learning models. The emergent 
model is not inconsistent with the information flow or the learning models; 
however, it focuses on the holistic aspects of culture and climate and the dynamic 
relationship among the various elements, which has been long sought by both 
organizational culture and safety culture researchers because most of them have 
observed that organizational culture or safety culture is more than sum of the 
various parts like leadership, shared values, environmental factors, etc. and risks 
exist throughout the organization, as well as from external influences, not just 
within a particular element of culture (e.g., Clarke, 2000; Pidgeon, 1998; Reason, 
1997, 1998). 
Work Climate Model: The work climate model proposed by Clarke (2000) 
suggests that safety behaviors are influenced by safety climate at the workplace, 
which in turn is influenced by the underlying safety culture. Specifically, Clarke 
presents two mechanism of influence: (a) safety culture affects behaviors directly 
through latent failures and (b) safety culture affects behaviors indirectly through 
safety climate. Further, this model presents three stations at which work climate 
could be assessed: perceptions of management commitment, perceptions of 
workplace risk, and perceptions of the safety management systems. While safety 
climate survey instruments could be structured to assess the worker perceptions at 
these three stations, the relationship between their perceptions and their behaviors 
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or performance outcomes is still correlational and not causal. The emergent 
model can certainly accommodate a three-station structure of the safety climate 
survey, but it retains the following antecedent-behavior-consequence pathway: 
shared experiences and learning  shared values implementation mechanisms 
individual behaviorsperformance outcomesfeedback to shared experiences 
and learning. Thus, the elements of safety management systems described in 
Clarke’s model are represented in the emergent model as implementation 
mechanisms, managers and supervisors are represented as leaders and key 
influencers, and organizational context is represented in environmental factors. 
Two elements of safety culture that are notably absent, or at least underspecified, 
in Clarke’s model are the role of shared experiences and the role of shared values 
and beliefs. On the other hand, the emergent model is not explicit about personal 
beliefs regarding risk and safety, personality variables, and the notion of 
individual responsibility because these aspects are presumed to be handled under 
Schneider’s ASA theory (Schneider, 1987), at least in high-consequence 
industries. The assumption is that individuals who do not fit the norm in terms of 
their personality or individual motivation are not likely to be recruited, retained, 
or promoted within the organization.  
Zohar (2014) presents a conceptual model of safety climate with antecedents and 
consequences. In this model, there are seven antecedent variables: structural 
attributes, symbolic interaction, group/organizational leadership, psychological 
work ownership, organizational commitment, job stress and burnout, and 
personality. Of these, the first three are well-aligned with the implementation 
mechanisms, shared experiences and learning, and leaders and key influencers in 
the emergent model. However, the latter seven are not explicitly included in the 
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emergent model. While Zohar provided both theoretical and empirical support to 
include these antecedents in the overall safety climate model, the relative 
significance of these variables has not been established. Zohar’s model also seeks 
to explain the safety climate-behavior relationship in terms of expectancy theory: 
individuals are likely to align their behaviors toward maximizing the payoff 
associated with recognition for safety performance. Similarly, there are other 
individual-level psychological constructs such as knowledge, motivation, and 
engagement that are included in Zohar’s model, but not in the emergent model. 
The emergent model seeks to explain the relationship between various cultural 
and climatic elements at a macro level; wherein, all the cultural elements 
essentially serve as antecedents to the climatic elements. Zohar also points to the 
continued need for research focused on the operationalization of safety culture 
and safety climate in order to gather empirical evidence to explain their 
relationship. It seems that the emergent model of culture and climate is well 
positioned to contribute toward the operationalization of the constructs of culture 
and climate as well as their inter-relationship. 
Recent Safety Climate Studies in Healthcare: Over the past three decades, some 
studies have periodically reviewed the extant literature on safety climate/culture 
and presented meta-analysis of the consistent themes. Six such studies (Flin, 
2007a, 2007b; Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000, 2007; Jackson & Kline, 
2014; Sammer, Lykens, Singh, Mains, & Lackan, 2010) are used to present an 
overview of the key safety climate elements that have been retained through 
multiple studies and some from across domains. Table 6 presents these themes as 
key elements of safety climate. 
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Table 6: Elements of safety climate 
Key Element The degree to which the employees 
perceive that … 
Synthesis 
Studies 
Safety as an 
organizational 
value 
… the organization considers patient 
safety as an organizational value; there is 
visible and authentic engagement of all 
stakeholders; changes in policies and 
practices are consistent with this core 
value. 
Guldenmund 
(2000); Sammer 
et al. (2010)  
Leadership or 
Senior Management 
Commitment 
…their leaders and immediate supervisors 
to be committed to safety programs as 
experienced in terms of accountability, 
change management, provision of 
resources, role-modeling, clarity of vision, 
and building of open relationships. 
Guldenmund (2000); 
Flin et al. (2000); 
Singer et al. (2007); 
Sammer et al. 
(2010); Jackson & 
Kline (2014); 
Mutual Trust …their work environment is just; 
everyone is held accountable for the 
group’s values and commitment; at-risk 
behaviors are not tolerated 
Sammer et al. (2010) 
Communication …communication is both top-down and 
bottom-up; there is openness, structure, 
and follow-up 
Guldenmund 
(2000); Flin (2007); 
Sammer et al. 
(2010); Jackson & 
Kline (2014) 
Teamwork …there is alignment between values and 
action, there is deference to expertise, 
autonomy, mutual respect for individuals, 
willingness to adapt, and generally 
supportive (warmth) relationships 
Singer et al. (2007); 
Sammer et al. 
(2010); Jackson & 
Kline (2014) 
Respect for 
Individuals 
…there is investment in individual 
competency; there is engagement of 
employees in improving safety 
Flin et al. (2000) 
Support for 
Team/Firm-level 
Goals (Resources) 
…there are sufficient, competent resources 
to handle the workload (inverse of work 
pressure); work conditions are generally 
supportive of safe practices 
Guldenmund 
(2000); Flin et al. 
(2000); Singer et al. 
(2007); Sammer et 
al. (2010); 
Emphasis on 
Learning from 
Experience  
(Evidence-based 
practice) 
…the organization is committed to risk 
management, evidence-based improvement, 
use of best practices from other 
organizations/industries, and places 
emphasis on overall performance 
improvement 
Guldenmund 
(2000); Flin et al. 
(2000); Sammer et 
al. (2010)  
Response to 
Unintentional 
Errors 
…the organization is committed to learning 
from errors 
Guldenmund 
(2000); Singer et al. 
(2007); Sammer et 
al. (2010); Jackson 
& Kline (2014) 
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Flin et al. (2000) reviewed 18 survey instruments used in the energy sector in the 
United Kingdom and revealed 18 scales corresponding to three key dimensions: 
management, system safety, and risk. Also, secondary dimensions of work 
pressure and individual competence were noted. Subsequently, Flin (2007b) 
reviewed safety climate studies from industrial safety and healthcare and 
concluded that (a) there was a general lack of psychometric validation of safety 
climate questionnaires used in healthcare and (b) there were four core dimensions 
that could be mapped from industrial safety to healthcare: management 
commitment to safety, supervisor commitment to safety, safety system, and work 
pressure. Flin’s (2007a) first conclusion stratifies the need for leadership 
commitment at two levels: senior management and immediate supervisor. The 
senior management commitment is typically equated with provision of resources, 
anchoring with organizational values, and handling of errors. The immediate 
supervisor commitment is typically associated with role modeling, employee-
management trust, willingness to change established practices, and warmth or 
care for the individual practitioners. 
Guldenmund (2000) reviewed studies in safety culture/climate up to 1997 and 
argued that safety climate could be considered an alternative safety performance 
indicator. Furthermore, he concluded that, “climate follows naturally from culture 
or, put another way, organizational culture expresses itself through organizational 
climate” (p.221). His meta-analysis of ten safety climate instruments that had 
been subjected to exploratory factor analysis yields the following common 
themes: generally, the work environment is safe; individuals are free from 
blame/punishment for inadvertent errors; management and immediate supervisors 
show concern for their employees and are effective in providing a safe work 
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environment; technical and safety training is adequate; there are established rules, 
mechanisms and protocols to address safety concerns; safety is regarded as an 
organizational value at par with productivity; and communication involves 
promotion of safe practices, lessons learned, and proactive identification of 
hazards.  
Guldenmund (2007) set out to review the existing safety climate survey 
questionnaires to determine “the common basis that might explain the patterns of 
shared attitudes found in safety climate research’ (p. 724). First, Guldenmund 
argues that there has been some confusion in safety climate research as a result of 
distinction made between perceptions and attitudes, wherein perception refers to 
description of the external objects and attitudes refer to evaluation of those 
objects. However, he also argues that perceptions are not entirely separate from 
attitudes; thus, in the context of safety climate, he concludes that “safety climate 
research is basically attitude research” (p.726). In comparison, Ehrhart et al. 
(2014) have also focused on climate as an attitudinal measure, but emphasized 
the role of experience with the environment rather than the environment itself. 
Second, Guldenmund concludes that organizations are influenced by national and 
regional conditions as well as educational, socio-economic, and religious 
characteristics of its workforce.  
Sammer et al. (2010) used the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ-USA) definition of safety culture, which is borrowed from the Health 
and Safety Advisory Commission of Great Britain: 
The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the 
commitment to and the style and proficiency of an organization’s health and safety 
management. (p.156).  
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This definition integrates the notions of safety culture and climate; therefore, 
when interpreting their findings in terms of safety climate (rather than culture), it 
is essential to restate their findings in terms of employee perceptions of the 
cultural elements in order to consider them as the safety climate elements. 
Nonetheless, Sammer et al. reviewed 38 generic patient safety studies (not 
including medical specialties or interventions) conducted at hospitals in the 
United States from 1999 through 2007 to make an important contribution to the 
assessment of extant literature. They discovered the following seven key 
elements: (a) leadership, (b) teamwork, (c) evidence-based practice (use of 
feedback loops to reduce variation and improve reliability), (d) communication, 
(e) learning, (f) accountability, and (g) patient-centered focus. 
Jackson and Kline (2014) found consensus around four themes: (a) management 
commitment, (b) teamwork, (c) communication, and (d) incident reporting. The 
Hospital Survey of Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC), which was originally 
developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and implemented 
across 1,128 hospitals in the United States, was adopted for the U.K. environment 
and implemented across three large hospitals in the East Midlands. The 
exploratory factor analysis of this instrument yields the following unit-level 
scales: supervisor expectations; organizational learning; teamwork; 
communication; feedback and communication about errors; non-punitive 
response to errors; and staffing resources.   
While the above studies present multiple synthesized elements of safety climate, 
they do not provide a conceptual model of how these elements may be associated 
with each other. For example, should one consider a hierarchical model of molar 
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and focused climate elements or should one consider a functional model that 
illustrates the influence of various factors on each other.  
Studies based on the emergent, integrated model of culture and climate should 
strive to explore the role of seven general cultural elements and appropriately 
focused climatic elements. For example, keeping the cultural elements as listed 
below, the corresponding climate elements focused on safety are also listed. Both 
cultural and climatic elements are considered in formulating the specific research 
questions and hypotheses. 
Cultural Elements: 
1. Shared Experiences and Learning 
2. Organizational Values 
3. Implementation Mechanisms 
4. Leaders and Key Influencers 
5. Individual Behaviors 
6. Performance Outcomes 
7. Feedback 
Climatic Elements: 
1. Leadership 
2. Teamwork 
3. Evidence-based Practice 
4. Communication 
5. Learning 
6. Accountability 
7. Safety-centered Focus (for safety climate assessment) 
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2.6 Narrative for the Integrated Model of Organizational Culture and 
Climate 
So far, an incremental approach to theory building has resulted in Model 7, the 
integrated model of culture and climate, and enhancements based on the literature 
on safety culture and climate. Since a theory is a “statement of relationships 
between units observed or approximated in the empirical world” and it addresses 
how these units interact, when or under what conditions, as well as the rationale 
for their interactions (Bacharach, 1989, p. 498), the narrative presented this 
section serves as the proposed theory. Thus, in accordance with the integrated 
model of culture and climate illustrated in Figure 7, the theoretical units 
approximated are all the elements contained within the complex constructs of 
culture and climate as well as those contained in the construct of external 
environment. First, considering the three constructs involved (environment, 
culture, and climate), two broad propositions are presented: 
1. External factors influence organizational culture and  
2. Organizational culture influences organizational climate. 
The narrative describing this proposed model could be termed as a cultural 
transformation theory, and it could be stated as follows:  
When external factors create conditions that threaten an organization’s 
continued survival or market leadership position, the organization tends to 
undergo a cultural transformation. Such a transformation is initiated by two 
types of shared experiences: (a) organic shared experiences by virtue of the 
members of the organization being aware or directly influenced by the 
external factors and (b) planned shared experiences that are intentionally 
 75 
 
designed and implemented by leaders and key influencers. Both types of 
shared experiences have the potential to influence organizational values, 
which in turn result in changes in operational processes, individual behaviors, 
and changes in corresponding performance outcomes. Feedback from changes 
in performance influences learning derived from shared experiences and the 
effectiveness of subsequent operational actions. Organizational climate is a 
psychological response to the underlying culture and hence could serve as a 
symptomatic measure of the underlying culture. 
At the heart of an organization’s culture, however, are its values, which are 
formed, reinforced, or revised through shared experiences of its members. 
While reinforcement of organizational values takes place on a routine basis, 
revision takes place under extraordinary circumstances such as threats to its 
survival, leadership, or well-being. The quest to institutionalize the group’s 
values leads to implementation mechanisms like strategies, policies, 
procedures, and practices. Leaders and key influencers have a significant 
impact on which values are modeled and how they are reinforced through the 
various implementation mechanisms. Organizational climate, on the other 
hand, is the group’s psychological response to the shared experiences, values, 
and implementation mechanism, experience with behaviors in the workplace, 
as well as reactions to individual-, group- and firm-level outcomes. Group 
performance includes behaviors that influence specific safety, quality, or 
innovation outcomes, and firm performance includes broader outcomes like 
financial outcomes or major accidents. Thus, organizational climate includes 
its members’ psychological response to how different outcomes are treated, 
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how the members feel about the underlying behaviors that are rewarded/ 
penalized, and what is valued by the management or the group.  
When the desired performance outcomes are achieved, the experience of such 
success drives the change in shared values. Patankar, et al. (2012, p.167) illustrate 
three models adapted from the original works of Argyris (1977), Bierly, Kessler, 
and Christensen (2000), and Wang and Ahmed (2003). In accordance with this 
perspective, an organization tends to progressively become more collaborative, 
community-spirited, and innovative, thus opening up a broader array of learning 
mechanisms and improved employee engagement. In the context of safety, when 
an airline or a hospital specifically articulates safety as its organizational value, 
rather than limiting the list of values to business success (e.g., profitability, 
customer satisfaction, and industry-leading performance), there have been many 
instances of collateral changes in implementation mechanisms such as the launch 
of an error reporting system. Specifically, Patankar et al. (2012, p.173) report a 
case from healthcare where the values shifted from defensive to collaborative, 
and finally to innovative, achieving a transformational impact on the subject 
hospital.   
Since the constructs of culture, climate, and external environment are complex by 
themselves, a second tier of propositions is presented as follows: 
1. Environmental factors provide the context for organizational culture; 
2. Leaders and key influencers influence organizational values; 
3. Shared experiences influence organizational values; 
4. Performance feedback influences learning derived from shared 
experiences; and 
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5. Multiple mechanisms, including planned interventions, influence a 
cultural transformation. 
These propositions are used to develop the relevant research questions and 
hypotheses. 
2.7 Learning in the Context of the Emergent Model 
Organizational studies have often used a learning perspective to explain a 
particular phenomenon, particularly issues related to strategic choice, mergers 
and acquisitions, and performance differences (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004). In the 
development of the emergent model, learning has emerged as an element of 
organizational climate, and it is structurally represented within the shared 
experience block as well as through the overall feedback and implementation 
mechanisms that are used to reinforce or revise organizational values. Thus, 
learning is an integral aspect of the emergent model. This section presents 
categories of learning outcomes and levels of analysis in the context of the 
emergent, integrated model of organizational culture and climate.  
Kraiger, Ford, and Salas (1993) classify learning outcomes into three categories: 
cognitive, skill-based, and affective. In the context of the emergent, integrative 
model of organizational culture and climate, a participant’s (individual level) 
learning in all three categories could be assessed: cognitive learning could be 
assessed with knowledge exams, skill-based learning could be assessed with 
practical tests or field observations, and affective learning could be assessed with 
climate surveys. The individual-level data could then be aggregated to group-
level, as long as there is psychometric support for such aggregation, and group-
level conclusions could be drawn. For the purpose of this thesis, cognitive 
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learning outcomes will be obtained through scores on knowledge exams that were 
administered prior to the beginning of the MOREOB training and at the end of 
each module. Similarly, affective outcomes will be obtained through scores on 
safety climate surveys, which are essentially attitudinal measures, also 
administered prior to the beginning of the MOREOB training and at the end of 
each module. In accordance with Kraiger et al.’s (1993) model of learning 
outcomes, qualitative data that indicate deep, value-level change at individual, 
group, or organization-level would be considered an affective learning outcome, 
rather than a cognitive or skill-based outcome. While the use of skill-based 
outcomes is consistent with the emergent theoretical model, the use of such 
outcomes was beyond the scope of this study. 
Since the emergent model of culture and climate takes a group-level perspective 
as the unit of analysis, assessment of learning can also be accomplished at the 
group level. Edmondson (2002) focused on the role of team or group-level 
learning in influencing organizational learning. Edmondson proposed two 
competencies to be integral to group-level learning: reflection and action. She 
further claimed that a team member’s perception of psychological safety is 
critical to moving a team from reflection to action. In the context of the emergent 
model, shared experience, by definition is a group-level phenomenon and 
therefore, one could argue that the learning derived from such experience is 
group-level learning; however, in accordance with Edmondson’s observation, in 
order for shared experiences to translate into learning, the group must engage in 
deliberate reflection practices. When, the reflective practices are appropriately 
structured and managed, they have the potential to cause deep, value-level impact 
that would either reinforce the extant values (“an incremental change” according 
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to Edmondson) or revise the extant values (“a radical change” according to 
Edmondson). The feedback loops, as well as the role of leaders and key 
influencers, identified in the emergent model specifically aims at addressing the 
barriers to convert reflection into action and to move from group-level learning to 
organization-level learning. Thus, the emergent model is complementary to 
Edmondson’s perspective on group-level learning. The qualitative analysis 
conducted in this study explores how group-level learning translates into cultural 
change. Although this study is limited to the study of group-level changes, it can 
be extended to organization –level changes without changing the core model.   
Easterby-Smith, Crossan, and Nicolini (2000) examine the rise and fall of 
specific debates in the field of organizational learning. Of particular significance 
is the debate regarding levels of analysis: is organizational learning a simple 
aggregation of individual-level learning or is it much more and truly a property of 
the group? While there are arguments on both sides of this debate, Hedberg 
(1981) argues that organizational learning is more than the sum of individual 
learning because “members come and go, and leadership changes, but 
organizations’ memories preserve certain behaviors, mental maps, norms, and 
values over time” (p.6). The literature reviewed thus far regarding what 
constitutes an organizational transformation would suggest that the application of 
Hedberg’s definition of organizational learning is essential for any change 
program or intervention to effect a deep, transformational cultural change. In 
other words, organizational learning is a prerequisite to cultural change. 
Consistent with the current thinking regarding the appropriateness of the level of 
analysis, as noted by Easterby-Smith et al., it seems fitting to consider both the 
individual level analysis to quantitatively determine the effectiveness of a 
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training intervention at the individual level and supplement it with qualitative 
field observations and/or interviews to determine group-level learning. Also, 
artifacts of learning such as new organizational values, procedures, posters, or 
task kits would serve as tangible evidence of group-level learning that has 
transcended beyond individual-level learning and is likely to survive personnel 
transitions. Considering that the MOREOB training intervention is a team-based 
training program aimed at a particular community of practice—the obstetrics 
team consisting of physicians, nurses, midwives, and administrators—the notion 
of “collective or social learning” or learning as a result of meaningful interactions 
among different individuals and professional groups both within the training 
sessions as well as in actual practice (Bruner & Haste, 1987; Cook & Brown, 
1999; Edmondson, 1999; Engestrom & Middleton, 1996; Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
March, 1991), is more relevant. Furthermore, Easterby-Smith et al. note that the 
most current thinking on level of analysis for learning has shifted toward 
“learning-in-working” or organizational learning as a social phenomenon. Thus, 
it makes sense to collect individual-level knowledge exam data to quantitatively 
measure cognitive learning, conduct field observations and interviews to collect 
qualitative data regarding group-level learning, and seek artifacts that support 
individual-independent, group-level learning and collectively provide evidence of 
lasting, change in the organizational culture. 
Bapuji and Crossan (2004) reviewed 123 articles that were published between 
1990-2002 to take stock of the state of empirical research in organizational 
learning. Their findings conclude that there was a “growing consensus in the 
literature that learning can be behavioral and cognitive, exogenous and 
endogenous, methodical and emergent, incremental and radical, and it can occur 
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at various levels in an organization” (p.400). Furthermore, Bapuji and Crossan 
claim that about 65 per cent of the empirical studies employed a learning 
perspective to organizational research and offer another classification of 
organizational learning based on the source of the underlying experience: internal 
experience or endogenous learning, or external experience or exogenous learning. 
While the internal experience as a source of learning appears to be self-
explanatory, the external experience could be further categorized into congenital 
learning, vicarious learning, and inter-organizational learning. Congenital 
learning occurs when a firm is new and needs to learn from other established 
firms in the industry or from other industries. Vicarious learning occurs when a 
firm is fairly established, but learns from other firms within the industry or from 
other industries—possibly through benchmarking of outcomes. Inter-
organizational learning occurs among firms that are formally affiliated with each 
other through coalitions or associations and regularly share certain data or 
experiences. These overall findings and definitions of internal versus external 
learning complement the emergent model very well. For example, applying a 
learning orientation to the emergent model, one could argue that (a) shared 
experiences are essentially group-level phenomenon and so learning occurring 
through such experiences could be assessed at that level; (b) knowledge imparted 
through a training intervention could be assessed through tests at an individual 
level and then aggregated to determine the group-level change in knowledge 
levels; (c) the effect of knowledge improvement on behavioral changes could be 
assessed through practical tests or field observations; (d) changes in individual or 
group behaviors are both a function of individual-level learning as well as social 
learning resulting from immersion in the work environment and interacting with 
 82 
 
other members of the obstetrics practice; (e) both methodological and emergent, 
as well as incremental and radical, changes are possible through the 
operationalization of the emergent model; (f) the notion of external factors could 
be framed in the learning context as external or exogenous learning. 
Table 7 presents a summary of different learning perspectives, their 
classification, definition, and contextual fit. 
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Table 7: Learning perspectives and contextual fit 
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Table 7 (Continued): Learning perspectives and contextual fit 
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Table 7 (Continued): Learning perspectives and contextual fit 
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2.8 Training as a Culture-change Intervention 
Now that an integrated model of culture and climate has been developed, it is 
worthwhile to consider where a typical intervention program would fit within this 
model. Training is arguably the most common intervention aimed at shaping 
individual behaviors at the workplace. Orientation and basic skills programs are 
commonly used to train newly hired workers to be productive at their job and 
also learn the norms of the organization. Similarly, changes in organizational 
performance outcomes are attempted through changes in workplace behaviors 
that rely on transfer of knowledge from training programs to individual 
behaviors. For example, in healthcare, training programs have been used to 
enhance individual-level clinical knowledge and skills as well as team-oriented 
competencies, particularly with the use of simulation and drills (Aggarwal et al., 
2010; Miller et al., 2008; Pratt et al., 2007; Thomas, Sexton, & Helmreich, 2004; 
Weaver et al., 2014). Such programs have also been known to influence 
organizational culture and climate  (Patankar & Taylor, 2004; Pratt et al., 2007). 
There is also support for organizational climate to be linked with improvement in 
personal injury rate (Beus, Payne, Bergmann, & Arthur, 2010), which in turn, is a 
result of certain at-risk individual behaviors. Clarke (2006) also proposes a link 
between safety climate and employee safety performance: “Organizational safety 
climate has an important influence in ensuring adherence to procedures, but, in 
particular, plays a significant role in the promotion of employee commitment and 
involvement in safety” (p.324). Thus, it follows that if a training program is 
developed as an intervention strategy aimed at providing a specific shared 
experience aimed at enhancing knowledge, it could influence organizational 
climate, group performance outcomes, and firm performance. However, it is not 
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clear as to how such programs would influence individually-held and shared 
organizational values. Yet for an intervention program to effect a cultural 
transformation at the organization, it must either create new values, change old 
values, or connect new values with old values (Rochon, 1998). Thus, it is 
essential to investigate the effectiveness of training programs in improving 
individual-level knowledge, group-level climate, and group-level peroformance 
outcomes, as well as the impact on the shared organizational values.    
Over the past 50 years, much research has been done in the areas of training 
evaluation, including transfer of training to workplace behaviors and 
organizational outcomes. For example, Kirkpatrick’s four-level model of training 
evaluation consists of reaction, learning, behavior and results (Kirkpatrick, 1979, 
1998; Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006). The first level of evaluation is generally 
affective: the participants’ feelings about the training, perceived relevance and 
practicality of the training, and the overall effort required to engage in the 
training. Essentially, it assessed whether or not the participants were pleased 
about the training. This assessment is short and prompt, and can be done 
immediately after the training. The next level of evaluation is the assessment of 
actual change in knowledge or cognitive capabilities as a result of the training. 
This assessment involves a pre-post training assessment of knowledge via written 
tests or interviews. Attitudes and opinions surveys are also used to assess the 
effectiveness of learning. The third level of assessment is typically conducted 
some months (12-18 months) after training to find out whether the participants 
changed any of their own behaviors as a result of their training. This assessment 
can be done through observations, self-assessment, survey questionnaires, or 
interviews. Finally, the fourth level of assessment seeks to determine if the 
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training could have resulted in any changes in organization-level performance 
outcomes. From the context of safety, the goal of a training program could be to 
reduce workplace injuries. The series of underlying assumptions running across 
these four levels of assessment would be as follows: 
 The participants liked the safety training and they were generally pleased; 
 The participants’ knowledge about key safety issues improved after 
training; 
 The participants used their new knowledge to change their behaviors at 
the workplace; and 
 As a result of the changed behaviors, the workplace injuries declined. 
Since its introduction, Kirkpatrick’s model has been used, criticized, expanded, 
and contracted; nonetheless, most researchers in the field agree that it has spurred 
both extensive field-testing as well as new theoretical development in the field of 
training evaluation (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). Alliger, Tannenbaum, 
Bennett, Traver, and Shotland (1997) expanded Kirkpatrick’s level one 
evaluation beyond affective reaction and discovered a stronger link between 
usability of the training and transfer of training to work performance. 
Tannenbaum et al. (1993) expanded the behavior level into two outcomes: 
training performance and transfer performance. In their model, learning (level 
two) is related to training performance (which includes academic performance on 
post-training tests), and the pathway to results (level four) is mediated by training 
performance and transfer performance. Warr, Allan and Birdi (1999) discovered 
that the correlation between reaction (level one) and job behavior (level three) 
were non-significant and correlations between learning (level two) and job 
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behavior (level three) were low. Thus, they concluded that transfer of training to 
work performance must be related to other factors. Holton (2005) criticized 
Kirkpatrick’s model because it seemed like per Kirkpatrick’s model failure to 
achieve the set training goals, particularly transfer of training to work 
performance was blamed entirely on the training itself. Instead, Holton proposed 
a three-level model that focused on two trainee-level factors (learning and 
individual behavior) and one organizational factor (organizational performance). 
The challenges associated with transfer of learning to work performance are 
largely related to organizational culture (management support, peer support, 
feedback, etc.)(Holton, 2005). Similarly, Birdi (2007) discovered that while most 
training programs regarding innovation focus on idea creation, they tend to have 
much less success in idea implementation because the latter requires a different 
skillset and it also relies on support from the organization (i.e., a supportive 
organizational culture).   
In an attempt to bridge prevailing theories and models, Alvarez, Salas, and 
Garfano (2004) developed one of the most comprehensive models integrating 
training evaluation (a measure of how well the training program achieves its 
goals) and training effectiveness (why the training program is effective in 
achieving its goals). Dealing with transfer performance, they attribute it to 
individual characteristics (mostly motivation to learn and transfer), training 
characteristics (content and delivery mechanisms most likely to support transfer), 
and organizational characteristics (generally termed as organizational climate 
conducive to transfer of training). Spitzer’s Learning Effectiveness Measurement 
(LEM) methodology takes a more active stance on training as well as transfer of 
training to work performance (Spitzer, 2005). Essentially, the LEM seeks to 
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proactively identify the barriers to transfer before designing the training, persuade 
the management to address these barriers, and use longitudinal, continuous 
measurements to determine whether the barriers have been effectively removed 
or mitigated as well as the level of success of the training program in effecting 
the change at individual and organizational levels.  Sitzman and Weinhardt’s 
(2015) training engagement theory takes a holistic view about what it takes to 
achieve successful training outcomes, including transfer of training and 
organizational performance improvements. Essentially, it advocates for 
continuous assessment of engagement and commitment from multiple levels of 
the organization so that there is an ongoing attention to the training and multi-
level vested interest in the training program’s success. Birdi and Reid (2013) take 
another multi-level perspective and propose that training can impact at not only 
individual and group levels, but also at organizational and societal levels. Finally, 
Blume et al.  (2010) also acknowledge the vital role played by the work 
environment (organizational culture) in successful transfer of training to 
workplace behaviors and organization-level performance outcomes.  
In the light of this growing body of literature that points to the significance of 
organizational culture in transfer of training as well as the potential for a training 
intervention to impact societal norms, Model 8 (Figure 8) includes a mediated 
pathway between learning (arising out of planned training intervention) and 
changes in individual behaviors.  Cases of training programs that may have 
resulted in changes in organizational culture need to be studied more carefully to 
determine the mechanisms by which training can influence shared organizational 
values, as well as consider the influence of other concurrent mechanisms of 
influence.  Table 8 summarizes the above models and their features. 
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In the light of the training research discussed above, the role of training 
intervention in shaping organizational culture and climate is illustrated in the 
updated model in Figure 8. Training creates new shared experiences, which result 
in individual-level learning and can influence individually held vales. Alternately, 
training may directly influence individual behaviors, even though they may be 
mediated by individual characteristics, training characteristics, and organizational 
culture. Regardless of the pathway, changes in individual behaviors are theorized 
to produce improvements in group and firm-level outcomes.  
  
 92 
 
Table 8: Key models and features of training evaluation and transfer 
Theory/Model Features Publications 
Four Levels of 
Training Evaluation 
Training should be evaluated at four 
levels: Reaction, Learning, Behavior, and 
Results  
Kirkpatrick 
(1979, 1998)  
Three Levels of 
Training Outcomes 
There are three broad levels of training 
outcomes: Learning, Individual 
Performance, and Organizational 
Performance 
Holton (2005) 
Integrated Model of 
Training Evaluation 
and Effectiveness 
Most comprehensive model: It takes into 
consideration  needs analysis, individual 
trainee characteristics, training 
characteristics, organizational 
characteristics, post-training attitudes, 
reactions, cognitive learning, training 
performance, transfer performance, and 
results. 
Alvarez et al. 
(2004) 
Learning 
Effectiveness 
Measurement 
Proactive and continuous assessment of 
learning effectiveness; consists of five 
phases: Predictive Measurement;  
Baseline Measurement; Formative 
Measurement; In-process Measurement; 
and Retrospective Measurement 
Spitzer (2005) 
Training Engagement 
Theory 
A temporal, concurrent set of sequences 
taking place at various levels of an 
organization affects the ultimate 
effectiveness of training programs. 
Sitzman & 
Weinhardt 
(2015) 
Transfer of training 
from 
knowledge/skills to 
workplace behaviors 
It is a function of motivation- and ability-
related factors 
Elangovan & 
Karakowsky 
(1999) 
 Work environment also plays a critical 
role in transfer of training 
Birdi (2007); 
Blume et al. 
(2010) 
Taxonomy of 
Training and 
Development 
Outcomes 
Training can be designed to achieve 
multiple levels of outcomes: individual, 
workgroup, organizational, and societal 
Birdi & Reid 
(2013) 
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Figure 8. Model 8. Influence of training on culture, climate, and performance 
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2.9 Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The overarching research question of this study was whether an intervention, 
such as training, alone would be sufficient to produce a cultural change. The 
review of literature presented in this chapter demonstrates that although culture 
and climate have emerged and developed as separate constructs, it is time to 
consider an integrated model of culture and climate, which in turn, necessitates a 
mixed-methods approach to test the model (cultural studies tend to be qualitative 
and climatic studies tend to be quantitative). Thus, in the context of the selected 
domain (obstetrics practice in Ontario, Canada), it is essential to develop the 
second-tier theoretical propositions into specific research questions and use one 
of the propositions (the fifth proposition was selected based on availability of 
quantitative data) to derive corresponding hypotheses. The purpose of these 
research questions and hypotheses is to empirically-test the validity of the 
integrated model of culture and climate and revise it, as necessary.  
2.9.1 Research Question #1 
In accordance with the integrated model of culture and climate, and supported by 
the literature, broad environmental factors tend to influence organizational culture 
(proposition #1). For example, in Deal and Kennedy’s (1982) five elements of 
culture, one element is environment, which constitutes business, political, and 
social considerations. Similarly, Barney’s (1986) model places emphasis on 
external business environment and Ostroff et al.’s (2012) integrative model of 
organizational culture and climate takes into account two external factors: 
business factors and national factors. Empirically, Hofstede (1984) is renowned 
for his study on the influence of the national environment within which personnel 
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are raised on their individual and group-level values, which in turn are aggregated 
as characteristics of national cultures. Additionally, three key examples of 
environmental factors shaping organizational culture were reported by Wilkins 
(1984), Freiberg and Freiberg (1996), and Knowles (2002). Wilkins reported the 
importance of stories in building and sustaining organizational cultures. Most of 
these stories relate shared experiences of certain individuals or groups (heroes) 
within given environmental conditions (challenges) and their triumph over those 
conditions, which eventually help communicate and germinate the desired 
organizational values across generations of employees.  Freiberg and Freiberg 
told the story of Southwest Airlines narrating their triumphs over unprecedented 
environmental challenges and how these shared experiences formed their 
distinctive culture. Also, Knowles reported in great detail how a combination of 
community outrage and regulatory pressures led to DuPont Chemicals’ 
transparent and engaged approach to chemical safety. Thus, there is sufficient 
theoretical support, reinforced by empirical findings, to pursue the research 
question as to how specific environmental factors might have influenced the 
patient safety culture in the obstetrics practice in Ontario.   
RQ1:  How did environmental factors influence the patient safety culture in the 
obstetrics practice in Ontario? 
2.9.2 Research Question #2 
The role of leaders and influencers in shaping organizational cultures in general, 
and values in specific, has been studied by numerous scholars over the past 
decades (proposition #2). In particular, the works of Pettigrew, Schneider, and 
Schein are salient. Pettigrew (1979) promulgated an anthropological perspective 
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on how leaders, particularly founders, infuse their personal values into their 
organizations. He defined entrepreneurship as the leader’s ability to transform 
“individual drive into collective purpose and commitment” (p.573)—this 
definition necessitates leaders to reflect on their personal values and habits and 
not only imprint them on the organization, but also to institutionalize them 
through robust mechanisms such that these values and habits will be continually 
reinforced. Schneider’s attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) theory (1987), which 
is an extension of Lewin’s person-environment concepts (1935, 1951), focuses on 
the role of traditional human resources function in an organization. It asserts that 
an organization will tend to attract and retain individuals—including leaders—
who manifest values that are consistent with those of the organization (and by 
extension, those of the founders of the organization). Schein’s (2010, 2015) 
notion of norms institutionalizing organizational values comes from a 
combination of human relations perspective and organizational behavioral 
perspective of neoclassical approach to management (Sarkar & Khan, 2013). 
Schein builds on the human relations perspective that social context plays a key 
role in individual employee behavior as well as the organizational behavioral 
perspective in that individuals within an organization will respond to incentives 
that reinforce specific behaviors.  Many consultant accounts and biographies of 
prominent leaders/founders give vivid examples of how leaders instilled their 
personal values in their respective organizations. For example, Freiberg and 
Freiberg (1996) tell the Southwest Airlines story and the influence of their 
founder Herb Kelleher, Packard (1996) tells the story of Hewlett-Packard (HP) 
and the influence of its co-founders Bill Hewlett and David Packard on the 
organizational values and culture of HP. Additionally, Lala (2006) documented 
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the multi-generational influence of the Tata family on the multi-national 
conglomerate, the Tata Group. Throughout these accounts, it is clear that 
corporate founders seek to build companies that are “like them.” Schneider 
(1987) and Schein (2010, 2015), on the other hand have studied publicly-traded 
corporations (which were not founded by the current leaders) and documented the 
leadership’s profound impact on a wide range of strategic and operational 
decisions which include, but are not limited to, attraction, selection and attrition 
of employees, development of formal structures and process to develop and 
maintain certain organizational values, and reward and recognition mechanisms 
that celebrate the desired behaviors. Thus, there is sufficient theoretical support, 
reinforced by empirical accounts, for proposition #2 and to pursue the research 
question as to how leaders and influencers at the subject organizations might 
have shaped the shared organizational values. 
RQ2:  How did leaders and influencers shape shared organizational values at the 
subject organizations? 
2.9.3 Research Question #3 
Shared experiences form the core of Schein’s theory on organizational culture 
and leadership (2010, 2015). While different organizations in the same business, 
national, and legal environment may be presented with the same set of 
challenges, how they specifically choose to address their challenges, and 
ultimately triumph, distinguishes them from their competitors. The lessons 
learned through such trials are distilled into organizational values and serve as the 
foundation to address future challenges (proposition #3). Schein addresses the 
notions of both revision and reinforcement: challenges that require new solutions 
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tend to revise previously held organizational values and those that continue to be 
overcome with previously proven solutions tend to reinforce the existing values. 
The implementation mechanisms used to institutionalize organizational values 
include organizational structures, policies, and procedures. Since Schein’s work 
has been the foundation of many applied studies in organizational culture, there is 
support for proposition #3, and therefore, the corresponding research question 
would be to determine how specific shared experiences, through implementation 
mechanisms, might have helped revise and reinforce organizational values at the 
subject organizations.   
RQ3:  How did shared experiences, through implementation mechanisms, help 
revise and reinforce organizational values at the subject organizations? 
2.9.4 Research Question #4 
Feedback is one specific element or action that distinguishes the relationship 
between teaching and learning from being a simple transmission and reception of 
information to a dynamic, multi-loop system of transmitting, receiving, 
questioning, sense-making, building, and assimilating toward enhancement of 
core knowledge within the learner (Askew, 2000). In the context of 
organizational learning, knowledge of factors leading to certain positive or 
negative performance outcomes can result in commitment to certain policies, 
processes, standards, or practices (Clarke, 2006; Putter, 2010; Reason, 1997; 
Senge, 1990). It is also possible that there are two types of feedback: formal and 
informal. Formal feedback is often reported in human resources literature or 
education literature as a means to enhance individual performance (Askew, 2000; 
Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 2014); however, informal feedback is generally 
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implied in the social learning context, particularly in response to how new-hires 
might learn about the prevailing norms at an organization or a specific workgroup 
(Louis, 1980). Thus, at an organizational level, it is likely that both types of 
feedback are present and hence there is support for proposition #4. The 
corresponding research question needs to determine more specifically how 
feedback from group-level performance might have influenced learning derived 
from shared experiences: 
RQ4:  How did feedback from group-level performance influence learning 
derived from shared experiences at the subject organizations? 
2.9.5 Research Question #5 
Several studies noted in the literature review point toward the relationship 
between organizational climate and performance (Beus et al., 2010; Clarke, 2006; 
Zohar, 2002a; Zohar & Hoffman, 2012). However, the link between climate and 
performance is correlational rather than causal. Thus, it makes sense to 
investigate the relationship between the key cultural elements and the 
performance outcomes while organizational climate continues to serve as a 
temporal measure of the underlying cultural elements. Furthermore, the training 
transfer literature claims that the effectiveness of transfer is at least partially 
mediated by organizational culture (Alvarez et al., 2004; Birdi, 2007; Blume et 
al., 2010; Sitzman & Weinhardt, 2015; Spitzer, 2005). Therefore, the final 
research question, derived from proposition #5, seeks to determine how inherent 
cultural elements tend to influence the effectiveness of a planned culture-change 
intervention.  
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RQ5:  How do inherent cultural elements influence the effectiveness of a planned 
culture-change intervention? 
2.9.6 Hypothesis #1 
Building on the last proposition (#5), planned interventions like training could be 
targeted toward increasing awareness, providing a new set of shared experiences, 
and thereby resulting in improved organizational climate. Similarly, training 
could also be targeted toward changing individual and group behaviors and 
thereby impacting individual- and group-level performance (Patankar & Taylor, 
2004). For example, just culture training focuses on reducing at-risk behaviors at 
the individual level, but uses a community standard to set the threshold for such 
behaviors (Dismukes & Smith, 2000; Marx, 2001; Reason, 1997). In the 
healthcare domain, Milne, Walker, and Vlahiki (2013) have demonstrated that 
focus on improving clinical knowledge across a team can improve their 
performance and thereby influence group-level clinical outcomes. Patankar and 
Taylor (2004) have illustrated that just as a well-designed safety program could 
result in a positive return on investment at the firm level, poorly designed 
programs could result in a negative return on investment. Thus, there is sufficient 
evidence to support a more specific hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as an 
implementation mechanism, improves group-level performance. Thus, this 
analysis will have to be at the group-level. 
H1:  The MORE
OB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level 
outcomes. 
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2.9.7 Hypothesis #2 
Fundamentally, training not only seeks to provide a certain necessary skillset for 
the employees, it also symbolizes the value attributed to its employees. Hence, 
Patterson et al. (2005) map emphasis on training with the human relations 
quadrant of the Competing Values Framework. Singer et al. (2007) studied 
organizational climate across 105 hospitals in the United States and concluded 
not only that patient safety training programs influence organizational safety 
climate, but also that for training to have the greatest impact on climate, the 
training programs should target three levels: organization, group, and individual. 
In the aviation industry, Patankar and Taylor (2008) reviewed four generations of 
maintenance resource management training and concluded that as a safety 
training program, it raised awareness among the participants and improved 
organizational safety climate, which in some cases lasted up to two years after the 
end of the training program. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support the more 
specific hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, 
improves group-level patient safety climate. Thus, this analysis will have to be at 
the group-level. 
H2:  The MORE
OB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level 
patient safety climate. 
  
 102 
 
2.10 Summary 
The healthcare system, particularly in Canada, must improve both quality and 
affordability. One key element in addressing this need is the ability to develop 
and sustain a strong culture of patient safety. Building on past studies on 
organizational culture and climate, this study seeks to develop and validate an 
integrated model of culture and climate using a mixed-methods approach. In the 
emergent integrated model of organizational culture and climate, Schein’s 
original model of organizational culture was expanded to explicitly include the 
concepts of environmental influence on culture, organizational learning, four 
types of organizational values, implementation and feedback mechanisms, and 
the role of leaders and key influencers. Artifacts were acknowledged as physical 
objects as well as embedded stories—but they served as evidence of culture 
rather than the culture itself. Thus, culture was proposed to comprise of shared 
experiences and learning, values, implementation and feedback mechanisms, 
individual behaviors, individual and group outcomes, and firm outcomes, as well 
as reinforcement and revision mechanisms that enabled the balance between 
stability and responsiveness inherent to a culture. Climate was viewed as a 
psychological response to the underlying culture and thus comprised of the group 
members’ perceptions of the degree to which the extant work environment is 
conducive to their well-being. In order to change organizational safety culture, 
one would have to influence one or more of its shared core values; training could 
provide an intentional shared experience aimed at influencing organizational 
values. Five research questions and two hypotheses were presented to determine 
the viability of this integrated model.  
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The five research questions focused on the structural aspects of the model, while 
the two hypotheses focused on the operational aspects. Specifically, the research 
questions sought to determine the role of environmental factors in influencing 
organizational culture (RQ1), the role of leaders and key influencers in shaping 
organizational culture (RQ2), the role of implementation mechanisms in 
engineering specific shared experiences that sought to reinforce or revise 
organizational values (RQ3), the role of feedback mechanisms in shaping learning 
derived from shared experiences (RQ4), and the role of inherent cultural elements 
in influencing the effectiveness of planned culture-change interventions (RQ5). 
The two hypotheses, on the other hand, sought to test the influence of the 
MOREOB training (as a planned intervention) on group-level outcomes (H1) and 
on group-level patient safety climate (H2). Collectively, responses to these 
research questions and hypotheses sought to validate the integrated model of 
culture and climate, consider revisions to the model, and ultimately answer the 
overarching research question as to whether a training intervention alone could 
result in a cultural change.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Culture studies, rooted in the tradition of anthropology, tend to be qualitative 
studies involving ethnographic observations, narrative analysis of interviews, 
and/or artifact analysis. Climate studies, on the other hand, are rooted in the 
tradition of psychology and tend to be dominated by quantitative methods like 
survey instruments. Both these approaches have their relative strengths and 
weaknesses. For example, cultural studies tend to be deep but narrow and hence 
difficult to compare across multiple groups; whereas, climate studies tend to be 
broad but shallow and hence making it difficult to get an in-depth understanding 
of the phenomenon being measured. In order to leverage the strengths of both 
these methods, several leading authors have recommended a mixed-methods 
approach. There are many ways of structuring such an approach. For example, 
one could conduct a qualitative study to generate research hypothesis and then 
follow-up with a quantitative study to test the hypothesis. Alternatively, one 
could conduct a quantitative study to get a broad understanding of the 
phenomenon being studied and then follow-up with complementary qualitative 
study to build a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.  
For the purpose of this study, the preceding literature review has led to an 
integrated model of culture and climate. Thus, it follows that both qualitative and 
quantitative methods should be used to test this model. Since the focus of this 
study was not on the development of individual analytical tools (like survey 
instruments or knowledge exams), but rather on the overall dynamics of the 
integrated nature of culture and climate in the narrow context of patient safety, 
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the overall architecture of the methods used in this study would be best described 
as a retrospective, quasi-experimental, mixed-methods approach. It was 
retrospective because the intervention for cultural change, the MOREOB program, 
was developed and implemented by the Salus Global Corporation and pre- and 
post-implementation data were made available to the researcher. The researcher 
was not involved in the design or implementation of the intervention, nor was the 
researcher involved in the design of the various quantitative data collection tools. 
Also, since the earliest intervention had been applied over ten years ago, there 
were no opportunities to make changes to the intervention based on the findings 
of this study. Nonetheless, the extensive datasets available through the Salus 
Global Corporation provided a unique opportunity to study safety culture from 
the perspective of a specific intervention on a longitudinal basis. This study was 
quasi-experimental because the human subjects participating in the safety climate 
survey, the MOREOB intervention, and the knowledge exam were not selected 
randomly—they represented a convenience sample of those who volunteered for 
the intervention and associated surveys and outcome measures (cf. Reichardt & 
Mark, 1997).  From an analytical perspective, this research employed qualitative 
techniques to explore the research questions and quantitative techniques to test 
the hypotheses. Results from both methods were triangulated using a 
convergence model. Thus, this study used a mixed-methods approach.  
Figure 9 has been adapted from Creswell and Clark’s (2007) convergence model. 
In accordance with this model, quantitative and qualitative data collection and 
analysis may proceed along parallel paths, producing their independent results 
(the row of red boxes and the row of blue boxes). In order to maximize the 
benefits of the two types of datasets and the associated methodologies, the 
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convergence approach uses a comparison-and-contrast step, which involves 
identification of unique, complementary, or conflicting learning arising out of the 
two analyses. Finally, in the interpretation phase, the researcher must present the 
holistic learning arising out of the two analyses.  
Figure 9: Creswell’s convergence model for mixed-methods research 
 
In accordance with Creswell’s convergence model for mixed-methods research, 
this study was divided into three studies. The MOREOB program, as an 
intervention strategy, served as the independent variable or treatment across all 
three studies. Study #1 was a quantitative study of the impact of the MOREOB 
program on (a) knowledge, (b) clinical outcomes, and (c) patient safety climate. 
This study tested the two hypotheses: impact of training on group-level outcomes 
(H1) and impact of training on group-level patient safety climate (H2). Study #2 
was a qualitative study of (a) environmental factors, (b) role of leaders and key 
influencers, (c) role of shared experiences, and (d) the role of feedback 
mechanisms in reinforcing or revising organizational values. This study 
developed a richer understanding of the impact of the MOREOB program on the 
patient safety culture of a narrow sample of obstetric units. It addressed four 
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research questions. Finally, Study # 3 followed the integrated model of culture 
and climate to compare and contrast the analyses of qualitative and quantitative 
data in accordance with the theoretical model and in the context of two subject 
hospitals. This study responded to the final research question (RQ5).   
 
3.2 Description of the Study Sample 
The unit of analysis in this study was the obstetrics team. Since organizational 
climate and culture are experienced and lived at a group-level rather than an 
individual-level, the smallest measurable unit for organizational climate and 
culture within obstetrics is the multidisciplinary obstetrics team. Thus, consistent 
with the recommendations in the literature  (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Ehrhart et al., 
2014; Schneider & Barbera, 2014b; Waterson, 2014), the researcher believes that 
culture, as a group-level construct, should be studied and reported as such, and 
not at the individual or at the institutional level (higher than group level). 
This study was based on data from 68 hospitals (represented by one obstetric 
team per hospital) in Ontario, Canada, out of 103 hospitals that provide birthing 
facilities. Of these 68 facilities, 39 are considered “early adopters” because they 
implemented their training program between 2006 and 2008, and the remaining 
29 facilities are considered “late adopters” because they implemented their 
training program between 2009 and 2011. The early adopter group of hospitals 
served as the experimental group and the late adopters served as the control group 
when comparing the effects of the MOREOB program on clinical outcomes.   
A typical obstetrics team in Canadian hospitals consists of obstetricians (10%), 
family physicians (9%), nurses (70%), and midwives (11%). In some cases, the 
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obstetrics team may include residents and administrators of the obstetrics 
program. The average total size of an obstetrics team per hospital is 70. This team 
forms the unit of analysis for all the studies. Thus, any assertions made about the 
safety culture are limited to the obstetrics team at the hospital and not generalized 
to the broader enterprise. Since not all team members participated in every study, 
the specific number of participants in each study varies; a description of sample 
participating in each study is presented in the corresponding section.  
3.3 Description of the Training Intervention 
The MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, was implemented in three 
modules: Learning Together (Module 1), Working Together (Module 2), and 
Changing the Safety Culture (Module 3). Table 8 presents the key steps involved 
prior to each module, during the module, and after the module. Table 9 presents 
the measurement timeline for the patient safety climate survey measurement, 
knowledge exam administration, training module administration, and interview 
and artifact data collection. Clinical outcomes data were available from three to 
five years before the start of the MOREOB training, during the training, and up to 
five years after the training.  The topical content of the training modules matched 
the 16 competencies developed by a group of subject matter experts. A list of 
these competencies is presented in Section 4.2.1 (p.137). As the participants 
progressed from Module 1 to Module 2, the emphasis shifted from acquiring 
foundational knowledge to learning to work together in real-world setting 
through drills and emergency exercises; and in Module 3, the emphasis was on 
proactively identifying and changing individual and team behaviors, as well as 
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past practices and policies to be consistent with those expected from high-
reliability organizations (e.g., hierarchy is flattened in an emergency situation). 
Table 9: Key steps before, during, and after the training intervention for each 
module 
Pre-Training    
Hospital appoints a multidisciplinary Core Team consisting of physicians, 
nurses, and administrators to manage the overall implementation of the 
MOREOB program 
Consulting Company assigns a dedicated Program Consultant to work with the 
Hospital Core Team 
Core Team receives a Program Manual and access to the online platform which 
has all the clinical and non-clinical content, workshop materials, and materials 
to conduct group activities including skills drills and emergency drills 
Core Team conducts an environmental scan of clinical outcomes and other 
concurrent initiatives in session 
Pre-Module Climate Survey (For Module 1) 
Pre-Module Knowledge Exam (For Module 1) 
Selection of Emphasis Areas for Training, Workshops, Skills Drills, and 
Emergency Drills based on team-level weaknesses identified in the Knowledge 
Exam 
Program Consultant trained the Core Team using the “Train the Trainer” model 
During Training 
Program Consultant worked with the Core Team to provide technical support, 
monitor overall progress, and address emerging issues 
The Hospital Core Team was responsible for conducting the training—
multidisciplinary local trainers trained multidisciplinary teams. 
Post Training  
Post Module Climate Survey (For All Modules) 
Post Module Knowledge Exam (For All Modules) 
Review of Clinical Outcomes, Climate Survey, and Knowledge Exam with the 
Core Team and Hospital Management 
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Table 10: Training and data collection timeline 
Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 Interviews 
and 
Artifact 
Collection 
Pre-Module 1 
Climate 
Survey 
    All 
interviews 
and 
artifact 
collections 
were 
conducted 
in 2016 
Pre-Module 1 
Knowledge 
Exam 
  
 
Module 2 
(8-12 months) 
Early 
Adopters: 
2007 
Late Adopters: 
2010 
  
 
Module 3 
(8-12 months) 
Early 
Adopters: 
2008 
Late Adopters: 
2011 
Module 1 
(8-12 months) 
Early 
Adopters: 
2006 
Late Adopters: 
2009 
  
Post-Module 1 
Climate 
Survey 
 Post-Module 2 
Climate 
Survey 
 Post-Module 2 
Climate 
Survey 
 
Post-Module 1 
Knowledge 
Exam 
 Post-Module 2 
Knowledge 
Exam 
 Post-Module 2 
Knowledge 
Exam 
 
Post-Module 1 
Clinical 
Outcomes 
Data 
 Post-Module 2 
Clinical 
Outcomes 
Data 
 Post-Module 3 
Clinical 
Outcomes 
Data 
 
 
3.4 Measures Used in the Study 
This section presents an overview of the measures used across the three studies. 
Study #1 has three sections: (a) knowledge exam analysis, (b) clinical outcomes 
analysis, and (c) patient safety climate analysis.  The knowledge exam analysis 
was used to determine the knowledge gained about clinical topic areas (listed in 
Section 4.2.1, p.137) and about how to work in multidisciplinary teams that was 
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gained through the MOREOB program. Since exam scores were not available at 
question level, it was not possible to provide Chronbach’s alpha for the exam; 
however, the Kuder-Richardson formula 21 (KR-21) was used to determine the 
reliability of the exam and then the scores were categorized by the exam topics 
(e.g, communication, postpartum hemorrhage, management of labor, etc.). Next, 
in the clinical outcomes analysis, outcome data were categorized in terms of 
dichotomous values on whether a particular condition exists (e.g., Cesarean 
section birth) and the frequency of these conditions existing over a period of time 
before and after the MOREOB training program modules. Finally, patient safety 
climate analysis focused on the effects of the MOREOB program on the safety 
climate at the participating obstetrics units. Since the survey instrument which 
was used to collect the safety climate data was not designed by the researcher and 
was not tested for psychometric properties, Exploratory Factor Analysis was 
conducted to discover the underlying pattern of connections between the 
responses to survey items. This discovery led to the development of a factor 
structure. This factor structure was then tested using Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis to determine its validity. The confirmed factor structure was used for the 
analysis of the effects of the MOREOB training on patient safety climate in 
obstetrics.  
Study #2 was a qualitative study. As such, it used semi-structured interviews and 
artifact analysis to identify key themes that could be used to explain how the 
organizational culture was created, maintained and changed at the subject 
organizations. Emphasis was placed on identifying and differentiating between 
espoused, attributed, shared, and aspired values, as well as the reinforcement and 
revision processes used to maintain/revise the organizational values. The role of 
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formal leadership and key influencers at the group level and the effects of group-
level performance outcomes were also explored. 
Study #3 was a mixed-methods, longitudinal study of two subject hospitals. It 
leveraged the data and findings from the preceding two studies but focused on the 
two subject hospitals and their respective peer groups (Early Adopters or Late 
Adopters).  The goal of this study was to respond to the fifth research question: 
How do inherent cultural elements influence the effectiveness of a planned 
culture-change intervention? 
3.5 Study #1: Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of the MOREOB Program 
on Knowledge, Clinical Outcomes, and Patient Safety Climate 
3.5.1 Hypotheses and Measures 
In Study #1, two hypotheses were tested.  
H1:  The MORE
OB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level 
outcomes. 
Two performance measures were used to test this hypothesis: knowledge 
examination scores and clinical outcomes.  
H2:  The MORE
OB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level 
patient safety climate. 
Safety climate survey scores were used to test this hypothesis. 
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3.5.2 The Knowledge Examination 
The objective of the knowledge exam analysis was to determine the extent to 
which the MOREOB program was effective in raising the knowledge level of 
participating clinicians. Traditionally, healthcare professionals have been trained 
in accordance with their respective professional discipline and tested for their 
individual knowledge and skill; yet, in practice, they have been expected to work 
together, across multiple disciplines and achieve the collective goal of health and 
safety of their patient. In the case of the MOREOB program, the premise was that 
if the entire obstetrics team was trained together, with appropriate emphasis on 
discipline-specific knowledge and skills training, as well as mutual roles and 
responsibilities, they would have a stronger core knowledge base in the field of 
obstetrics, build respect for each other’s professional competency, trust each 
other, and improve interpersonal communication (Milne et al., 2013). The 
MOREOB knowledge assessment examination was developed by a diverse team 
of subject matter experts with due consideration to the core knowledge that each 
obstetrics team member should demonstrate. The assessment tool itself consisted 
of a criterion-referenced multiple-choice exam (75 questions), which was 
reviewed and updated periodically. Thus, although the competencies remained 
the same, the specific exam questions changed over time, thereby ensuring that 
any gains in scores were most likely to be due to knowledge gained from the 
MOREOB program and subsequent implementation, rather than chance or 
memorization of answers from the preceding round of testing.   
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3.5.2.1 Description of the Sample and Analysis of the Exam 
The Salus Global Corporation provided the researcher with exam scores 
associated with each administration of the knowledge examination for each 
participant in the MOREOB program. The sample for this analysis consisted of 
participants from 68 hospitals (n=4,157). It was a representative sample of 
obstetricians, family physicians, nurses, and midwives.   
A validity and reliability analysis of the exam was conducted. The validity 
analysis was based on the process used to construct the exam and its conformity 
with the learning outcomes of the course. Since item-level student performance 
scores were not available, Chronbach’s Alpha could not be calculated. Thus, only 
Kuder-Richardson formula 21 (KR-21) was used to determine the reliability of 
this exam (Gay, 1996), which is a conservative estimate of reliability and is 
popularly used in educational testing. 
 
Where   K= the number of items in the test 
SD= the standard deviation of the scores 
     = the mean of the scores 
 
Generally, a reliability score of .90 is expected for established achievement tests; 
however, a score in the range of .70 to .80 is more common for classroom-based 
educational programs and associated tests.  
In order to establish the content validity of the exam, the researcher reviewed the 
process used to construct the exam and compared its structural blueprint with 
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learning outcomes of the MOREOB program. Each exam question was analyzed 
(Item Analysis) to determine the difficulty level of each item, the discriminating 
power of the item, and the effectiveness of each alternative (McCowan & 
McCowan, 1999).  
This analysis tested the overall reliability and validity of the knowledge exam 
before its scores were used to determine whether or not the MOREOB training 
program was effective in improving the core knowledge.   
3.5.2.2 Measure 1: Knowledge Exam Scores 
In response to the MOREOB training, the participants’ clinical and non-clinical 
(about communication and teamwork) knowledge was expected to improve. Data 
were collected at the individual level and aggregated at the obstetrics group level. 
Changes in clinical and non-clinical knowledge levels of the group were tested 
using repeated measures ANOVA on the pretest/post-test scores on knowledge 
exams. Improvement in knowledge scores would mean that the MOREOB training 
was effective in improving the clinical and team-performance knowledge of the 
participants. The context in which such knowledge was obtained forms a new 
shared experience and the knowledge gained serves as learning derived from this 
shared experience. Thus, per the integrated model of organizational culture and 
climate, there would be partial support for the hypothesis that the MOREOB 
training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level outcomes (H1).  In order 
to fully support this hypothesis, the improvement in knowledge needs to transfer 
to an associated improvement in work performance outcomes (such as clinical 
outcomes). 
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3.5.3 The Clinical Outcomes 
The objective of the clinical outcomes analysis was to determine the extent to 
which the MOREOB program was effective in improving the clinical outcomes. 
The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) collects clinical outcomes 
data from all Canadian healthcare facilities.  The Salus Global Corporation 
requested maternal and neonatal linked health records for all acute care 
separations where the patient presented for labor and delivery. CIHI provided 
these data on a secure platform for access and analysis only at the Salus Global 
facility in London, Ontario.  
3.5.3.1 Description of the Sample 
The sample for this analysis was divided into two groups: Experimental Groups 
(I & II) and Control Group. The Experimental Group I comprised of the 39 early 
adopting obstetrics groups and Experimental Group II comprised of 29 late 
adopting obstetrics groups, as described in Section 3.3. The Control Group 
comprised of all the other healthcare facilities in Ontario. Since there were 103 
total obstetrics groups in Ontario, for Experimental Group I, the corresponding 
Control Group I consisted of 64 obstetrics groups and for Experimental Group II, 
the corresponding Control Group II consisted of the remaining 35 obstetrics 
groups. 
Data from the Canadian Institute for Healthcare Information (CIHI) were used for 
the analysis of clinical outcomes. CIHI uses ICD-10-CA (CIHI, 2009b) as the 
coding scheme for diagnosis and CCI (CIHI, 2012) as the coding scheme for 
interventions. Since case-level linked data were made available, it was possible to 
consider each maternal case and its linked neonatal case and decode the 
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associated diagnosis and intervention. For example, if a woman was admitted for 
pre-term labor and she delivered a set of twins with low birth weights, and 
suffered postpartum hemorrhage, stayed in the hospital for five days and the 
babies stayed in the hospital for two weeks, it was possible to decipher all this 
information from the dataset. It is important to note that although the maternal 
and neonatal cases were linked, there were no names or other identifiable 
information associated with these cases. Also, in accordance with Salus Global’s 
agreement with CIHI, the researcher had signed a non-disclosure agreement with 
the Salus Global Corporation. 
3.5.3.2 Analysis of the Clinical Outcomes 
The maternal clinical outcome variables of interest were as follows:  
1. Caesarean Section, 
2. Postpartum Hemorrhage, 
3. Shoulder Dystocia, and   
4. Length of Stay.  
The data for both experimental groups (those participating in the MOREOB 
program) and the control group (all other facilities) were mapped against the 
MOREOB training dates and analyzed to determine if the difference in the clinical 
outcomes achieved by the experimental groups versus the control group was 
significant. Also, the longitudinal trend of the clinical outcomes was mapped to 
determine whether the clinical impact of the MOREOB program was significant. 
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3.5.3.3 Measure 2: Clinical Outcomes  
Since the MOREOB program was aimed at reducing undesirable clinical 
outcomes, it was logical to expect a decline in such outcomes after the MOREOB 
training. If the clinical outcomes of the obstetrics units improved after the 
MOREOB training, it would mean that the MOREOB training was effective in 
improving the clinical performance outcomes at the participating obstetric units. 
An improvement in these outcomes would support the hypothesis that the 
MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level outcomes 
(H1).   
3.5.4 The Patient Safety Climate Assessment  
The objective of the patient safety climate analysis was to test the second 
hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-
level patient safety climate (H2). Before this objective could be addressed, it was 
essential to analyze the safety climate survey instrument. This instrument was 
developed by the Salus Global Corporation and administered prior to the 
initiation of the MOREOB program as well as after each of the three modules. It 
consisted of 54 items that were rated on a Likert-type scale of 1-5 (strongly 
disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree). The goal of this instrument 
was to determine the effectiveness of the MOREOB training program in changing 
the safety climate at hospitals participating in the MOREOB program. The survey 
instrument is provided in Appendix B.  
The underlying model of safety climate survey was derived from High Reliability 
Organizations and Communities of Practice literature (Thanh et al., 2010). The 
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survey instrument corresponded with the instructional goals of the MOREOB 
program and included six dimensions: 
1. Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority 
2. Teamwork 
3. Valuing Individuals 
4. Open Communication 
5. Learning 
6. Empowering People 
The MOREOB program required that each implementing hospital form a 
multidisciplinary core team, including senior management and clinical 
practitioners, who signed a commitment agreement to implement the MOREOB 
program. Such a commitment most likely included assignment of the necessary 
organizational resources to ensure that all members of the obstetrics unit were 
available for training and any barriers to their training or practices resulting from 
their training were at least addressed if not removed. The majority of the cost of 
training itself, however, was provided by an external entity—either the insurance 
provider or the provincial Ministry of Health. The goal of the MOREOB program 
was “to change the culture of blame to a focused and sustained patient safety 
culture, where patient safety is everyone’s responsibility, with observed 
reductions in events and improved quality of care” (Milne & Lalonde, 2007) 
p.565). Thus, the MOREOB program placed a clear overall emphasis on safety.  
3.5.4.1 Description of the Sample 
The MOREOB Safety Climate Assessment Survey was administered by the Salus 
Global Corporation at 68 obstetrics groups across Ontario between 2006 and 
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2011, both pre- and post-MOREOB training. On an average, each obstetrics group 
consisted of 70 personnel (49 nurses, 7 obstetricians, 6 family physicians, and 8 
midwives). Although the actual number of members attending any particular 
delivery ranged from 5-7, since the entire pool of 70 personnel underwent the 
MOREOB training together and there was considerable shift-based rotation in 
allocation of a specific member to a specific delivery, the entire group of 70 
personnel was considered a functional unit of measurement for safety culture 
assessment. Rousseau (1990) emphasized the importance of choice of the “unit of 
measurement” and cautioned against generalizing the conclusions beyond the unit 
of measurement. According to Schein (1988), “culture is the organization’s 
response to the problems that it has confronted” (p.5). Schein’s definition of 
culture involves contributory relationships: common experiences of a group lead 
to a shared view of the world by that group, which in turn leads to shared 
methods of problem solving, and repeated success of certain methods results in 
basic assumptions about the world in which this group operates. Since the 
MOREOB training, operational challenges, and the routine practice of newly 
acquired knowledge and skills take place as a shared experience within various 
combination of personnel involving the obstetrics team, it makes sense to define 
and measure culture at this level.   
In accordance with the approach used by Singer et al. (Singer et al., 2007) to 
validate Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare Organizations Survey, the MOREOB 
Safety Climate Survey data were sorted as follows:  
 Group 1A (50 Percent Random Sample of the Early Adopters): Includes 
39 obstetrics groups that underwent the MOREOB training between 2006 
and 2008. A 50 percent random sample of all the pre-training responses 
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from the total Group 1 respondents (n=2,198) formed the derivation 
sample.  
 Group 1B (50 Percent Random Sample of the Early Adopters): Includes 
39 obstetrics groups that underwent the MOREOB training between 2006 
and 2008. A 50 percent random sample of all the pre-training responses 
from the total Group 1 respondents (n=2,198) formed the validation 
sample. 
 Group 1C (50 Percent Random Sample of Early Adopters): Includes 39 
obstetrics groups that underwent the MOREOB training between 2006 and 
2008.This third  50 percent random sample of all the pre-training 
responses from the total Group 1 respondents (n=2,198) formed 
confirmation sample (used in Confirmatory Factory Analysis). 
3.5.4.2 Factor Analysis  
An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted on all the pre-training 
responses in the derivation sample (from Group 1) with extraction of factors 
using Principal Axis Factoring, followed by Direct Oblimin Rotation with Kaiser 
Normalization, to identify a simplistic structure of relatively independent groups 
of items (factors) as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2012). The factor 
groupings were verified by referencing the inflection points on the Scree plot.  
Next, the EFA results were compared with the intended six dimensions of the 
Safety Climate Assessment Survey: 
1. Patient safety is everyone’s priority 
2. Teamwork 
3. Valuing individuals 
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4. Open communication 
5. Learning  
6. Empowering people 
A Multi-Trait Analysis (MTA) was conducted on all the responses in the 
validation sample (from Group 1B). Item-to-scale correlations were examined to 
determine the extent to which the item measured the hypothesized dimension or 
factor of safety climate rather than any other dimension. For construct validity to 
be high, the item-to-scale correlation should be above .40 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2012). Together, EFA and MTA tested for the reliability and validity of the 
survey instrument.   
The emergent model of safety climate was compared with Singer et al’s (2007) 
nine-dimensional model: three organization-level factors, two unit-level factors, 
three individual-level factors, and one additional factor.  
Finally, another sample of survey responses (Group 1C) was used to conduct a 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis on the factors previously identified and validated 
by MTA.  The results of MTA were presented as a hypothetical factor structure 
for patient safety climate in obstetrics. In accordance with contemporary 
recommendations for the assessment of model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012) the following criteria were used: 
 χ2/df  <  5.00 is acceptable; <3.00 is good (Kline, 1998) 
 NFI > .90 is good (Bentler & Bonett, 1980) 
 CFI > .90 is acceptable; >.95 is good (Bentler, 1990) 
 TLI > .90 is acceptable; >.95 is good (Hu & Bentler, 1999) 
 RMSEA < .10 is acceptable; <.06 is good (Hu & Bentler, 1999)   
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The resultant, well-supported, factor structure was used to test the impact of 
MOREOB training on safety climate. 
3.5.4.3 Impact of the MOREOB Training on Safety Climate 
An assessment of changes in safety climate pre-/post-MOREOB training was 
conducted at the obstetrics group level at each healthcare facility to identify 
statistically significant differences in the safety climate that may be attributed to 
the MOREOB training. 
3.5.4.4 Measure 
Patient safety climate scores served as the measure for the second hypothesis.  
H2:  The MORE
OB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level 
patient safety climate. 
This hypothesis was tested using a Latent Growth Modeling (LGM) framework, 
which allowed for assessment of change over periodic treatments along a 
longitudinal timeline (Duncan & Ducan, 2009). Pre-training, post-Module 1, 
post-Module 2, and post-Module 3 formed the four measurements used to 
determine both the amount of change and the shape of change. An improvement 
in patient safety climate scores would mean that the MOREOB training was 
effective in improving the safety climate at the participating obstetric units, 
supporting the second hypothesis, as stated above. An improvement in patient 
safety climate signals an improvement in the participants’ attitudes toward the 
underlying culture. Climate scores alone are not capable of identifying all the 
underlying cultural changes, but they would be indicative of potential cultural 
shifts.  
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3.6 Study #2: Qualitative Analysis of Environmental Factors, Leadership, 
Shared Experiences, and Feedback Mechanisms  
Study #2 was a qualitative study and addressed four research questions:  
RQ1:  How did environmental factors influence the patient safety culture in the 
obstetrics practice in Ontario? 
RQ2:  How did leaders and influencers shape shared organizational values at the 
subject organizations? 
RQ3:  How did shared experiences, through implementation mechanisms, help 
revise and reinforce organizational values at the subject organizations? 
RQ4:  How did feedback from group-level performance influence learning 
derived from shared experiences at the subject organizations? 
This study developed a richer understanding of the key cultural elements within 
the narrow sample of obstetric units at two subject hospitals.  
The researcher conducted interviews with key informants from a convenience 
sample of two hospitals with comparable attributes like level of care, number of 
births per year, and availability of key informants for the interviews.  With the 
average functional unit size of 70 and two  facilities, as many as 140 interview 
candidates were identified; however, it was not practically feasible to conduct as 
many individual interviews. Therefore, a combination of individual and team 
interviews was used.  Forty-one individuals, representing senior management, 
obstetricians, nurses, and midwives, from two hospitals participated in the 
interviews.  
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3.6.1 The Interview Instrument 
A semi-structured interview approach was used to collect narrative data regarding 
the experience prior to implementing the MOREOB program, during the 
implementation, and post-implementation.  The general themes explored during 
these interviews included the following (the interview schedule, with specific 
questions, is included in Appendix A): 
1. Rationale for the choice of the MOREOB program as a strategic 
intervention—consider environmental factors, compatibility with existing 
organizational values and goals of the MOREOB program, and specific 
desired clinical or financial outcomes; 
2. The role of leaders and key influencers in facilitating the adoption of new 
practices in response to the MOREOB program, challenges in 
implementing the program, and use of feedback mechanisms to sustain 
the momentum of change; and 
3. Evidence of institutionalization in terms of artifacts, stories, awards, and 
general recognition of best practices and heroes, as well as transfer of best 
practices beyond obstetrics. 
Follow-up questions varied slightly, depending on the candidates. For example, 
some nurses commented on examples of how their practice had changed. Senior 
management, on the other hand, commented on broad changes in the healthcare 
sector and how such changes influenced changes in practice. In response, they 
were asked to give specific examples. The narratives generated from these 
interviews were first assigned attributes such as participant type (e.g., nurse, 
physician, senior manager, etc.) as well as employer (e.g., hospital A or hospital 
 127 
 
B). Next, the content was coded at three levels: (a) as individual-level answers to 
specific questions from the interview instrument; (b) as common themes 
emerging across all the answers, (c) whether they were related to specific cultural 
elements (e.g., values, leadership, implementation mechanism, etc.), and (d) in 
accordance with the five research questions. These narratives were also used to 
identify underlying assumptions, shared values, and key shared experiences 
(defining moments). 
3.6.2 Artifact Analysis 
Artifacts are symbolic representations of culture (Rousseau, 1990). They are 
unique to each functional unit and they represent that unit’s values. Some 
examples of such artifacts include mission and vision statements, goals and 
priorities, logos, awards, commonly told stories, and local heroes and legends.  
In addition to the on-site interviews at the two healthcare facilities, as described 
in Section 3.6.1, the researcher collected examples of the following artifacts: 
1. Mission/Vision Statement 
2. Goals and Priorities 
3. Annual Reports 
4. Strategic Plan 
5. Awards/Recognition 
6. Notes from Field Visit 
A content analysis of these items, together with the themes extracted from the 
interviews, served as manifestation of enacted values and unquestioned 
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assumptions. Overall, the above types of artifacts served as tangible evidence of 
institutionalization of organizational culture. 
3.7 Study #3: Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Studies. 
The objective of this study was to integrate the data and findings from the 
preceding studies, in the context of longitudinal assessments of two subject 
hospitals, and develop a comprehensive response to the integrated model of 
culture and climate. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were inadequate 
on their own in fully describing or analyzing culture and hence a mixed-methods 
approach was used to leverage the benefits of each and produce a more 
meaningful and substantive analysis (cf. Rousseau, 1990). Generally, a mixed-
methods approach in research design refers to all procedures involved in 
collecting and analyzing research data in the context of a single research project 
(Creswell & Clark, 2007; Currall, Helland Hammer, Baggett, & Doniger, 1999; 
Driscoll et al., 2007). In the case of this study, the quantitative data were 
collected independently and at different times; however, the MOREOB program 
served as the common shared experience and enabled temporal anchoring of the 
data to investigate the influence of various factors on each other.  
3.7.1 Quantitative Data 
The quantitative data collected in the context of this research project included the 
following: 
1. MOREOB Knowledge Exam Data 
2. CIHI Clinical Outcomes Data 
3. Patient Safety Climate Survey Data 
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While these three types of quantitative data could not be linked at the individual 
level, the functional unit (the unit of analysis) contributing to the three datasets 
were known to be the same. Thus, at the functional unit level, two hospitals were 
selected for focused, longitudinal reviews.  
3.7.2 Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data collected included the following: 
1. Interview Data 
2. Artifact Data 
Both these types of data were collected from three healthcare facilities, as 
described in Section 3.6.2. These data were coded using QSR NVivo 10.0, a 
qualitative data coding software, so that the themes emerging from the qualitative 
data could be analyzed (cf. Driscoll et al., 2007).   
3.7.3 Anchoring Scheme 
The quantitative and qualitative data were collected in different timeframes and 
by different entities; thus, the researcher had to develop an anchoring scheme to 
enable effective merging of the datasets. It was possible to link the quantitative 
datasets based on a timeline starting with one year prior to the beginning of the 
first module of the MOREOB training at one of the 39 early-adopter facilities and 
continuing on through three years after the completion of the last MOREOB 
module at the last of the 39 early-adopter facilities. With this approach, pre- and 
post-training data were analyzed to determine the degree to which the MOREOB 
training could have influenced the safety climate and clinical outcomes.  
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3.7.4 Test of the Integrated Model of Culture and Climate 
The emergent model, as presented in this study, integrated the constructs of 
organizational culture and climate. Culture, as a group-level construct, is a shared 
set of values that manifest themselves in distinctive artifacts and behaviors of that 
group, giving that group a specific identity. At the heart of a group’s culture are 
its values, which are reinforced or revised through shared experiences of its 
members. While reinforcement of the group’s values takes place on a routine 
basis, revision takes place under extraordinary circumstances such as internal or 
external threats to its survival or well-being. Values lead to implementation 
mechanisms like strategies, policies, procedures, and practices. Leaders and key 
influencers impact how values are reinforced through the various implementation 
mechanisms. Group performance includes individual and group behaviors that 
influence performance on focused metrics like safety, innovation, and quality. 
Climate, as a psychological response, includes perceptions by members of the 
group with respect to how individual, group, and firm-level outcomes are 
treated—what is deemed important and what underlying behaviors are rewarded. 
Finally, a transformational change can be claimed when there has been a “value-
level” impact.   
In order to validate the above model, this section considered the MOREOB 
program as an independent variable and knowledge, clinical outcomes, and 
patient safety climate as dependent variables. Since all the hospitals in this study 
were located in the same province, they were all assumed to be subjected to the 
same four environmental factors. However, it was noted in Study #2 that Hospital 
A was particularly impacted by a sudden growth in population and ethnic 
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diversity—this was noted as a defining moment or a systemic shock. Similarly, 
Hospital B was impacted by the appointment of the external supervisor, another 
example of a defining moment. Thus, it was reasonable to expect that the 
organizational cultures at these two hospitals would be different from those at 
other hospitals in their respective peer groups. Therefore, these two hospitals 
were selected for longitudinal analysis to determine how prior shared 
experiences, shared values and assumptions, leaders and key influencers, 
implementation mechanisms, and post-intervention experiences and performance 
outcomes might have influenced  the effectiveness of the MOREOB training, as a 
planned intervention, on their respective organizational culture and climate. 
Analysis of artifacts was expected to be representative of the extant cultural 
attributes and the evolutionary path taken by the organization. The theoretical 
influence trajectory was postulated to be as follows: 
Shared Experiences Defining MomentValues and Assumptions, as 
well as LeadershipImplementation MechanismsNew Shared 
ExperienceNew Individual BehaviorsNew Performance 
OutcomesFeedback Mechanisms New Shared ExperienceRevision 
of Values and Assumptions.  
This study discussed findings related to all five research questions and two 
hypotheses, but the findings were in the limited context of the two subject 
hospitals. In particular, this study focused on the fifth research question because 
it was not addressed in the preceding two studies. 
RQ5:  How do inherent cultural elements influence the effectiveness of planned 
culture-change interventions? 
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3.8 Ethical Considerations 
The researcher was a nine-month, fulltime tenured faculty member of Saint Louis 
University. Part of his employment expectations included research; therefore, 
there was no conflict of interest in the researcher pursuing this project concurrent 
with his employment, especially on a part-time basis from a distance. In fact, the 
University of Sheffield’s research degree structure (part-time, remote location) 
was particularly suitable for this project. The researcher committed to spending 
20 per cent of his time during the academic year and 100 per cent of his time 
during the summer and winter breaks (off-contract periods) to concurrently fulfill 
all the necessary obligations toward his employer and toward the research Ph.D. 
program at the University of Sheffield.   
3.8.1 The Salus Global Corporation Fellowship 
The researcher was a U.S. citizen conducting research on Canadian data, and 
pursuing doctoral degree from the United Kingdom. This was a unique, 
international research partnership. In order to facilitate the research while 
respecting Canada’s Export Control laws, the Salus Global Corporation served as 
the agent between the researcher and Canadian agencies. Also, Salus Global 
provided a Visiting Research Fellowship to the researcher. In order to manage the 
conflict of interest arising out of such funding, the researcher exercised a three-
level conflict management plan: one, the funding for this fellowship was not 
contingent upon any specific research outcomes; two, the Salus Global 
Fellowship stipend was restricted to less than 25 per cent of the total cost of the 
research so that Salus Global was not the majority stakeholder in the outcomes of 
this research; and three, the University of Sheffield, which had no financial 
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interest in the Salus Global Corporation, retained full supervisory and approval 
authority for the project. 
3.8.2 Access to Archival Data 
The Salus Global Corporation provided access to the following three sets of 
archival data: 
1. MOREOB Knowledge Exam Scores 
2. Patient Safety Climate Survey Data 
3. CIHI Clinical Outcomes Data 
The first two sets of data were collected by Salus Global and were proprietary; 
however, the researcher was granted full access to these data through a non-
disclosure agreement. The researcher had no reason to believe that these data may 
not be genuine and therefore assumed to be truthful and provided in good faith. 
The clinical outcomes dataset had been collected by Canadian Institute for Health 
Information (CIHI) directly from the individual healthcare facilities and provided 
to Salus Global. However, given the fact that the dataset contained some 
institution-level identifying information, the researcher signed a non-disclosure 
agreement with Salus Global that enabled him to access the data, de-identify it, 
and run the necessary statistical analyses.  
3.8.3 CIHI Protocol 
The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) provided Salus Global with 
maternal and neonatal health abstracts from all healthcare facilities in Ontario for 
fiscal years 2001 through 2011. Salus Global made these abstracts available to 
the researcher, but the data did not leave the Salus Global property. Therefore, the 
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researcher installed a separate computer (non-networked) on Salus Global’s 
property so that the CIHI data in both SAS and Excel formats could be loaded on 
this separate computer. This computer remained within full control of Salus 
Global until the end of this project; thereafter, its hard-drive was reformatted and 
it was returned to the researcher. 
3.8.4 Protection of Human Subjects  
Prior to beginning Study #2, which involved interviews and artifact collection, it 
was necessary to secure appropriate Human Subjects approval. A proposal for 
Human Subjects study was developed, which was subsequently approved by the 
University of Sheffield. In accordance with the protocol, an approved informed 
consent form was used to secure every participant’s consent prior to enrolling 
them in the study.  In order to minimize the risk of breach of confidentiality for 
the participants, the researchers did not use any identifying information on the 
interview transcripts. The participating subjects were made aware of this risk and 
only those volunteering to continue with the interview were included in the study. 
Every reasonable precaution was taken to secure confidential data. 
The CEOs of all 68 hospitals with MOREOB programs were invited to participate 
in interviews of themselves as well as members familiar with the implementation 
of the MOREOB program (specifically, the obstetrics team).  Each prospective 
participant was made aware of the purpose of the research, the benefits and risks 
associated with participating and not participating, confidentiality of their identity 
and affiliation, and their right to terminate the interviews at any time. This project 
received Ethics Approval on June 1, 2015. The Approval Letter, Research 
Information Sheet, and the Consent Form are attached in Appendix A.    
 135 
 
Chapter 4: Results of Study #1 
4.1 Introduction 
Overall, five research questions and two hypotheses were addressed across three 
studies. Appropriate quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques were used to 
test the hypotheses and respond to the research questions. Study #1 was a 
quantitative study of knowledge exams, clinical performance improvements, and 
safety climate outcomes. This study addressed the following two hypotheses: 
H1:  The MORE
OB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level 
performance. 
H2:  The MORE
OB training, as a planned intervention, improves organizational 
climate.  
The first hypothesis was tested with two measures: knowledge examination 
scores and clinical outcomes. Knowledge examinations were administered by the 
Salus Global Corporation prior to the first MOREOB training module and at the 
end of each subsequent module. Data from three modules were used in the 
analysis. Since the exams were developed by Salus Global and results of 
reliability and validity analysis were not available, this study started with a 
validity analysis of the examination and proceeded with item analysis as well as 
reliability analysis. Once the reliability and validity of the examinations were 
established, participant scores before and after the MOREOB training modules 
were compared between two groups of hospitals (Early Adopters and Late 
Adopters, as described in Section 3.2).  Results of these analyses are reported in 
the Section 4.2.1. 
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Next, four clinical outcomes were analyzed: (a) Cesarean section rates, (b) 
postpartum hemorrhage rates, (c) handling of shoulder dystocia, and (d) overall 
length of stay. The rationale for choosing these outcomes is discussed later in this 
chapter. The original data were provided by the Canadian Institute for Healthcare 
Information (CIHI) to the Salus Global Corporation. The researcher accessed 
these data under the terms of the agreement between CIHI and Salus Global. In 
addition to the obstetrics groups classified as Early Adopters or Late Adopters, a 
third group of obstetrics groups —Non-Adopters—was also included in the 
analysis. The Non-Adopters consisted of obstetrics groups that had not adopted 
the MOREOB program. Thus, the total sample consisted of data from 103 
obstetrics groups across Ontario (35 Non-Adopters, 39 Early Adopters, and 29 
Late Adopters).  Results of these analyses are reported in Section 4.2.2. 
The second hypothesis was tested using a validated multi-factor safety climate 
structure. The exploratory factor analysis process followed by confirmatory 
factor analysis processed used to test the psychometric properties of the survey 
instrument resulted in six factors: (a) Patient safety is everyone’s priority; (b) 
Learning, (c) Valuing individuals, (d) Empowering people, (e) Open 
communication, and (f) Teamwork. Results of these analyses are reported in 
Section 4.2.3. 
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4.2 Results of Study #1: Quantitative Analysis 
4.2.1 MOREOB Knowledge Examination Data Analysis  
4.2.1.1 Validity Analysis 
The Salus Global Corporation followed a DACUM-like process (Norton, 1997), 
which started with the identification of key tasks performed by the obstetrics 
team and followed by the identification of the underpinning knowledge required 
to perform those tasks. This approach is different from the traditional DACUM 
process, which focuses on tasks performed by an individual because the process 
is intended to produce certification criteria for the individual. Nonetheless, the 
process could be used to develop team-level knowledge requirements. The 
following sixteen competencies were identified by a group of subject matter 
experts: 
1. Communication (Interpersonal) 
2. Patient Safety (As a philosophical and practical priority) 
3. Management of Labor 
4. Induction of Labor 
5. Assisted Vaginal and Breech Births 
6. Hypertensive Disorders in Pregnancy 
7. Antepartum and Intrapartum Hemorrhage 
8. Postpartum Hemorrhage 
9. Preterm Labor and Birth 
10. Prelabor Rupture of Membranes 
11. Fetal Well-being 
12. Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Section 
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13. Group II Streptococcus Infection 
14. Deep Vein Thrombosis 
15. Twins 
16. Shoulder Dystocia and Cord Prolapse 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) developed learning objectives for each 
knowledge domain to be taught and tested, a separate Obstetrical Care Review 
Committee reviewed all relevant literature to ensure that the core content was 
current and supported the prevailing best practices. Then, a modular curriculum 
was developed to progressively address both knowledge and skill aspects of the 
above sixteen areas of competencies. There were three training modules, each 
approximately 8-12 months in length: Learning Together, Working Together, and 
Changing the Safety Culture. All three modules covered the same sixteen topics 
(listed above), but the pedagogy transitioned from purely didactic to clinical. 
Each module started with an overview of subject matter to be covered and the 
expected student learning outcomes. In the first module, the emphasis was on 
acquiring clinical knowledge. The second module started by reinforcing 
previously learned clinical knowledge and emphasized the application of that 
knowledge while working as an obstetrics team. The third module reinforced 
both didactic and clinical aspects of previously acquired knowledge and 
emphasized the roles and responsibility that each member of the obstetrics team 
has in influencing the culture of their unit. As the modules progressed from 
didactic to clinical setting, they incorporated high-reliability concepts like 
interpersonal communication, teamwork, and prioritization of patient safety. 
(Milne et al., 2013). 
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Another group of SMEs, who were specialists in writing exam questions, 
developed a bank of over 400 multiple choice questions to match with each 
learning objective. These questions were aimed at criterion-referenced testing, 
meaning each candidate had to demonstrate a certain level of proficiency or pass 
rate rather than a norm-based testing wherein the score required for a particular 
candidate to pass the exam is relative to the scores attained by a group of 
candidates taking the exam. Further, each question was structured with its stem as 
a vignette and three answer options. The correct answer was marked in the master 
document and content from the corresponding learning module was linked with 
the answer. Also, each question was evaluated for importance of the knowledge 
(KI) and cognitive level (CL) in accordance with the Bloom’s Taxonomy. Table 
11 presents the categories and explanations associated with each cognitive level. 
The SMEs evaluating the exam for content validity included members consistent 
with the intended audience of the training and testing: an obstetrician, a family 
physician, a registered nurse, and a registered midwife. The role of the SMEs was 
to regularly review the exam questions, establish cut-off scores using an Angoff 
evaluation approach (Shrock & Coscarelli, 2007). Additionally, the SMEs 
assigned a difficulty index (a rating on a five-point scale that represents the 
estimate of difficulty) and knowledge importance index (a rating on a five-point 
scale that represents the level of criticality of the knowledge to practice) to each 
question. Questions that were too easy, or under a “3” on the difficulty index, 
were eliminated. Questions that received a score of “5” on the knowledge 
importance index were deemed “mandatory” or could not be substituted and had 
to be answered correctly because that knowledge was critical to practice; a score 
of “4” indicated that the knowledge was important but not critical; and a score of 
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“3” indicated that the knowledge was important. Questions that scored less than 
“3” were eliminated from the pool. Ultimately, the exam had 60 per cent of the 
questions at a cognitive level of “3” or “4” and 26 per cent of the questions were 
at a knowledge importance index of “5.”  Exam covering the same topics was 
administered prior to starting Module 1 (to establish the baseline), and after each 
module.  
Table 11: Cognitive levels and characteristics 
Cognitive 
Level 
Number 
Level of 
Sophistication 
Cognitive 
Level Category 
Characteristics of the Level 
1 Lowest Knowledge Requires direct recall of fact, 
number or content exactly as it 
was presented 
2 Intermediate Comprehension Requires understanding of a 
guideline or a formula, which 
are given in order to answer 
the question. May involve 
paraphrasing or giving an 
example (not previously used 
in teaching). 
3 Higher Application Requires application of 
information. The principle or 
guideline which must be 
known to solve the problem is 
not provided. 
4 Highest for 
Multiple-
Choice 
Question 
Analysis Requires analysis and breaking 
apart of a problem. There may 
be extraneous or distracting 
information. More complex 
than straight application 
questions 
 
Table 12 presents an exam blueprint with knowledge area, the corresponding 
number of questions assigned to the area, and their respective Knowledge 
Importance and Cognitive Levels (Walker, 2015). 
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Table 12: Typical exam blueprint 
Knowledge Area Number 
of 
Questions 
 Knowledge 
Importance (KI) 
Level 
 Cognitive Level 
(CL) 
 5 4 3  4 3 1 or 2 
Communication 2   1 1   2  
Patient Safety 2  1 1    1 1 
Management of 
Labor 
5 
 
1 2 2  1 3 1 
Induction of Labor 5  2 1 2   3 2 
Assisted Vaginal 
and Breach Births 
8 
 
3 2 3  2 2 4 
Hypertensive 
Disorders in 
Pregnancy 
5 
 
2 1 2  3  2 
Antepartum and 
Intrapartum 
Hemorrhage 
5 
 
2 2 1  2 2 1 
Postpartum 
Hemorrhage 
5 
 
2 2 1  3 1 1 
Preterm Labor and 
Birth 
4 
 
1 2 1   3 1 
Prelabor Rupture 
of Membranes 
2 
 
1 1   1  1 
Fetal Well-being 12  3 6 3  5 4 3 
Vaginal Birth 
After Cesarean 
3 
 
1 1 1   1 2 
Group II 
Streptococcus 
5 
 
1 2 2  1 3 1 
Deep Vein 
Thrombosis 
5 
 
2 1 2  1 1 3 
Twins 2   1 1    2 
Shoulder Dystocia 
and Cord Prolapse 
5 
 
2 2 1  1 3 1 
Total 75 
 24 28 23  20 29 26 
 75  75 
 
Thus, a typical 75-question exam will consist of question distribution as follows: 
KI Level 5 (n=24), KI Level 4 (n=28), KI Level 3 (n=23); CL Level 4 (n=20), CL 
Level 3 (n=29), and CL Level 1 or 2 (n=26). Overall, the exam development 
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process and the resultant structure is consistent with the guidelines of the Royal 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada (Sherbino & Frank, 2011) and the 
U.S. National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME, 2002). 
4.2.1.2 Item Analysis 
The Salus Global Corporation provided all the examination data for this analysis. 
Over the 10-year implementation period, there were seven versions of the exam. 
Item analyses of the earliest available version (Version 6) and the latest available 
version (version 12) are reported. Table 13 presents the item analysis of Exam 
Version 6. The first column is the item (question number), next is the topic (e.g., 
APH refers to Antepartum Hemorrhage), and next are the four answer options 
(the correct option is underscored and the number in the each cell indicates 
percentage of respondents that chose that option). Under “Test Item Analysis,” 
there are two columns: difficulty and discrimination. The difficulty index is 
essentially the percentage of the candidates who got that answer correct. Thus, 
the higher the difficulty index, the easier the question. The discrimination index 
is the difference between the percentage of high-scoring candidates who got this 
answer correct and the percentage of low-scoring candidates who got this answer 
correct. In this sample, the obstetricians scored higher than all other professional 
groups (which included nurses, midwives, general practitioners, other—
anesthesiologists, residents, and administrators) and the “other” professionals 
scored the lowest. So, the discrimination index is the difference between the 
scores of the obstetricians and the others. This index is between -1 and +1; the 
higher the number, the greater the item discriminates between the high performer 
and the low performer. Thus, it is much more likely that the person who got 
question 3 in subject area AVB (assisted vaginal birth) correct, also earned a high 
 143 
 
overall score because the discrimination index is fairly high (.27). Overall, the 
average difficulty index is .75 (the test is moderately easy; SD=.17)) and the 
average discrimination index is .12 indicating that performance on a particular 
question is not a strong indicator of the overall performance. Also, 33 items have 
discrimination index under 0.10; these items could be strengthened in the future. 
The subject area or topical abbreviations used in tables 12 and 13 are as follows: 
1. APH: Antepartum Hemorrhage 
2. AVB: Assisted Vaginal Birth 
3. COMM: Communication 
4. DVT: Deep Vein Thrombosis 
5. FWB: Fetal Well-being 
6. GBS: Group B Streptococcus 
7. HDP: Hypertensive Disorders of Pregnancy 
8. IOL: Induction of Labor 
9. MOL: Management of Labor 
10. PS: Patient Safety 
11. PPH: Postpartum Hemorrhage 
12. PLROM: Pre Labor Rupture of Membranes 
13. PTL: Preterm Labor 
14. TWINS: Twins 
15. VBAC: Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Section  
Shoulder dystocia was covered in multiple subject areas: AVB, IOL, MOL, 
TWINS, and VBAC.  
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Table 13: Item analysis of exam version 6 
  
 
Answer Options Test Item Analysis 
Item Topic A B C D Difficulty Discrimination 
1V06 APH 0.34% 0.39% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00 0.00 
2V06 APH 4.56% 0.08% 94.82% 0.54% 0.95 0.11 
3V06 APH 0.08% 8.49% 4.77% 86.66% 0.87 0.18 
4V06 APH 0.72% 77.75% 18.88% 2.7% 0.78 0.18 
1V06 AVB 6.70% 63.50% 7.39% 22.40% 0.64 0.16 
2V06 AVB 3.18% 1.21% 93.92% 1.69% 0.94 0.10 
3V06 AVB 51.84% 39.76% 7.49% 0.92% 0.52 0.27 
4V06 AVB 2.95% 1.15% 92.15% 3.75% 0.92 0.06 
5V06 AVB 24.16% 4.85% 24.02% 46.97% 0.47 0.12 
6V06 AVB 4.05% 3.98% 78.73% 13.24% 0.79 0.22 
1V06 COMM 0.02% 0.00% 0.48% 0.28% 0.00 0.00 
2V06 COMM 77.79% 15.96% 1.31% 4.93% 0.78 -0.04 
3V06 COMM 1.62% 1.98% 94.49% 1.90% 0.94 -0.02 
4V06 COMM 0.79% 0.03% 2.33% 96.85% 0.97 -0.01 
1V06 DVT 7.88% 31.14% 2.28% 58.70% 0.59 0.15 
2V06 DVT 4.82% 49.21% 29.32% 16.65% 0.49 0.18 
3V06 DVT 78.81% 1.67% 3.54% 15.98% 0.79 -0.04 
4V06 DVT 1.75% 5.64% 11.96% 80.65% 0.81 0.24 
1V06 FWB 64.00% 4.38% 27.27% 4.36% 0.64 0.07 
2V06 FWB 22.01% 5.92% 2.72% 69.35% 0.69 0.07 
3V06 FWB 9.57% 78.56% 1.36% 10.50% 0.79 0.16 
4V06 FWB 78.15% 0.34% 5.41% 16.09% 0.78 0.27 
5V06 FWB 2.34% 7.77% 85.25% 4.64% 0.85 0.09 
6V06 FWB 12.08% 4.00% 16.63% 67.29% 0.67 0.18 
7V06 FWB 16.32% 75.66% 5.36% 2.65% 0.76 0.18 
8V06 FWB 10.42% 78.74% 0.21% 10.62% 0.79 0.06 
1V06 GBS 67.30% 3.44% 15.54% 13.68% 0.67 0.08 
2V06 GBS 0.98% 1.11% 93.28% 4.62% 0.93 0.22 
3V06 GBS 0.92% 2.88% 6.33% 89.87% 0.90 0.14 
4V06 GBS 1.25% 6.10% 30.84% 61.82% 0.62 0.30 
5V06 GBS 89.40% 2.95% 4.28% 3.38% 0.89 0.07 
1V06 HDP 0.93% 5.82% 71.01% 22.24% 0.71 0.27 
2V06 HDP 2.03% 62.77% 34.27% 0.93% 0.63 0.25 
3V06 HDP 4.87% 85.22% 3.16% 6.75% 0.85 0.20 
4V06 HDP 61.80% 21.68% 8.69% 7.83% 0.62 0.10 
5V06 HDP 0.74% 95.54% 1.69% 2.03% 0.96 0.14 
1V06 IOL 11.24% 79.92% 1.46% 7.37% 0.80 0.11 
2V06 IOL 0.74% 1.92% 75.70% 21.65% 0.76 0.09 
3V06 IOL 2.75% 0.97% 80.97% 15.31% 0.81 0.11 
4V06 IOL 10.91% 1.29% 6.47% 81.32% 0.81 0.08 
5V06 IOL 1.43% 72.60% 24.48% 1.49% 0.73 0.03 
1V06 MOL 98.44% 0.54% 0.10% 0.92% 0.98 0.01 
2V06 MOL 4.88% 30.50% 56.82% 7.80% 0.57 0.18 
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Table 13 (Continued): Item analysis of exam version 6 
   Answer Options Test Item Analysis 
Item Topic A B C D Difficulty Discrimination 
3V06 MOL 5.21% 72.04% 3.46% 19.29% 0.72 0.21 
4V06 MOL 0.80% 18.63% 0.36% 80.20% 0.80 0.09 
5V06 MOL 1.92% 2.20% 95.08% 0.80% 0.95 0.10 
6V06 MOL 37.91% 42.69% 9.73% 9.67% 0.43 0.16 
7V06 MOL 1.03% 23.37% 2.13% 73.47% 0.73 0.10 
8V06 MOL 70.88% 25.58% 3.13% 0.41% 0.71 0.13 
1V06 PS 1.05% 13.73% 11.27% 73.94% 0.74 0.04 
2V06 PS 88.74% 0.29% 0.57% 10.65% 0.89 0.08 
3V06 PS 78.70% 6.31% 8.05% 6.95% 0.79 0.01 
4V06 PS 0.28% 0.16% 5.59% 93.97% 0.94 0.04 
1V06 PPH 2.64% 16.18% 71.71% 9.47% 0.72 0.06 
2V06 PPH 89.63% 5.74% 3.88% 0.75% 0.90 0.05 
3V06 PPH 2.75% 0.29% 91.95% 5.00% 0.92 0.01 
4V06 PPH 2.31% 10.24% 76.12% 11.32% 0.76 0.19 
1V06 PLROM 3.79% 12.24% 73.17% 10.80% 0.73 0.23 
2V06 PLROM 54.97% 25.27% 15.96% 3.80% 0.55 -0.14 
3V06 PLROM 0.28% 91.97% 5.93% 1.82% 0.92 0.19 
4V06 PLROM 0.82% 73.30% 7.90% 17.98% 0.73 -0.01 
1V06 PTL 58.98% 9.24% 27.38% 4.39% 0.59 0.20 
2V06 PTL 0.51% 95.41% 3.74% 0.34% 0.95 0.03 
3V06 PTL 3.52% 85.22% 2.97% 8.29% 0.85 0.22 
4V06 PTL 5.72% 10.95% 12.77% 70.57% 0.71 0.26 
5V06 PTL 34.76% 1.67% 57.42% 6.15% 0.57 -0.08 
1V06 TWINS 1.87% 83.63% 4.40% 10.06% 0.84 0.09 
2V06 TWINS 0.26% 1.54% 1.52% 96.67% 0.97 0.06 
3V06 TWINS 44.51% 14.67% 1.59% 39.23% 0.39 0.01 
4V06 TWINS 6.85% 84.68% 3.38% 5.10% 0.85 0.00 
5V06 TWINS 83.73% 9.11% 2.46% 4.70% 0.84 0.12 
1V06 VBAC 1.90% 23.68% 70.47% 3.95% 0.70 0.09 
2V06 VBAC 90.77% 1.49% 1.23% 6.51% 0.91 0.16 
3V06 VBAC 74.73% 8.85% 5.69% 10.73% 0.75 0.21 
4V06 VBAC 9.95% 7.37% 56.41% 26.27% 0.56 0.39 
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Table 14 presents the item analysis for exam version 12.  
Table 14: Item analysis of exam version 12 
  
Answer Options Test Item Analysis 
Item TOPIC A B C Difficulty Discrimination 
1V12 APH 0.67% 95.38% 3.95% 0.95 0.16 
2V12 APH 46.64% 0.51% 52.86% 0.53 0.19 
3V12 APH 14.63% 83.53% 1.84% 0.84 0.12 
4V12 APH 42.96% 49.06% 7.98% 0.43 0.16 
5V12 APH 47.56% 17.45% 34.99% 0.35 0.48 
1V12 AVB 3.85% 11.91% 84.24% 0.84 0.15 
2V12 AVB 11.07% 4.90% 84.03% 0.84 0.18 
3V12 AVB 16.38% 44.68% 38.94% 0.39 0.47 
4V12 AVB 61.48% 28.57% 9.96% 0.61 0.25 
5V12 AVB 98.36% 0.91% 0.73% 0.98 0.06 
6V12 AVB 16.94% 16.21% 66.86% 0.67 -0.02 
7V12 AVB 53.34% 5.54% 41.13% 0.53 0.31 
8V12 AVB 5.27% 89.84% 4.89% 0.90 0.18 
1V12 COMM 64.15% 18.25% 17.60% 0.64 -0.09 
2V12 COMM 1.11% 4.48% 94.41% 0.94 0.08 
1V12 DVT 31.06% 4.92% 64.02% 0.64 0.26 
2V12 DVT 64.75% 7.62% 27.63% 0.65 0.14 
3V12 DVT 24.35% 73.97% 1.68% 0.24 0.22 
4V12 DVT 58.05% 1.88% 40.06% 0.58 -0.10 
5V12 DVT 22.92% 35.20% 41.88% 0.23 -0.10 
1V12 FWB 88.66% 3.14% 8.20% 0.89 0.03 
2V12 FWB 68.38% 30.02% 1.60% 0.68 -0.03 
3V12 FWB 57.43% 12.38% 30.19% 0.57 0.15 
4V12 FWB 5.39% 91.10% 3.51% 0.91 0.18 
5V12 FWB 4.24% 73.85% 21.91% 0.74 0.07 
6V12 FWB 2.88% 11.45% 85.67% 0.86 0.11 
7V12 FWB 12.51% 14.52% 72.97% 0.73 0.16 
8V12 FWB 63.68% 34.94% 1.38% 0.64 -0.01 
9V12 FWB 14.43% 13.83% 71.74% 0.72 0.14 
10V12 FWB 14.65% 19.53% 65.86% 0.66 0.09 
11V12 FWB 4.20% 84.50% 11.31% 0.85 0.15 
12V12 FWB 37.03% 62.97%   0.63 0.44 
1V12 GBS 8.57% 0.53% 90.90% 0.91 0.08 
2V12 GBS 29.67% 64.29% 6.04% 0.64 0.12 
3V12 GBS 0.55% 10.82% 88.64% 0.89 0.11 
4V12 GBS 65.97% 4.29% 29.73% 0.66 0.34 
5V12 GBS 73.07% 0.06% 21.24% 0.73 0.37 
1V12 HDP 95.44% 2.00% 2.55% 0.95 0.15 
2V12 HDP 1.50% 84.22% 14.28% 0.84 0.13 
3V12 HDP 89.91% 9.47% 1.05% 0.90 0.05 
4V12 HDP 31.98% 11.04% 56.98% 0.57 0.13 
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Table 14 (Continued): Item analysis of exam version 12  
  Answer Options Test Item Analysis 
Item TOPIC A B C Difficulty Discrimination 
5V12 HDP 9.74% 8.20% 82.06% 0.82 0.10 
1V12 IOL 6.70% 73.37% 19.93% 0.73 0.29 
2V12 IOL 80.82% 12.47% 6.70% 0.81 0.15 
3V12 IOL 27.28% 61.77% 10.96% 0.62 0.25 
4V12 IOL 0.69% 4.27% 95.04% 0.95 0.17 
5V12 IOL 82.97% 1.72% 15.31% 0.83 0.23 
1V12 MOL 10.43% 6.26% 83.31% 0.83 0.22 
2V12 MOL 5.35% 24.34% 70.31% 0.70 0.18 
3V12 MOL 88.52% 1.82% 9.66% 0.89 0.08 
4V12 MOL 0.93% 2.71% 96.35% 0.96 0.07 
5V12 MOL 14.99% 85.01%   0.85 0.11 
1V12 PS 1.42% 98.22% 0.36% 0.98 0.00 
2V12 PS 41.19% 46.03% 12.78% 0.46 0.08 
1V12 PPH 4.52% 8.93% 86.55% 0.87 0.11 
2V12 PPH 36.97% 55.52% 7.51% 0.37 -0.13 
3V12 PPH 63.99% 17.29% 18.71% 0.56 -0.01 
4V12 PPH 31.79% 56.18% 12.03% 0.56 0.44 
5V12 PPH 2.55% 76.97% 20.47% 0.77 0.18 
1V06 PLROM 11.00% 3.12% 85.88% 0.86 0.33 
2V06 PLROM 25.93% 29.55% 44.52% 0.45 -0.02 
1V12 PTL 7.09% 1.09% 91.82% 0.92 0.09 
2V12 PTL 70.77% 20.26% 8.97% 0.71 0.37 
3V12 PTL 0.95% 1.99% 97.06% 0.97 0.08 
4V12 PTL 6.74% 87.91% 5.35% 0.88 0.13 
1V12 SD 2.39% 89.33% 8.28% 0.89 0.08 
2V12 SD 16.61% 10.57% 72.82% 0.73 0.14 
3V12 SD 3.38% 91.39% 5.23% 0.91 0.08 
4V12 SD 22.83% 74.88% 2.29% 0.75 0.19 
5V12 SD 89.49% 1.36% 9.16% 0.89 0.22 
1V12 TWINS 13.06% 81.13% 5.81% 0.81 0.14 
2V12 TWINS 31.17% 20.76% 48.08% 0.48 0.20 
1V06 VBAC 79.95% 16.61% 3.44% 0.80 0.20 
2V06 VBAC 11.87% 14.18% 73.96% 0.74 0.28 
3V06 VBAC 34.91% 46.62% 18.47% 0.35 0.05 
 
In developing version 12 of the exam, the item writers recognized that there was 
no significant difference between a four-options question and a three-options 
question; more likely, the three-options question was stronger (Rodriguez, 2005). 
The average difficulty index for version 12  is .73 (which is very close to that of 
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version 6; SD=.19) and the average discrimination index moved up slightly from 
.13 to .15, indicating that performance on a particular question is now slightly 
better  (though not strong) indicator of the overall performance. This time, 24 
items have a discrimination index of under 0.10. In comparison to the previous 
exam, one could say that this one is almost equally easy, but has a slightly higher 
discrimination capability. Regardless, both versions of the exam have 
discriminant validity. 
4.2.1.3 Reliability Analysis 
Kuder-Richardson formula 21 (KR-21) was be used to determine the reliability of 
this exam.  
𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  =
(𝐾)(𝑆𝐷2) − ?̅?(𝐾 − ?̅?)
(𝑆𝐷2)(𝐾 − 1)
   
Where   K= the number of items in the test 
SD= the standard deviation of the scores 
?̅? = the mean of the scores 
 
Pre-Module 1 (or pre-training) exam administered at all the early adopter 
obstetrics groups was used for this analysis. This population contained a 
representative sample of obstetricians, nurses, midwives, general practitioners, 
and a small number of others like anesthesiologists, residents, and hospital 
administrators (n=2,666). The KR-21 total reliability of the test was found to be 
0.92, which is excellent and above the threshold for an achievement test. Table 
15 presents the variables used in the KR-21 formula and the final result. 
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Table 15: Reliability data for pre-Module 1 exam 
Pre-Module 1 Scores 
Mean 60.02 
Median 59.62 
Mode 57.52 
Standard Deviation 11.62 
Count 2666 
Number of items on the test 75 
SD of the scores 11.62 
Mean of Scores 60.02 
KR-21 Reliability 0.92 
 
4.2.1.4  Comparison of Pre-training Knowledge between Early Adopter and Late 
Adopters 
Knowledge exam scores were collected at the individual level and then 
aggregated at the obstetrics group level. In order to verify whether or not such 
aggregation would be appropriate, the normality of the data within each group 
was verified. Field (2013, p.188-191) suggests using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(K-S) test of significance (p-value should be above .05, indicating that the sample 
tested did not deviate significantly from a random, normal sample generated by 
the computer). Also, since the K-S test is highly sensitive in large samples, Field 
recommends that if the test is significant, one should view the Q-Q plot to 
determine whether the sample satisfies the conditions for normality. The data 
from pre-module 1, post-module-1, post-module-2, and post-module-3 
knowledge exam scores were tested for each obstetrics unit (n=68). All datasets 
passed the normality test either based on the K-S test or based on the 
interpretation of the Q-Q plot. Thus, the individual exam scores were aggregated 
at the obstetrics group level. Similarly, the second level of aggregation: from 
obstetrics group level to adopter level (early/late) was verified with normality 
tests. 
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Table 16 presents the comparison of pre-module 1 means scores between Early 
Adopters and Late Adopters. Table 17 presents the results of the independent 
sample t-test. On average, participants from the Late Adopter Group (29 
hospitals; M=66.75, SE=1.10) scored higher than those from the Early Adopter 
Group (39 hospitals; M=59.48, SE=.70). Levene’s test for equality of variances 
(Table 16) indicates that this difference in scores, 7.27, 95% CI [-9.76, -4.77], 
was significant when equal variances were assumed, t(66)=-5.82, p=.000. The 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normality revealed that the significance was above the 
threshold of .05. The S-W Sig. value for Early Adopters was 0.548 and for Late 
Adopters was .655. Thus, the pre-module 1 knowledge scores among both groups 
were normally distributed and the mean knowledge score of the Late Adopter 
Group was significantly higher than the knowledge score of the Early Adopter 
Group. 
 
Table 16: Pre-Module 1 average knowledge exam scores 
Adopter Group N Mean Std. Dev. 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Early Adopter 39 59.48 4.46 .70 
Late Adopter 29 66.75 5.84 1.10 
  
Table 17: Results of the independent samples t-test 
 Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tail
ed) 
Mean 
Differ-
ence 
Std. 
Error 
Differ-
ence 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.679 .059 -5.82 66 .000 -.7.27 1.25 -9.76 -4.77 
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4.2.1.5  Comparison of Post-training Knowledge between Early Adopters and 
Late Adopters 
Table 18 presents the comparison of post-module 3 means scores between Early 
Adopters and Late Adopters. Table 19 presents the results of the independent 
sample t-test. On average, participants from the Late Adopter Group (29 
hospitals; M=77.86, SE=0.93) scored higher than those from the Early Adopter 
Group (39 hospitals; M=74.29, SE=.74). The post-module 3 scores failed the 
equality of variance test and thus equal variances were not assumed. The 
difference in scores, 3.57, 95% CI [-5.95, -1.19], was significant when equal 
variances were not assumed, t(56.53)=-3.00, p=.004. Thus, the post-module 3 
knowledge level of the Late Adopter Group was significantly higher than the 
knowledge level of the Early Adopter Group. 
Table 18: Post-Module 3 average knowledge exam scores 
Adopter Group N Mean Std. Dev. 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Early Adopter 39 74.29 4.69 .74 
Late Adopter 29 77.86 4.91 .93 
  
Table 19: Results of the independent samples t-test 
 Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tail
ed) 
Mean 
Differ-
ence 
Std. 
Error 
Differ-
ence 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -3.00 56.53 .004 -3.57 1.19 -5.95 -1.19 
 
 152 
 
4.2.1.6 Pre- and Post-Training Comparison between Early Adopters and Late 
Adopters 
Figure 10 illustrates the improvements in the overall knowledge scores in Early 
Adopters and Late Adopters. At the end of Module 3, there is a clear 
improvement in the clinical knowledge level of participants from both groups. 
 
 
Figure 10: Pre- and post-training comparison of knowledge exam scores 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine the significance of the 
differences in scores pre- and post-training. Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(5) = 86.36, p = .000; therefore, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests are reported (ε = .605). The results show that 
the change in knowledge exam scores was significant, F(1.82, 1.82)=218.47, 
p=.000,  ω2=.768.  
Ultimately, the hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, 
improves group-level outcomes (H1) is partially supported based on the 
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improvement in the obstetrics group’s clinical and non-clinical (about 
communication and teamwork) knowledge examination scores. Since knowledge 
is a component of work performance (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006), 
improvement in knowledge exam scores demonstrates that the training was 
effective in improving the knowledge. Also, since the training transitioned from 
purely didactic to mostly clinical, the total improvement in knowledge should be 
considered. Nonetheless, for the hypothesis (H1) to be fully supported, there must 
be a demonstrable improvement in clinical outcomes after Module 3, if not after 
each module.  
4.2.2 Clinical Outcomes Analysis 
This section presents the results of analyses of clinical outcomes before and after 
the MOREOB program was implemented. Although a number of clinical 
outcomes could be justified, four outcomes were considered for this study:         
(a) Cesarean section rates, (b) postpartum hemorrhage rates, (c) handling of 
shoulder dystocia, and (d) overall length of stay. The Cesarean rates were deemed 
important because there is a global interest in addressing the rising Cesarean rates 
(WHO, 2015) and the MOREOB program specifically targets the control of 
elective Cesareans; postpartum hemorrhage was selected because it is the leading 
cause of maternal mortality (Smith, Ramus, & Brennan, 2016) and the MOREOB 
program specifically targets the management of postpartum hemorrhage; and 
shoulder dystocia was selected because it is considered “the nightmare of 
obstetricians” because of its relatively rare occurrence coupled with elevated risks 
for both the mother and the fetus (Politi, D'Emidio, Cignini, Giorlandino, & 
Giorlandino, 2010), and the MOREOB program involves specific training and 
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drills to practice deliveries involving shoulder dystocia. The overall length of stay 
is arguably oversimplified, yet it serves as a popular proxy indicator of quality of 
care (Kaveh  Shojania, Showstack, & Wachter, 2001; Thomas, Guire, & Horvat, 
1997)—the higher the length of stay, the greater the probability that the case 
involved complications and higher the cost of care. 
4.2.2.1 The ICD-10-CA and CCI Coding Structures 
The Canadian Institute for Healthcare Information (CIHI) provided data for fiscal 
years 2001-2011 (fiscal year is from April 1- March 31) to the Salus Global 
Corporation. In accordance with the agreement between Salus Global and CIHI, 
and the non-disclosure agreement between the researcher and Salus Global, all 
the CIHI data were accessed and analyzed on site at the Salus Global Corporation 
office in London, Ontario.  The ICD-10-CA (International Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems) manual (CIHI, 2009b) was used to 
decode the diagnosis classification data. The CCI (Canadian Classification of 
Health Interventions) manual (CIHI, 2009a) was used for the intervention data 
from FY2002-2011; for FY2001, the CCP (Canadian Classification of 
Diagnostic, Therapeutic and Surgical Procedures) manual was used.   
4.2.2.2 Description of the Maternal Sample Population 
The total dataset of women admitted to one of the Ontario hospitals included 
1,345,624 cases; of these, 81,697 cases (6.1%) did not involve deliveries (they 
were for a variety of conditions like calculus of the gall bladder, acute 
appendicitis, postpartum examination visit, etc.). Next, only four cases from 
FY2001 had complete data; so, this fiscal year was eliminated from further 
analysis. Table 20 presents the maternal characteristics of the study population 
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(n=1,263,923 cases). From fiscal year 2002 through 2011, the number of women 
admitted for birthing has increased by about 50 per cent between 2002 and 2004, 
but between 2005 and 2011, it was within the range of 130,000 to 140,000. The 
sample under consideration consists of three groups: Non-Adopters (hospitals 
without MOREOB program), Early Adopters (hospitals that adopted the MOREOB 
program between 2006 and 2008), and Late Adopters (hospitals that adopted the 
MOREOB program between 2009 and 2011). While there was some decline in the 
number of mothers at the Non-Adopter hospitals, it remained steady at about 11 
per cent of the total number of mothers per year over 2009 through 2011.  
Considering the distribution of the mothers by the level of care, about 3 per cent 
of the mothers at Level 1 facilities were among the Non-Adopter group, 35.5 per 
cent were from the Early Adopter group, and the remaining 61.3 per cent were 
from the Late Adopter group. Similarly, 2.4 per cent of the mothers at Level 2 
facilities were among the Non-Adopter group, 71.7 per cent were from the Early 
Adopter group, and the remaining 25.9 per cent were from the Late Adopter 
group; about 89.3 per cent of the mothers at Level 3 facilities were among the 
Early Adopters and the remaining 10.7 per cent were among the Late Adopters. 
The age of the mothers ranged from 12 years to 60 years, with an overall mean of 
29.84 (SD = 5.54) and median of 30 years. The mean ages for the Non-Adopter, 
Early Adopter, and Late Adopter groups appear to be reasonably similar; 
however, with large sample sizes and the three group sizes being of substantially 
different sizes (non-adopters include 182,986 cases, early adopters include 
795,763 cases, and late adopters include 285,174 cases), the differences in means 
are significant, F(2) = 15,550.789, p=0.000. While the mean age of the mothers 
in the Early Adopter group is significantly higher than that in the other two 
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groups, other characteristics like previous preterm deliveries and previous 
spontaneous abortions are practically identical.  
Table 20: Maternal characteristics of the study population 
Total number of 
mothers delivering at 
hospitals by FY 
Non Adopters Early Adopters Late Adopters 
Freq. 
Count 
Rate  
(%) 
Freq. 
Count 
Rate 
(%) 
Freq. 
Count 
Rate 
(%) 
FY2002 83,697 24,006 28.7 38,302 45.8 21,389 25.6 
FY2003 99,571 20,197 20.3 55,326 55.6 24,048 24.2 
FY2004 121,593 20,426 16.8 72,931 60.0 28,236 23.2 
FY2005 129,304 20,317 15.7 80,208 62.0 28,779 22.3 
FY2006 133,877 20,021 15.0 84,652 63.2 29,204 21.8 
FY2007 139,914 17,490 12.5 91,281 65.2 31,143 22.3 
FY2008 140,054 17,776 10.6 94,089 67.2 31,189 22.3 
FY2009 139,805 15,204 10.9 93,715 67.0 30,886 22.1 
FY2010 137,308 15,198 11.1 92,233 67.2 29,877 21.8 
FY2011 138,800 15,351 11.1 93,026 67.0 30,423 21.9 
Total         1,263,923 182,986 14.5 795,763 63.0 285,174 22.6 
Mothers by Level 
of Care 
 Non Adopters Early Adopters Late Adopters 
 Freq. 
Count 
Rate  
(%) 
Freq. 
Count 
Rate  
(%) 
Freq. 
Count 
Rate  
(%) 
Level 1 (107,868) 3,479 3.2 38,311 35.5 66,078 61.3 
Level 2 (743,071) 17,853 2.4 532,919 71.7 192,299 25.9 
Level 3 (251,330) - - 224,533     89.3    26,797  10.7 
Characteristics of 
the mothers (FY01 -
- FY11) 
Non Adopters Early Adopters Late Adopters 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age (12 to 60) 28.24  5.59  30.41   5.45  29.29   5.48 
Overall mean of 29.84  
(SD= 5.54);  
median = 30 years 
      
Previous term 
deliveries (0 to 19) 
0.90 1.12 0.80 1.00 .86 1.07 
Previous preterm 
deliveries (0 to 13) 
.05 .26 .04 .29 0.05 .26 
Previous spontaneous 
abortions (0 to 20) 
  .31 .70 .31 .71     .32  .72 
 
Table 21 presents the frequencies of delivery types and maternal conditions. 
Vaginal births included a wide range of sub-types like manually assisted, 
spontaneous, forceps and traction, vacuum, and breech delivery. Cesarean 
Section births included 27 sub-types. Overall, in the Non-Adopter group, the 
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Cesarean Section births accounted for about 24 per cent of the total; in the case of 
Early Adopters and Late Adopters, the percentage of Cesarean Section births 
were about 27 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively.   
Table 21: Characteristics of delivery types 
 Non Adopters Early Adopters Late Adopters 
Delivery 
Type 
Frequency Rate, % Frequency Rate, % Frequency Rate, % 
Vaginal 
Delivery 
138,633 75.8 582,584 73.2 218,535 76.6 
Cesarean 
Section 
44,353 24.2 213,179 26.8 66,639 23.4 
Total 182,986 100 795,763 100 285,174 100 
 
 
4.2.2.3 Effect of the MOREOB Program on Clinical Outcomes 
The national Cesarean Sections (C-section) rate in Canada increased from 17 per 
cent in 1995 to almost 27 per cent 2010 and up to about 29 per cent in Ontario in 
2011/2012 (BORN, 2015). Such a rise in the C-section rate is both a financial 
challenge as well as a patient safety challenge (Murphy, 2015). Thus, the effect of 
MOREOB program on the C-section rate was chosen as one of the many measures 
to test the hypothesis that the group-level outcomes improved after the MOREOB 
training (H1).  
Table 22 presents the C-section rates for Non-Adopters (n=35), Early Adopters 
(n=39), and Late Adopters (n=29) from years 2002-2005. Since all the Early 
Adopter hospitals had completed the first module of the MOREOB program 
during 2006, the 2002-2005 data were considered baseline. CIHI data for 2003 
was corrupted and could not be used; thus, the baseline data consisted of years 
2002, 2004, and 2005.  
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Table 22: Baseline C-section rates 
Fiscal Year Non-Adopters  Early Adopters  Late Adopters 
2002 24.24% 25.10% 22.00% 
2004 26.88% 27.83% 24.74% 
2005 27.50% 28.81% 25.44% 
 
Two observations were made from the above data: first, the C-section rates in all 
three groups were on the rise; and second, the Early Adopter group had the 
highest C-section rate, which might have been one reason why the Early Adopter 
group was eager to implement the MOREOB program. 
Figure 11 projects the trends for the C-section rates if no intervention were 
implemented. Data from years 2002, 2004, and 2005 were used to build the initial 
equation for the trend and then it was extended for six time periods. All three 
trend lines were logarithmic and the corresponding 2011 C-section rates for the 
Non-Adopters (NA), Early Adopters (EA), and Late Adopters (LA) were 31.13, 
32.75, and 29.21 per cent, respectively.  
 
Figure 11: Projected rise in C-section rates 
 
y-NA = 0.0307ln(x) + 0.2438
R² = 0.963
y-EA = 0.0344ln(x) + 0.2519
R² = 0.9863
y-LA = 0.0322ln(x) + 0.2213
R² = 0.9674
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Table 23 presents the actual versus projected C-section rates from 2002-2011 
(except 2003); most actual rates were lower than projected. Regardless of when 
the MOREOB program was implemented (or not implemented at all), the C-
section rates did not rise as high as projected. The MOREOB program was 
implemented at the Early Adopter sites between 2006 and 2008, and at the Late 
Adopter sites between 2009 and 2011.  
Table 23: Actual versus projected C-section rates from 2002-2011 
 Fiscal 
Year 
Non-Adopters 
(Projected)  
Early Adopters  
(Projected) 
MOREOB Late Adopters 
(Projected) 
2002 24.24% 25.10%  22.00% 
2004 26.88% 27.83%  24.74% 
2005 27.50% 28.81%  25.44% 
2006 28.17% (28.64%) 28.63% (29.96%) (M-1) 25.61% 
2007 28.59% (29.32%) 28.58% (30.73%) (M-2) 26.48% 
2008 28.03% (29.88%) 29.49% (31.35%) (M-3) 26.29% 
2009 28.41% (30.35%) 29.42% (31.88%) (M-1) 25.54% (28.40%) 
2010 26.95% (30.76%) 29.34% (32.34%) (M-2) 26.18% (28.83%) 
2011 27.74% (31.13%) 29.52% (32.75%) (M-3) 26.30% (29.21%) 
 
Murphy (2015) cites many reasons for a C-section including, but not limited to 
older or overweight mothers, twin births, prior C-section birth, or other fetal 
complications. None of these factors is specifically within the control of the 
obstetrics team; also, a C-section can be a medical necessity and simply avoiding 
a C-section is not necessarily an indication of improved clinical performance. 
However, Osterman and Martin (2014) conducted a review of low risk3 C-
sections because they may not have been based on compelling clinical needs. 
While it was impractical to control for all the factors that might classify a 
particular C-section a “low-risk” case, the researcher was able to control for 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking a low-risk C-section is defined as a first birth, at term, single fetus, and head 
first positioning. An LRC delivery rate is the ratio of low-risk C-sections to low-risk births 
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multiple births and consider only single birth cases. Table 24 presents the data for 
these reduced-risk cases (RRC).  
Table 24: Reduced risk C-section rates from 2002-2011 
 Fiscal Year Non-
Adopters  
Early Adopters  MOREOB Late Adopters 
2002 21.9% 21.5%  19.5% 
2004 25.9% 23.6%   23.3% 
2005 26.5% 24.5%  24.3% 
2006 27.2% 24.4% (M-1) 24.5% 
2007 27.7% 24.4% (M-2) 25.3% 
2008 27.1% 25.0% (M-3) 25.2% 
2009 27.5% 24.2% (M-1) 24.1% 
2010 26.2% 23.9% (M-2) 24.5% 
2011 26.8% 23.7% (M-3) 24.6% 
 
In the Early Adopter sample, a pre-post comparison of means using independent 
samples t-test revealed t(2.177)=-1.175, p=.353. Thus, the difference in the mean 
RRC rate of pre-MOREOB training (23.20%) and post-MOREOB training 
(24.27%) was not significant. Also, a similar comparison between the pre-post 
RRC rates within the Late Adopter sample revealed that the difference between 
pre-MOREOB training (23.68%) and post-MOREOB training (24.40%) was not 
significant, t(7)=-.550, p=.559. Considering that the year-to-year RRC rates for 
Early Adopters and Late Adopters were consistently lower than the Non-
Adopters, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. The difference in the means of 
RRC rates between the three groups was significant, F(2)=16.84, p=.000. 
Tukey’s post hoc analysis showed that the differences between the RRC-mean 
section rates between all three groups (Non-Adopters: 24.30%; Early Adopters: 
23.91%; and Late Adopters: 21.66%) were significant (p<.05%). These results 
indicate that it may take longer than six years for the MOREOB program to 
significantly reduce the RRC rate. 
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The hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, improves 
group-level outcomes (H1) was not fully supported on the Cesarean section 
measure, but showed promise based on the following:  
1. Both the Early Adopters and the Late Adopters demonstrated an 
improvement in reduced risk C-section rates after the implementation of 
the MOREOB program (in 2006 and 2009, respectively), but the 
improvement was not statistically significant;  
2. The mean reduced-risk C-section rate for Non-Adopters was significantly 
higher than that for Early Adopters and Late Adopters; and  
3. Both experimental groups (Early Adopters and Late Adopters) showed 
improvements in post-intervention performance compared to the control 
group (Non-Adopters) 
 
Table 25 presents the baseline postpartum hemorrhage (PPH) across the three 
groups. Data from 2003 were corrupted and hence eliminated from analysis. 
Table 25: Baseline postpartum hemorrhage rates 
Fiscal Year Non-Adopters Early Adopters Late Adopters 
2002 2.86% 3.69% 3.02% 
2004 3.22% 3.50% 2.82% 
2005 3.12% 3.56% 2.93% 
Three observations were made from the above data: first, the PPH rate at the 
Non-Adopter obstetrics units had increased; second, the Early Adopter group had 
the highest PPH rate and although it had come down slightly by 2005, it was still 
fairly high; and third, the PPH rate at the Late Adopter obstetrics units was 
starting to rise. Again, a comparatively poor performance might have been one 
reason why the Early Adopter group was eager to implement the MOREOB 
program. 
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Figure 12 projects the trends for PPH rates if no intervention were implemented.  
The trends for Non-Adopters and Early Adopters were best described by 
logarithmic equations and the trend for the Late Adopters was best described by a 
second order polynomial curve (best fit curve; based on the best R2 value). The 
corresponding 2011 PPH rates for the Non-Adopters (NA), Early Adopters (EA), 
and Late Adopters (LA) were 3.38, 3.51, and 3.82 per cent, respectively.  
 
Figure 12: Projected rise in PPH rates 
 
Table 26 presents the actual versus projected PPH rates from 2002-2011 (except 
2003); the actual rates ended up higher than projected for the Non-Adopters, but 
lower than projected for Early Adopters and Late Adopters. Both Early Adopters 
and Late Adopters consistently performed better than the projected levels. Thus, 
the experimental group (Early and Late Adopters) performed better than the 
control group (Non-Adopters). Therefore, the MOREOB program seemed to have 
helped control the PPH rates.  
  
y-NA = 0.0026ln(x) + 0.0291
R² = 0.6307
y-EA = -0.001ln(x) + 0.0367
R² = 0.5822
y-LA = 0.0006x2 - 0.0036x + 0.0335
R² = 0.7749
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Table 26: Actual versus projected PPH rates from 2002-2011 
 Fiscal 
Year  
Non-Adopters  
(Projected) 
Early Adopters  
(Projected) 
MOREOB Late Adopters 
(Projected) 
2002 2.86% 3.69%  3.02% 
2004 3.22% 3.50%  2.82% 
2005 3.12% 3.56%  2.93% 
2006 3.20% (3.27%) 3.36% (3.53%) (M-1) 2.69%  
2007  3.26% (3.33%) 3.43% (3.51%) (M-2) 2.93%  
2008  3.23% (3.38%) 3.25% (3.49%) (M-3) 3.26%  
2009  4.19% (3.42%) 3.30% (3.48%) (M-1) 3.22% (3.77%) 
2010  4.07% (3.45%) 3.37% (3.46%) (M-2) 3.52% (4.31%) 
2011 4.21% (3.48%) 3.36% (3.45%) (M-3) 3.82% (4.97%) 
 
In the Early Adopter sample, a pre-post comparison of means using independent 
samples t-test revealed t(7)=4.562, p<.01. Thus, the difference in the mean PPH 
rate of pre-MOREOB training (3.58%) and post-MOREOB training (3.35%) was 
significant. Also, a similar comparison between the pre-post PPH rates within the 
Late Adopter sample revealed that the difference between pre-MOREOB training 
(2.94%) and post-MOREOB training (3.52%) was significant, t(7)=-3.577, p<.01. 
In this case, however, the PPH rate had significantly increased after the MOREOB 
training. Since there was no reason for the PPH rate to increase as a result of the 
MOREOB training, the reasons for this increase were most likely other factors. In 
a one-way ANOVA, the difference in the means of PPH rates between the three 
groups was not significant, F(1)=3.958, p=.058. Considering that the actual PPH 
rates for Early Adopters were lower than projected, and the post-MOREOB rates 
were consistently lower than the pre-MOREOB rates, the PPH measure at least 
partially supports the hypothesis that MOREOB training improves group-level 
outcomes (H1).  
An inexplicable discrepancy was noted in the cases involving shoulder dystocia. 
From 2002 through 2008, the percentage of cases recorded with shoulder 
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dystocia ranged from 3.33 to 5.15 per cent. However, 2009 onward, the rate 
ranged between 11.68 and 17.20 per cent. This discrepancy was possibly due to 
inconsistencies in reporting such conditions. Thus, only the data from 2009 
through 2011 were considered. Table 27 presents the data for shoulder dystocia. 
 
Table 27: Shoulder dystocia rates from 2009-2011 
 Fiscal Year Non-Adopters  Early Adopters  Late Adopters 
2009 16.79%  12.34% 14.27% 
2010 17.20% 11.85% 13.78% 
2011 17.11% 11.68% 12.79% 
The general trend for should dystocia rates in both Early Adopters and Late 
Adopters was in the downward direction, indicative of a potential influence of the 
MOREOB program. Thus, there was a possibility that the MOREOB program 
influenced the probability of a C-section, given shoulder dystocia. To test this 
possibility, conditional probabilities for a C-section, given shoulder dystocia were 
calculated; these results are presented in Table 28. Although the probabilities for 
the Early Adopters were better than those for the Non-Adopters, the probabilities 
for the Late Adopters were not any better. Thus, this measure was not pursued 
further. 
Table 28: Conditional probability of a C-section given shoulder dystocia  
 Fiscal Year Non-Adopters  Early Adopters  Late Adopters 
2009 11.5% 9.9% 12.2% 
2010 10.6% 9.9% 10.6% 
2011 12.2% 10.2% 12.8% 
 
Table 29 presents the mean Length of Stay by fiscal years and adopter status. 
Although data for 2008 were not available, all three groups indicate a downward 
trend from a high of 2.57, 2.54, and 2.55 days to a low of 2.25, 2.33, and 2.30 
days for Non-Adopters, Early Adopters, and Late Adopters, respectively. The 
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overall means for the three groups were 2.39, 2.36, and 2.31 days. One-way 
ANOVA for these three groups was significant, F(2)=64.16, p<.001. Tukey’s 
post hoc analysis indicated that the means of all three groups were significantly 
different from each other (p<.05): the Non-Adopter mean (2.39 days) was 
significantly higher than the Early Adopter mean (2.36 days) and the Late 
Adopter mean (2.31 days), and the Early Adopter mean was significantly higher 
than the Late Adopter mean.  In the Early Adopter sample, a pre-post comparison 
of means using independent samples t-test revealed t(7)=1.524, p>.05. Thus, the 
difference in the mean Length of Stay pre-MOREOB training (2.43days) and post-
MOREOB training (2.33 days) was not significant. However, a similar comparison 
between the pre-post Length of Stay within the Late Adopter sample revealed 
that the difference between pre-MOREOB training (2.42 days) and post-MOREOB 
training (2.25 days) was significant, t(7)= 3.221, p<.05. Therefore, the hypothesis 
that the MOREOB train improved group-level outcomes was partially supported 
by the Length of Stay measure.   
 
Table 29: Mean length of stay  
 Fiscal Year Non-Adopters 
(SD) 
Early Adopters 
(SD) 
Late Adopters 
(SD) 
2002 2.57 (1.812) 2.54 (2.595) 2.55 (2.387) 
2003 2.40 (1.412) 2.26 (1.721)  2.30 (1.697) 
2004 2.45 (1.524) 2.48 (2.128) 2.47 (2.106)  
2005 2.37 (1.362) 2.45 (2.189) 2.43 (2.174) 
2006 2.38 (1.590) 2.43 (2.520) 2.41 (2.362) 
2007 2.38 (1.542) 2.39 (2.247) 2.38 (2.248) 
2009 2.37 (1.452) 2.33 (2.201) 2.30 (2.094) 
2010 2.29 (1.295) 2.27 (2.273) 2.25 (2.174) 
2011 2.25 (1.450) 2.22 (2.106) 2.20 (2.034) 
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In summary, the hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, 
improves group-level outcomes (H1) was partially supported by the following 
measures: 
1. Cesarean Section Rates: Early Adopters and Late Adopters (experimental 
groups) demonstrated a significantly lower reduced-risk C-section rate 
compared to Non-Adopters (control group); however, a comparison 
between pre-training and post-training reduced-risk C-section rates did 
not show a significant change within the experimental group; 
2. Postpartum Hemorrhage (PPH) Rates: Early Adopters and Late Adopters 
(experimental groups) demonstrated a lower than predicted PPH rate after 
the implementation of the MOREOB training, and the Early Adopters 
showed a statistically significant improvement in PPH rates after the 
MOREOB training;  
3. Mean Length of Stay: The mean length of stay was significantly lower in 
both Early Adopters and Late Adopters (experimental groups), compared 
to Non-Adopters (control group). However, only the Late Adopter group 
showed significant difference between pre- and post-MOREOB training. 
4.2.3 Patient Safety Climate Analysis 
The goal of the patient safety climate analysis was to test the hypothesis that 
training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level patient safety climate 
(H2). In order to pursue this hypothesis, the patient safety climate survey 
instrument was first evaluated for its psychometric properties and a multifactor 
model was developed using both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. 
 167 
 
Then, the survey responses were analyzed to determine whether there was 
sufficient support for the hypothesis.  
The total sample of responses to the Patient Safety Climate Survey consisted of 
pre-training responses (n=3,689), post-module 1 responses (n=4,427), post-
module 2 responses (n=3,074), and post-module 3 responses (n=1,626). The pre-
training sample was divided into two groups: Group 1 (Early Adopters), which 
included 39 hospitals that underwent the MOREOB training between 2006-2008 
and Group 2 (Late Adopters), which included 29 hospitals that underwent the 
MOREOB training between 2009-2011.  Group 1 consisted of 2,198 responses and 
Group 2 consisted of 1,491 responses. Table 30 summarizes the distribution of 
sample sizes. 
Table 30: Distribution of the survey samples 
 Sample Size Group 1 
(Early Adopters) 
Group 2 
(Late Adopters) 
Pre-Training 3,689 2,198 (59.6%) 1,491 (40.4%) 
Post-Module 1 4,427 3,297 (74.5%) 1,130 (25.5%) 
Post-Module 2 3,074 2,344 (74.3%) 730 (23.7%) 
Post-Module 3 1,626 1,237 (76.1%) 389 (23.9%) 
 
4.2.3.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The goal of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was to discover patterns that might 
form clusters of variables such that those variables might be considered in terms 
of more abstract constructs that underpin the responses to survey items, making 
the subsequent analysis more meaningful and simpler (Child, 2006).  In such 
analysis, each survey question represents an observable variable because response 
to the survey question is provided by the human subject responding to the survey; 
whereas, the scales that are formed based on the clustering of the responses are 
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considered to be latent variables or hypothetical constructs (Cattell, 1978). Thus, 
for example, if responses to survey items 1, 2, 3, and 4 cluster together, indicating 
that the variables may be measuring the same construct, then the construct could 
be given a label based on a collective meaning that the researcher might ascribe 
to that cluster of survey items. At this point, it is important to note that a survey 
questionnaire with a Likert-type scale is an attempt to convert qualitative data or 
subjective interpretation of survey items into quantitative data. Furthermore, the 
meta-level meaning ascribed to the clusters uncovered through EFA is a 
subjective effort to give qualitative meaning to the quantitatively validated 
clustering.  At the meta-level, the goal of EFA is to discover the smallest number 
of factors or scales that will represent the most variance in the dataset 
(McDonald, 1985). Thus, an EFA typically yields 1-5 scales. It is also important 
to note that purists have argued against the use of Likert-type scales to do EFA 
because a Likert scale is ordinal and as such, the distance between “1” and “2” on 
the scale may not be the same as that between “4” and “5”(Jakobsson, 2004; 
Vigderhous, 1977). However, other methodological research indicates that such 
analysis could be performed on ordinal or dichotomous variables (Bartholomew, 
1980; Mislevy, 1986) as long as analytical methods used are consistent with the 
characteristics of the data.  
For this study, the pre-training, early adopter sample (Group 1) was split into two 
(approximately 50 per cent) randomly generated groups (Group 1A and Group 
1B). Group 1A contained 1,116 responses and Group 1B contained 1,082 
responses. Group 1A was used as the derivation sample for EFA and Group 1B 
was used as the validation sample for Multi-Trait Analysis (MTA).  
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Prior to conducting EFA, the suitability of the Group 1A data for EFA was 
verified using the following characteristics/criteria: 
1. Sample size and number of observations: the sample size should be at 
least 300 and the variables that are subjected to EFA should have at least 
5 to 10 observations or responses. Normally, a threshold of respondents to 
variables is set to 10:1, and the factors are considered to be stable and 
cross-validated with respondents to variables ratio of 30:1 or better (Yong 
& Pearce, 2013). Thus, larger the ratio, the lower the error in the data. In 
this study, the Group 1A sample contained 1,116 respondents. With 54 
items in the survey, the respondent-to-variable ratio was approximately 
20:1.  Thus, by these criteria, Group 1A was reasonably above the cut-off 
levels for EFA.  
2. KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
Measure is often used to determine sampling adequacy. The threshold is 
set at 0.50. Values between .5 and .7 are mediocre, between .7 and .8 are 
good, between .8 and .9 are great and above .9 are superb (Hutcheson & 
Sofroniou, 1999). The Group 1A dataset yielded a KMO of .980, which 
was excellent. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is conducted to confirm that 
the dataset has patterned relationships among variables. The desired p-
value is less than .001. The Group 1A dataset had a p-value of .000; thus, 
the dataset had a strong likelihood of patterned relationships. Next, the 
diagonal values of the anti-correlation matrix should be above .50 so that 
distinct and reliable factors may be produced. In Group 1A dataset, all the 
diagonal values were above .935. Thus, this dataset ranked very highly on 
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sampling adequacy and there was very high likelihood that distinct and 
reliable factors would be produced.  
Since the purpose of this analysis was to explore the data and determine what 
factors may exist, the ability to generalize the findings was limited to the sample 
used rather than the larger population. Since the original sample was randomly 
split into two groups (1A and 1B), the findings could be extended to the entire 
Group 1. Generalization beyond Group 1 may be possible in subsequent analyses 
of other populations if those analyses yield a consistent factor structure. Principal 
Axis Factoring was used to extract six factors because the safety climate survey 
was constructed with six elements (or theoretical factors); otherwise, the more 
commonly used cutoff of eigenvalues at or above 1.0 would have yielded five 
factors. The goodness of fit of this six-factor model was determined by 
examining the percentage of the non-redundant residuals with values greater than 
0.05—the cutoff for a good model is below 50 per cent with non-redundant 
residuals greater than 0.05. For the Group 1A dataset, there were 32 (2.0%) non-
redundant residuals with absolute values greater than 0.05. Thus, the six-factor 
model appears to be an extremely good fit for this dataset. 
The Pattern Matrix, with Principal Axis Factoring and Direct Oblimin Rotation 
with Kaiser Normalization, indicated that the rotation converged in 38 iterations 
for Group 1A. The Principal Axis Factoring was used instead of Principal 
Components Analysis because “only factor analysis can estimate the underlying 
factors” (Field, 2013), while PCA is helpful in reducing  a larger survey 
instrument to a more compact, yet equally reliable instrument. Although the 
preceding analysis indicated that distinct and reliable factors may be produced, it 
was not clear the extent to which these factors may be inter-related. Thus, it was 
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assumed that they would be inter-related and hence Direct Oblimin rotation was 
chosen instead of Varimax rotation.  
The factor analysis yielded the first five factors above eigenvalues of 1 and the 
sixth factor at eigenvalue of .982. The first five factors explained 51 per cent of 
the variance and the sixth factor added approximately 1 per cent. Thus, the six-
factor model would explain 52 per cent of the variance. The Scree Plot (Figure 
13) shows a clear inflection point at the fifth factor and the factor loadings 
indicate that the sixth factor has only one item (Q16), loaded at -.351. Thus, 
Factor 6 was dropped. Although the Scree Plot indicated a four-factor model, the 
fifth factor was explored (because of eigenvalue above 1.0) with the intention to 
drop this factor if subsequent Confirmatory Factor Analysis justified only four 
factors. The factor loadings are presented in Table 30. All loadings at or below 
0.30 are suppressed for clarity. In cases where an item loaded on more than one 
factor, the highest loading is expressed in bold. Presence of such cross-loading 
indicates that some factors may be inter-related. 
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Figure 13: Scree plot indicates inflection at the fifth factor. 
 
Factor 1 was long with 22 items (after Q4 was moved to Factor 2 due to better 
loading on Factor 2 than Factor 1) and had a very high level of internal 
consistency (α = 0.96), which could mean presence of redundancy within a scale. 
On the other hand, the item homogeneity (the mean of all inter-item covariances 
within the scale) was moderate at 0.64. These characteristics were indicative of 
the presence of subscales or two fairly-correlated scales (Singer et al., 2007).  
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Table 31: Item descriptive statistics and factor loadings 
 
 
 174 
 
Table 31 (Continued): Item descriptive statistics and factor loadings 
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Table 31 (Continued): Item descriptive statistics and factor loadings 
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Based on the themes expressed in items clustering under Factor 1, and the 
potential presence of subscales, Factor 1 was split into two scales: Factor 1A and 
Factor 1B. Factor 1A was labelled, “Patient Safety is Everyone’s Responsibility” 
and Factor 1B was labelled, “Learning.” These labels were consistent with the 
themes expressed in the items as well as the learning outcomes of the MOREOB 
program. Items inconsistent with the two themes as well as those with loading at 
or below .40 were deleted. The final items contained in Factor 1 A and Factor 1B, 
and their loadings, are presented in Table 32 and Table 33, respectively. 
Table 32: Factor 1A item descriptive statistics and loadings 
     
Scale/Items Mean SD Loading 
Factor 1A: Patient Safety is Everyone’s Responsibility  
    
Q53 We have a well-structured process to report potential 
patient safety hazards. 
3.47 1.15 .75 
Q52 We have a well-structured process to report unexpected 
events (errors, near misses). 
3.48 1.19 .69  
Q17 We are encouraged to report errors, even those that are 
caught and corrected before affecting the patient. 
3.67 1.14 .68  
Q21 Patient safety occurrences are investigated thoroughly. 3.55 1.15 .65  
Q22 Learning from patient safety occurrences is shared with 
the entire unit staff. 
3.32 1.16 .63  
Q23 When a patient safety issue is reported it is acted upon in a 
timely manner. 
3.59 1.11 .61  
Q25 Our unit is actively doing things to improve patient safety. 3.76 0.99 .54  
Q24 We review our safety procedures and protocols regularly. 3.27 1.14 .48  
   
Table 33: Factor 1B item descriptive statistics and loadings 
     
Scale/Items Mean SD Loading 
Factor 1B: Learning  
    
Q44 Clinical errors and near misses are used as learning 
opportunities to improve and prevent recurrences. 
3.55 1.14 .75 
Q50 We have made improvements as a result of our learning 
from near misses. 
3.56 1.10 .69 
Q51 We have made improvements as a result of learning from 
past clinical errors. 
3.67 1.05 .67 
Q47 Clinical management processes are examined to identify 
where errors might be made and how they can be 
prevented. 
3.30 1.16 .65 
Q46 The focus of patient care reviews is on identifying system 
problems and not on individual blame. 
3.41 1.17 .48 
Q45 We receive in-service training to update skills and 
proficiency using the equipment and technology in our 
unit. 
3.69 1.06 .42 
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Factor 2 also contained 16 items. It too had a very high level of internal 
consistency (α = 0.93) and the item homogeneity was low at 0.38. Therefore this 
factor was also examined for thematic clustering and item reduction. Nine items 
clustered around the theme, “Valuing Individuals,” which was consistent with the 
learning objectives of the MOREOB program. Items inconsistent with this theme 
or loading at or below .40 were deleted; seven items were retained. The final 
items contained in Factor 2, and their loadings, are presented in Table 34. 
Table 34: Factor 2 item descriptive statistics and loadings 
     
Scale/Items Mean SD Loading 
Factor 2: Valuing Individuals  
    
Q6 We communicate with each other in a respectful manner. 3.86 0.81 .81  
Q3 We treat each member of our unit with equal respect. 3.64 0.95 .80  
Q7 We are open to hearing each other's points of view. 3.77 0.85 .74  
Q8 We value each other's knowledge base and skill sets. 3.91 0.85 .74  
Q5 We show appreciation for each other's contributions. 3.74 0.89 .62  
Q2 We know we can count on one another. 4.02 0.84 .52  
Q4 When a concern is raised there is an effort to act on it 
and/or feedback is received. 
3.60 0.96 .41  
   
 
Originally, Factor 3 had six items. Since item Q1 loaded more strongly on Factor 
2 (it was not included in the final list of items because it loaded below the .40 
threshold for Factor 2), it was removed from consideration in Factor 3. The 
dominant theme for these items was, “Empowering People,” which was 
consistent with the learning objectives of the MOREOB program. The final items 
contained in Factor 3, and their loadings, are presented in Table 35.  
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Table 35: Factor 3 item descriptive statistics and loadings 
     
Scale/Items Mean SD Loading 
Factor 3: Empowering People  
    
Q13 I have the skills to manage an emergency safely until 
someone else arrives to assist or assume management. 
3.82 0.96 .76 
Q14 I have the knowledge to identify when someone is about to 
do something that might threaten patient safety. 
3.90 0.80 .36 
Q15 I am comfortable intervening if I see someone about to do 
something that might threaten patient safety, regardless of 
their level of authority. 
3.62 1.05 .56 
Q37 I am comfortable sharing my observations or concerns in 
multidisciplinary patient review meetings. 
3.23 1.27 .32 
Q16 I feel free to question the decisions or actions of others, 
regardless of their level of authority. 
3.33 1.08 .31 
 
Although four items loaded below the desirable cutoff of 0.40, thematically, they 
seemed to add a more holistic context to the rest of the items; therefore, they 
were retained in the final model for Factor 3.  
Factor 4 started with nine items. Two items were removed because they loaded 
better on other factors (Q2 and Q28). The dominant theme for these items was, 
“Open Communication,” which was consistent with the learning objectives of the 
MOREOB program. Although three items loaded below the desirable cutoff of 
0.40, thematically, they seemed to add a more holistic context to the rest of the 
items; therefore, they were retained. The final items contained in Factor 4, and 
their loadings, are presented in Table 36.  
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Table 36: Factor 4 item descriptive statistics and loadings 
     
Scale/Items Mean SD Loading 
Factor 4: Open Communication  
    
Q49 If we don't know something, we take the initiative to ask 
someone who does. 
4.35 0.72 .60 
Q31 We keep one another appropriately informed about the 
patient's condition. 
4.06 0.78 .48 
Q39 If I don't understand something, I feel free to ask 
questions. 
4.34 0.79 .42 
Q48 We voluntarily share knowledge and experiences with one 
another. 
3.93 0.88 .40 
Q35 Information is communicated accurately between people 
and between shifts. 
3.87 0.82 .39 
Q33 We take the initiative to offer assistance when needed 
without waiting to be asked. 
4.00 0.82 .37 
Q43 Patients are included in discussions and decisions 
regarding their care. 
3.86 1.02 .30 
 
Factor 5 had eight items. Two items were removed because they loaded better on 
other factors (Q19 and Q37). The dominant theme for these items was, 
“Teamwork,” which was consistent with the learning objectives of the MOREOB 
program. Although two items loaded below the desirable cutoff of 0.40, 
thematically, they seemed to add a more holistic context to the rest of the items; 
therefore, they were retained. The final items contained in Factor 5, and their 
loadings, are presented in Table 37.  
 
Table 37: Factor 5 item descriptive statistics and loadings 
     
Scale/Items Mean SD Loading 
Factor 5: Teamwork  
    
Q34 I am included in inter-professional meetings regarding 
patient care and safety. 
2.78 1.29 .60 
Q27 Multidisciplinary meetings about patient care are a normal 
part of our practice. 
2.96 1.27 .56 
Q29 When things do not go well with a patient, we meet as a 
multidisciplinary group to discuss the issues involved. 
3.04 1.29 .42 
Q42 There is open discussion of the results of patient care 
reviews so that all members of our unit learn from the 
experiences of others. 
3.07 1.20 .40 
Q20 Caregivers, managers and administrators regularly discuss 
unit issues/patient care concerns and potential solutions 
together. 
3.23 1.13 .36 
Q40 Information is shared across disciplines on a regular basis. 3.36 1.07 .32 
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The inter-factor correlation indicates, shown in Table 38, that the correlation 
across all factors is significant (p<.01). Thus, one cannot assume that the six 
factors are not correlated and therefore, it confirms the use of oblique rotation 
(Direct Oblimin) rather than orthogonal rotation (Varimax). 
Table 38: Inter-factor correlation matrix 
 Factor 1A Factor 1B Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
1A     Pearson Correlation 
          Sig. (2-tailed) 
          N 
1 
 
1116 
.843* 
.000 
1116 
.596* 
.000 
1116 
.538* 
.000 
1116 
.621* 
.000 
1116 
.790* 
.000 
1116 
1B     Pearson Correlation 
          Sig. (2-tailed) 
          N 
.843* 
.000 
1116 
1 
 
1116 
.557* 
.000 
1116 
.535* 
.000 
1116 
.600* 
.000 
1116 
.782* 
.000 
1116 
2       Pearson Correlation 
          Sig. (2-tailed) 
          N 
.596* 
.000 
1116 
.557* 
.000 
1116 
1 
 
1116 
.475* 
.000 
1116 
.737* 
.000 
1116 
.584* 
.000 
1116 
3       Pearson Correlation 
          Sig. (2-tailed) 
          N 
.538* 
.000 
1116 
.535* 
.000 
1116 
.475* 
.000 
1116 
1 
 
1116 
.494* 
.000 
1116 
.540* 
.000 
1116 
4        Pearson Correlation 
          Sig. (2-tailed) 
          N 
.621* 
.000 
1116 
.600* 
.000 
1116 
.737* 
.000 
1116 
.494* 
.000 
1116 
1 
 
1116 
.543* 
.000 
1116 
5        Pearson Correlation 
          Sig. (2-tailed) 
          N 
.790* 
.000 
1116 
.782* 
.000 
1116 
.584* 
.000 
1116 
.540* 
.000 
1116 
.543* 
.000 
1116 
1 
 
1116 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
4.2.3.2 Multi-Trait Analysis (MTA) 
The factors developed through the EFA were used to create summative rating 
scales in the validation sample (Group 1B, n=1,082), wherein the scale score is 
the mean of the scores of the individual items contained in that scale.  
The key MTA results are summarized in tables 39-44. The first four columns 
report the question number, text, mean and standard deviations for all the items 
(since this analysis is for Group 1B, the mean and standard deviation are different 
from those reported earlier in Tables 31-36; for Group 1B, n = 1,082). The 
remaining columns of each table report item-to-scale correlations. The boxed-
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coefficients are the corrected correlations between each item and the remaining 
items in the hypothesized scale, which is a measure of convergent validity. 
Comparing these correlations with others in the same row indicates the 
discriminant validity, which is the extent to which that item measures the 
hypothesized dimension of safety climate rather than any other dimension. 
The convergent item-scale correlations were between 0.46 and 0.74 across the six 
proposed scales (median, 0.67). Generally, the threshold for the corrected 
(adjusted for overlap) item-to-scale correlation is set at 0.40 (Kerlinger, 1973; 
Ware, Harris, Gandek, Rogers, & Reese, 1997). In this study, 100 per cent of the 
scales met this criterion.  
A review of the correlations between each item and its hypothesized scale/factor 
in contrast to the other scales revealed good item discriminant validity. For 
example in Table 39, the first row indicates that item Q53 had a corrected item-
to-scale correlation of 0.74 and the correlation between item and all other scales 
was lower than 0.74. Thus, while this item did well in measuring the construct 
represented by Factor 1A (Patient Safety is Everyone’s Responsibility), it did not 
measure any other construct as well. The selected items loaded higher on their 
own hypothesized scale than on any other scale in 187 out of 195 comparisons, 
yielding a discriminant validity quotient of 96 per cent.   
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Table 39: Item descriptive statistics and item-to-scale correlations for Factor 1A 
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Table 40: Item descriptive statistics and item-to-scale correlations for Factor 1B 
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Table 41: Item descriptive statistics and item-to-scale correlations for Factor 2 
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Table 42: Item descriptive statistics and item-to-scale correlations for Factor 3 
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Table 43: Item descriptive statistics and item-to-scale correlations for Factor 4 
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Table 44: Item descriptive statistics and item-to-scale correlations for Factor 5 
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Finally, Table 45 presents inter-scale correlations, which could be used to further 
verify the validity and reliability of the scales. The inter-scale correlations range 
between 0.46 and 0.85 with a mean of 0.62. The diagonal entries are all higher 
than the inter-scale correlations. Thus, the scales are not interchangeable and 
measure distinguishable aspects of patient safety climate among the sample 
population. 
Table 45: Inter-scale correlations 
   Factor 1A Factor 1B Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Factor 1A 1      
Factor 1B 0.85 1     
Factor 2 0.61 0.59 1    
Factor 3 0.54 0.54 0.46 1   
Factor 4 0.63 0.63 0.73 0.49 1  
Factor 5 0.78 0.77 0.57 0.56 0.53 1 
 
4.2.3.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Safety Climate Survey Instrument 
The six-factor model developed from exploratory factor analysis and validated by 
multi-trait analysis served as the hypothesis for the confirmatory factor analysis. 
Thus, the hypothesis was that patient safety climate in obstetrics could be 
represented by a six-factor model consisting of the following: 
1. Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority: Items 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 52, 53 
2. Learning: Items 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51 
3. Valuing Individuals: Items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
4. Empowering People: Items 13, 14, 15, 16, 37 
5. Open Communication: Items 31, 33, 35, 39, 43, 48, 49 
6. Teamwork: Items 20, 27, 29, 34, 40, 42 
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Figure 14 shows the CFA model. Since the previous analysis (Table 37) 
demonstrated that all the factors were correlated, this CFA model also illustrates 
that all factors are inter-related. 
 
Figure 14: CFA Model with six inter-related factors 
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A different random sample (Group 1C) of approximately 50 per cent of the pre-
training safety climate surveys was selected. After eliminating the cases with 
missing data, 1082 cases were left. One assumption of structural equation 
modeling is the absence of multicollinearity within factors, which is a measure of 
correlation between items that are included in a given factor (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2012). Table 46 presents the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance 
scores for each factor. In order to rule out multicollinearity, the VIF score should 
be below 3.0 and the tolerance should be greater than .10 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2012). All six factors demonstrated absence of multicollinearity. 
Table 46: Variable inflation factor scores and tolerances for the six-factor model 
Factor VIF Tolerance 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Patient Safety is 
Everyone’s Priority 
1.657 2.518 .397 .603 
Learning 1.382 2.627 .381 .724 
Valuing Individuals 1.541 2.317 .432 .649 
Empowering People 1.224 1.816 .551 .817 
Open Communication 1.293 2.089 .479 .773 
Teamwork 1.287 2.134 .469 .777 
 
Another critical assumption of structural equation modeling was multivariate 
normality (Byrne, 2010, p.102), it was essential to test whether or not the data 
conformed to this requirement. First, using (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995) 
guidance on evaluation of univariate kurtosis, no single item was over the 
threshold of 7.00. Thus, the sample was not kurtotic at the univariate level. 
Examination of multivariate kurtosis revealed that the critical ratio value was 
164.74, which is substantially higher than the threshold of 5.00 suggested by 
Bentler (2005). Thus, the standard Maximum Likelihood estimation technique 
could not be used without some remedies.  
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In accordance with the strategy adopted by Simon and Esau (2004), a two-step 
approached was used. First, the sample was examined for evidence of 
multivariate outliers using Mahalanobis distance, and second, when elimination 
of cases4 with excessive Mahalanobis distance did not bring the multivariate 
normality within allowable limits, bootstrapping with Bollen-Stine correction was 
used. The final sample size was 1049 cases and 2,000 bootstrap subsamples. 
Table 47 presents the model fit statistics for the CFA Model. The hypothesized 
model achieved a reasonable fit. The hypothesized model was a poor fit based on 
χ2 alone: χ2(687, N=1049) = 2676, p<.001. However, since χ2 is not a reliable 
indicator of model fit (it tends to be heavily influenced by sample size), other 
goodness-of-fit indicators have been recommended (Hu & Bentler, 1995). Based 
on the additional robust statistics, χ2/df was above the conservative value of 3.0, 
but under the acceptable value of 5.0; NFI was slightly under the acceptable 
value of .90; the CFI and TLI were between the acceptable and conservative 
(above.90 to above .95); and RMSEA met the conservative criteria.  
Table 47: Goodness-of-fit measures for the CFA Model   
Models 
Goodness-of-Fit Measures 
χ2 df χ2/ df NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Minimal Value - - < 5.0 > .90 > .90 > .90 < .06 
Hypothesized 
six-factor model 
2676 687 3.895 .894 .919 .913 .053 
Final Model 1039 335 3.101 .945 .962 .957 .045 
 
Next, each factor was further examined for squared multiple correlations (R2 
values) and path loadings (β values). Path loadings are a measure of the strength 
                                                 
4 33 cases with the greatest Mahalanobis distance were eliminated; resulting sample size was 1049 
and the critical ratio for multivariate normality was brought down to 117.02 (still too high) 
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of the relationship between the survey item (indicator) and the factor (latent 
variable); thus, higher the path loading, the stronger the contribution of the 
survey item toward the factor. The R2 value represents the degree to which 
variance in the latent factor could be explained by the indicator; thus, the higher 
the R2 value, the stronger the role of the survey item. Items with R2 value lower 
than .50 or β values lower than .70 were eliminated. Table 48 lists the items that 
were eliminated from the respective factors.  
Table 48: Items eliminated due to low regression weights or path loadings 
Factor Item R2 value β value 
Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority 17 .49 .67 
Learning 45 .37 .61 
Valuing Individuals 4 .44 .67 
Empowering People 13 .28 .53 
 14 .41 .64 
 37 .35 .59 
Open Communication 35 .46 .68 
 39 .43 .66 
 43 .29 .54 
Teamwork 34 .42 .65 
 40 .45 .67 
The model fit data reported in Table 47 under Final Model represent results after 
eliminating items listed in Table 48.  This revised model was a much stronger fit. 
Next, factors 1 and 2 were combined to determine whether there was any support 
for a five-factor model, as identified in the Scree Plot (Figure 12), this model 
produced the following measures: χ2=1117, df= 340, χ2/ df =3.28, NFI=.941, 
CFI=.958, TLI=.953, and RMSEA=.047. These results are certainly supportive of 
a good model fit, but slightly inferior to the final model with six factors.  
Figure 15 presents the final six-factor CFA Model. 
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Figure 15: CFA Model with factor loadings 
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Table 49 presents the factor loadings from the EFA and CFA models, and Table 
50 presents the inter-factor correlations derived from the CFA model. Generally, 
the factor loadings as well as the inter-factor correlations are stronger with CFA 
than with EFA. 
Table 49: Factor loadings comparisons between EFA and CFA 
Scale/Items EFA 
Loading 
CFA 
Loading 
Factor 1: Patient Safety is Everyone’s Responsibility  
    
Q53 We have a well-structured process to report potential 
patient safety hazards. 
.75  .79 
Q52 We have a well-structured process to report unexpected 
events (errors, near misses). 
.69  .75  
Q21 Patient safety occurrences are investigated thoroughly. .65  .74  
Q22 Learning from patient safety occurrences is shared with 
the entire unit staff. 
.63  .78  
Q23 When a patient safety issue is reported it is acted upon in a 
timely manner. 
.61  .71  
Q25 Our unit is actively doing things to improve patient safety. .54  .75  
Q24 We review our safety procedures and protocols regularly. .48  .77  
    
Scale/Items EFA 
Loading 
CFA 
Loading 
Factor 2: Learning  
    
Q44 Clinical errors and near misses are used as learning 
opportunities to improve and prevent recurrences. 
.75  .79 
Q50 We have made improvements as a result of our learning 
from near misses. 
.69  .79 
Q51 We have made improvements as a result of learning from 
past clinical errors. 
.67  .80 
Q47 Clinical management processes are examined to identify 
where errors might be made and how they can be 
prevented. 
.65  .79 
Q46 The focus of patient care reviews is on identifying system 
problems and not on individual blame. 
.48  .74 
    
Scale/Items EFA 
Loading 
CFA 
Loading 
Factor 3: Valuing Individuals  
    
Q6 We communicate with each other in a respectful manner. .81  .78  
Q3 We treat each member of our unit with equal respect. .80  .75  
Q7 We are open to hearing each other's points of view. .74  .79  
Q8 We value each other's knowledge base and skill sets. .74  .77  
Q5 We show appreciation for each other's contributions. .62  .79  
Q2 We know we can count on one another. .52  .72  
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Table 49: (Continued): Factor loadings comparisons between EFA and CFA 
Scale/Items EFA 
Loading 
CFA 
Loading 
Factor 4: Empowering People  
    
Q15 I am comfortable intervening if I see someone about to do 
something that might threaten patient safety, regardless of 
their level of authority. 
.56  .76 
Q16 I feel free to question the decisions or actions of others, 
regardless of their level of authority. 
.31  .72 
     
Scale/Items EFA 
Loading 
CFA 
Loading 
Factor 5: Open Communication  
    
Q49 If we don't know something, we take the initiative to ask 
someone who does. 
.60  .74 
Q31 We keep one another appropriately informed about the 
patient's condition. 
.48  .73 
Q48 We voluntarily share knowledge and experiences with one 
another. 
.40  .76 
Q33 We take the initiative to offer assistance when needed 
without waiting to be asked. 
.37  .74 
     
Scale/Items EFA 
Loading 
CFA 
Loading 
Factor 6: Teamwork  
    
Q27 Multidisciplinary meetings about patient care are a normal 
part of our practice. 
.56  .76 
Q29 When things do not go well with a patient, we meet as a 
multidisciplinary group to discuss the issues involved. 
.42  .75 
Q42 There is open discussion of the results of patient care 
reviews so that all members of our unit learn from the 
experiences of others. 
.40  .81 
Q20 Caregivers, managers and administrators regularly discuss 
unit issues/patient care concerns and potential solutions 
together. 
.36  .74 
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Table 50: Inter-factor correlation matrix comparison 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
1     Pearson 
Correlation 
          CFA      
1 
 
.     
2     Pearson 
Correlation 
          CFA        
.843* 
.947+ 
1 
 
    
3       Pearson 
Correlation 
          CFA 
.596* 
.638
+
 
.557* 
.621
+
 
1 
 
   
4       Pearson 
Correlation 
          CFA 
.538* 
.565
+
 
.535* 
.573
+
 
.475* 
.541
+
 
1 
 
  
5        Pearson 
Correlation 
          CFA 
.621* 
.706
+
 
.600* 
.695
+
 
.737* 
.803
+
 
.494* 
.566
+
 
1 
 
 
6        Pearson 
Correlation 
          CFA 
.790* 
.906
+
 
 
.782* 
.884
+
 
.584* 
.606
+
 
.540* 
.571
+
 
.543* 
.585
+
 
1 
 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
+
. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
Next, a second-order CFA was conducted to test whether Patient Safety Climate 
could be represented by a six-factor model. Table 51 illustrates the goodness-of-
fit measures for this model and Figure 16 represents the second-order CFA model 
with path loadings. 
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Table 51: Goodness-of-fit measures for the second-order CFA Model   
Models 
Goodness-of-Fit Measures 
χ2 df χ2/ df NFI CFI TLI RMSEA 
Minimal Value - - < 5.0 > .90 > .90 > .90 < .06 
Second-order 
CFA Model 
with six factors 
1397 344 4.061 .926 .943 .937 .054 
 
Based on these analyses, patient safety climate can be represented by a multi-
factor model consisting of six factors: (1) patient safety is everyone’s 
responsibility; (2) learning; (3) valuing individuals; (4) empowering people;      
(5) open communication; and (6) teamwork.  
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Figure 16: Second-order CFA Model with path loadings 
 
4.2.3.4 Conclusion from the Safety Climate Survey Instrument Analysis 
The analysis conducted in this section proves that the Safety Climate Survey 
instrument used by the Salus Global Corporation has both convergent and 
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discriminant validity. There are six underlying constructs that could be used to 
represent safety climate in obstetrics units since this instrument was implemented 
in such facilities. The six factors that represent the safety climate are as follows: 
1. Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority 
2. Learning 
3. Valuing Individuals 
4. Empowering People 
5. Open Communication 
6. Teamwork 
Four of these six factors are consistent with the safety climate elements identified 
in the emergent, integrated model of culture and climate (Section 2.5, p.73). 
Leadership, Evidence-based Practice, and Accountability are not represented in 
the six-factor model. These factors may be considered for inclusion in future 
development of Salus Global’s safety climate survey. However, at the present 
time, all six factors are consistent with Singer et al.’s (Singer et al., 2007) model. 
Factor 1 (Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority) addresses all three components of 
Singer et al.’s organizational factors: senior managers’ engagement, 
organizational resources, and overall emphasis on safety. Factor 2 (Learning) is 
consistent with Singer et al.’s learning component in the individual-level factor. 
Factor 3 (Valuing Individuals) addresses Singer et al.’s unit-level factors and 
components like safety norms and recognition and support for safety. This factor 
is about the obstetrics unit valuing and respecting individuals. Factor 4 
(Empowering People) takes a positive approach to individual-level perceptions; 
whereas, Singer et al. use fear of blame and fear of shame as two constituent 
components of the individual factor. Factor 5 (Open Communication) represents 
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opinions regarding how individual members of the obstetrics team keep each 
other informed and how comfortable they are in sharing knowledge as well as 
including patients in their conversation. Thus, this is a unit-level factor. Factor 6 
(Teamwork) is also consistent with Singer et al.’s unit-level factor because the 
items contained in this factor address opinions regarding the effectiveness of 
obstetrics teams (including patients). Thus, this theoretical model of safety 
climate, although it has some different components, is consistent with the overall 
structure presented by Singer et al (2007); it is mapped against Singer et al.’s 
model in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17: Comparison with Singer et al.’s model of safety climate in obstetrics 
 
4.2.3.5 Results of Safety Climate Assessment 
In order to test whether participants’ perceptions of the safety climate were 
relatively homogeneous, the variance of safety climate scores within obstetrics 
groups was compared with the variance between obstetrics groups (n=68 and   
13,123 individual responses) similar to the way Zohar (1980) justified his 
aggregation from individual to factory-level assessment. The resulting F ratio, 
F(67,13146) ranged from 8.523 to 27.708; it was highly significant for all six 
climate factors at p=.000, justifying the level of analysis for safety climate at the 
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Valuing 
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Organization Unit Individual 
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obstetrics group level. Additionally, the level of agreement for such aggregation 
was verified based on the rWG(J) index. For large group sizes (n=>25), (Cohen, 
Doveh, & Nahum-Shani, 2009) demonstrated that a threshold of .50 is adequate 
and (LeBreton & Senter, 2008) consider the agreement level between .51 and .70 
moderate, but acceptable. The computed rWG(J) index for each factor and 
obstetrics unit ranged between .55 and .94; the rWG(J) index for obstetrics group to 
adopter level aggregation ranged from .67 to .93. Since all group sizes were 
greater than 25, for both levels of aggregation, the rWG(J) index was above the 
threshold recommended by Cohen et al. (2009): about 10 per cent were between 
.55 and .69. A detailed table of rWG(J) index values is provided in Appendix C.  
Additionally, since the climate model is a multi-class model (individual level to 
obstetrics group level, and obstetrics group to adopter level) Interclass 
Correlation (ICC-2) was performed. Table 52 presents the results of this 
comparison. The ICC-2 values ranged between .80 and .97, well above the 
threshold of .70 (Field, 2013), justifying group-level analysis. 
Table 52: Inter-rater reliability 
Individual (n=13,123) to Obstetrics Group (n=68) Level Aggregation and  
Obstetrics Group to Adopter (n=2) Level Aggregation 
Factor Obstetrics Groups MS Adopter Groups MS ICC (2) 
 Between 
Groups 
(n=68) 
Within 
Groups 
(n=68) 
Between 
Groups 
(n=2) 
Within 
Groups 
(n=2) 
Obstetrics 
Groups 
(n=68) 
Adopter 
Groups 
(n=2) 
1 11.779 .615 24.532 .669 .95 .97 
2 12.62 .652 8.313 .711 .95 .91 
3 6.849 .382 8.015 .413 .94 .95 
4 6.546 .729 3.892 .758 .89 .80 
5 2.877 .337 2.591 .349 .88 .87 
6 22.03 .795 28.868 .899 .96 .97 
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Figure 18 illustrates the pre-training comparison between the two groups (Group 
1: Early Adopters (n=39) and Group 2: Late Adopters (n=29)) across all six 
factors. The 2-tailed significance for all the differences in mean scores between 
the two groups was significant (p <.05) for all factors.  
 
Figure 18: Pre-training comparison between early adopter and late adopter groups 
 
The survey of the pre-training climate at the Early Adopter hospitals was 
conducted in 2006; while the same survey at the Late Adopter hospitals was 
conducted in 2009. Both surveys were conducted immediately prior to starting 
the first MOREOB training module. Considering that the MOREOB program was 
available to both groups at the same time (in 2006), but one group (the early 
adopters) chose to implement it first—and  three years ahead of the second 
group—it is not surprising that the early adopter group scored higher on five of 
the six factors in the pre-training comparison. Thus, one could conclude that there 
might have been differences in the underlying safety cultures at the early-adopter 
healthcare facilities versus the late-adopter hospitals.   
Patient
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Priority
Learning
Valuing
Individuals
Empower-
ing People
Open
Communi-
cation
Teamwork
Early Adopters 3.49 3.51 3.80 3.51 4.10 3.06
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The post-training surveys were conducted immediately after each training 
module. In the case of the Early Adopters, the pre-training survey was conducted 
in 2006, the post-module 1 survey was conducted in 2007, the post-module 2 
survey was conducted in 2008, and the post-module 3 survey was conducted in 
2009. Within this group, Figure 19 shows changes in safety climate scores across 
all six factors, starting with pre-training scores and each training module 
thereafter. Scores for factors 1, 2, 4, and 6 (Patient safety is everyone’s priority, 
learning, empowering people, and teamwork, respectively) improved 
successively and substantially over the period of the three modules. Scores for 
factors 3 (valuing individuals) and 5 (open communication) were higher than 
other factors prior to the MOREOB training, but they too showed slight 
improvement.  
 
Figure 19: Improvement in safety climate in response to the MOREOB training 
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Safety is
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Priority
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ing People
Open
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Teamwork
Pre-Training 3.49 3.51 3.80 3.51 4.10 3.06
Module 1 3.63 3.64 3.83 3.76 4.15 3.22
Module 2 3.71 3.72 3.85 3.87 4.14 3.31
Module 3 3.80 3.77 3.86 3.93 4.13 3.40
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Latent Growth Curve Modeling (LGM), for the Early Adopter Group, on Patient 
Safety is Everyone’s Priority (Factor 1) achieved CFI and TFI of .957 and .967, 
respectively, indicating a good model fit. The intercept was 3.341 and the slope 
was .467. Thus, the average starting score for Factor 1 is 3.34 out of 5.00 and 
there was an average improvement in this score by .47 after every module.  Table 
53 presents comparable data for all six factors for both groups (Early Adopters 
and Late Adopters). In the case of Early Adopters, the average starting score for 
Open Communication (Factor 5) was the highest and improved the least over the 
three modules; whereas, the average starting score for Teamwork (Factor 6) was 
the lowest and improved the most over the three modules. In the case of Late 
Adopters, the model fit was not as strong for the first factor, but it was much 
stronger for the other factors. Similar to the Early Adopters, the Late Adopters 
had average starting score for Teamwork (Factor 6) at the lowest and it improved 
significantly over the three modules; however, the most improvement was noted 
for Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority (Factor 1). In all cases, these estimates 
were based on a linear model, which is consistent with the theoretical construct 
that climate would improve gradually along a linear growth curve; however, 
quadratic estimation was also conducted to test whether there was an alternate 
explanation. In this test, although the model fit statistics remained stable, the 
intercept and slope data were substantially lower. Thus, it was clear that climate 
improvement would be gradual and best estimated using a linear model. Figure 
20 illustrates the LGM structure, which was applied across all six factors.  
Assuming that the MOREOB program was the only patient safety intervention 
during the period in which the various training modules were implemented, one 
could conclude that the MOREOB training program contributed toward a 
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substantive improvement in the safety climate at the participating healthcare 
facilities.  Thus, the hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as a planned 
intervention, improves group-level patient safety climate (H2) is supported. 
 Table 53: Latent growth curve statistics 
Early Adopters Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
1     CFI .957 .974 .975 .990 .986 .966 
2     TLI .967 .981 .981 .993 .989 .975 
3     Intercept 3.341 3.353 3.737 3.491 4.103 2.847 
4     Slope .467 .405 .125 .465 .058 .507 
Late Adopters 
      
1     CFI .868 .927 .900 .976 .960 .938 
2     TLI  .901 .945 .925 .982 .970 .954 
3     Intercept 3.314 3.394 3.762 3.607 4.099 2.853 
4     Slope .536 .413 .138 .488 .076 .515 
 
 
Figure 20: Latent growth curve model of changes in safety climate after each 
module 
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4.2.4 Correlation between Knowledge, Climate, and Clinical Outcomes 
Similar to Warr et al.’s (1999) correlational analysis, in order to test the 
relationship between changes in knowledge, climate, and clinical outcomes, the 
improvement in the knowledge examination scores was compared with the 
improvement in patient safety climate, and improvements in patient safety 
climate were compared to the improvements in postpartum hemorrhage and 
length of stay scores. Of the six available scales in the patient safety climate 
survey, the scales with greatest improvement were selected for comparison as an 
example of best case scenario. Thus, for the Early Adopter group, the selected 
scale was Teamwork, and for the Late Adopter group, the selected scale was 
Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority. Since Postpartum Hemorrhage (PPH) and 
Length of Stay (LoS) showed the most improvements, they were used for this 
analysis. Table 54 shows the results of correlational analysis. 
Table 54: Correlation between knowledge, climate, and clinical outcomes 
 Knowledge PPH LoS 
 Adopter Group Adopter Group Adopter Group 
 Early Late Early Late Early Late 
Climate .779 .989 -.556 -.532 -.866 -.532 
 
Based on the above results, change in patient safety climate was highly correlated 
with change in knowledge. Thus, greater improvement in knowledge is likely to 
be associated with a greater improvement in patient safety climate. Also, changes 
in patient safety climate showed good correlation with improvements in clinical 
outcomes. The negative correlation between climate and clinical outcomes 
illustrates that as the patient safety climate scores improve, the average number of 
PPH cases and the average Length of Stay (in days) decreases. In general, a 
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change in knowledge exam scores or a change in patient safety climate scores 
could serve as an early indicator of changes in clinical outcomes. 
4.3 Discussion of Training Influence on Performance Outcomes and Climate 
The pre/post training knowledge and climate assessments were completed 
immediately before and after each training module. As reported earlier, the 
change in knowledge exam scores was significant and can be attributed to the 
MOREOB training. Since the knowledge assessment was most proximal to the 
training and aligned with the training content, and there were no other known 
interventions targeted at improving the participants’ knowledge, one could 
conclude that the first outcome of a training intervention is improvement in 
participants’ knowledge (learning). Since each module was covered over an 8-12 
month period concurrent with the participants’ experience of their work 
environment, the post-training climate scores are likely to be reflective of the 
psychological response to the new shared experience of the entire obstetrics team 
going through the training together and sensemaking associated with the content 
of the training itself, as well as any new workplace behaviors or changes in their 
workplace shared experiences. Since the knowledge scores showed significant 
improvements, the conditions must have been conducive to changes in workplace 
behaviors and creation of new shared experiences in the workplace, 
implementation of new policies, performance standards, and procedures, as well 
as role-modeling by leaders and key influencers. Participants’ experiences 
between Module 1 and Module 2, are likely to have also contributed toward the 
improvement in post-Module 2 climate scores, and experiences between Module 
2 and Module 3 are likely to have contributed to post-Module 3 climate scores. 
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Successive improvements in safety climate scores after Module 2 and Module 3 
indicate improvement in the organizational safety climate, suggesting a positive 
response to behaviors of leaders and key influencers, satisfaction with the 
implementation mechanism and potential change in values, beliefs, and 
assumptions. Furthermore, since the post-Module 2 and post-Module 3 climate 
scores in “Teamwork” showed the highest improvement among Early Adopters 
and those in “Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority” showed the highest 
improvement among Late Adopters, there must have been factors other than the 
training intervention that reinforced the importance of these two attributes.   
A review of the reduced-risk C-section (RRC) rates indicates that prior to the 
implementation of the MOREOB training, the RRC rate was on the rise; however, 
after the implementation of the MOREOB training, the RRC rate stabilized at a 
slightly lower value for the first two years, climbed slightly, and then started to 
decline. The difference in the RRC rates before MOREOB and after MOREOB was 
not significant. Thus, it may take longer than six years (the most data available 
since the first MOREOB module) for the RRC rate to show significant 
improvement.  On the other hand, the postpartum hemorrhage (PPH) rate showed 
a significant improvement after the MOREOB training in the Early Adopter group, 
but not in the Late Adopter group. Also, the pre-post difference in the Length of 
Stay was not significant in the Early Adopter group, although the differences 
between the experimental groups (Early Adopter and Late Adopter) versus the 
control group (Non-Adopter) were significant.  Thus, one could conclude that    
(a) there was a lag in the manifestation of improvements in clinical performance 
outcomes and (b) there might have been other factors impeding the influence of 
training on clinical performance outcomes.  The delay in transfer of training from 
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knowledge gain to behavioral change and further delay in transfer of training to 
group-level performance, as well as confounding with non-training factors, has 
been supported by many other studies (Alvarez et al., 2004; Arthur, Bennett, 
Edens, & Bell, 2003; Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Birdi, 2007; Blume et al., 2010; 
Elangovan & Karakowsky, 1999; Sitzman & Weinhardt, 2015; Tannenbaum et 
al., 1993; Warr et al., 1999). The role of cultural elements in influencing the 
transfer of training is explored in more detail in Study #3. 
4.4 Conclusions from Study #1 
Study #1 was a quantitative analysis of three datasets: knowledge examination 
scores, clinical outcomes data, and safety climate survey data. It tested two 
hypotheses:  
H1:  The MORE
OB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level 
outcomes.  
H2:  The MORE
OB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-level 
patient safety climate. 
Two measures were used to test the first hypothesis: knowledge examination 
scores and clinical outcomes data. Improvement in knowledge is not the same as 
improvement in work performance; however, such improvement would be one of 
the expected outcomes of a training intervention. The knowledge examination 
scores were aggregated from individual scores to the obstetrics team level and 
therefore considered group-level outcomes; clinical outcomes were reported by 
external agencies at the firm level, but since they were most pertinent to the 
obstetrics team, they were considered group-level outcomes.  
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Based on the analysis of the knowledge exam data, it was concluded that the 
knowledge exam itself showed good construct validity and reliability (KR-21 was 
.92). A comparison of pre-Module 1 scores among Early Adopters and Late 
Adopters revealed that mean knowledge score (M=66.75) for Late Adopters was 
significantly higher than that of the Early Adopters (M=59.48). Thus, the 
obstetrics practitioners from the Late Adopter group were more knowledgeable. 
After the MOREOB training, although both groups showed significant 
improvement in their respective scores, the Late Adopter group (M=77.86) 
continued to perform significantly better than the Early Adopter group 
(M=74.29). A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine the 
significance of the differences in scores pre- and post-training within each group. 
The results showed that the change in knowledge examination scores was 
significant. However, improvement in knowledge alone was not sufficient to 
support the first hypothesis; improvement in clinical outcomes was also 
necessary. 
Three clinical outcomes (Cesarean section rate, Postpartum Hemorrhage rate, and 
Mean Length of Stay) were analyzed to determine whether there was any 
improvement after the MOREOB training. The Cesarean section (C-section) rates 
in all three groups were on the rise; and the Early Adopter group had the highest 
C-section rate, which might have been one reason why the Early Adopter group 
was eager to implement the MOREOB program. Based on a comparison of 
projected C-section rate versus the actual rate, most actual rates were lower than 
projected. Regardless of when the MOREOB program was implemented (or not 
implemented at all), the C-section rates did not rise as high as projected from the 
baseline of 2002-2005 data. When focused on reduced-risk, single-birth C-section 
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rates, the difference in the mean rates before and after the MOREOB training was 
not significant in either the Early Adopters or the Late Adopters; however, their 
rates were consistently lower than those of the Non Adopters. These results 
indicate that the hospitals with MOREOB training (experimental groups) had a 
lower reduced-risk C-section rate than those without the MOREOB training 
(control group). 
 
Three observations were made from the Postpartum Hemorrhage (PPH) data: 
first, the PPH rate at the Non-Adopter hospitals had increased; second, the Early 
Adopter group had the highest PPH rate and although it had come down slightly 
by 2005, it was still fairly high; and third, the PPH rate at the Late Adopter 
hospitals was starting to rise. The actual PPH rates ended up higher than 
projected for the Non-Adopters, but lower than projected for Early Adopters and 
Late Adopters. Both Early Adopters and Late Adopters performed consistently 
better than the projected levels. Thus, the MOREOB program seemed to have 
helped control the PPH rates in both Early Adopters and Late Adopters. 
Considering that the actual PPH rates for Early Adopters were lower than 
projected, and the post-MOREOB rates were consistently lower than the pre-
MOREOB rates, there was at least partial evidence that the clinical outcomes of 
the obstetrics units improved after the MOREOB training.  
Finally, with respect to Length of Stay, all three groups indicate a downward 
trend from a high of 2.57, 2.54, and 2.55 days to a low of 2.25, 2.33, and 2.30 
days for Non-Adopters, Early Adopters, and Late Adopters, respectively. The 
overall means for the three groups were 2.39, 2.36, and 2.31 days. The Non-
Adopter mean (2.39 days) was significantly higher than the Early Adopter mean 
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(2.36 days) and the Late Adopter mean (2.31 days), and the Early Adopter mean 
was significantly higher than the Late Adopter mean. Also, the Late Adopter 
group showed a significant decline in Length of Stay after training. 
Therefore, considering both knowledge scores and clinical outcomes, the 
hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-
level outcomes (H1) was supported.  
Next, with respect to the second hypothesis, safety climate survey data were 
analyzed to first develop a multifactor model based on exploratory factor 
analysis. This model was tested using multi-trait analysis, confirmed using 
confirmatory factor analysis, and revised. The second order CFA demonstrated 
that patient safety climate could be represented by six factors and showed good 
goodness-of-fit measures (CFI=.94, NFI =.93, TLI =.94, and RMSEA = .054). 
The six factors were as follows: (1) Patient safety is everyone’s responsibility; (2) 
Learning; (3) Valuing individuals; (4) Empowering people; (5) Open 
communication; and (6) Teamwork.  
The Early Adopter group’s pre- and post-training scores were used to test 
whether the patient safety climate in that group improved after the MOREOB 
training. Latent Growth Curve Modeling was used to determine model fit, 
intercept and slope for each factor. The model fit indices for each of the factors 
ranged as follows: CFI=.957-.990 and TLI=.967-.993. Thus, it was a very good 
model fit. The intercepts ranged from a low of 2.85 to a high of 4.10, and the 
slopes ranged from a low of .06 to .51. Based on these data, there was an 
improvement in the scores across all six factors. Similarly for the Late Adopter 
group, there was improvement in the scores across all six factors. Additionally, it 
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was discovered that there was most significant improvement in Teamwork (slope 
of .51) in the case of the Early Adopters and in Patient Safety is Everyone’s 
Priority (slope of .54) in the case of the Late Adopters. Therefore, there was 
sufficient support for the hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as a planned 
intervention, improves group-level patient safety climate (H2). 
In conclusion, the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-
level outcomes (H1) as well as patient safety climate (H2). Also, based on the 
training schedule and intervals at which performance outcomes and safety climate 
were assessed, there is evidence to support that (a) improvement in participant 
knowledge (learning) is an early indicator of training effectiveness;                    
(b) improvement in safety climate immediately after training is more likely to 
have been influenced by the actual training experience itself as well as the 
experience of workplace behaviors during the training period; and (c) 
performance improvements may lag several years due to other impediments not 
related to the training. Finally, change in patient safety climate was highly 
correlated with change in knowledge. Also, changes in patient safety climate 
showed good correlation with improvements in clinical outcomes. Thus, in 
general, a change in knowledge exam scores or a change in patient safety climate 
scores could serve as an early indicator of changes in clinical outcomes. 
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Chapter 5: Results of Study #2  
5.1 Introduction 
Study #2 was a qualitative study targeted at addressing four research questions: 
RQ1:  How did environmental factors influence the patient safety culture in the 
obstetrics practice in Ontario? 
RQ2:  How did leaders and influencers shape shared organizational values at the 
subject organizations? 
RQ3:  How did shared experiences, through implementation mechanisms, help 
revise and reinforce organizational values at the subject organizations? 
RQ4:  How did feedback from group-level performance influence learning 
derived from shared experiences at the subject organizations? 
This study developed a richer understanding of the key cultural elements within a 
narrow sample of obstetric units.  
In July-August 2015, the researcher worked with the Salus Global Corporation 
(since they had ongoing relationship with all the hospitals) to contact CEOs of all 
68 hospitals to inform them about this research project (with the Research 
Information Sheet, as provided in Appendix A) and invited their obstetrics teams, 
as well as senior management team, to participate in interview sessions, either 
individually or in groups, that may last up to two hours. The issues regarding 
human subject protection as well as lack of any material incentives to participate 
in the research were made clear to them. Thus, the entire eligible population of 
obstetrics groups was made aware of this study and was invited to participate. 
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The initial invitations, which were sent out through email, were followed-up with 
phone calls and reminder email messages. Ten hospitals responded and sought 
additional information about the project; one hospital required the researcher to 
seek approval of their internal Human Subjects Review Board, but subsequently 
withdrew this requirement. After several months of conversations with various 
levels of leadership, only three hospitals agreed to proceed with the interviews 
and appointed a liaison person. This person was responsible for organizing all the 
interviews based on the availability of the participants. Generally, the following 
people were recruited: senior management team, including the CEO, 
obstetricians, nurses, midwives, chief of staff, and other appropriate personnel 
who may have involvement or sufficient knowledge about the implementation of 
the MOREOB program. The rationale for including the senior management team 
was twofold: first, numerous culture studies as well as studies associated with 
transfer of training to workplace behaviors (as discussed in the Literature 
Review) had emphasized the role of management commitment in enabling 
cultural change; second, the MOREOB program specifically required senior 
management commitment prior to its launch.  Thus, it was essential to include 
them in the interviews and find out about their motivations as well as 
subsequently determine the differences in their perception as compared to those 
of the other interview participants. Essentially, they were believed to have key 
information in response to the research questions. The other personnel were 
directly impacted by the MOREOB training both from a professional standpoint as 
well as from an operational standpoint. Professionally, as physicians, nurses, or 
midwives, the MOREOB training expected them to behave differently and change 
their established practices. Operationally, the changes in their behaviors would 
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have a direct impact on how their patients were handled and potentially increase 
the risk to their patients. Thus, it was essential to seek their perspective about the 
MOREOB training, as well as their reactions before, during, and after the training. 
These frontline personnel were the primary subjects of the training intervention 
and therefore, their participation in the interviews was critical.  
Three hospitals had agreed to proceed with the interviews; one was from the 
Early Adopter group and two from the Late Adopter group. After continued 
conversations with all three liaison members, only two hospitals were consistent 
in providing access to the requested personnel and arranging the meetings. Thus, 
participants from these two hospitals (one from the Early Adopter group and one 
from the Late Adopter group) served as the subjects for this study.  
The attributes of these two hospitals and their obstetrics teams were comparable 
on the level of care, number of births per year, and availability of key informants 
for the interviews.  With the average functional unit size of 70 and two facilities, 
there were about 140 potential candidates; however, at least half of them had 
moved to other hospitals or were otherwise not available for the interviews. Thus, 
41 candidates who had undergone the MOREOB training, or were sufficiently 
familiar with the program, were recruited for interviews. These candidates 
represented senior management, frontline leaders, obstetricians, nurses, and 
midwives. Interviews were conducted over a two-day period at each facility. 
5.1.1 The Interview Instrument 
A semi-structured interview approach was used to collect narrative data regarding 
the experience prior to implementing the MOREOB program, during the 
implementation, and post-implementation.  The general themes explored during 
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these interviews included the following (the specific interview schedule is 
included in Appendix A): 
1. Rationale for the choice of the MOREOB program as a strategic 
intervention—consider environmental factors, compatibility with existing 
organizational values and goals of the MOREOB program, and specific 
desired clinical or financial outcomes; 
2. The role of leaders and key influencers in facilitating the adoption of new 
practices in response to the MOREOB program, challenges in 
implementing the program, and use of feedback mechanisms to sustain 
the momentum of change; and 
3. Evidence of institutionalization in terms of artifacts, stories, awards, and 
general recognition of best practices and heroes, as well as transfer of best 
practices beyond obstetrics. 
Follow-up questions varied, depending on the responses to the general questions 
and the nature of the candidates’ involvement with the MOREOB program or their 
overall role at the healthcare facility. For example, some nurses commented how 
their practice had changed. Senior management, on the other hand, commented 
on broad changes in the healthcare sector and how such changes influenced 
changes in practice. In response, they were asked to give specific examples. A 
thematic analysis of the narratives generated from the interviews provided depth 
and context to the quantitative data that were analyzed in the previous study.  
5.1.2 Artifact Analysis 
Artifacts are symbolic representations of culture (Rousseau, 1990). They are 
unique to each functional unit and they represent that unit’s values. Some 
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examples of such artifacts include mission and vision statements, goals and 
priorities, logos, awards, commonly told stories, and local heroes and legends.  
In addition to the on-site interviews at the two healthcare facilities, the researcher 
collected examples of awards, physical items created by members of the 
community, and stories recalled (and told) by the members. Analysis of these 
items, together with the themes extracted from the interviews, served as 
manifestation of enacted values and unquestioned assumptions. These artifacts 
served as tangible evidence of institutionalization of organizational culture.  
5.2 Description of the Sample Population 
The sample population was drawn from two hospitals. The participating 
individuals included nurses, midwives, obstetricians, frontline leaders like 
department heads and educational practice leaders, and senior management like 
directors, chiefs of staff, vice presidents, and chief executive officers. The general 
characteristics of the two hospitals and participating interview subjects are 
presented in Table 55.  
Table 55: Hospital and participating subject profile 
 Hospital A Hospital B Total 
Level of Care IIc5 IIc  
Number of Births in 2015 3,100 4,458  
Participant Subjects    
-  Senior Management 4 5 9 
-  Frontline Leaders 1 5 6 
- Obstetricians 2 2 4 
- Midwives 6 2 8 
- Nurses 7 7 14 
- Total 20 21 41 
                                                 
5 Level IIc facilities care for women and their infants from 30 weeks of gestation to full term; 
generally don’t handle premature deliveries and neonatal complications. For details, refer to 
http://www.pcmch.on.ca/health-care-providers/maternity-care/pcmch-strategies-and-
initiatives/loc/  
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5.3 Results of the Interview and Artifact Analysis 
All the interviews were transcribed from audio recordings and subsequently 
coded using NVivo 10.0 (by QSR International). Participants and Hospitals 
served as case nodes and each interview transcript served as a source document. 
Each source document was read multiple times and excerpts were matched with 
corresponding elements of the integrated model of organizational culture and 
climate presented in Figure 7. Since the researcher followed a semi-structured 
interview protocol based on previously identified cultural elements, the responses 
were categorized in accordance with those elements. Thus, initial coding structure 
(Level 1 coding) was as follows: 
 Environmental Factors 
 MOREOB Training [Planned Intervention] 
 Leaders and Influencers 
 Shared Experiences 
 Assumptions 
 Values  
 Feedback Mechanisms 
 Implementation Mechanisms 
While there was variation regarding the focus of different participants (e.g., some 
were more comfortable discussing environmental factors while others were more 
comfortable describing their shared experiences), no extraneous or additional 
(outside the initial coding structure) information was discovered. However, the 
initial coding structure was further refined by adding details emerging from the 
interview narratives (Level-2 coding structure). When compared to quantitative 
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analysis, qualitative analysis is inherently burdened with the need to establish 
validity. In some studies, it is appropriate to consider multiple coders and conduct 
inter-coder reliability to demonstrate the objectivity of the coded results (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994). In other cases, it may be more appropriate to use the 
trustworthiness paradigm recommended by Lincoln and Guba (1986), which 
consists of credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability. In order 
to strengthen the trustworthiness of this study, the researcher has presented 
findings with a combination of direct quotes from the participants, external 
documents that corroborate the participants’ comments, images of tangible 
artifacts that demonstrate the legitimacy of the concept presented, and logical 
explanation of how the various research questions were addressed. Refinement of 
the coding structure in response to the narrative analysis demonstrates that the 
interview protocol was not overly restrictive, and it creates an opportunity to 
present a further enhanced model of organizational culture and climate.     
In spite of all the efforts to establish trustworthiness of the reported findings, the 
researcher acknowledges that at least four types of biases have influenced this 
study: self-selection bias, sampling bias, confirmation bias, and the researcher’s 
interpretive framework (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Creswell & Clark, 2007; Mullane & 
Williams, 2013). A self-selection bias is created because the participants who 
have particularly positive or negative opinions tend to select themselves or 
volunteer to participate in such studies. Thus, opinions contrary to the ones 
expressed by the participants are not equally accessible to the researcher. 
Sampling bias is introduced because of the limited sample size in qualitative 
studies and the composition of the sample. Next, a confirmation bias is 
introduced because when certain hypotheses have been developed by the 
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researcher, there is a tendency to be sensitive to only those opinions that are 
supportive of the hypotheses; counter opinions have to be much stronger for them 
to be noticed by the researcher. Finally, the researcher’s own framework that 
reality could be presented from multiple perspectives causes him to pick one 
perspective at the cost of others. Thus, it is plausible that a similar data collection 
and analysis exercise could produce different results and bring forth alternate 
explanations or perspectives of reality. Nonetheless, in order to preserve 
objectivity and maximize authenticity of the conclusions presented, the 
researcher used a triangulation approach by providing concrete examples in terms 
of direct quotes, external reference literature as mentioned by the participants, 
and artifacts (Kennedy, 2009).  
5.3.1 Environmental Factors Influence Organizational Culture 
The first research question was regarding the influence of broad environmental 
factors on organizational culture: 
RQ1: How did environmental factors influence the patient safety culture 
in the obstetrics practice in Ontario?  
In order to remain objective and let the participant guide the flow of the 
conversation, the researcher asked each participant to reflect on their professional 
career and talk about key changes over the past 10-15 years and how they might 
have influenced the patient safety culture in the obstetrics practice at their 
hospital. They were asked to comment at whatever level they were most 
comfortable: national, local, or hospital level. Out of the total 50 responses coded 
in this category, 27 came from senior management, 8 from nurses, 6 from 
frontline leaders, 6 from obstetricians, and 3 from midwives. Members of senior 
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management (n=9) were most eloquent about the influence of the broad 
environmental factors on the local culture and practices at their hospital; 
obstetricians, midwives, and nurses (n=29) focused on the impact of the 
MOREOB program on their professional practice; and frontline leaders (n=6) 
focused on the impact of legal and political developments that may have 
influenced the adoption of the MOREOB program. Thus, based on the actual 
comments made by the participants, the environmental factors were further coded 
into four categories: economic, geo-social, legal, and professional. Figure 21 
shows the connection map depicting the mapping between the participant 
attributes and the coding structure for environmental factors. The thickness of the 
lines corresponds to the frequency of comments linking the participant and the 
corresponding environmental factor. Table 56 presents the Level 2 coding 
structure and Table 57 presents examples of responses mapped to various 
environmental factors.  
 
 
Figure 21: Connection map between participants and comments regarding 
environmental factors 
  
Senior Management 
Frontline Leaders 
Obstetricians 
Midwives 
Nurses 
Economic 
Geo-social 
Legal 
Professional 
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Table 56: Level 2 coding structure for environmental factors 
Level 1 Code Level 2 Code Description 
Environmental Factor Economic Comments related to changes in 
general economic conditions or 
assumptions of the industry or 
the region, changes in budgets or 
budget models 
Geo-social Comments related to changes in 
local population : demographics, 
medical needs, ethnic cultural 
peculiarities, religious, 
linguistic, or social customs 
Legal Comments related to changes in 
laws or accreditation 
requirements impacting the 
operation, underlying 
assumptions, and societal 
expectations 
Professional Comments related to 
expectations from professional 
societies like the Society of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
of Canada 
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Table 57: Examples of participant responses mapped to environmental factors 
Participant Response Classification 
Senior 
Management 
Over the past several years, hospital 
accountability has been huge. I think this shift is 
happening all over the world, but also there’s a 
financial reality—all countries are spending more 
money on healthcare and recognizing that we 
can’t continue the upward spiral of the costs; we 
have to cut costs and a big part of cutting costs is 
focusing on quality.  
Economic 
Senior 
Management 
Unnecessary C-sections are costly and risky to the 
mother and child. Women with vaginal deliveries 
are here for 24 hours; those with section deliveries 
are here for 48-72 hours. Cost/day is higher for C-
sections—thus, the burden to the entire system is 
higher; there’s impact on breast-feeding and long-
term care for the child.  
Economic 
Senior 
Management 
We are now more focused on patient experience. 
Many cultures have different traditions regarding 
visiting a doctor, child birth, death, etc. This is the 
most ethnically diverse region of Canada. We have 
to know more about their cultural background in 
order to enhance the patient experience. We are 
trying to reach out to the different ethnic groups 
and get them engaged with the hospital. We also 
want representation from different cultural groups 
on our board. Our staffing has also become more 
representative of the community. 
Geo-social 
Nurse Now we have all these high-rises, a mall, a 
Walmart, and on and on…there are people 
everywhere (of child bearing age) and the volume of 
births is going up. Ten years ago, we were at about 
2,400 births per year and now we are more than 
3,200 per year and that’s a huge difference. In the 
old days, 4 deliveries per shift was a rare (high), 
now, that’s a rare low. 
Geo-social 
Senior 
Management 
There was some legislation in 2004 QCIPA (Quality 
of Care Information Protection Act). What that 
really supported was these inter-professional teams 
coming together to review these near misses or 
adverse events.  
Legal 
Frontline 
Leader 
There’s been a focus on meeting Ministry 
requirements or practicing evidence-based care. An 
example is a surgical safety checklist. 
Legal 
Obstetrician Because it was SOGC (Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists of Canada) endorsed and some of the 
top experts in the field came and spoke to our 
physician leaders, they really endorsed it.   
Professional 
Midwife The Association of Midwives in Ontario has an 
ongoing dialog with the members about the best 
practices, and it has endorsed the MOREOB 
program.  
Professional 
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From an economic perspective, the Canadian healthcare system is a single payer 
system, which means that nearly 100 per cent of the hospital’s operating funds 
are provided by the Ministry of Health. One respondent cited the Canada Health 
Act and said that it prohibits hospitals from using philanthropic contributions to 
support operating expenses, which would be considered privatization of 
healthcare financing ("The Canada Health Act: Overview and Options," 2005). 
Also, hospitals bill the Ministry independent of the physicians and midwives, 
who bill separately for their services and they are compensated 100 per cent of 
their approved rate. Thus, simplistically, hospitals can maximize their net revenue 
by maximizing the number of procedures while minimizing the length of stay. 
Physicians and midwives can maximize their earnings by maximizing their 
number of cases. From an obstetrics perspective, the financial interest of the 
hospital and the financial interest of physicians (and midwives) were aligned in 
support of increased vaginal births and decreased Cesarean sections. 
Additionally, there were a number of safety benefits. The following comment 
from one of the senior managers illustrates this point: 
We have had a program on C-sections. That’s an excellent example of how costs 
drove the quality agenda. We limited the OB/GYN department to a fixed amount 
of budget and they were doing x number of deliveries. We recognized that if 
they cut their C-section rates down, they could do more deliveries; otherwise, we 
would have to cap them at a certain number [budget]. That was an impetus for 
their department to say that they could do better with their C-section rates, 
particularly if we want to continue with the same number of births or grow the 
number of births. We capped the amount of money that we were willing to 
provide to the department and that fixed amount equated to a certain number of 
births. Let’s say they could do 3,000 births in the available budget. So, they 
either had to find money from other sources to increase the number of births or 
to limit the number of births to 3,000. It was then recognized that a vaginal birth 
costs the hospital much less than a C-section birth. The OB department was not 
happy in the beginning, but realized that the hospital was in a difficult position. 
The chief took it on as an opportunity. Capping the number of births would have 
meant a cut in the number of births and the overflow patients would have to go 
somewhere else. Since the obstetricians get paid for every birth that they handle, 
this would have meant a cut in their compensation. From reputational 
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perspective, the hospital doesn’t want to be turning people away. The hospital is 
caught in the middle—we don’t want people to go somewhere else.  
 
Geo-social factors were primarily related to growth and changes in the ethnic 
diversity of the local community. Both hospitals were community hospitals; 
hence, they had to be responsive to the needs of their community. Over the past 
10-15 years, these communities reported both growth and increase in diversity. 
According to Statistics Canada6, the overall population increased between 9.20 
and 19.10 percent and the visible minority population in the areas surrounding the 
subject hospitals increased by between 4.48 and 9.74 percent. Table 58 presents 
the percentage change in the respective local communities. As of 2011, visible 
minorities made up almost 50 percent of Hospital A’s community and over 70 
percent of Hospital B’s community. 
Table 58: Growth and changes in ethnic diversity in the local communities 
Community Percent change in total 
population from 2001-2011 
Percent change in visible minority 
population (2001-2011) 
A +9.20% +4.48% 
B +9.20% +9.74% 
 
Hospital B reported a particularly traumatic shared experience: the hospital was 
not able to respond to a wide range of issues, particularly to the needs of its 
diverse community, and therefore the Ministry of Health appointed a Supervisor 
to oversee the hospital. Subsequently, the hospital’s governing board was 
dissolved and a new interim CEO was appointed. This was a defining moment for 
the hospital and it started an avalanche of changes. Two participants recalled this 
shared experience as follows: 
When I first arrived, we were under the care of a Supervisor, which means that 
the CEO and the Board was dissolved and a Supervisor was appointed by the 
Ministry of Health. This Supervisor brought a new, very different Board; the 
bylaws were changed; it was a 50-50 Board (half elected and half appointed); a 
                                                 
6 http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/dp-pd/prof/index.cfm?Lang=E&fpv=3867 
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new leadership team was brought in—this team saw quality and safety as 
paramount.  
 
When I started 8 years ago, the hospital was under Supervision—the Ministry 
had decided that the hospital was not properly running itself and so an external 
person was brought in as the CEO (X) and then they hired an interim CEO (Y). 
The community was very negative/unhappy about the hospital (not listening to 
it, was not providing good care or good feedback to the patients and families)—
and there was quite an upheaval. One of the reasons that I was hired was to try to 
manage the issue around community/patient complaints. At that time, there was 
no patient relations department. 
 
As a community hospital, it is reasonable to infer that the hospital should be 
responsive to its community’s needs. While it is not known why the hospital was 
not able to respond to its community’s needs, it is clear that the Supervisor’s 
appointment made a profound impact on the subsequent actions of the senior 
leadership: a thorough strategic planning exercise, new leaders in key positions, 
transparency, and data-driven management.  These changes were summarized in 
one senior manager’s response as follows: 
We have mission, vision, values of the hospital—they were conceived about 8 
years ago. They were developed from the ground up and are now flowing back 
to the frontline. We take into context the values and their alignment with 
strategic directions and the overall strategic plan—it’s about how the 
organization makes its decisions based on the agreed upon values.  
 
Reflecting on the theoretical model represented in Figure 7, the role of defining 
moments was noted in revising organizational values. Based on the narrative 
analysis, however, the role of environmental factors in triggering a defining 
moment, as well as the pathway between defining moments, leadership, and 
organizational values needs to be articulated.   
Legal factors were primarily related to national regulatory changes that facilitated 
the development of new practices. The two initiatives were particularly 
mentioned: The Quality of Care Information Protection Act (QCIPA)7 and the 
                                                 
7 http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/legislation/qcipa/default.aspx  
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Excellent Care for All Act (ECFAA)8. The QCIPA was first passed in 2004 and 
updated in 2015. This Act is specifically designed to facilitate critical incident 
reviews within a hospital without fear of reprisal. All information shared during 
this review is confidential and the goal of the review process is to identify 
systemic problems and improve the quality of care. However, not all reviews 
(one hospital calls them “clinical debriefs”) have to be done under the formal 
protection of QCIPA. Following are two examples of how such reviews are 
handled: 
After a postpartum hemorrhage (PPH), we will have a clinical debrief. In the 
early days, people were afraid of the debriefings because they thought that there 
would be a lot of finger pointing. But there’s none of that. In fact, if it starts to 
go that way, it is immediately shut down. It is run by someone from the 
leadership team. When they are doing that, we have action items that come out 
and some of them might be related to the kit—some items may be added, others 
may be removed because they are not necessary. A debrief is triggered by an 
adverse event or it could also be triggered by a near miss (in the moment 
debrief). We even do informal debriefings within our team and we talk through 
the cases—it doesn’t always have to be a formal debrief. We just added an item 
to our checklist to make sure that we have batteries for our Doppler. [Hospital A] 
 
Under the Public Hospitals Act and the Excellent Care for All (ECFA) Act, 
Critical Incidents (specifically defined) are reported and investigated. We have 
about 3,000 patient incidents per year; only a subset of them qualify as critical 
incidents based on the criteria outlined in the Public Hospitals Act. For Critical 
Incidents, we review all of them under QCIPA, which is not required under the 
legislation. It was put into place in 2004 to allow organizations to review 
incidents under confidentiality protection—the meeting is confidential, the 
opinions are confidential, the discussion is confidential, but the outcomes of the 
meeting and the facts of the incident are not confidential. [Hospital B] 
 
While the QCIPA legislation may not have been a factor in Hospital A’s 
debriefing, it seems to have influenced Hospital B’s incident review process. 
With respect to the Excellent Care for All Act, 2010, it seems to have brought a 
provincial integration and cohesion to efforts around quality of care and patient 
safety. Sullivan and Brown (2014) report several expectations of this Act. Central 
to these expectations is an organization-wide emphasis on quality of care and 
                                                 
8 http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/ecfa/legislation/act.aspx  
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continuous improvement. The Act requires the CEO’s compensation plan be 
linked to quality improvement results: “What the legislation effectively does is to 
require an institution’s board to take responsibility for quality and to ensure that 
the chief executive—its sole report—takes this responsibility seriously…the new 
imperative for boards is to raise quality reporting at the board table to the same 
priority as financial reporting” (p.57). Thus, it is not surprising that a senior 
manager from Hospital B claimed the following: 
The one quality improvement methodology that we have chosen a number of 
years ago was LEAN, which was originally developed out of Toyota—a number 
of hospitals have incorporated that as a quality improvement methodology. In 
certain clinical areas, you will see these whiteboards with dashboards of 
indicators and quality improvement initiatives that they are tracking and various 
tools that you would expect with that methodology. This hospital has been on a 
pretty substantive journey over the last 7-8 years in terms of improving quality 
and safety and I think it’s done a remarkable job and a leader in many areas and 
we have also been an outlier for the wrong reasons on the other side of the coin!  
From a professional perspective, all the key professional bodies have endorsed 
the quality and safety imperatives both at a general hospital level as well as 
within the obstetrics practice. The Ontario Hospital Association (OHA) is playing 
a key role in influencing the senior leadership across all hospitals in Ontario. In 
support of the provincial focus on quality and patient safety, the OHA developed 
a series of strategic plans, built awareness about safety issues, and provided 
resources and mentoring to executives and board members to collectively and 
collaboratively improve the quality of care and patient safety across all the 
member hospitals in Ontario9. Additionally, the Canadian Institute for Health 
Information (CIHI) has developed an online tool for patients to determine the 
relative quality and efficiency at their local hospital10. This tool uses performance 
data submitted by each hospital and presents a dashboard of performance on key 
                                                 
9 http://www.oha.com/currentissues/keyinitiatives/patientsafety/pages/default.aspx  
10 http://yourhealthsystem.cihi.ca/  
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indicators such as access, safety, appropriateness and effectiveness, and 
efficiency. Since the data are presented with respect to a comparative peer group, 
it is easy for the reviewers to determine the relative quality, safety, and efficiency 
of their hospital with respect to the peer group, the province, and the nation. The 
Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC) has been a 
principal supporter of the MOREOB program11 and their endorsement has helped 
build both awareness as well as credibility for the program. At one of the subject 
hospitals, it was clear that the SOGC endorsement helped the implementation of 
the MOREOB program: 
Because it was SOGC endorsed and some of the top experts in the field came 
and spoke to our physician leaders, they [hospital leadership] really endorsed it.  
 
The Canadian Nursing Association’s statement on patient safety proclaims that 
“Patient safety is fundamental to nursing care and to health care more generally, 
across all settings and sectors. It is not merely a mandate; it is a moral and ethical 
imperative in caring for others.”12 In addition to such endorsements, professional 
organizations have significant power to influence their members’ behaviors 
through award of continuing medical education (CME) credit for courses such as 
MOREOB. When asked about how professional organizations representing nurses 
and midwives influence their respective disciplines, the responses were as 
follows: 
The first three years (of the MOREOB program) were very prescriptive. After 
that, you are expected to do everything on your own—you can align it with 
reflective practice per the College of Nurses; the physicians use it for CMEs—so 
there are ways in which these exercises could be aligned with the recurrent 
training requirements of your professional society. 
 
The Association of Midwives in Ontario has an ongoing dialog with the 
members about the best practices, and it has endorsed the MOREOB program. 
                                                 
11 http://sogc.org/continuing-medical-education-cme/more-ob/  
12 https://www.cna-aiic.ca/~/media/cna/page-content/pdf-en/ps102_patient_safety_e.pdf?la=en  
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The Association also has its own safety culture training as a part of our 
recertification training.  
 
Figures 22-25 present exemplar artifacts in support of each environmental factor. 
These items serve as cultural artifacts because they were created by people in 
support of certain underlying values and with the intention to communicate those 
values to the members within the community (obstetrics, hospital, province, or 
the broad healthcare sector) as well as to members outside the community (other 
units within the hospital, other hospitals, other provinces, other countries, etc.). 
Artifacts are generally assessed on three levels: instrumentality, aesthetics, and 
symbolism (Vilnai-Yavetz & Rafaeli, 2012). All these artifacts are high on 
instrumentality and symbolism because they serve a specific function and the 
have a special meaning attached—for example, the multilingual information 
pamphlet serves as an instrument to communicate with a diverse community and 
it simultaneously symbolizes inclusion.  
Figure 22 illustrates how the actual funding (per capita) for hospitals in Ontario 
has been below average since 2005 and declined below past funding levels since 
2010. Thus, hospital-wide emphasis on quality as a means to cut costs and 
manage the increased patient volume within available budget makes sense. 
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Figure 22: Artifact illustrating the economic pressures influencing changes in 
safety cultures in hospitals 
Figure 23 illustrates how hospitals have adapted to the local demographic 
changes. In response to the 4.48-9.74 per cent increase (as a percentage of total 
population) in visible minority population and consistent with the hospital’s 
commitment to be responsive to its community’s needs and emphasis on patient 
experience, the hospitals have adopted multilingual signage and documentation. 
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Figure 23: Artifact illustrating geo-social impact on organizational culture 
 
Figure 24 presents the latest requirements from the 2016 Required Organizational 
Practices handbook of Accreditation Canada, which accredits health 
organizations in Canada13, and a historical view of various requirements that have 
been developed since 2006. This is an example of how federal regulatory 
                                                 
13 https://accreditation.ca/sites/default/files/rop-handbook-2016-en.pdf  
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requirements for emphasis on quality and safety have translated into accreditation 
requirements. Coupled with the formal endorsement of specific programs, like 
the MOREOB program, by professional bodies like the Society of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC) and the Association of Midwives of 
Ontario (CMO), and the Position Statement14 on patient safety, see Figure 25, by 
the Canadian Nurses Association (CNA), there is a confluence of requirements 
and expectations toward desired cultural attributes, particularly in the areas of 
quality of care and patient safety. 
  
                                                 
14  Full statement is available at https://www.cna-aiic.ca/~/media/cna/page-content/pdf-
en/ps102_patient_safety_e.pdf?la=en 
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Figure 24: Artifact illustrating the influence of regulatory impact on 
organizational culture 
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Figure 25: Artifact illustrating influence of professional organizations 
 
In conclusion, the data presented in this analysis identified four environmental 
factors that influenced the patient safety culture in obstetrics practices in Ontario, 
Canada: economic, geo-social, legal, and professional. Significant shifts in 
national economic conditions required the subject hospitals to reduce costs by 
improving quality and efficiency. As an example, unnecessary C-sections were 
both costly and risky for patients; thus, reduction in such procedures became a 
safety goal triggered by economic pressures and facilitated by the MOREOB 
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training. Closely linked with the economic factors were the geo-social factors 
because over the preceding decade the local communities for both subject 
hospitals had become substantially diverse and in order to retain/grow their 
patient volume (an economic necessity), they had to be more responsive to their 
communities. Thus, inclusivity became important and the concepts of open 
communication, respect for the individual, and teamwork that were taught in the 
MOREOB training were operationalized with a professional as well as a social 
mindset. Legal or regulatory factors also played a critical role in influencing the 
patient safety culture in subject hospitals. For example, the Quality of Care 
Information Protection Act of 2004 supported inter-disciplinary teams coming 
together to review near misses and adverse events. Such reviews facilitated 
learning, enabled non-punitive reporting, and reinforced organizational 
commitment to patient safety. The MOREOB training materials and reference 
documents were actively used in aligning individual and team behaviors with 
standardized professional practices.  Finally, professional organizations like the 
Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada and the Association of 
Midwives in Ontario endorsed the practices and standards expected by the 
MOREOB program. Some leaders of these organizations also personally 
advocated the need to adhere to the MOREOB training and standards. Therefore, 
there was strong alignment between economic, geo-social, legal, and professional 
factors—all creating the conditions for a cultural change in the obstetrics practice 
in Ontario.  
Another finding from the narrative analysis led to the identification of the role of 
defining moments (or systemic shocks) in shaping organizational culture: (a) in 
the case of Hospital A, it was a matter of a sudden increase in ethnic diversity and 
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local population and (b) in the case of Hospital B, it was the placement of the 
hospital under supervisory control, which triggered an avalanche of changes 
across the hospital. Both these events were classified as defining moments 
because their impact was sudden; whereas other events like the changes in 
economic conditions or regulatory requirements were relatively gradual. 
Nonetheless, the role of defining moments in shaping organizational culture 
needs to be better addressed in the integrated model of organizational culture and 
climate. 
 
5.3.2 Leaders and Influencers Shape Shared Organizational Values 
The second research question was about the role of leaders and key influencers in 
shaping shared organizational values (RQ2). The interview transcripts were 
analyzed to identify evidence of how leaders and key influencers might have 
shaped organizational values. 
Since the senior management (CEO and C-suite colleagues) as well as the clinical 
leaders participated in the selection of the MOREOB, it was essential to uncover 
the group’s shared values that may have led to the selection of the MOREOB 
training program as a planned intervention. Uncovering a group’s shared values 
is not about identifying facts, but about understanding and exploring the group’s 
construction of reality (Dibley & Baker, 2001). Dibley and Baker used a 
laddering technique in their in-depth interviews to probe their participants by 
repeatedly asking the question, Why, to gain progressively higher levels of 
understanding about the participant’s value-oriented behavior. Since their study 
was focused on consumer behavior, they started with product attributes (Why is 
each product appealing? Or What do you like about this product?), moved toward 
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identifying the consequences of those attributes (Why are these attributes 
important? What do these attributes mean to you?), and finally achieved the 
identification of individually-held values (Why are these meanings important to 
you?). Such a laddering technique enables researchers to identify the link 
between a product’s attributes and the consumer’s personal values (Reynolds & 
Gutman, 1988) and ultimately helps marketers to align their marketing and 
advertising campaigns with the product’s features and the target consumer 
group’s personal values (Gutman, 1982). Thus, Dibley and Baker constructed a 
three-step model: Attributes  Consequences  Values. Applying this approach 
to the present study, the researcher analyzed the interview narratives from the 
perspective of the following three questions: 
1. Why is MOREOB important to the participants? What are its key 
attributes? 
2. Why are these attributes significant? What have the participants been able 
to do as a result of the MOREOB program (what were the consequences)? 
3. Why were these achievements through the MOREOB program important 
to the participants (what were the higher level values attributed to the 
MOREOB training program)? 
The researcher’s thematic analysis identified 90 practices or norms that were 
linked with the MOREOB program. Thus, the “MOREOB Training” code in the 
original coding structure was linked with the associated Norms and Practices. 
Each norm/practice was reviewed to identify its attribute, consequences, and 
potential higher-level attributed values. This review led to the discovery of 
following four most commonly identified attributes: Credible, Team-oriented, 
Evidence-based, and Mixed-methods teaching. These four attributes formed the 
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bottom rung of a ladder and thus four ladders were initiated. Each of the 90 
practices or norms was further classified by attributes. Subsequently, each 
practice or norm was reviewed further by repeatedly pursuing the second 
question until either a response to the third question was identified or the pursuit 
did not yield any further responses nor did it identify a meaningful response to 
the third question (it reached a dead end). The number of practices or norms 
associated with each of the attributes was not important; it was more important to 
identify ladders that reached all the way up to the identification of values. Since 
these values were based on the review of interview transcripts describing actual 
practices or norms within their respective groups and associated with the 
MOREOB training, they were coded as shared values aligned with the MOREOB 
training program.  
Table 59 presents the level 2 coding structure of attributes, consequences and the 
corresponding shared values associated with the MOREOB training.  
Table 59: Level 2 coding structure associated with MOREOB Training 
Level 1 Code Level 2 Code Example 
MOREOB Training Attribute Credible 
 Consequence It could help against 
insurance and 
malpractice claims 
 Shared Value (s)  Patient Safety & Quality 
of Care 
 
Figure 26 illustrates the mapping from attributes to consequences, and from 
consequences to shared values. For example, the participants thought that one of 
the important attributes of the MOREOB program was that it was credible. It was 
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deemed credible because it was endorsed by multiple professional societies, the 
hospital insurance provider, and the hospital management. The perceived 
consequences of such endorsements included increased belief in the quality of the 
program; they thought that it must be consistent with the best practices from other 
industries (particularly aviation) and other countries (because United States had 
already tested such ideas); the HIROC (Health Insurance Reciprocal of Canada) 
endorsement supported the belief that there would be some insurance premium 
adjustments and also provide support for individual level claims; ultimately, they 
thought that the program could address the national concerns for patient safety, 
quality, and affordability—all of these were closely held personal values. The 
notion of affordability was further articulated as accountability because it was 
about societal responsibility toward its citizens to make judicious use of the 
resources (taxes) to support universal healthcare.  
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Figure 26: Hierarchical value map of the MOREOB program 
 
Another important attribute of the MOREOB program was its team-oriented 
approach. Healthcare professionals are typically trained within their professional 
groups, but are expected to perform as members of a multidisciplinary team. The 
participants thought that this was a unique opportunity for them to train as a 
multidisciplinary team—“train as you work and work as you train.” One of the 
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most pronounced consequences of such team training was flattening of the 
hierarchy, particularly between the obstetricians and nurses, which resulted in 
improved assertiveness and mutual respect. Thus, everyone felt included and 
treated as a valued member of the team, yet held accountable for their knowledge 
and actions. Closely associated with team-orientation was evidence-based 
practice. This attribute forced everyone to focus on evidence (which came 
primarily from MOREOB training documents). Previously, it was common to 
engage in opinion-based arguments: one party would say, “research says…” and 
the other party would say, “in my experience…” and ultimately, the obstetrician’s 
opinion would over-rule everyone else’s opinion. After MOREOB, everyone had a 
common platform and it was less about who was right and more about whether 
they were consistently compliant with the published (and committed) guidelines. 
Finally, the mixed-methods approach to training allowed everyone to bring their 
fundamental clinical knowledge to a consistent baseline level—thus, they knew 
what to expect from each other. Next, the simulations, drills and hands-on 
guidance enabled them to practice their skills together without an actual patient. 
The simulations and drills were practiced regularly because they offered an 
opportunity to stay current and be prepared for relatively infrequent conditions. 
Ultimately, the MOREOB program appealed to the following higher-level shared 
values: patient safety, quality of care, inclusion, mutual respect, accountability, 
and continuous improvement.  Thus, a practical lesson learned from this analysis 
is that for a planned intervention to be successful, it needs to have attributes that 
appeal to the shared values of the group in which it is implemented.  
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In the responses about the influence of leaders and influencers, the participants 
used the terms “leaders,” “leadership,” and “management” as either external or 
internal:   
1. External members like Dr. Ross Baker authored The Canadian Adverse 
Event Study in 2004 (Baker et al., 2004) and Dr. Ken Milne who served as 
the President of SOGC and created the MOREOB program (Milne et al., 
2013) were mentioned as key influencers who did not hold any formal 
positions within the subject hospitals but raised the awareness of patient 
safety challenges across Canada, including those in obstetrics, and helped 
hospitals as well as individual professionals be receptive to ideas like non-
punitive reporting systems, reduction of variance in practices through 
standard operating procedures, flattening of the hierarchy under 
emergencies, evidence-based practice, etc.  
2. Internally, senior management—from the Board of Directors to manager-
level personnel—was critical in supporting the MOREOB program and the 
changes to operating practices that resulted from the implementation of 
the program. Their support was mentioned in the context of 
implementation mechanism such as non-punitive error reporting system, 
willingness to add staff when the risk exceeded the pre-set threshold, 
visible management that was seen by, and was easily accessible to, the 
frontline personnel, transparency of data—both clinical and financial, and 
consistent focus on quality, safety, and continuous improvement. 
 
Figure 27 illustrates the various contexts within which the term “leader” or 
“management” was used by the participants, including “risk management.”   
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Figure 27: Many references to leaders and management 
 
A review for 90 practices and norms for the influence of leaders and influencers 
on organizational values revealed the following: 
1. External entities such as Accreditation Canada, HIROC, and the Ministry 
of Health were holding the hospital leadership (both governing boards and 
 247 
 
executives) accountable for continuous improvements in quality of care. 
In some instances, “quality of care” appeared to be an all-encompassing 
catch phrase with reference to patient safety, efficiency, and patient 
engagement. Most frontline personnel associated quality and patient 
safety as related terms; senior management believed that improved quality 
would result in improved efficiencies and reduction of costs; some 
frontline personnel included patient engagement in their definition of 
quality. Thus, a composite definition of quality care emerged as follows: 
Quality care engages the patients and/or their families in developing and 
managing the care, all the operational risks are managed within acceptable 
limits, and it incurs minimal costs to the payer(s). 
2. Examples of how leaders and influencers shaped organizational values 
include the following: 
a. The Ministry of Health appointed a supervisor to manage Hospital 
B. Based on the subsequent structural and procedural changes 
made at that hospital, the following values could be attributed: 
i. Diversity and Inclusion 
ii. Clinical Excellence 
iii. Patient Safety 
iv. Financial Viability 
b. Hospital B also implemented Lean methodology to drive process 
improvements, reduce waste, improve quality, and galvanize its 
community not only toward their common goals, but also through 
a common language and process. They articulated their espoused 
values as follows: 
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i. Integrity 
ii. Compassion 
iii. Accountability 
iv. Respect  
They operationalized these values in the form of four strategic 
directions and related goals: 
i. Patients as Partners 
ii. Quality and Sustainability 
iii. Integrated Care Networks 
iv. Innovation and Learning 
 
Figure 28 presents a photograph of wall-to-wall status boards in 
Hospital B’s CEO’s office. Based on these boards as artifacts and 
conversation with the CEO, the following values emerge: 
i. Transparency 
ii. Accountability 
iii. Continuous Improvement 
 
These three values were consistently visible in the strategic 
planning documents, a sample of formal communications between 
the CEO and members of the organization, and the alignment of 
various performance charts from CEO level down to clinical units.  
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Figure 28: Planning boards illustrating CEO’s influence on organizational values 
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c. At lower levels of leadership, the implementation of Hospital B’s 
non-punitive event reporting program and the subsequent handling 
of the investigation brought to light a slightly nuanced set of 
values. The risk manager reached out to frontline personnel (both 
clinical and non-clinical) to encourage them to report events—
those that resulted in reaching the patient with no adverse 
outcome, those with adverse outcome, as well as those that were 
stopped in time and did not reach the patient—these events 
became “Good Catch” stories. The total number of reports had 
stabilized at around 2,500 reports per year, but the number of 
Good Catch reports was growing. At this hospital, most of the 
critical incident investigations were handled under QCIPA, which 
meant that the content of the discussions was held confidential and 
the emphasis was on developing systemic solutions. Also, all the 
event investigations were regularly reported to HIROC to ensure 
open communication between the hospital and its insurer. Thus, 
the underlying values were as follows: 
i. Continuous Improvement  
ii. Respect for Every Individual  
iii. Transparency  
 
d. Finally, at the frontline, nurses and obstetricians served as role 
models and bearers of standards within their communities of 
practice. The following story from Hospital B illustrates how 
nurses reinforced organizational values: 
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This was a total catch by the nurses. I was on call one day. Nurses 
came to me and asked why are all the patients who have had normal 
deliveries scratching their noses the way our patients who have had 
a spinal morphine do. So we brought in the anesthetist and started to 
investigate the problem. What we found was that we had a syringe 
system in those days for something called PCA (big fat 30cc syringe 
with morphine for patients to use intravenously) and another syringe 
system for epidural which looked exactly the same as the PCA. Both 
these syringes were kept close together. So these patients were given 
epidural (10x to 100x what they should have received). We picked it 
up only because the nurses observed that the patients were 
scratching their noses. So, there was awareness among the nurses, a 
certain degree of comfort within the team, and a willingness to go 
forward and find out what might have gone wrong. We placed the 
patients in ICU through the night, nobody had any further adverse 
reaction, we explained to them what had happened, and we also 
learned and changed the system of the syringe labeling. There was 
no blame on anyone. It was about the system. 
 
The following example from another hospital illustrates how 
obstetricians reinforced organizational values 
We had a drug cupboard with four bottles and all of them looked the 
same. In an emergency, they needed Cytotec, the midwife ran and 
got the bottle, ran down the hall and put it in the physician’s hand. 
He looked at the pills and saw that they were the wrong shape and 
that’s when he caught the error. The nurse looked at the bottle and 
realized that it was Labetalol. So the process issue is that we can’t 
have similar looking bottles because in an emergency, we know that 
people don’t look as carefully as they should. As a solution, we got 
different manufacturers for different drugs—this gave us distinct 
bottles for the different drugs. 
 
The following values emerged from comments by clinical personnel: 
i. Patient Safety 
ii. Teamwork 
iii. Assertiveness 
iv. Open Communication 
v. Continuous Improvement 
Table 60 presents the values discovered through narrative analysis at different 
levels of the subject hospitals. Espoused values were those that appeared in 
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marketing materials, strategic plans, and bulletin boards, and enacted values were 
derived from interview transcripts. Table 61 presents a comparison of espoused 
versus enacted, shared values. Accountability arose as the dominant value, which 
was espoused at the organization level and was enacted as a shared value, and in 
different forms, at multiple levels of the organization. Most notably, however, 
Teamwork and Assertiveness did not map across any of the espoused values. 
Thus, there was evidence to support the idea that leaders and influencers not only 
reinforce and operationalize espoused organizational values, but they also expand 
on the operational values and enact additional values appropriate to their 
operational context. Also, Compassion, as an espoused value did not map across 
any of the enacted values. This may have been a case of an unquestioned 
assumption: healthcare professionals may assume that they value and exercise 
compassion simply because of the mission of their organization and their chosen 
personal profession. One senior manager remarked that their espoused values 
were so basic that if a person has a conflict with any of them or was not able to 
live up to any of them, the person should not be in healthcare, not just at that 
hospital. 
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Table 60: Values influenced by leaders and influencers 
Espoused 
Organizational 
Values 
Enacted, Shared Values 
Senior 
Management 
Frontline 
Leaders 
Practitioners 
Integrity Transparency Continuous 
Improvement 
Patient Safety 
Compassion Accountability Respect for 
Individual 
Teamwork 
Accountability Continuous 
Improvement 
Transparency Assertiveness 
Respect   Open 
Communication 
   Continuous 
Improvement 
 
Table 61: Mapping of espoused and enacted, shared values 
Espoused Organizational Values Enacted, Shared Values 
Integrity Transparency 
Compassion Accountability 
Accountability Continuous Improvement 
Respect Respect for Individual 
 Patient Safety 
 Teamwork 
 Assertiveness 
 Open Communication 
 
In conclusion, leaders and influencers played a significant role in shaping shared 
organizational values by interpreting, refining, expanding, and operationalizing 
espoused and shared organizational values. At lower levels of the organization, 
additional or different values were introduced to match the context in which work 
was being accomplished. For example, as illustrated in Table 60, while Integrity 
was the espoused organizational value, it was enacted by senior management in 
the form of Transparency, by frontline leaders in the form of Continuous 
 254 
 
Improvement, and by practitioners in the form of commitment to Patient Safety. 
Thus, the initial coding structure, which included a high-level code for “Leaders 
and Influencers,” was expanded, as illustrated in Table 62, to include the types of 
roles played by leaders and influencers: external versus internal. External 
influencers were found to play a dominant role in raising awareness about the 
patient safety problem as well as interpreting the problem in the context of the 
Canadian healthcare system. On the other hand, external leaders played a critical 
role in raising accountability via new professional standards both for personnel as 
well as for hospitals. Similarly, internal influencers raised the awareness of the 
patient safety problem and interpreted it in the context of the obstetrics practice at 
their hospital, while the internal leaders adopted appropriate formal mechanisms 
to operationalize the new standards and performance expectations, as well as 
raised the accountability toward adherence to the new standards and performance 
expectations.  
Table 62: Level 2 coding structure for leaders and influencers  
Level 1 Level 2 Description 
Leaders 
and 
Influencers 
External 
Influencer 
External Influencers: general status reports, results 
of best practices implementation, consequences of 
patient safety problem in the Canadian healthcare 
sector 
 Internal 
Influencer 
 
Internal Influencers: operationalized the institutional 
expectations in the context of obstetrics practice; 
served as role models. 
 External 
Leader 
External Leaders: raised expectations through 
changes in professional standards for personnel and 
institutions.   
 Internal 
Leader 
Internal Leaders: raised accountability for new 
performance standards through new programs and 
incentives at their hospitals. 
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5.3.3 Shared Experiences Help Revise and Reinforce Organizational Values 
The third research question was about the role of shared experiences, through 
implementation mechanisms, in revising and reinforcing organizational values 
(RQ3). The interview transcripts were analyzed to identify different shared 
experiences and how they might have shaped organizational values.  
Theoretically, shared experiences shape organizational values (Schein, 1988, 
2010). Analysis of the transcripts revealed two types of shared experiences: 
infrequent defining moments and routine, refining moments. Defining moments 
were abrupt and impactful for the entire organization and they were instrumental 
in changing organizational values; whereas, routine experiences were responsible 
for reinforcing organizational values. For example, at one hospital, almost every 
participant commented on the sudden growth in population and diversity and how 
it impacted every aspect of the organization. Another hospital was dramatically 
impacted by the appointment of an external Supervisor by the Ministry of 
Health—it resulted in a chain reaction of changes and brought into focus safety 
and quality as institutional priorities.  Routine shared experiences included non-
punitive error reporting programs, the Lean methodology, and clinical debriefings 
or incident reviews. Table 63 presents this revised coding structure. 
Table 63: Level 2 coding structure for shared experiences 
Level 1 Level 2 Description 
Shared Experiences Defining Moment Appointment of a supervisor by 
the Ministry 
 Defining Moment Sudden growth in population and 
diversity 
 Routine Non-Punitive Reporting Systems 
 Routine Lean methodology 
 Routine Clinical Debriefing or Incident 
Review 
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Additionally, interview transcripts revealed a shift in unquestioned assumptions 
resulting from the various shared experiences. Thus, the theoretical model, as 
presented in Figure 7, should include “values, beliefs, and assumptions” instead 
of just “values.” Furthermore, two types of shifts in unquestioned assumptions 
were discovered: strategic and operational. Thus, the coding of assumptions was 
expanded to accommodate these two types of shifts. A particular shift was 
classified as having a strategic impact if it changed the interpretation of how the 
fundamental mission of the organization was being accomplished; on the other 
hand, it was classified as having an operational impact if it changed the way 
people thought about their routine work. Table 64 lists these shifts in terms of 
strategic impact and operational impact. Strategically, there were three areas of 
shifts in assumptions: Accountability, Ethnic Diversity, and Economic 
Efficiency. Operationally, there were two key areas of shifts in assumptions: 
Clinical Excellence and Teamwork. It was also noted that unlike shift in 
organizational values, shifts in assumptions may not be due to dramatic events 
(defining moments); they could result from chronic exposure to certain 
conditions like flat or declining budget allocations.  Such shifts in assumptions, 
albeit strategically impactful, may not be sufficient to trigger immediate value-
level changes and the subsequent changes in the organizational culture; 
nonetheless, over time, they may lead to value-level changes. Thus, shifts in 
assumptions are indicators of potential value-level changes.  
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Table 64: Level 2 coding structure for assumptions 
Level 1 Level 2 Example of Shift in Assumption 
Assumption Strategic Senior Management will not be held accountable. 
 Senior Management will be held accountable. 
 Strategic We will always be a small community hospital  
We are now a large, diverse community hospital. 
  Strategic The Ministry will always provide enough funding 
to meet our needs  We will not get what we 
request or what we deserve; we will have to 
manage in what we get. 
 Operational Hierarchical obstetrics team structure  Flat team 
structure 
 Operational Compassion is same as clinical excellence  
That’s not true; we have to demonstrate that we 
are both: compassionate and clinically excellent 
 Operational Labor and delivery is going to be generally good, 
but a random experience  It is going to be a 
planned, successful experience. 
 Operational We have been assuming that we are good  We 
must continuously prove that we are at least as 
good as our peers. 
 
Three types of artifacts were reviewed to determine the degree to which some of 
the organizational values had been institutionalized: awards, physical items 
created by the obstetrics unit, and stories about the nature of their work. 
Awards, as artifacts of culture, symbolize organizational values: both what is 
valued by the organization (aspirational value and or shared value) as well as 
what is valued by the community (attributed value: what value the various sets of 
communities attribute to their hospital). Table 65 presents these awards and their 
attributed values. Four external awards and one internal award were mentioned 
by the participants as artifacts exemplifying the recognition of certain aspects of 
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their organizational culture by their regional community. The Quality Healthcare 
Workplace Award is presented by the Ontario Hospital Association and it 
recognizes excellence across three organizational outcomes: quality and patient 
safety; retention, recruitment, and employer reputation; and employee 
productivity and costs15. The Diversity Employer Award is based on a national 
competition and the review criteria include not only successful implementation of 
a wide range of initiatives, but also relative success with respect to peer 
institutions in the same industry sector16. The Excellence in Diversity and 
Inclusion Award is presented by the Canadian College of Health Leaders and it 
recognizes leadership in creating and promoting a diversity-friendly work 
environment17. The Accreditation Canada recognition at various levels endorses 
quality improvement efforts; for example, an “Exemplary Standing” would be 
awarded to a hospital that demonstrates excellence in quality improvement. 
Internally, the Good Catch award is presented to individuals or teams that stop an 
error trajectory from reaching a patient and causing harm. This award celebrates 
employee alertness to patient safety and encourages all employees (clinical and 
non-clinical) to be vigilant about patient safety. The Donor Plaques are not 
traditional awards, but they indicate both the financial support from the 
community as well as the hospital’s appreciation for that support. Also, the 
diversity in the donors—corporate, individual, ethnic diversity—is indicative of 
the consistency with which a certain attribute is appreciated. 
 
  
                                                 
15 
https://www.oha.com/CurrentIssues/keyinitiatives/QualityHealthCareWorkplaceAwards/Pages/Q
ualityHealthcareWorkplaceModel.aspx  
16 http://www.canadastop100.com/diversity/  
17 http://www.cchl-ccls.ca/site/awards_diversity_inclusion  
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Table 65: Recognition and attributed values 
  Hospital 
Recognition Attributed Value (s) A B 
Quality Healthcare Workplace 
Award 
- Quality and Safety 
- Reputation 
- Efficiency 
X X 
Diversity Employer Award - Diversity and 
Inclusion 
 X 
Diversity and Inclusion Award - Diversity and 
Inclusion 
 X 
Accreditation Canada - Commitment to 
Quality 
Improvement 
 X 
Good Catch Award - Patient Safety X X 
Donor Plaques - Gratitude X  
 
 
The obstetric teams as well as the frontline leaders and senior managers talked 
about various physical items created by their members that could be linked with 
an underlying value and meaning. Table 66 presents these items, their underlying 
value, and symbolism. Generally, these items were high on utility because they 
were designed for a practical purpose and were updated as necessary to improve 
their effectiveness; they were high on symbolism because they had become an 
integral part of the participants’ work environment and a manifestation of value 
attached to their work; however, except for the Annual Reports, most of them 
were low on aesthetics because they were not supposed to be for external use.   
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Table 66: Physical items and their underlying values and symbolism  
 Underlying Value Symbolism Hospital 
Item  (Meaning) A B 
Kits and Checklists 
- Postpartum Kit 
- Pregnancy 
Induced 
Hypertension Kit 
- Intubation Kit 
- Surgical 
Checklist 
- Quality 
- Safety 
- Efficiency 
- We are prepared  
- We are experienced 
- We adopt best 
practices 
- We care about 
patient safety 
X X 
     
Whiteboards, 
dashboards, and 
scorecards 
- Huddle Boards 
- Quality Metrics 
- Efficiency 
Metrics 
- Communication 
- Coordination 
- Accountability 
- Transparency 
 
- We keep track of 
our progress 
- We keep our team 
members informed 
- We take care of 
discrepancies and 
deviations 
- We take 
responsibility  
 X 
     
Annual Reports - Communication 
- Engagement 
- What’s important  
- We are improving 
- Reputation and 
Brand Value  
X X 
     
Unit Charter 
- A code of 
conduct for the 
obstetrics unit 
- Professionalism 
- Discipline 
- Solidarity 
- We self-regulate 
- We prioritize 
safety and quality 
- Don’t push us 
below our standard 
of practice 
 X 
     
External 
Performance 
Indicators 
- Health System 
Performance 
Indicators18 
- Communication 
- Standardization 
- Accountability 
- Transparency 
- Quality, safety, and 
efficiency are 
national concerns 
X X 
 
Participants were asked tell stories or anecdotes that were being shared in their 
group (about obstetrics, hospital, or community) that would be useful in 
communicating the nature of work at their hospital or obstetric unit. They were 
asked to consider scenarios that would illustrate cultural changes over time, 
                                                 
18 https://www.cihi.ca/en/health-system-performance/your-health-system-tools  
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specific cultural attributes of the current environment, or stories that they would 
tell prospective employees, new employees, or even patients to communicate 
what it is like to be a member of this hospital. Twenty-two anecdotes were 
collected. A set of three anecdotes that illustrate overall organizational values and 
three others that illustrate values at the obstetrics unit level are presented.  
Story #1: How we reduced the length of stay after surgery 
In surgery, our conservable days were 35 percent; today, we range between 11-
14 %. How did we do that? We made it transparent. We made it known what the 
conservable days were by provider—this is what is costing the organization. 
Conservable days are patients staying over their optimum length of stay 
(overstay). If the readmission rates, patient satisfaction rates, infection rates, are 
no different, then why are one provider’s patients staying longer than the others? 
So, we keep working provider-by-provider—that’s how we shut a whole unit 
down: 32 beds! All because of variation in practice!! One spine surgeon was 
sending patients in 2.5 days, the other was keeping them for 5 days. It required 
peer-to-peer coaching. It was not about me telling the surgeon, it was about their 
high-performing peers speaking to their colleagues—that’s the dialog, trust and 
openness that needs to exist. It exists today, but did not exist years ago. No, you 
would never question anyone’s practice—in fact, you didn’t even know another 
provider’s performance. 
We just implemented ERAS system (Enhanced Recovery After Surgery)—it’s 
another new process that you implement. In orthopedics, through ERAS, our 
length of stay went from 7 days to 3.5 days for joint surgery. The momentum is 
building. Day before yesterday, my spine surgeon spoke with our clinical 
resource leader, “I need to implement ERAS on my spine surgery because if they 
were solely spine patients, they would be going home within 2 days after the 
procedure I am doing, but because I am doing the abdominal approach to get to 
the bottom of the spine, why can’t I use ERAS?” Now they are developing a 
learning plan and an implementation plan.  
With orthopedic integration to one site, our access improved, our safety 
improved, our variation in practice decreased, and our length of stay decreased. 
The efficiency gains resulted in ability to provide access to more patients with 
same bed allocation and human resources. Occupancy went up from around 72% 
to around 90% and we are using our resources more effectively; length of stay 
went down so our patients are going out faster and our cost per patient went 
down. We never lose sight of quality indicators like readmission rates, infection 
rates, or patient satisfaction or staff satisfaction. With our staff, they want to stay 
on one unit where they were hired; they don’t want to be cancelled when they 
are scheduled to work; they don’t want them to be moved to another unit 
because there’s not enough work on a particular unit. So, as you increase your 
throughput and your efficiency, you are actually retaining your staff; as you 
retain your staff, you are building knowledge and capacity; the application of 
consistent knowledge and capacity results in better patient care, which in turn 
results in better outcomes.  
Values: Transparency, Accountability, Clinical Excellence 
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Story #2: Training in teams fosters working in teams. 
I remember having to do the OSCE “OS-KEY” (objective structured clinical 
examination) stations, we didn’t have enough physicians to do all the OSCE 
stations so I was monitoring and evaluating physicians and nurses who were all 
applying forceps, doing vacuum deliveries, they started to add MOREOB work 
that we had done. I could hear nurses saying, “Dr. Smith, why are you doing it 
like that?”  That would never have happened in the old days. Once the 
physicians were part of it, and part of the groups, they were able to even show 
off! I can remember doing the forceps OSCE and the doctors were eager to show 
off their new skills. Physicians, nurses, and midwives were working very well 
together. For about six months, there was a lot of buzz about MOREOB. When 
the activity was low, they would read the chapters together and ask questions. 
There was a lot of excitement! When we were at the first workshop, I remember 
when we did the OSCE, it was a “wow” moment. We had the pelvic simulator, 
we had all the equipment on the unit to practice—it was like this is what 
obstetrics needed for a long time! It brought the inter-professional team together 
in a way where people could ask questions and learn together. Then, we started 
hearing, “MOREOB says…” both within professions and across professions. I 
would see nurses taking out pneumonic for vacuum delivery and work through 
it. It was not too long where they knew all the pneumonics and became true 
experts. 
Values: Flattened Hierarchy (Teamwork), Assertiveness, Communication, 
Teamwork, Clinical Excellence 
Story #3: We surprised the rest of the hospital.  
We had an amniotic fluid embolism and our OR staff was a little taken back that 
we had the patient stabilized before they could come and before the doctor had 
asked. We just saw the patient going into shock; we didn’t know what it was 
because it is extremely rare (I many not see another one of those cases rest of my 
career). We attribute this ability to our MOREOB training—we didn’t have to talk 
to anyone. We had the IV ready, we had drawn blood, we know what we needed 
to do and we were doing it. We just knew what was needed. We had another 
case with placenta accreta and she had delivered vaginally and she kept 
hemorrhaging—we knew that she would have to have a hysterectomy and we 
were prepared. Two nurses were on one side with one OB and another two 
nurses were on the other side with the other OB. We knew what the physicians 
needed and we didn’t need to talk. Physician doesn’t have to ask us what to do 
because we already know. 
Values: Teamwork, Clinical Excellence 
Story #4: Costs can drive the quality agenda 
We have had a program on C-sections. That’s an excellent example of how costs 
drove the quality agenda. We limited the OB/GYN department to a fixed amount 
of budget and they were doing x number of deliveries. We recognized that if 
they cut their C-section rates down, they could do more deliveries; otherwise, we 
would have to cap them at a certain number. That was an impetus for their 
department to say that they could do better with their C-section, particularly if 
we want to continue with the same number of births or grow the number of 
births. We capped the amount of money that we were willing to provide to the 
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department and that fixed amount equated to a certain number of births. Let’s 
say they could do 3,000 births in the available budget. So, they either had to find 
money from other sources to increase the number of births or to limit the number 
of births to 3,000. It was then recognized that a vaginal birth costs the hospital 
much less than a C-section birth. The OB department was not happy in the 
beginning, but realized that the hospital was in a difficult position. The chief 
took it on as an opportunity. Capping the number of births would have meant a 
cut in the number of births and the overflow patients would have to go 
somewhere else. Since the obstetricians get paid for every birth that they handle, 
this would have meant a cut in their compensation. From reputational 
perspective, the hospital doesn’t want to be turning people away. The hospital is 
caught in the middle—we don’t want people to go somewhere else. Of course, 
vaginal births are inherently safer for the mother and child. 
Values: Cost containment (Accountability), Quality of Care, Patient Safety 
 
In conclusion, a synthesis of value statements, shared experiences, shifts in 
assumptions, and artifacts consistently supported three fundamental values: 
Accountability, Inclusion, and Excellence. Table 67 presents the Level 2 coding 
structure for values.  
Table 67: Level 2 coding structure for values 
Level 1  Level 2 Supporting Evidence 
Values Accountability  Stories 
 Ministry’s actions 
 Accreditation expectations 
 Legal expectations (ECCFA and QCIPA) 
 A code of conduct for the obstetrics unit 
 Kits and Checklists 
 Good Catch Award 
 Inclusion  Stories 
 Whiteboards, dashboards, and scorecards 
 Diversity and Inclusion Award 
 Excellence  Stories 
 Kits and Checklists 
 Annual Reports 
 Health System Performance Indicators 
Quality Healthcare Workplace Award 
 Accreditation Canada recognition 
 
 264 
 
The specific ways in which leaders and influencers shaped and institutionalized 
the shared values varied. For example, the Ministry’s decision to hold the senior 
management team accountable and replace them in order to improve the 
hospital’s overall effectiveness was a wakeup call for everyone at Hospital B. It 
shifted the community’s unquestioned assumption that the Ministry would not 
hold the senior management accountable to a new assumption that the Ministry 
would hold the senior management accountable. Subsequently, there was support 
for accountability through legislation and positon statements or standards from 
professional bodies. For example, the Excellent Care for All Act (ECFAA) holds 
the senior management accountable for quality and safety; Accreditation Canada 
holds the hospital accountable for continuous improvements in quality and safety; 
and the Canadian Healthcare Reporting Program makes the quality and safety 
scorecard publicly available, thereby adding transparency. Therefore, one could 
say that the external influencers institutionalized the values of accountability, 
inclusion, and excellence by holding senior management accountable for their 
performance, requiring transparency in key safety, quality, and operational 
metrics, and linking hospital accreditation to compliance with such requirements. 
Two levels of inclusion were noted: community and professional. At the 
community level, the inclusion was about being responsive to the ethnic diversity 
of the community in which the hospital was located. There were several artifacts 
proving that the hospitals were being responsive to their community’s needs: for 
example, multi-lingual information brochures, provision of translation services, 
diversity in the staffing reflective of the diversity in the community, and donor 
plaques appreciating philanthropic contributions from the community as well as 
demonstrating satisfaction across the visible minorities. At the professional level, 
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inclusion was about respecting the different professionals on the obstetrics team, 
valuing everyone’s opinion, encouraging evidence-based decision-making, 
including patients in decision-making, and being compassionate with each other 
as well as with the patients.   
Excellence included clinical excellence and financial efficiency. The use of the 
Lean methodology and clinical debriefings were clearly tied to improving the 
quality of care and emphasizing systemic improvements. However, they also 
resulted in reduced waste by eliminating the unnecessary process loops and  
redundant, conflicting or ineffective policies, as well as by streamlining 
communication. Excellence was also mentioned in the context of accountability: 
“we are expected to be accountable to our tax payers in how we utilize our 
financial resources…our quality improvement efforts are expected to improve 
both patient safety and efficiency…the better the efficiency, the greater the 
chance of support from our provincial government.”  
Overall, several shared experiences were reported by the interview participants 
through which they illustrated how such experiences influenced their shared 
values. Among these experiences, the defining moments included appointment of 
the external supervisor and sudden growth of the local population. In contrast, the 
routine experiences included implementation mechanisms such as the non-
punitive reporting system or clinical debriefing. Over a period of time, these 
experiences resulted in shifts in assumptions, operationalization of shared 
organizational values, as well as alignment between internally shared values and 
externally attributed values. Additionally, several daily-use artifacts reinforced 
the institutional commitment toward their shared organizational values.  
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5.3.4 Feedback Influences Learning Derived from Shared Experiences 
The fourth research question was about the role of feedback regarding 
performance in influencing learning derived from shared experiences (RQ4).  
Theoretically, and through other empirical studies presented in Chapter 2, 
feedback plays a critical role in performance improvement, and the means by 
which feedback is generated and shared are mechanisms that institutionalize 
cultural values, and the tangible evidence that demonstrates performance 
improvement serves as a cultural artifact.   
The interview narratives were analyzed to determine how performance feedback 
mechanisms could have influenced learning derived from shared experiences, and 
what artifacts could serve as evidence to support the participants’ claims. Overall 
there were 29 references to feedback mechanism and they were categorized as 
internal versus external, and formal versus informal. Also, the label for 
“Feedback Mechanisms” was changed to “Learning and Sensemaking Loops” 
(Weick, 1995) to be more descriptive of the actual role of these mechanisms, as 
derived from the narratives. Table 68 presents the level 2 coding structure for 
learning and sensemaking loops.  
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Table 68: Level 2 coding structure for learning and sensemaking loops 
Level 1  Level 2 Example 
Learning and 
Sensemaking 
Loops 
[Feedback 
Mechanisms] 
Internal, 
Formal 
Monthly review of clinical outcomes by the 
obstetrics team 
External, 
Formal 
Survey results are compared laterally across peer 
hospitals in the province and longitudinally across 
each hospital’s preceding cycle’s performance.  
Undesirable outcomes and trends are investigated 
and appropriate interventions are implemented 
 Internal, 
Informal 
The obstetrics team randomly picks patient charts 
for monthly audits and reviews discrepancies; results 
are used for education and systemic improvements. 
 External, 
Informal 
A group of stakeholders that is used to develop new 
ideas and initiatives, test initiatives, and champion 
their dissemination 
 
Table 69 shows the mapping of learning and sensemaking loops with underlying 
cultural values and artifacts. While there were many examples of internal and 
external artifacts that were used by the participants, they also identified some 
intangible artifacts such as a coaching experience that resulted in improved 
performance. External artifacts included a variety of regularly reported data that 
were being shared within the group of reporting hospitals as well as some that 
were publicly available. The Canadian Institute for Health Information played a 
critical role in improving both transparency and accountability by making 
performance data on key metrics publicly available. Examples of such metrics 
include Access and Wait Times, Quality of Care and Outcomes, Integration and 
Continuity of Care, and Performance Reporting19. 
 
  
                                                 
19 https://www.cihi.ca/en/health-system-performance  
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Table 69: Learning and sensemaking loops used to reinforce values 
Learning and 
Sensemaking  
Loops 
Description of its Use Underlying 
Organizational 
Value 
Artifact 
Monthly 
review of 
clinical 
outcomes by 
the obstetrics 
team 
The obstetrics team 
reviews its clinical 
outcomes with respect to 
its peer institutions and its 
own pre-established 
performance targets. 
Outlier cases are discussed 
in detail and systemic 
solutions are implemented 
as necessary. 
Accountability 
Clinical 
Excellence 
Transparency 
Continuous 
Improvement 
 
Change in C-
section rate from 
29% to 23%; 
Change in 
induction rate 
from 19% to 
13% 
    
Regular 
Surveys: 
Staff 
Satisfaction, 
Physician 
Satisfaction, 
Patient 
Satisfaction, 
and Patient 
Safety 
Culture 
Survey results are 
compared laterally across 
peer hospitals in the 
province and longitudinally 
across each hospital’s 
preceding cycle’s 
performance.  Undesirable 
outcomes and trends are 
investigated and 
appropriate interventions 
are implemented 
Accountability 
Inclusion 
(employees 
and patients)  
Continuous 
Improvement 
Generally, 
participants 
noted that their 
survey results 
were starting to 
slip and they 
needed to 
refresh some of 
their previously 
successful 
initiatives. 
    
Community 
Advisory 
Board 
A group of stakeholders 
that is used to develop new 
ideas and initiatives, test 
initiatives, and champion 
their dissemination 
 
Community 
Engagement 
Continuous 
Improvement 
Community 
Advisory Board 
Monthly 
Audits of 
Patient 
Charts 
The obstetrics team 
randomly picks patient 
charts for monthly audits 
and determines if there are 
any patterns for concern. 
The results of these 
reviews are used for 
education and systemic 
improvements. 
Continuous 
Improvement 
Accountability 
Examples 
involved review 
of clinical skills, 
more consistent 
enforcement of 
established 
policies, and 
early 
identification of 
factors that tend 
to increase risks. 
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Table 69 (Continued): Learning and sensemaking loops used to reinforce values 
Learning and 
Sensemaking 
Loops 
Description of its Use Underlying 
Organizational 
Value 
Artifact 
    
Strategic 
Plan with 
goals and 
schedules 
The hospital’s strategic 
plan aligns with every 
clinical and non-clinical 
unit’s performance goals. 
Continuous 
Improvement 
Accountability 
Transparency 
Excellence 
Patient safety and 
quality scorecard 
is one of the 
artifacts used to 
track unit as well 
as hospital level 
improvements. 
 
Incident 
Reporting 
System 
The Incident Reporting 
System is available to all 
hospital personnel. It is 
used to share critical 
incidents that resulted in 
harm to the patient as well 
as those that did not result 
in any harm. “Good Catch” 
stories are also shared 
through this system 
Clinical 
Excellence 
Patient Safety 
Accountability 
Several examples 
of incident reports 
were shared with 
the researcher. 
Also, the format 
used to report 
such incidents to 
management and 
the Board was 
shared. 
 
In conclusion, the learning and sensemaking loops could be classified in 
accordance with a 2x2 matrix: formal versus informal, and internal versus 
external. Also, overall, learning and sensemaking from group-level performance 
influenced learning from shared experiences by (a) creating transparency of 
performance status; (b) engaging employees and patients in assessing their 
experience; (c) employing a broad array of quality control mechanism; and (d) 
recognizing personnel who stopped undesirable outcomes.  
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5.4 Conclusions from Study #2 
Study #2 was a qualitative analysis of interview data. Forty-one individuals, 
representing both management and frontline personnel participated in the 
interviews. A summary of research questions explored and their respective 
findings are presented below.   
RQ1:  How did environmental factors influence the patient safety culture in the 
obstetrics practice in Ontario? 
Analysis of interview transcripts led to the identification of four environmental 
factors: economic, geo-social, legal, and professional. Economically, the 
Canadian healthcare system had not been increasing funding to hospitals 
commensurate with their patient volume and therefore most hospitals were forced 
to implement innovative cost-containment measures in order to meet the 
increasing demand within the available resources. From a geo-social perspective, 
the local population had not only increased, but had become more diverse. They 
needed multilingual support, their health profile was different (increased cases of 
delayed pregnancies, diabetes, and hypertension), and they had different 
traditions with respect to medical care. Legally, QCIPA provided means to hold 
interdisciplinary dialog about medical errors in a protected environment, and 
ECFAA required hospitals to link executive compensation to quality 
improvement initiatives. Professionally, there were complementary requirements 
from accreditors, and organizations representing obstetricians, nurses, midwives, 
and hospitals were all in support of quality and safety. All these factors 
collectively made the values of quality and safety explicit, as well as encouraged 
the development and use of implementation mechanisms to measure and improve 
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quality and safety, thereby influencing the patient safety culture in the obstetrics 
practice in Ontario. 
RQ2:  How did leaders and influencers shape shared organizational values at the 
subject organizations? 
First, a hierarchical value-mapping exercise was conducted to identify the 
participants’ shared values, which were as follows: Patient Safety, Quality of 
Care, Inclusion, Mutual Respect, Accountability, and Continuous Improvement. 
Next, four types of leaders and influencers were identified by the participants: 
external versus internal as well as formal versus informal. From an external- 
informal perspective, influencers like Dr. Ross Baker and Dr. Ken Milne were 
instrumental in influencing national legislature, professional organizations, 
hospital administration as well as clinical personnel to develop specific measures 
to reduce adverse events. Internally, formal senior management as well as 
frontline personnel played a key role in raising expectations of alignment with the 
shared values of the organization, increasing transparency about quality and 
clinical performance, and holding each other accountable for modeling the 
desired behaviors. External-formal influencers like the Ministry of Health held 
the hospital management accountable and changed the unquestioned assumptions 
held deeply among the hospital staff. Internal-informal influencers served as role 
models who practiced the desired behaviors (consistent with the shared values) 
and encouraged their peers and team members to do the same. 
 
 
 272 
 
RQ3:  How did shared experiences, through implementation mechanisms, help 
revise and reinforce organizational values at the subject organizations? 
There were two types of shared experiences: defining moments and routine, 
refining moments. Defining moments were abrupt and impactful for the entire 
organization. For example, at Hospital A, almost every participant commented on 
the sudden growth (and change in diversity) and how it impacted every aspect of 
the organization and also threatened its ability to maintain its original, deeply-
held values. On the other hand, Hospital B was dramatically impacted by the 
appointment of an external Supervisor by the Ministry of Health—it resulted in a 
chain reaction of changes and brought into focus safety and quality as 
institutional priorities.  Routine shared experiences included non-punitive error 
reporting programs, the Lean methodology, and clinical debriefings or incident 
reviews. Also, several shifts in unquestioned assumptions were noted. A 
particular shift was classified as having a strategic impact if it changed the 
interpretation of how the fundamental mission of the organization was being 
accomplished; on the other hand, it was classified as having an operational 
impact if it changed the way people thought about their routine work. 
Strategically, the three main areas of shifts in assumptions were accountability, 
ethnic diversity, and economic efficiency. Operationally, the shifts in 
assumptions were in the areas of clinical excellence and teamwork. Also, analysis 
of physical artifacts and stories revealed institutionalization of practices 
consistent with MOREOB training, shared organizational values, and other 
implementation mechanisms such as the Lean methodology. Thus, there were 
several examples to illustrate how shared experiences, through implementation 
mechanisms, helped revise and reinforce organizational values.  
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RQ4:  How did feedback from group-level performance influence learning 
derived from shared experiences at the subject organizations? 
The interview narratives were analyzed to identify feedback mechanisms, the 
underlying cultural values that might have been reinforced, and artifacts that 
could serve as evidence to support the claim. Overall, there were 29 references to 
feedback mechanisms; both formal and informal mechanisms, as well as internal 
and external mechanisms were considered. External artifacts included regularly 
reported data that were being shared within the group of reporting hospitals as 
well as some that were publicly available. The examples presented by the 
participants revealed that feedback from group-level performance influenced 
learning derived from shared experiences by identifying performance gaps with 
respect to benchmark hospitals as well as with respect to past performance and 
target performance at both group-level (obstetrics) and firm-level (hospital).  The 
title of “feedback mechanisms” was changed to “learning and sensemaking 
loops” to better reflect their role in shaping the organizational culture. 
Ultimately, this study also resulted in a revised coding structure that offers 
additional detail and insights about the various cultural elements and their 
interactions. Table 70 presents the consolidated revised coding structure for 
narrative analysis. In accordance with this structure, there were four types of 
environmental factors; the MOREOB training’s attributes aligned with the shared 
organizational values; there were four types of leaders and influencers, there were 
two types of shared experiences; there were three overarching shared values, and 
there were four types of learning and sensemaking loops.  
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Table 70: Consolidated revised coding structure for narrative analysis 
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Chapter 6: Study #3 
6.1 Introduction 
This study represents the integrative step in Creswell and Clark’s (2007) 
convergence model for mixed-methods research (see Figure 8). The quantitative 
analysis presented in Study #1 revealed that training, as a planned intervention, 
can improve the domain knowledge among the participants, can improve the 
organizational climate, and can have a delayed, but measurable influence on the 
clinical outcomes. It also helped develop a six-factor safety climate model. The 
qualitative analysis presented in Study #2 provided a richer explanation of how 
certain environmental factors, leadership behaviors, shared experiences, and 
learning and sensemaking loops contributed to shift in assumptions and had a 
value-level impact. Study #2 also helped refine the previously developed 
organizational culture model by adding a second level of coding structure. Since 
the integrated model of culture and climate calls for a holistic analysis of both 
constructs (culture and climate) in order to develop a robust understanding of 
how, and under what conditions, an organization maintains and revises its 
culture, it was essential to structure this final study as an integrative study and 
specifically focus on the cultural elements that may distinguish specific hospitals 
from their peer groups. It was known from Study #2 that there were two defining 
moments or systemic shocks—one to Hospital A (sudden growth in population 
and ethnic diversity) and one to Hospital B (appointment of the external 
supervisor)—that may have contributed toward a more distinctive dynamic 
between the various cultural elements, leading to a potentially distinctive patient 
safety climate and clinical outcomes at those hospitals. Thus, these two hospitals 
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were selected for a longitudinal study. It is also acknowledged that since these 
two hospitals emerged from the pool of eligible hospitals as a matter of 
convenience sampling, the results reported in this study may be subject to self-
selection bias—they hospitals decided to participate in the study because they 
thought/knew that they had a better organizational culture than their peers. 
The goals of this study were to (a) determine if the subject hospitals performed 
any better than their peer group and (b) determine how inherent cultural elements 
might have influenced the effectiveness of the MOREOB program in changing the 
patient safety culture within the obstetrics units at these hospitals. Thus, the 
research question was as follows: 
RQ5:  How do inherent cultural elements influence the impact of a planned 
culture-change intervention? 
As presented in Chapter 1, the integrated model of organizational culture and 
climate consists of six elements of culture: shared experiences, organizational 
values, implementation mechanisms, leadership (role of leaders and influencers), 
performance outcomes, and feedback mechanisms (which were later called 
“learning and sensemaking loops). Organizational climate, on the other hand, is 
considered the psychological response to culture, and could be described using a 
six-factor model, which was reported in Study #1. Quantitative data came from 
sources previously described and used in Study #1 and the qualitative data came 
from the interview narratives and artifacts discussed in Study #2. Results of these 
analyses are reported with respect to each subject hospital in terms of (a) shared 
experiences and organizational values, (b) role of leaders and influencers, (c) 
learning and sensemaking loops, (d) effects of MOREOB training on outcomes, 
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(e) effects of MOREOB training on patient safety climate, and (f) an integrated 
review of culture and climate with respect to the MOREOB training.  
6.2 Longitudinal Analysis of Hospital A 
Hospital A reported about 3,100 births in 2015 and it was located in a major 
metropolitan area with a diverse ethnic population. It was considered one of the 
Late Adopters of the MOREOB program because most of the participants 
completed their three training modules in the 2006-2009 timeframe. Prior to 
implementing the MOREOB program, Hospital A’s overall mean Length of Stay 
was 2.19 versus 2.43 days at the rest of the Late Adopters, 2.37 at the Non 
Adopters, and 2.45 days at the Early Adopters. However, Cesarean section (C-
section) rate was higher than that at the other hospitals in the Late Adopter group 
as well as all the hospitals in the Non-Adopter group: 28.9 versus 25.4 and 27.5 
per cent, respectively. Thus, the hospital seemed to be performing well on overall 
efficiency, but there was room for improvement in the C-section rate. Therefore, 
reduction in elective (low and reduced risk) C-section rates became one of the 
key goals for obstetrics. This section presents a longitudinal analysis of the 
influence of the inherent cultural elements on the effectiveness of the MOREOB 
program in changing the patient safety culture and climate within the obstetrics 
unit at Hospital A. 
6.2.1 Shared Experiences and Organizational Values 
Based on the emergent model of culture and climate used in this study, shared 
experiences help revise and reinforce organizational values. Therefore, 
participants from Hospital A were asked to generally describe some of their 
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memorable experiences at Hospital A, and probed further to elicit examples that 
may reveal deeply-held, unquestioned assumptions as well as values. Most of the 
shared experiences reported by the interview participants (n=20) related to small 
size and empathetic care. The senior management recounted two key stories: 
Story #1: Everyone feels proud of the culture here…we give high quality of care. When 
we do an actual objective, deep dive, we are not necessarily doing what we hope that we 
would be doing. We seem to be riding on our reputation and there’s a bit of a miss-
association between care and quality: because we care, we must be providing good 
quality of care.  MOREOB is a good example. When we stopped the program, we saw 
slippage—when new people came in, we were not able to keep that culture going. We 
tend to lose the discipline, rigor and consistency. Another example is wound care. If you 
ask people about pressure ulcers, they will say that we never have issues with pressure 
ulcers. In reality, if we look at the data, we do have problems—we are no better than 
anyone else. So, the people’s perceptions about quality of care are confounded by the 
quality of compassion that people have for their patients.   
Thus, the prevalent unquestioned assumption was, “because we care, we must 
have good quality.” 
Story #2: I heard many stories where people talk about how they brought their friends 
and relatives here and how someone really cared and went above and beyond, reflecting 
personal care. The hospital is therefore very much revered and extremely important part 
of the community’s fabric. Strong emotions are attached to this hospital. The donor 
plaques in the front lobby reflect not only community’s ownership of the hospital, but 
also the diversity of the community—ethnicities, languages, religions, etc.—is very well 
represented in the donor-base of the hospital. 
Thus, another prevalent unquestioned assumption was that the community took 
emotional and financial ownership of the hospital.  
However, a critical shared experience, which turned into a defining moment, was 
the fact that the hospital’s local community experienced a sudden and drastic 
increase in population as well as ethnic diversity. As a result of this sudden shift, 
the hospital had to not only care for a much larger population, but also respond to 
ethnic needs such as language support and counseling, support significantly 
different medical care, and engage in a rapid hiring process. Thus, many of the 
participants were concerned that they would not be able to nurture their cherished 
organizational values. 
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Values attributed to Hospital A (by its local community) were derived from 
interview narratives based on the participants’ reasons for joining the hospital, 
stories being told in the community about the hospital, and personal experiences 
as employees and patients. A value-mapping exercise (as described in Study#2) 
was conducted to identify the following attributed values: compassion, 
excellence, diversity, and accountability. The espoused values were derived from 
the hospital’s strategic plan and marketing posters20; they were as follows: 
healthy community, safe and high-quality care, talent development, and 
accountability.  
The MOREOB program, as a team-training intervention, served as a planned 
intervention. Therefore, narratives (n=28) associated with the experience of 
participating in the MOREOB training as well as after the implementation of the 
MOREOB program were analyzed to derive the group’s shared values. Figure 29 
illustrates the value map for Hospital A. The attributed value of compassionate 
care surfaced in the participants’ narrative about why they wanted to reduce the 
C-section rate and how they included the patients in their decision-making 
process. Thus, it was also noted as a shared value. Excellence was related to both 
patient safety and quality of care. Thus, excellence, as an attributed value was 
linked with the espoused value of safe and high-quality care. The narratives about 
safety and quality expressed general concern for patient safety and noted 
examples of increased assertiveness among nurses as well as improved teamwork 
within the obstetrics team. These shared experiences were linked to patient safety 
and quality of care as two shared values. Diversity, as an attributed value, was 
readily visible to the researcher based on observation of ethnic diversity among 
                                                 
20 These values have been slightly reworded because the original document presented them as 
belief statements rather than espoused values as stated in the parenthetical statements.  
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the physicians and staff employed at the hospital. This value was echoed in the 
espoused value of talent development (by investing in people). It was further 
noted in shared experiences as to how people were valued and their opinions 
were sought; also, the MOREOB program was viewed as an example of 
investment in the people. Finally, accountability was the most consistently 
mapped value as an attributed, espoused, and shared value. The experiences 
relating to accountability included responsibility toward patient (clinical and 
humanitarian) as well as responsibility toward the healthcare system—judicious 
use of financial resources will be better for the entire system, not just for  
Hospital A.  
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Figure 29: Hospital A’s hierarchical value map 
As a result of implementing the MOREOB program, participants reported the 
creation and use of specific artifacts like the PPH kit illustrated in Figure 30. 
Such artifacts were typically moderate in their aesthetic appeal, but high in utility 
and symbolism. They served as tools for consistent practice of behaviors and 
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skills learned through MOREOB. Also, the MOREOB program served as a tool to 
train new entrants into the existing culture of the organization.  
 
 
Figure 30: PPH kit made by the obstetrics team at Hospital A 
 
Three types of shared experiences were noted: pre-intervention, during the 
intervention, and post-intervention. In the case of Hospital A, the sudden growth 
in population and ethnic diversity created a defining moment prior to the 
intervention and influenced both how the leadership responded to this situation 
(described in greater detail in the next section) as well as its influence on the 
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alignment between attributed, espoused, and shared values. The experience of 
implementing the MOREOB program empowered the participants to change their 
workplace behaviors: they became more assertive, focused on evidence-based 
practice, flattened the professional hierarchy within their team, etc. The actual 
practice of these learned behaviors formed their post-intervention shared 
experience. A review of artifacts illustrated reduction of variation in their practice 
(as evidenced by the PPH kit) as well as creation of additional, complementary  
implementation mechanisms like critical incident reviews, routine analysis of C-
section rates, labor induction policy, progressive growth in the scope of practice 
for the midwives, and  peer-to-peer enforcement of inter-personal communication 
standards. As the participants practiced new behaviors and adhered to the new 
implementation mechanisms, they also witnessed improved clinical performance 
and experienced a positive reinforcement of their personal learning and 
sensemaking, which ultimately reinforced their shared values. 
In summary, the shared organizational values at Hospital A were mediated by the 
shared experiences of the participants; first, as members of the community 
(attributed values) and then, as members of the obstetrics team. Their defining 
moment emerged from the external environment and triggered three categories of 
impact: forced the leadership to reframe the emerging challenge into local context 
(presented in more detail in the next section), challenged the participants to 
confront their deeply held assumptions, and contributed toward the acceptance of 
the MOREOB program as one of the potential solutions. The MOREOB program 
itself created new shared experiences, which resulted in improved clinical 
outcomes, and helped revise and shape the shared organizational values. As a 
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result, the community was able to further strengthen their culture and use their 
defining moment toward positive adaptation.  
6.2.2 Role of Leaders and Influencers 
Based on the emergent model of culture and climate used in this study, leaders 
and influencers shape shared organizational values. Therefore, participants from 
Hospital A were asked about how their leaders and influencers might have 
shaped the shared organizational values at their facility. The participants (n=20) 
claimed that their senior management was generally supportive of the MOREOB 
training because it was credible, successful at other hospitals, and promised 
safety and cost savings. The following response from one of the managers is 
indicative of how senior management influenced workplace behaviors by 
aligning the interests of individuals and the organization: 
We limited the OB/GYN department to a fixed amount of budget and they were doing x 
number of deliveries. We recognized that if they cut their C-section rates down, they 
could do more deliveries; otherwise, we would have to cap them at a certain number. 
That was an impetus for their department to say that they could do better with their C-
section, particularly if we want to continue with the same number of births or grow the 
number of births. We capped the amount of money that we were willing to provide to the 
department and that fixed amount equated to a certain number of births. Let’s say they 
could do 3,000 births in the available budget. So, they either had to find money from 
other sources to increase the number of births or to limit the number of births to 3,000. It 
was then recognized that a vaginal birth costs the hospital much less than a C-section 
birth. The OB department was not happy in the beginning, but realized that the hospital 
was in a difficult position. The chief took it on as an opportunity. Capping the number of 
births would have meant a cut in the number of births and the overflow patients would 
have to go somewhere else. Since the obstetricians get paid for every birth that they 
handle, this would have meant a cut in their compensation. From reputational 
perspective, the hospital doesn’t want to be turning people away. The hospital is caught 
in the middle—we don’t want people to go somewhere else.  
 
A corresponding comment from a frontline clinician (influencer) was as follows: 
The hospital management was very supportive of this program. For them, it’s all about 
dollars! The program itself is costly, but the cost saving to the hospital is enormous: 
decreased section rate, decreased length of stay, decreased baby’s stay in the NICU—it 
also puts the hospital on the map. Dr. [Obstetrician] has done many interviews about 
decreased section rates; other hospitals have come here to learn how we reduced our 
section rate. Again, it puts [Hospital A] in a leadership position. 
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In mentoring new entrants, preceptors (influencers) played a critical role in 
imprinting the shared organizational values on them. In this case, the MOREOB 
training became the baseline expectation from new entrants: 
We start from the very beginning. When they give their preceptors out, it’s usually those 
nurses that have been here longer and it’s usually repetition. We do get to see different 
styles—we swap the preceptors from time to time to mix up the styles; we refer them 
back to the MOREOB manuals, we pull skills drills; they do a lot of mentoring even after 
they have finished formal training—they stay connected to their mentors. We teach them 
until we have taught them enough and then we watch them in action; then the preceptors 
feel comfortable as well. I think it takes about 3 years before a nurse is confident and 
comfortable handing a variety of cases and in thinking outside the box without realizing 
that they are thinking outside the box…We are really committed to the practice and it 
has become very normal in our practice and in our teaching of new nurses. It’s 
normalized into our daily practice. 
 
Nurses at Hospital A played a critical role in enforcing the obstetrics team’s 
agreed-upon MOREOB guidelines. For example, in an effort to reduce their C-
section rate, they agreed that they would not induce labor unless the patient is at 
41 weeks plus 3 days of gestation. Prior to these guidelines being in effect, 
patients were being scheduled after 38 weeks of gestation based on the doctor’s 
availability or other scheduling conveniences. Maintaining the “41+3” threshold 
was consistent with the obstetrics team’s shared values as well as the hospital’s 
espoused values; yet, adhering to this standard was a challenge in the beginning. 
The doctors were habituated in the old way of scheduling the C-sections and the 
nurses and the scheduling staff was hesitant to change the extant practices. 
However, the MOREOB training empowered the nurses to be assertive and help 
enforce the 41+3 rule.  A senior nurse explained how conflict with the 
community’s shared values was handled: 
With the doctors, they have seen the hierarchy at other places, but when they come here, 
they see that we work as a team and if they don’t work with the nurses, don’t 
communicate with the nurses, they don’t stay long because then we complaint that they 
don’t work as team members and they don’t fit. It takes several shifts of effort on our 
part to work with them, but at the end, if it doesn’t work, they leave. One of the doctors 
told us that she had heard that the nurses here tend to eat their doctors so she was fearful 
coming here, but now that she is here and has gotten to know everyone, she is really 
happy here. 
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Thus, leaders and influencers impacted organizational values via two 
mechanisms: interpretation and operationalization. Senior leaders played a vital 
role in interpreting the external, environmental factors in the context of the local 
priorities and constraints. They observed that in order for the obstetrics team to 
thrive, they needed to grow the patient volume within the current budget 
constraints. In response, they committed to the MOREOB training and adjusted 
the incentives so that the entire obstetrics team was motivated to reduce the 
elective C-sections and increase the total patient volume.  The preceptors and 
senior nurses served as guardians of the new performance standards and 
professional practices, thereby reinforcing the previously agreed-upon shared 
values. Together, they influenced implementation mechanisms through policies, 
guidelines, and incentives, and workplace behaviors through role modeling the 
desired behaviors and teaching the new expectations to new entrants before they 
had the opportunity to learn the old habits. 
6.2.3 Learning and Sensemaking Loops 
Based on the emergent model of culture and climate used in this study, learning 
and sensemaking loops (feedback) from workplace experiences and group-level 
performance influence learning derived from shared experiences. Therefore, 
participants from Hospital A were asked about how various feedback 
mechanisms may have influenced learning derived from their shared experiences. 
The participants identified four types of mechanisms in use at Hospital A: formal 
versus informal, and internal versus external. Table 71 presents a 2x2 matrix of 
these mechanisms along with examples. 
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Table 71: Learning and sensemaking mechanisms in use at Hospital A 
 Informal Formal 
External -Canadian Institute for 
Healthcare Information 
database of quality and safety 
performance. 
-BORN data 
 
-Reports to the Ministry of Health 
regarding progress on quality 
improvements 
-Compliance with Accreditation 
Canada’s guidelines 
-Patient satisfaction surveys 
Internal  -Review of outliers in clinical 
performance: e.g., C-sections, 
induction of labor, length of 
stay  
-Event debriefings 
-Peer-to-peer enforcement of 
MOREOB standards and policies 
-Quick checks on patient 
satisfaction, engagement, and 
safety culture 
-Critical Incident Review 
-Safety and Quality Reports to the 
Board of Directors  
-Consistent training of new staff 
and physicians 
-Formal engagement of patients in 
their plan of care: “birth plan” 
-Internal safety culture survey 
 
The Canadian Institute of Health Information collected voluntarily submitted data 
from all Canadian healthcare facilities21. As such, it was able to present national 
and provincial data not only to the various participating facilities, but also at an 
aggregate level to the general public. These data, and the corresponding 
dashboards, were discussed by the interview participants as influential in 
providing external feedback to the organization and subsequently reinforcing or 
changing organizational practices. Figure 31 illustrates a screenshot of a chart 
showing comparative performance of various healthcare regions within Ontario 
on Low Risk C-Sections. 
                                                 
21 http://yourhealthsystem.cihi.ca/hsp/indepth?lang=en#/indicator/032/2/C5001/  
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Figure 31: Low-risk C-section rates across Ontario 
 
Such transparency facilitated both conversations and accountability. Also, some 
participants reported increased interest from Board members to understand the 
metrics and ways in which hospital performance could be improved. 
BORN (Better Outcomes Registry and Network)22 was another external data 
source that was reported to influence internal decision-making. For example, 
                                                 
22 https://www.bornontario.ca/  
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BORN published reports at regional levels and also on special topics such as 
preterm birth rates, infant mortality, and maternal mortality. These data were 
used by Hospital A to (a) triangulate with other available data and (b) make 
comparative judgments regarding the hospital’s performance.   
In addition to these external datasets, internal data on key metrics like C-section 
rate and Length of Stay as well as performance data at the team level prompted 
incident reviews and streamlining of protocols. Inconsistencies in adherence to 
induction policy, for example, were noted by the participants and were promptly 
corrected. At the informal level, the participants did not wait for periodic reports 
to be released; they simply questioned current status and made minor corrections 
to their actions. Their assertiveness, structured communication with the help of 
MOREOB practice guidelines, and focus on systemic solution were noted in 
several examples. 
With regard to external, formal feedback mechanisms, three items were most 
frequently noted: annual quality improvement plans, patient satisfaction surveys, 
and employee and physician satisfaction survey. All three of these items were 
required under the Excellent Care for All Act (ECFAA), 201023. Additionally, 
this regulation requires that executive compensation be linked to quality 
improvement targets achieved in accordance with the annual quality 
improvement plans. Thus, there was strong motivation to measure extant quality, 
develop mechanisms to improve it, and demonstrate the improvements on a 
continuing basis. 
                                                 
23 
https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/10e14?search=%22excellent+care+for+all+act%22&use_exa
ct=on  
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These external feedback mechanisms were echoed at the internal level. The 
Quality Committee, people in charge of patient relations, and practice leaders and 
risk managers were responsible for data collection, validation, and analysis. 
Success of externally-mandated reports seemed to rely on an operational system 
of data collection, inter-personal trust, and transparency. Thus, internal, informal 
feedback to the providers of vital data was critical to the success of the entire 
accountability chain. For example, the emphasis of critical incident reviews was 
clearly on systemic solutions and they linked to the quality improvement efforts. 
Similarly, patient engagement efforts started with regular tours of the Labor and 
Delivery facilities and provision of a book to each patient, which described all the 
details from initial registration through final discharge and postpartum, post-
discharge care. Special issues like midwifery services, water births, and high-risk 
pregnancies were also discussed. This book was so central to the Labor and 
Delivery practice at Hospital A that all the nurses, midwives, and physicians were 
required to read it. This book served as a consistent communication tool, enabling 
conversations, and providing timely feedback from patients to the care providers. 
Additionally, the formal engagement of patients with their birth plans provided 
early indication to the nurses about the expectations of the parents and enabled 
difficult conversations under less stressful conditions, much ahead of the actual 
birth. This birth plan was periodically updated, if conditions changed. Thus, it 
served as a living document and as a learning and sensemaking mechanism.     
6.2.4 Effects of the MOREOB Training on Outcomes 
Based on the emergent model of organizational culture and climate, a training 
intervention such as MOREOB would be expected to improve group-level 
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outcomes. In particular, the MOREOB training was designed to provide clinical 
and non-clinical knowledge to the entire obstetrics team with the belief that such 
an improvement in knowledge would result in improved clinical outcomes. 
Hence, the following two performance measures were analyzed: 
1. Knowledge examination scores and   
2. Clinical outcomes.  
Figure 32 illustrates the knowledge exam scores after each module. Hospital A’s 
mean scores after all three modules were higher than the mean scores for other 
Late Adopters.  
 
Figure 32: Post-MOREOB Hospital A’s knowledge exam scores 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine the significance of the 
differences in post-training mean knowledge exam scores after each module. 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated, 
χ2(2) = 5.35, p = .069. The results showed that the differences in knowledge 
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exam scores after each module were significant, F(2)=3.992, p<.05. Also, these 
results indicate that Hospital A’s obstetrics team performed better than the teams 
from other Late Adopter hospitals.  
The review of clinical outcomes focused on C-section rates and Length of Stay; 
other clinical outcomes data were not available at the hospital level. Also, 
Cesarean section rates prior to 2005 were not available; however, the rates from 
2005 through 2011 are presented in Table 72. Compared with the other Late 
Adopters, Hospital A’s C-section rates were lower in 2010 and 2011, the two 
years during the MOREOB training, than the preceding five years. Also, the rates 
in 2010 and 2011 were lower than those at the other Late Adopter hospitals. 
Thus, with the help of the MOREOB program, Hospital A was able to bring down 
its C-section rates below the comparable rates at other Late Adopter hospitals.  
Table 72: Comparison of C-Section rates between Hospital A and other Late 
Adopters 
Year C-Section Rate  
 Hospital A All Other Late Adopter Hospitals 
2005 28.9 25.4 
2006 26.1 25.6 
2007 27.8 26.5 
2008 28.9 26.3 
2009 29.8M-1 25.5 
2010 24.6 M-2 26.2 
2011 25.4 M-3 26.3 
 
Table 73 presents the mean Length of Stay for Hospital A and all the other Late 
Adopter Hospitals. Data prior to 2005 were not available; however, since 2008, 
the mean Length of Stay at Hospital A declined from 2.19 days pre-MOREOB to 
1.85 days at the end of Module 3. Concurrently, the mean Length of Stay at all 
the other Late Adopter Hospitals declined as well; however, the mean Length of 
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Stay at Hospital A was always lower than that at all the other Late Adopter 
hospitals. Thus, one could argue that Hospital A was already more efficient than 
other hospitals in the Late Adopter group and maintained its lead after the 
MOREOB program.  
Table 73: Comparison of the mean Length of Stay at Hospital A and other Late 
Adopters  
Year Mean Length of Stay (Days) in Obstetrics 
 Hospital A All Other Late Adopter Hospital 
2005 2.19 2.43 
2006 2.07 2.35 
2007 2.07 2.34 
2008 2.07 N/A 
2009 1.98M-1 2.19 
2010 1.96M-2 2.16 
2011 1.85M-3 2.11 
 
 
In summary, Hospital A’s obstetrics team’s knowledge exam performance 
improved after each training module and both the knowledge exam scores as well 
as the clinical outcomes were better than those of obstetrics teams at other Late 
Adopter hospitals. The improvements in knowledge exam scores were recorded 
immediately after the training and the improvements in clinical outcomes were 
recorded several months later. Thus, one could conclude that the most immediate 
impact of training was on the knowledge level, and the subsequent impact was 
most likely on the workplace behaviors of the participants (changes in workplace 
behaviors were not assessed in this study), which translated into improved 
clinical outcomes. 
6.2.5 Effects of the MOREOB Training on Patient Safety Climate 
Based on the emergent model of organizational culture and climate, a training 
intervention such as MOREOB would be expected to improve patient safety 
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climate. Specifically, the MOREOB training was intended to produce a long-term 
change in the patient safety culture at the participating obstetrics units. Therefore, 
the patient safety climate scores before and after the MOREOB training were 
analyzed to determine whether there was a significant difference in the scores.  
Before presenting the results of the patient safety climate survey, a mapping 
between shared organizational values at Hospital A and the six-factor patient 
safety climate model developed in Study #1 is presented in Table 74.  
Table 74: Mapping between shared values and patient safety climate factors at 
Hospital A 
Shared Organizational 
Values at Hospital A 
 Corresponding Patient Safety 
Climate Factors 
Compassion   
Patient Safety  Patient Safety is Everyone’s 
Priority 
Quality of Care   
Inclusion   Respect or Valuing Individuals 
  Empowering People or Investing 
in People 
Accountability  Learning or Continuous 
Improvement 
 
Compassion, although a shared value at Hospital A, was not reflected in the 
patient safety climate survey instrument. However, the remaining four shared 
values mapped well with four of the six factors of the patient safety climate 
model, as presented in Study #1. Considering that the patient safety climate is a 
psychological response to the underlying safety culture, an assessment of pre-
training scores on these four factors was considered to be indicative of the 
underlying differences in organizational culture at Hospital A versus other Late 
Adopter hospitals. 
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Figure 33 illustrates the comparison between Hospital A’s patient safety climate 
scores and those of all other Late Adopters on four factors: Patient Safety is 
Everyone’s Priority; Learning; Valuing Individuals; and Empowering People. 
 
 
Figure 33: Hospital A’s patient safety climate scores 
 
Table 75 presents the results of the independent sample t-test of Hospital A’s 
patient safety climate scores. Overall, Hospital A’s patient safety climate scores 
were higher than those for all other Late Adopter hospitals (n=29). Levene’s test 
for equality of variances was significant (p<.05) for one of the four factors; thus 
equality of variances was not assumed for that factor. The independent sample t-
test for equality of means indicates that the differences in scores were significant 
for three of the four factors: for Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority, 
F(1488)=2.392, p=.000; for Learning, F(1488)=.876, p=.000; for Valuing 
Individuals, t(149.93)=3.185, p=.002; and for Empowering People, 
F(1488)=1.653, p=.059. Therefore, the patient safety climate within Hospital A’s 
obstetrics team was significantly better than within the obstetrics teams from the 
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other Late Adopter hospitals on three scales: (a) Patient Safety is Everyone’s 
Priority, (b) Learning, and (c) Valuing Individuals.  
Table 75: Results of the independent samples t-test on patient safety climate 
scores before MOREOB training 
  t-test for Equality of Means 
Factor F or t 
Value 
df Sig. 
(2-
tail
ed) 
Mean 
Differ-
ence 
Std. 
Error 
Differ-
ence 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
Patient 
safety is 
everyone’s 
priority 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.392 1488 .000 .41929 .07929 .26376 .57482 
Learning Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.876 1488 .000 .37863 .07952 .22264 .53462 
Valuing 
Individuals 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
3.185 149.93 .002 .17451 .05479 .06626 28276 
Empowering 
People 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.653 1488 .043 .16555 .08772 -.00653 .33762 
 
Figure 34 illustrates the post-Module 1 comparison of patient safety climate 
scores for Hospital A and all the other Late Adopters 
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Figure 34: Post Module 1 comparison of patient safety climate scores 
 
Overall, Hospital A’s patient safety climate scores were higher than those for all 
other Late Adopter hospitals (n=29). Levene’s test for equality of variances was 
significant, p<.05, for Learning and Empowering People and hence equal 
variances were not assumed for those two factors. The independent sample t-test 
for equality of means indicates that the differences in scores were significant: for 
Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority, F(1127)=2.925, p=.000; for Learning, 
t(133.29)=4.121, p=.000; and for Valuing Individuals, F(1127)=.610, p=.018. 
The difference in scores for Empowering People was not significant, 
t(134.58)=1.864, p=.065. Therefore, after the first MOREOB training module, the 
patient safety climate within Hospital A’s obstetrics team continued to be 
significantly better than within the obstetrics teams from the other Late Adopter 
hospitals on three scales: (a) Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority, (b) Learning, 
and (c) Valuing Individuals. 
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Figure 35 illustrates the post-Module 2 comparison of patient safety climate 
scores for Hospital A and all the other Late Adopters 
 
Figure 35: Post Module 2 comparison of patient safety climate scores 
 
Hospital A’s patient safety climate scores continued to be higher than those for 
all other Late Adopter hospitals (n=29). Levene’s test for equality of variances 
was significant, p<.05, for Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority and Learning, 
and hence equal variances were not assumed for those factors. The independent 
sample t-test for equality of means indicates that the differences in scores 
continued to be the first three factors: for Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority, 
t(107.45)=5.138, p=.000; for Learning, t(106.37)=4.369, p=.000; and for Valuing 
Individuals, F(728)=1.107, p=.014. The difference in scores for Empowering 
People was not significant, F(728)=2.725, p=.089. Therefore, after the second 
MOREOB training module, the patient safety climate at Hospital A continued to 
be significantly better than within the obstetrics teams from the other Late 
Adopter hospitals on the same three scales: (a) Patient Safety is Everyone’s 
Priority, (b) Learning, and (c) Valuing Individuals. 
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Figure 36 illustrates the post-Module 3 comparison of patient safety climate 
scores for Hospital A and all the other Late Adopters 
 
Figure 36: Post Module 3 comparison of patient safety climate scores 
 
Again, Hospital A’s patient safety climate scores continued to be higher than 
those for all other Late Adopter hospitals (n=29). Levene’s test for equality of 
variances was significant, p<.05, for three of the four factors and hence equal 
variances were not assumed for them. The independent sample t-test for equality 
of means indicates that the differences in scores were significant for two of the 
four factors: for Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority, t(89.80)=3.928, p=.000; for 
Learning, t(86.98)=4.086, p=.000; for Valuing Individuals, t(92.42)=1.437, 
p=.154; and for Empowering People, F(387)=.002, p=.652. Therefore, after the 
third MOREOB training module, the patient safety climate within the obstetrics 
team at Hospital A was significantly better than within the obstetrics teams from 
the other Late Adopter Hospitals on two scales: (a) Patient Safety is Everyone’s 
Priority and (b) Learning. Thus, there appeared to be narrowing of the gap in 
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safety climate between Hospital A and other Late Adopters after the third module 
of the MOREOB training. Therefore, on the one hand, the MOREOB training 
seems to influence patient safety climate at all participating hospitals; and on the 
other hand, since Hospital A’s patient safety climate was already better and 
continued to better than that at the other Late Adopter hospitals on two scales, 
there must have been a much stronger emphasis on patient safety and learning 
within the underlying cultural elements at Hospital A. Also, it is important to note 
that since there was a lag in noting any improvements in the patient safety 
climate scores, one could argue that the participants needed to experience the 
changes in underlying assumptions, role-modeling by leaders and key 
influencers, changes in workplace behaviors, effectiveness of new 
implementation mechanisms and incentives, and corresponding improvements in 
clinical outcomes before they would change their psychological response.  
Section 6.2.4 demonstrated a significant improvement in the participants’ 
knowledge after the MOREOB training modules. Since the patient safety climate 
also improved after MOREOB, it seemed reasonable to investigate whether there 
was any relationship between level of knowledge and strength of the patient 
safety climate. Two topics in the knowledge exam were directly linked with the 
patient safety climate: Communication and Patient Safety. While both these 
topics were non-clinical, since they were specifically covered and tested in the 
MOREOB training, and there were specific factors in the safety climate survey 
linked to these two topics, it was reasonable to expect that an improvement in 
knowledge in these two areas would have a positive influence on the climate 
scores in the corresponding areas. Figure 37 illustrates the comparison between 
the knowledge and climate scores after each module. 
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Figure 37: Knowledge and climate scores after each module 
 
Knowledge scores for Patient Safety dipped slightly after Module 2, but show an 
overall increase from Module 1 to Module 3. Climate scores for Patient Safety 
improved from Module 1 to Module 2 and dropped after Module 3, but ended at a 
level slightly higher than after Module 1. Knowledge scores for Communication 
increased slightly from Module 1 to Module 2, but decreased after Module 3. 
Also, there was a net decrease in the knowledge level about Communication from 
Module 1 to Module 3. While such a decline is uncharacteristic, its reasons are 
not known. Patient Safety Climate scores showed an improvement between 
Module 1 and Module 2, but a decline between Module 2 and Module 3. 
Similarly, the Communication Climate scores also improved after Module 1, but 
dropped after Module 3. Since there appeared to be a relationship between the 
knowledge scores and the corresponding climate scores, the correlation between 
the two was tested. Pearson’s Correlation between the knowledge and climate 
about patient safety was moderate after the first two modules (r1 = -.35 and         
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r2 = -.40), but was low after the third module (r3 = .09).  Correlation between 
knowledge and climate about open communication was low after the first two 
modules (r1 = -.15 and r2 = .25), but was lower after the third module (r3 = .04). 
Thus, patient safety climate scores and knowledge exam scores were not related. 
This finding further underscores the lead-lag phenomenon noted earlier: 
improvement in knowledge exam scores is most proximate to the training, 
followed by a delayed improvement in safety climate.  
6.2.6 Integrated Review of Culture and Climate with Respect to the MOREOB 
Training 
All hospitals in the Late Adopter group were presumed to have been under the 
influence of same environmental factors; thus, controlling for these factors, the 
participants’ shared experiences prior to the implementation of the MOREOB 
program, during the implementation, and after the implementation were analyzed. 
In the case of Hospital A, however, there was one notable exception: the 
community around the hospital had undergone a dramatic increase in population 
and an accompanying spike in its ethnic diversity. This change in the geo-social 
environmental factor formed the pre-intervention shared experience and due to its 
sudden nature, it was classified as a defining moment. At that time, Hospital A 
was performing well on overall efficiency (its mean Length of Stay was lower 
than the rest of the Late Adopters, all the Early Adopters, and all the Non-
Adopters), but there was room for improvement in the C-section rate. As a result 
of the sudden growth in population and ethnic diversity, its goal of maintaining 
the overall efficiency became much more challenging and the need to improve its 
C-section rate became a safety/quality priority, as well as a financial imperative. 
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Also, at that time, the hospital’s shared organizational values were Compassion, 
Patient Safety, Quality of Care, Inclusion, and Accountability. These values 
mapped very well with four of the patient safety climate factors: Patient Safety is 
Everyone’s Priority, Respect or Valuing Individuals, Empowering People, and 
Learning or Continuous Improvement. A pre-intervention climate assessment 
indicated that Hospital A’s obstetrics team’s patient safety climate was 
significantly better than within the obstetrics teams at other Late Adopter 
hospitals on three factors:  Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority, Respect or 
Valuing Individuals, and Learning or Continuous Improvement. Thus, one could 
conclude that it was critical for Hospital A to maintain these values, serve its 
community, and strengthen its clinical performance outcomes.  
The participants’ shared experiences revealed the underlying values of 
Compassion, Patient Safety, Quality of Care, Inclusion, and Accountability. They 
also revealed two unquestioned assumptions (a) compassionate care was viewed 
as a proxy for quality of care and (b) the local community took emotional and 
financial ownership of the hospital. There was also a high degree of coherence 
between the attributed values, espoused values, and shared values. Four of the 
five shared values resonated well with the goals of the MOREOB program and the 
associated patient safety climate factors: Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority; 
Valuing Individuals; Empowering People; and Learning.  Hospital A applied a 
number of implementation mechanisms to reinforce these values. While the 
MOREOB training was in itself an implementation mechanism, there were other 
mechanisms such as Critical Incident Review, Induction Policy, and Peer-to-Peer 
Coaching that were concurrently operational. Leaders and influencers played a 
critical role in reinforcing the shared organizational values by interpreting the 
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environmental factors in the context of local constraints and needs, as well as by 
enforcing the MOREOB guidelines. Overall, the obstetrics team created a number 
of cultural artifacts such as the PPH kit, which symbolized their preparedness and 
professionalism while serving the utilitarian purpose of saving lives. 
Before the implementation of the MOREOB program, the safety climate within the 
obstetrics unit at Hospital A was better than that at other Late Adopter hospitals; 
thus, it was favorably disposed to receiving and implementing the MOREOB 
training. As the training was implemented, Hospital A maintained its lead for two 
of the three modules, but by the end of the third module, Hospital A’s climate 
was better in only two areas: Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority and Learning. 
Hospital A’s knowledge exam scores were consistently better than those from 
other hospitals in the Late Adopter group. There was no correlation between the 
knowledge exam scores and the safety climate scores; they were independently 
better. 
A review of two clinical outcomes, C-section rates and Length of Stay, showed 
improvements after the MOREOB program. Hospital A’s C-section rate went 
down from 29.8 per cent in 2009 to 25.4 per cent in 2011; however, the C-section 
rate at the other Late Adopter hospitals climbed from 25.5 to 26.3 per cent during 
the same timeframe. The mean Length of Stay at Hospital A was already lower 
than that at the other Late Adopter hospitals and it continued to decline, but so 
did the Length of Stay at the other Late Adopter hospitals.  
Active use of feedback (learning and sensemaking) was a critical element of 
Hospital A’s organizational culture. Informal feedback was used regularly by the 
hospital staff to cross-check their internal data and keep track of their benchmark 
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hospitals. Formal feedback from Accreditation Canada and the mandatory 
reporting of quality and safety improvements as well as patient and staff 
satisfaction surveys were actively reported throughout the organizational chain of 
command and appropriate corrective actions were implemented. Internally, 
practice leaders as well as clinicians were consistent about attention to detail and 
follow-through on recommendations resulting from Critical Incident Reviews and 
event debriefings. Peer-to-peer enforcement was particularly noteworthy among 
nurses. Also, formal engagement of patients and their families through a birth 
plan and regular review of that plan, with appropriate changes, was distinctive.  
In conclusion, the inherent cultural elements make a definitive impact on the 
influence of planned culture-change interventions. A summary of observations 
noted in conjunction with the MOREOB training implementation are as follows: 
1. Four of the five shared values resonated well with the goals of the 
MOREOB program and the associated patient safety climate factors: 
Patient Safety Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority; Quality of Care  
Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority; Inclusion  Respect or Valuing 
Individuals and Empowering People; and Accountability  Patient Safety 
is Everyone’s Priority and Learning or Continuous Improvement. Thus, 
the planned intervention’s attributes were well-aligned with the inherent 
shared values of the organization.  
2. Leaders and influencers helped shape organizational values through two 
mechanisms: interpretation and operationalization. First, they interpreted 
the systemic shock or the defining moment experienced by their hospital 
into operational context. Then, they committed to the MOREOB program 
and adjusted the incentives so that the entire obstetrics team was 
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motivated to reduce the elective C-sections and increase the total patient 
volume.  The preceptors and senior nurses served as guardians of the new 
performance standards and professional practices, thereby reinforcing the 
previously agreed-upon shared values. The leaders and key influencers 
believed that the planned intervention would enable them to overcome the 
extant challenges, particularly the issues associated with their defining 
moment, and were able to make appropriate changes to implementation 
mechanisms and incentives, thereby influencing the inherent assumptions 
and values. 
3. Knowledge from the MOREOB training facilitated the use of formal and 
informal feedback mechanism, particularly the event debriefings, peer-to-
peer enforcement of standards, critical incident reviews, and consistent 
training of new staff and physicians, all of which served as concurrent 
impact mechanisms for cultural change. Thus, the planned intervention 
provided complementary knowledge, tools and techniques that could help 
improve workplace behaviors and group-level outcomes.  
4. Practice of teamwork, communication, and respect for individuals, as 
prescribed in the MOREOB training, helped flatten the hierarchy within 
the obstetrics team. Thus, the use of the skills taught in the planned 
intervention created new workplace behaviors and shared experiences that 
were consistent with the shared values, implementation mechanisms and 
incentives, and performance goals. 
5. Improved clinical outcomes (particularly in reducing the C-section rate) 
resulted in improved support from management and heightened 
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expectations from each other. Thus, learning and sensemaking associated 
positive association between the desired outcomes and shared experience. 
6. In response to the MOREOB training, since the knowledge assessment was 
conducted immediately after the training, improvement in knowledge 
could be claimed as the first observable change. Although climate 
assessments were also conducted immediately after the training, there was 
no correlation between climate scores and knowledge scores. Since the 
training modules were completed over an 8-12 month period, one could 
conclude that the increase in climate scores after training was most likely 
due to the participants’ satisfaction with the training program itself as well 
as their reaction to workplace behaviors concurrent with their training 
experience. Based on the interview data, there were reports of changed 
workplace behaviors and performance outcomes, and the participants 
were pleased with those changes. Thus, one could conclude that in 
response to the MOREOB training, the knowledge level improved first, 
then the workplace behaviors and performance outcomes, and finally, the 
patient safety climate. This lag in improvement in the patient safety 
climate suggests that the participants needed to experience the new 
workplace behaviors and performance improvements in order to improve 
their psychological response to the underlying improvements in 
organizational values, implementation mechanisms, leadership behaviors, 
and workplace behaviors and new shared experiences. 
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6.3 Longitudinal Analysis of Hospital B 
Hospital B reported about 4,458 births in 2015 and it was located in a major 
metropolitan area with a diverse ethnic population. It was considered one of the 
Early Adopters of the MOREOB program because most of the participants 
completed their three modules during the 2004-2005 timeframe. Prior to 
implementing the MOREOB program, Hospital B’s C-section rate was on the rise 
from 21.8 to 25.8 per cent; however, it was well below the C-section rate at other 
Early Adopter hospitals. At that time, the mean Length of Stay was 2.01 at 
Hospital B versus 2.28 days at the rest of the Early Adopters. This section 
presents a longitudinal analysis of the influence of the inherent cultural elements 
on the effectiveness of the MOREOB program in changing the patient safety 
culture and climate within the obstetrics unit at Hospital B. 
6.3.1 Shared Experiences and Organizational Values 
Based on the emergent model used in this study, shared experiences help revise 
and reinforce organizational values. Therefore, participants from Hospital B were 
asked to generally describe some of their memorable experiences at Hospital B, 
and probed further to elicit examples that may reveal deeply-held, unquestioned 
assumptions as well as values. The following two stories constructed by 
combining narratives from seven individuals illustrate the extant conditions and 
their impact on shared values and unquestioned assumptions: 
Story #1: After we went under supervisory control, we had a top level structural change, 
a bottom-up development of the mission-vision-values (MVV) document, which brought 
the organization/people together. Based on this MVV document, we developed the 
strategic plan. Then, with the new CEO, we revisited the strategic plan to test whether 
the plan was still aligned with our aspirations, and refined it just enough to keep it 
current. The new CEO was conscious of not starting over again because a lot of good 
work already happening—he wanted to build on the previous work. We went through a 
couple of cycles of financial challenges and other considerations, but we stayed with our 
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plan. We wanted to make sure we were financially stable and viable in order to keep 
serving our community—so we developed a concept of integrated clinical services 
across our two sites. Early on, the community was not in favor and our physicians were 
not in favor of organizational integration, but slowly, we are able to manage unit-by-unit 
integration and gradually demonstrated viability as well as quality, access and financial 
benefits of integration of clinical services across the two sites. So, the lesson here is that 
sometimes, it is better to take baby steps—test the change, prove that it works to build 
confidence (it may take longer to get to your goal), it doesn’t create as much noise, and it 
helps change culture in small bits. 
 
The most critical aspect of the above story is that the hospital experienced a 
defining moment when it was placed under external supervisory control. An 
avalanche of changes ensued as a result of this action and the following shifts in 
unquestioned assumptions emerged for further discussion:  
1. The Ministry would never put the hospital under supervisory control and 
hold the senior management accountable  The Ministry would hold the 
senior management accountable. 
2. The changes made during the supervisory control won’t last  The 
mission, values, and vision developed during the supervisory control were 
retained and only slightly revised by the new CEO, give credit for the past 
work and moving the organization forward; in the process, the CEO built 
trust with his staff, physicians, and the community. 
3. Organizational integration, in the interest of efficiency, would not work 
 With appropriate attention to key concerns and demonstration of 
quality improvements, the hospital was successful in accomplishing 
multiple integration efforts and achieved both quality and efficiency 
gains.   
 
Story #2: Prior to MOREOB, there were very different practices in obstetrics across the 
two sites of the same hospital: one site did all their C-sections and subsequent recovery 
within the Maternal-Newborn (MN) unit and the other site said that C-section is a 
surgical procedure and wanted them done only by the Surgery staff. It did not perform its 
own C-sections in the obstetrics program—as a result of very old practices. They came 
to the meetings in tears—they were really concerned that their patients would die. The 
MOREOB program helped us standardize our procedures and bring industry best practices 
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to our facility. It was a commitment that we made in Surgery—we will not pull our staff 
until the whole group was ready for it. We supported MN for over 18 months. We had 
Surgery nurses working with the MN nurses side-by-side. Ultimately, we went from the 
sentiment that “mothers and babies will die” to “this was the best thing that happened.” I 
used to think, this is not rocket science, but it was a huge culture shift for physicians to 
trust the administrators, educators, and nurses that their patients were going to be safe. It 
was probably one of the greatest achievements of my career! If you lived in the old 
culture, you would agree that it was transformative! 
 
The following shift in unquestioned assumption emerged from further discussion 
of the above story:  
1. Efficiency enhancement efforts are direct challenges to safety  With 
evidence-based practice, as recommended by the MOREOB program, it is 
possible to improve processes and achieve both safety and efficiency. 
Values attributed to Hospital B (by its local community) were derived from 
interview narratives based on the candidates’ reasons for joining the hospital, 
stories being told in the community about the hospital, and personal experiences. 
Prior to the MOREOB program and through the early days of supervisory control, 
the community viewed Hospital B as a poor-quality facility, but the staff within 
the hospital firmly believed that the quality of care was good. The following two 
anecdotes illustrate this point: 
The reputation in the community was not good at all, but the internal perception was 
quite positive. The press didn’t really care about the good news; they only wanted to put 
us on the front page when something bad happened. They don’t want to hear about how 
wonderful we are. Because we are not a teaching hospital, we can’t brag about our 
research or about our high-profile physicians. We have a lot of regular folks getting very 
good care. I personally come here for my medical needs and I would advise others to 
come here 
 
Initially, when I applied to work for this hospital, the reputation of Hospital B was pretty 
bad. I have always lived in this area so this hospital was close, but this hospital was not 
my first choice of employment. At that time, however, nobody wanted to work at 
Hospital B. I remember when I first got the job, most of my friends from my nursing 
program would question why I was taking this job (why don’t you go to downtown, why 
don’t you go down to a teaching hospital)—the reputation of this hospital was certainly 
not good. Even though I have stayed here throughout the years, I think because I 
understand the structure of the hospital a little bit more, as an employee, I think our 
reputation has gotten a little bit better. My friends don’t bother me anymore—they know 
I belong to Hospital B! I certainly remember that it was not that great, but we have done 
pretty well as a community hospital. 
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The interview participants (n=21) provided 44 experiences that illustrated a 
variety of changes resulting after the MOREOB program. Applying the 
hierarchical value mapping technique illustrated in Study #2, these experiences 
were treated as shared experiences and the following shared values were derived: 
Quality and Safety, Respect for Individuals, Open Communication, and 
Accountability. Figure 38 illustrates the hierarchical value map for Hospital B.  
The external attributions of poor quality, non-responsiveness to diversity, and 
non-accountability came from the remarks made by the interview participants 
based on their interactions with the community. Over the past 10-15 years, this 
reputation had changed significantly as evidenced by external awards, which 
served as artifacts of the current attributed values (see Figure 39). These artifacts 
have low utility, moderate aesthetic, and very high symbolic value. Four 
espoused values and strategic directions were derived from the hospital’s 2015-
2019 strategic plan: Integrity, Compassion, Accountability, and Respect.   
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Figure 38: Hierarchical value map for Hospital B 
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Figure 39: Artifacts illustrating Hospital B’s recognition by its community 
 
 
Accreditation Canada recognizes overall commitment to quality and patient 
safety as well as improvements in accordance with the quality improvement 
goals. Hospital B received the highest level of recognition: “Exemplary” rating. 
The Quality Healthcare Workplace Award is presented by the Ontario Hospital 
Association and is based on both individual-level and organization-level 
outcomes. Individual-level outcomes include competency, engagement, and 
safety. Organization-level outcomes include quality and safety, retention and 
recruitment, and efficiency metrics. Hospital B received “Gold” level 
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recognition; the next higher level recognition is “Platinum.” The Diversity and 
Inclusion Award is presented by the Canadian College of Health Leaders and is 
based on distinctive contributions to making the workplace accessible, friendly, 
and productive for diverse communities. The Registered Nursing Association of 
Ontario recognizes hospitals that have demonstrated exceptional nursing 
practices and could serve as role models for other hospitals. Finally, the Diversity 
Employers Award is presented by Mediacorp editors. This award recognizes top 
achievements compared to peer institutions in the same industry. Hospital B was 
recognized as a Top 100 Diversity Employer in Canada. Based on these artifacts, 
it is clear that Hospital B’s new attributed values were Quality, Patient Safety, 
and Diversity and Inclusion. These values were consistent with Hospital B’s 
shared values. 
6.3.3 Role of Leaders and Influencers 
Based on the emergent model used in this study, leaders and influencers shape 
shared organizational values. Therefore, participants from Hospital B were asked 
about how their leaders and influencers might have shaped the shared 
organizational values at their facility. The participants (n=21) claimed that their 
senior management played a distinctive role at Hospital B. They were highly 
consistent about their commitment to quality and safety through the Lean 
methodology across the hospital and the use of the MOREOB program in 
obstetrics. Since the MOREOB program was implemented well before the Lean 
methodology, and it was consistent with the basic principles of Lean, it was 
regarded by many of the frontline personnel as “ahead of Lean.” As a result of the 
MOREOB program, the frontline personnel were already trained to look at 
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systemic issues while reducing errors, and they were well-versed in the principles 
of high reliability organizations. These personnel served as role models and 
champions of key behaviors—such as evidence-based practice, assertiveness, 
structured debriefings, regular review of clinical skills, etc.—and modeled the 
desired behaviors themselves. Thus, they changed the workplace behaviors and 
the workplace experience. The one area that the frontline personnel lamented 
about was limited visible support from senior management.  The following 
comment from an obstetrician illustrates this point: 
One of the things that MOREOB says is that you need buy-in from the highest level of 
management. We still struggle with that. We always invite everyone to our meetings, but 
I don’t think they get it the way they were supposed to get it. They didn’t buy in, the way 
we bought in. The reality is that there’s much more awareness about safety culture 
throughout the hospital. There’s a high level safety meeting once a month. We always 
felt really good about our success, but it never really seeped up higher. There was no 
realization of what we were achieving in our department and they never really 
understood the culture of MOREOB. I don’t know whether it was a matter of personal 
interest on part of the management in place or whether we didn’t do enough to keep them 
informed. It seems like every time management brings in another safety program, it’s 
way behind our MOREOB program: the hospital is playing catchup with what we have 
been doing for the past 15 years. There’s a conversation and vocabulary that people in 
our program have (e.g., Swiss Cheese model) that the rest of the organization is just 
catching up! Our senior management had no ability to say maybe we made a mistake 
here and let’s look at it another way.  
 
On the other hand, the senior management appeared to be highly focused on 
using the Lean methodology to address all the issues: quality, safety, efficiency, 
communication, and operational management of the hospital. One of the senior 
managers commented that at more advanced facilities, they don’t even do annual 
budgets; resources are allocated based on achievement of performance targets. It 
was also apparent that at the hospital level, the senior management was faced 
with several other pressing challenges related to financial performance, a sense of 
entitlement among certain groups, and interpersonal aggression. The following 
comment from a senior manager illustrates this point: 
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As I reflect back 11 years and think about the first day that I started, my first meeting 
was in a conference room. It’s the OR (Operating Room) Committee, which was all 
docs, there was a new program director that was brought in six months before I arrived 
and that individual brought me here from another organization. I walked out of the 
meeting where the surgeons were pounding their fists on the table. I told them I was not 
going to tolerate behavior like that. Day 1 on the job, 9 am, one of the physicians started 
yelling. In front of everyone, I said to her: I don’t know who you are, but I will not 
tolerate this behavior. If you have an issue, I will be more than happy to assist you, but if 
that’s the behavior you are going to have with me, I can’t help you because I don’t know 
what your issue is, and by this behavior, it is not going to solve the problem. Three days 
later, I had three physicians walk into my office, shut the door and started yelling 
because I was making changes. I had to make those changes because we were already $1 
million over budget—first month of the fiscal year! I said to them, “[get] out of my 
office.” You want to talk to me, I will by all means talk to you, but you are not going to 
bang that door shut, you are going to leave that door open, and until you calm down, you 
are not going to be allowed back in my office. When the nurses saw this, they came back 
to me and said, boy, you have guts, don’t you. I said, no, I don’t have guts; I am standing 
up for my entitlement of respect and dignity. You are expected to have the same respect 
and dignity, but if you allow people to walk over you, then you are the one at fault. I 
think, organizationally, what we have done is we have put in processes, education, 
dialog, coaching-mentoring, huddles—people are starting to see the culture change and 
they are now more comfortable standing up or if they have concerns, they are 
comfortable bringing them up.  
 
Overall, both parties—leaders and influencers—seemed to be playing their part in 
improving the organizational culture and recognizing it as a part of continuous 
improvement, but they may not be appreciating each other’s contributions. The 
senior leaders seemed to be too focused on the use of the Lean methodology, and 
the leaders and influencers in the obstetrics teams wanted more direct attention 
and recognition of their local efforts. Thus, although both parties interpreted and 
operationalized their shared organizational values, the lack of cohesion in their 
efforts and the lack of mutual recognition could serve as a barrier to realizing the 
full potential of both the MOREOB program as well as the Lean methodology.  
6.3.4 Learning and Sensemaking Loops 
Based on the emergent model used in this study, learning and sensemaking loops 
(feedback) from group-level performance influences learning derived from shared 
experiences. Therefore, participants from Hospital B were asked about how 
various feedback mechanisms may have influenced learning derived from their 
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shared experiences. The participants identified four types of mechanisms in use at 
Hospital A: formal versus informal, and internal versus external. Table 76 
presents a 2x2 matrix of these mechanisms. 
Table 76: Learning and sensemaking loops in use at Hospital B 
 Informal Formal 
External -Canadian Institute for 
Health Information database 
of quality and safety 
performance 
-BORN data 
-Health Quality Ontario data 
-Reports to the Ministry of Health 
regarding progress on quality 
improvements 
-Compliance with Accreditation 
Canada’s guidelines 
-Patient satisfaction surveys 
Internal -Review of outliers in 
clinical performance: e.g., 
C-sections, induction of 
labor, length of stay. 
-The Lean methodology 
-Safety and Quality Reports to the 
Board of Directors 
-SAFE Reporting System 
 
While most of the external and internal feedback mechanisms were quite similar 
to the ones discussed earlier with respect to Hospital A, two distinctive 
mechanisms were noted at Hospital B: the Lean methodology and the SAFE 
Reporting System.  
The Lean methodology had become the de facto management and 
communication system. A strategic plan was developed with broad stakeholder 
input. This plan was then used to develop strategic directions and goals, which 
were then translated into annual objectives and key deliverables. Hospital B 
focused on Quality and Sustainability as a strategic direction because of the 
pressure from the Ministry of Health and Long-term Care and the Health Quality 
Ontario24 for standardization of evidence-based practice, as well as economic 
                                                 
24 HQO is a provincial advisory body for quality of healthcare in Ontario. Additional information 
is available at http://www.hqontario.ca/  
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incentives inherent in the Health System Funding Reform25, which will reward 
hospitals based on where the patients choose to seek services. Two of the specific 
strategic goals were listed as follows: 
1. Reduce unnecessary clinical practice variation by standardizing and 
adopting evidence-based practices; and  
2. Grow and spread lean adoption and culture to improve quality of care and 
reduce waste.  
Success of the first strategic goal would be measured in terms of “conservable 
days,” which are days of overstay, beyond the normal or planned stay for any 
procedure. For example, if a patient was admitted for vaginal delivery and was 
expected to stay for 2 days, but faced some complications and had to stay for a 
third day, the system would account for the extra day as one conservable day. A 
set of short-term and long-term targets have been set to progressively reduce the 
number of conservable days. Success of the second strategic goal would be 
measured in terms of percentage of units with business performance system and 
subsequent successful audits. The long-term target for this goal was 100 per cent. 
Health Quality Ontario also provides open access to hospital level performance 
on select quality indicators. Figure 40 illustrates the screenshot of HQO’s web 
page26 as an artifact of provincial commitment to transparency and accountability 
that may serve as an informal feedback mechanism for internal quality 
improvements. 
                                                 
25 In accordance with this model, 30% of the funding is based on quality of care. Additional 
information is available at 
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/ecfa/funding/hs_funding.aspx  
26 http://www.hqontario.ca/System-Performance/Hospital-Care-Sector-Performance accessed on 
May 7, 2016. 
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Figure 40: An artifact of external, informal feedback mechanism 
 
Hospital B formed an Office of Innovation and Performance Improvement to 
provide expert guidance in implementing the Lean methodology at unit level. 
Also, adequate training was provided to key influencers (n>100) at the unit level 
to ensure consistent understanding, implementation, and reporting of the metrics. 
For each performance target, there was a clear statement linking performance 
with funding: “This is to meet Pay-for-Results expectations. There could be 
funding impact if targets are not met.” Thus, the feedback was both in terms of 
operational or clinical outcomes, as well as budget allocation. 
Hospital B had a reporting program, called SAFE: Safety and Accountability For 
Everyone.  When an undesirable event occurred, either a person made a mistake 
or a systemic error was detected, people were encouraged to submit a SAFE 
report and classify it according to its severity and criticality. Anyone could 
submit such a report. The patient information was filled in automatically; there 
were drop-down selection choices to facilitate standardization and simplicity in 
filling out these forms. There was also space for a narrative description of the 
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event. This information was then simultaneously sent to the appropriate manager, 
director, educator, and risk management. Various individuals were then tasked 
with follow-up actions depending on the severity of the incident. The system 
gave a definition of different levels of severity—although the reporter was able to 
assign the level of severity according to their interpretation, the Risk 
Management Department either validated it or up/down graded it based on a 
broader context and investigation of the incident. However, both ratings (original 
and final) of severity were retained in the system. Most often, the severity rating 
was downgraded after the investigation of the incident with appropriate rationale.  
The risk management group followed-up with appropriate parties to make sure 
that process/systemic issues were addressed; also, if other departments needed to 
be brought in the conversation, they were included. All the investigations were 
done locally and reported in the computerized system. The Risk Management 
Department collaborated with the managers and helped them manage the 
investigations.  After the investigation, depending on the severity and type of 
case, it could move to a Quality of Care Review—this was done under QCIPA 
(Quality of Care Information Protection Act). Under the Public Hospitals Act and 
the Excellent Care For All Act (ECFAA), Critical Incidents (specifically defined) 
were reported and investigated. Hospital B had about 3,000 patient incidents per 
year; only a subset of them qualified as critical incidents based on the criteria 
outlined in the Public Hospitals Act. They reviewed all Critical Incidents under 
QCIPA, which was not required under the legislation; however, the staff and 
physicians were more comfortable with the confidentiality protection afforded by 
QCIPA—the meeting, the opinions expressed by the participants, and the overall 
discussion was confidential, but the outcomes of the meeting and the facts of the 
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incident were not confidential. The Risk Management Department was trying to 
slowly move away from reviewing everything under QCIPA because people were 
now accepting of the incident reviews. The original intent of QCIPA was for 
facilities to review cases and improve the quality of care, without fear of reprisal; 
however, it did not protect anyone from the facts of the incident. So, factually, if 
a person performed a procedure in a negligent manner, that remained a fact and it 
was discoverable in a lawsuit. Hospital B had been transparent about their 
QCIPA meetings: they told staff that they had a meeting, they disclosed the facts 
of the case, and they disclosed the outcomes (recommendations and actions), as 
required by the Act.  
Based on the facts of the case and the criteria outlined in the Public Hospitals 
Act, an incident may be deemed critical when it causes serious harm to the 
patient, harm is not related to the condition for which the patient was admitted, 
and it happened at the hospital. In the early days, Hospital B was over-
inclusive—they would include all cases with any harm to the patient as critical, 
but they discovered that such interpretation was extreme and inconsistent with 
their peer hospitals. Thus, they pulled back and focused on serious harm to the 
patient as critical event. There was often some negotiation on whether there was 
an underlying condition that contributed to the harm. For example, if an elderly 
person fell and fractured their hip: the patient fell at the hospital and the fracture 
was serious; however, the fracture was not directly related to their dementia for 
which they were admitted. In the past Hospital B would have called it a critical 
incident, but now they spend more time deliberating whether such a patient 
would have fallen anywhere (not necessarily in the hospital) under similar 
conditions and therefore was it really the hospital’s fault? Now, the only clear 
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cases of critical incidents are those that are specifically outlined in the Public 
Hospitals Act as reportable critical incidents; the rest are discretionary. In the 
near future, QCIPA revisions may require hospitals to report all such incidents 
into a central database.  
Two key challenges with the SAFE system were noted by the interview 
respondents: 
1. The definitions of criticality and severity had not been standardized across 
the Ontario healthcare system. Thus, it was possible for one hospital to 
under report and another hospital to over report, making comparison of 
critical incidents across hospitals unreliable.  
2. The Governing Board and Senior Management believed that lower the 
number of SAFE reports, safer the system. In fact, they should encourage 
increase in reporting so that systemic problems could be addressed 
proactively. Thus, the metrics need to be changed from number of reports 
filed to number of changes accomplished. The Business Performance 
System, under the Lean methodology, already provides comparative 
phraseology: “Hospital B’s staff addressed over 1,000 improvement 
opportunities in 2014” 
At the obstetrics team level, the MOREOB program itself guided routine 
operations and served as a feedback and reinforcement mechanism that helped 
improve assertiveness, teamwork, patient engagement, and reduction in variation 
through evidence-based practice. However, at the broader organizational level, 
additional complementary mechanisms were noted. The shared values of Quality 
and Safety, Respect for Individuals, Open Communication, and Accountability 
were being reinforced through the following mechanisms: 
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1. The Lean Methodology: The Lean  methodology was presented by the 
interview participants, and demonstrated through artifacts (score cards 
that link unit level performance with the hospital’s performance on key 
metrics reported to the Board of Directors and the Ministry of Health and 
Long-term care), as the core organization-wide method to reduce costs, 
reduce variance in practices, improve quality, and progressively bring 
about alignment between the organizational mission, vision, and goals , 
and the operational practices at the frontlines. Regular, real-time feedback 
was a key feature of this methodology. The following comment by a 
senior manager illustrates the changes accomplished through the Lean 
methodology: 
If you look at the HSMR (Hospital Standardized Mortality Ratio), we were over 
the 100 mark; if you look at today, we are at the low 80s27. Although HSMR is 
no longer an indicator, I recall that 5-7 years ago, with respect to the quality 
indicators reported to the Ministry, we were not among the high performers. 
Then, 3-4 years ago, we were among the top 10 organizations.  
 
This comment illustrates how externally-reported data were incorporated 
in the Lean methodology as feedback on overall performance and 
subsequently used to demonstrate improvement. 
2. Multiple Communication Channels and Transparency: Throughout the 
hospital, there was a strong sense of open communication through a wide 
range of channels and transparency of critical information. Examples of 
open communication included face-to-face interactions through town hall 
meetings hosted by the CEO and senior management team to hear 
concerns from the staff, physicians and the local community; regular 
interaction between the vice presidents and the frontline employees to 
                                                 
27 HSMR of 100 is normal; above 100 is worse than normal and below 100 is better than normal. 
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communicate concerns and appreciate the good work on a very short 
time-cycle; daily huddles for 15 minutes within each workgroup; use of 
social media, email, and newsletters to keep all the stakeholders informed; 
and consistent , thematic messaging—the focus on quality and safety as 
well as accountability throughout the organization was most significant.  
Overall, the frequency of communication, sharing of real-time 
performance data, and commitment to meet face-to-face on critical issues 
created numerous feedback loops between past performance, corrective 
actions, and results, improving their overall comfort level with the 
corrective actions and keeping the focus on systemic improvements rather 
than individual blame. 
3. Structured Communication and Escalation Process: The Lean 
methodology gave everyone across the organization a standard 
vocabulary, process, and a set of tools for their internal communication. 
As they practiced this method, they developed structured communication 
protocols that encouraged assertiveness and respect for all members of the 
team, and they also legitimized escalation of an issue if it was not being 
resolved at a local level. Similarly, in obstetrics, the MOREOB program 
democratized the obstetrics team and flattened their hierarchy—
particularly between the obstetricians and the nurses. The following 
comment from a senior manager illustrates how these mechanisms are 
used to reinforce their shared values: 
In the past, people would feel scared for calling a physician at the middle of the 
night for fear of being yelled at. Now, we have escalation processes in place. 
You try to make efforts to get hold of the most responsible provider—if he 
doesn’t respond within 5-10 minutes, you can respond to the chief of the 
division; if he doesn’t respond, you can escalate it to the chief of staff. Allowing 
 325 
 
the staff to be able to do that—and both parties know that it is going to 
happen—it is two pieces: one is setting expectations (this is what we expect 
from you) but at the same time, we have to support it. If a physician starts 
yelling at the nurse for calling him in the middle of the night, the support 
system in the organization should be such that there is dialog with that 
physician for his inappropriate behavior. We were able to coach the different 
groups and have their buy-in progressively. I am not saying we are perfect, but 
we have changed. 
 
Overall, the obstetrics team seemed to be ahead of the rest of the hospital in 
implementing the use of formal and informal feedback loops because the 
MOREOB training predated the launch of Lean methodology. However, both 
approaches emphasized the use of feedback to implement prompt corrective 
actions.  
6.3.5 Effects of the MOREOB Training on Outcomes 
Based on the emergent model of organizational culture and climate, a training 
intervention such as MOREOB would be expected to improve group-level 
outcomes. In particular, the MOREOB training was designed to provide clinical 
and non-clinical knowledge to the entire obstetrics team with the belief that such 
an improvement in knowledge would result in improved clinical outcomes. 
Hence, the following two performance measures were analyzed: 
1. Knowledge examination scores and   
2. Clinical outcomes.  
Figure 41 illustrates the knowledge exam scores after each module. Hospital B’s 
mean scores after all three modules were higher than the mean scores for other 
Early Adopters.  
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Figure 41: Post-MOREOB Hospital B’s knowledge exam scores 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to determine the significance of the 
differences in post-training mean knowledge exam scores after each module. 
Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not been violated, 
χ2(2) = 4.08, p = .130. The results showed that the differences in knowledge exam 
scores after each module were significant, F(2)=26.303, p=.000. Also, these 
results indicate that Hospital B’s obstetrics team performed better than the teams 
from other Late Adopter hospitals.  
The review of clinical outcomes focused on C-section rates and Length of Stay; 
other clinical outcomes data were not available from all the Early Adopter 
hospitals. At Hospital B, the MOREOB program started in 2006 and was 
completed by the end of 2008. Table 77 presents the actual versus projected C-
section rates for Hospital B and all other Early Adopter hospitals. Between 2002 
and 2006 there was a gradual rise in the C-section rate, from 21.8 per cent to 25.8 
per cent; however, it was well below the C-section rate at other Early Adopter 
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hospitals. In the summer of 2007, the Ministry of Health and Long-term Care 
moved the hospital under a supervisor’s oversight, who subsequently appointed 
an interim CEO and a new Board of Directors. With increased scrutiny brought 
about by the supervisor across all functions of the hospital, coupled with the 
recently adopted MOREOB program, it was not surprising that in 2007, there was 
a dip in the C-section rate down to 24.2 per cent. By 2008, the interim CEO had 
been appointed on a regular basis and the pressure from the Ministry must have 
subsided or the obstetrics team may have been distracted by these external 
influences because in 2008, the C-section rate rose to 25.9 per cent. However, the 
obstetrics team was able to maintain it at 25.9 per cent in 2009 and bring it back 
down to 25.1 in 2010. For 2011, the team appears to have slipped in its discipline 
because the C-section rate increased to 27.1 per cent. In the interview narratives, 
the obstetrics team acknowledged that their emphasis on the MOREOB program 
had faded a bit as they were trying to incorporate other initiatives, like fetal 
health monitoring, within the available budget. Thus, while the dip in C-sections 
in 2007 may be attributable to the dual influence of overall increased in 
organization-wide attention to safety and the freshness of the MOREOB program, 
the subsequent maintenance of the C-section rate between 25.1 and 25.9 for three 
years is most likely due to consistent practice of the MOREOB program. Based on 
the interview narratives, it seems that the obstetrics team has the opportunity to 
align the practice of MOREOB principles with the organization-wide Lean 
methodology so as to renew the momentum of the MOREOB program.   
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Table 77: Comparison of C-section rates between hospital B and other Early 
Adopters 
Year C-Section Rate (% of all births): Actual versus Projected 
 Hospital B All other Early Adopter Hospitals 
2002 21.8 25.4 
2004 24.6 28.1 
2005 24.4 29.1 
2006 25.8M-1 28.8 
2007 24.2 / 27.10M-2 28.9 / 30.65 
2008 25.9 / 28.28M-3 29.7 / 31.77 
2009 25.9 / 29.46 29.6 / 32.89 
2010 25.1 / 30.64 29.6 / 32.89 
2011 27.1 / 31.82 29.7 / 35.13 
 
Figure 42 illustrates the trend line for C-section rates. If there had been no 
significant changes in the practices in obstetrics, the projected C-section rate 
would have been 31.82 at Hospital B and 35.13 per cent at the other Early 
Adopters in 2011. Both groups were able to keep their C-section rates below the 
projected levels. 
 
Figure 42: Projected C-section rate at Hospital B and Early Adopters 
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Table 78 presents the mean Length of Stay for Hospital B and all other Early 
Adopter hospitals. Data for 2008 were not available. The Length of Stay has 
declined during the implementation of the MOREOB program in the 2006-2008 
timeframe and stabilized at about 1.86 days per admission. Since the completion 
of the program, the standard deviation has been declining, indicating lower 
variation among the individual cases. During this same period, however, the 
Length of Stay and standard deviation at all the other Early adopters have also 
declined, particularly after 2006. Thus, the MOREOB program appears to have 
had a positive influence at those hospitals as well. The mean Length of Stay at 
Hospital B was consistently lower than that at all the other Early Adopter 
hospitals.  
Table 78: Comparison of mean Length of Stay at Hospital B and other Early 
Adopters 
Year Mean Length of Stay (Days), SD, and Projected () 
 Hospital B All other Early Adopter Hospitals 
2002 2.18/1.44 2.56/2.65 
2003 2.01/1.29 2.28/1.76 
2004 2.19/1.80 2.50/2.15 
2005 2.10/1.47 2.48/2.23 
2006 1.99/1.36 M-1 2.47/2.58 
2007 1.86/1.15 (1.95)M-2 2.42/2.30 (2.43) 
2009 1.87/1.91 (1.82) 2.36/2.21 (2.37) 
2010 1.86/1.39 (1.75) 2.29/2.31 (2.34) 
2011 1.86/1.16 (1.69) 2.24/2.14 (2.31) 
 
Figure 43 illustrates the trend line for mean Length of Stay. If there had been no 
significant changes in the practices in obstetrics, the projected mean Length of 
Stay would have been 1.69 at Hospital B and 2.31 days at the other Early 
Adopters in 2011. While Hospital B was not, the other Early Adopters were able 
to keep their mean Length of Stay below the projected level.  
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Figure 43: Projected mean Length of Stay at Hospital B and Early Adopters 
 
In summary, Hospital B’s obstetrics team’s knowledge exam improved after each 
training module and was better than that of obstetrics teams at other Early 
Adopter hospitals. The C-section rate at Hospital B was both lower than projected 
as well as lower than the C-section rate at other Early Adopter hospitals. While 
the mean Length of Stay did not decline with respected to the projection, it 
remained lower than that at the other Early Adopter hospitals. Thus, overall, 
Hospital B’s obstetrics team performed better than the teams at other Early 
Adopter hospitals.  
6.3.6 Effects of the MOREOB Training on Patient Safety Climate 
Based on the emergent model of organizational culture and climate, a training 
intervention such as MOREOB would be expected to improve patient safety 
climate. Specifically, the MOREOB training was intended to produce a long-term 
change in the patient safety culture at the participating obstetrics units. Therefore, 
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the patient safety climate scores before and after the MOREOB training were 
analyzed to determine whether there was a significant difference in the scores.  
Before presenting the results of the patient safety climate survey, a mapping 
between shared organizational values at Hospital B and the six-factor patient 
safety climate model developed in Study #1 is presented in Table 79.  
Table 79: Mapping between shared values and patient safety climate factors at 
Hospital B 
Shared Organizational Values at 
Hospital B 
Corresponding Patient Safety Climate 
Factors 
Quality and Safety Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority 
Respect for Individuals Valuing Individuals 
Open Communication Open Communication 
Accountability Learning or Continuous Improvement 
 
Four organizational values mapped well with the patient safety climate factors: 
Quality and Safety, Respect for Individuals, Open Communication, and 
Accountability. Considering patient safety climate as a psychological response to 
the underlying safety culture, an assessment of pre-training scores on the 
corresponding patient safety climate factors was considered to be indicative of 
the underlying differences in the organizational culture at Hospital B versus other 
hospitals in the Early Adopter group. 
Figure 44 illustrates the difference between the climate scores of members from 
Hospital B versus those from other Early Adopter hospitals.  
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Figure 44: Pre-MOREOB patient safety climate scores at Hospital B 
 
Table 80 presents the results of the independent sample t-test of Hospital B’s 
patient safety climate scores before the MOREOB training. Overall, Hospital B’s 
mean patient safety climate scores were higher than those of all other Early 
Adopter hospitals (n=38).  Levene’s test for equality of variances was not 
significant, p>.05; therefore, equal variances were assumed. All the differences in 
scores were significant. For Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority, F(2116)=1.659, 
p=.000; for Learning or Continuous Improvement, F(2116)=.081, p=.000; for 
Valuing Individuals or Respect, F(2116)=.260, p=.000; and for Open 
Communication, F(2116)=.280, p=.000. Therefore, even before the MOREOB 
program began, the patient safety climate within Hospital B’s obstetrics team was 
significantly better than within the obstetrics teams from the other Early Adopter 
hospitals.  
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Table 80: Results of the independent samples t-test on patient safety climate 
scores before MOREOB training 
  t-test for Equality of Means 
Factor F df Sig. 
(2-
tail
ed) 
Mean 
Differ-
ence 
Std. 
Error 
Differ-
ence 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
Patient 
safety is 
everyone’s 
priority 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.659 2116 .000 .69253 .09736 .50161 .88346 
Learning 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.081 2116 .000 .62852 .10129 .42987 .82716 
Valuing 
Individuals 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.260 2116 .000 .48408 .07534 .33634 .63183 
Open 
Communi-
cation 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.280 2116 .000 .25903 .07131 .11919 .39888 
 
Figure 45 illustrates the post-Module 1 comparison of patient safety climate 
scores for Hospital B versus all the other Early Adopters. 
 
Figure 45: Post Module 1comparison of patient safety climate scores  
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Table 81 presents the results of the independent sample t-test of Hospital B’s 
patient safety climate scores after Module 1. Overall, Hospital B’s mean patient 
safety climate scores were higher than those of all other Early Adopter hospitals 
(n=38).  Levene’s test for equality of variances was not significant, p>.05, for 
three of the four factors; therefore, equal variances were assumed for those 
factors. For Learning, Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant, 
p<.05; therefore, equal variances were not assumed for Learning. Differences in 
means scores of three of the four areas were significant. For Patient Safety is 
Everyone’s Priority, F(3170)=2.098, p=.000; for Learning or Continuous 
Improvement, t(185.054)=5.709, p=.000; for Valuing Individuals or Respect, 
F(3170)=2.743, p=.009; and for Open Communication, F(3170)=2.588, p>.05. 
Therefore, after the first MOREOB module, although Hospital B’s patient safety 
climate scores remained higher than those at other Early Adopters for all four 
factors; the difference in the scores on Open Communication was not significant.  
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Table 81: Results of the independent samples t-test on patient safety climate 
scores after Module 1 of the MOREOB training 
   t-test for Equality of Means 
Factor F or t 
value 
df Sig. 
(2-
tail
ed) 
Mean 
Differ-
ence 
Std. 
Error 
Differ-
ence 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
Patient 
safety is 
everyone’s 
priority 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.098 3170 .000 .31157 .06421 .18566 .43747 
Learning 
 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
5.709 185.05 .000 .34116 .05975 .22327 .45905 
Valuing 
Individuals 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.743 3170 .009 .13460 .05123 .03415 .23505 
Open 
Communi-
cation 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
2.588 3170 .082 .07811 .04485 -.00982 .16604 
 
Figure 46 illustrates the post-Module 2 comparison of patient safety climate 
scores for Hospital B versus all the other Early Adopters.  
 
Figure 46: Post Module 2 comparison of patient safety climate scores  
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Table 82 presents the results of the independent sample t-test of Hospital B’s 
patient safety climate scores after Module 2. Overall, Hospital B’s mean patient 
safety climate scores were higher than those of all other Early Adopter hospitals 
(n=38). Levene’s test for equality of variances was not significant, p>.05, for two 
of the four factors; therefore, equal variances were assumed for those factors. For 
Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority and Learning, Levene’s test for equality of 
variances was significant, p<.05; therefore, equal variances were not assumed for 
these two factors. Differences in means scores of three of the four areas were 
significant. For Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority, t(131.954)=3.519, p=.001; 
for Learning or Continuous Improvement, t(136.230)=3.961, p=.000; for Valuing 
Individuals or Respect, F(2259)=.947, p=.002; and for Open Communication, 
F(2259)=3.316, p>.05. Therefore, after the second MOREOB module, although 
Hospital B’s patient safety climate scores remained higher in all four factors, 
there was no difference in the scores on Open Communication.  
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Table 82: Results of the independent samples t-test on patient safety climate 
scores after Module 2 of the MOREOB training 
   t-test for Equality of Means 
Factor F or t 
value 
df Sig. 
(2-
tail
ed) 
Mean 
Differ-
ence 
Std. 
Error 
Differ-
ence 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
Patient 
safety is 
everyone’s 
priority 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
3.519 131.95 .001 .2238 .06489 .10002 .35674 
Learning 
 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
3.961 136.23 .000 .24862 .06276 .12451 .37273 
Valuing 
Individuals 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.947 2259 .002 .18928 .05972 .07218 .30639 
Open 
Communi-
cation 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.316 2259 .850 .01015 .05361 -.09498 .11528 
 
Figure 47 illustrates the post-Module 3 comparison of patient safety climate 
scores for Hospital B versus all the other Early Adopters.  
 
Figure 47: Post Module 3 comparison of patient safety climate scores 
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Table 83 presents the results of the independent sample t-test of Hospital B’s 
patient safety climate scores after Module 3. Overall, Hospital B’s mean patient 
safety climate scores were higher than those of all other Early Adopter hospitals 
(n=38). Levene’s test for equality of variances was not significant, p>.05, for all 
four factors; therefore, equal variances were assumed. Difference in means scores 
of only one of the four areas was significant. For Patient Safety is Everyone’s 
Priority, F(1183)=1.536, p=.079; for Learning or Continuous Improvement, 
F(1183)=1.323, p=.012; for Valuing Individuals or Respect, F(1183)=3.667, 
p=.338; and for Open Communication, F(1183)=.001, p=.403. Therefore, after 
the third MOREOB module, although Hospital B’s patient safety climate scores 
remained higher in all four factors, but only one factor—Learning or Continuous 
Improvement—scored significantly higher.  Thus, the differences in safety 
climates between Hospital B and all the other Early Adopters narrowed 
substantially after the third module, indicating a positive influence of the 
MOREOB program on all the Early Adopters.  
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Table 83: Results of the independent samples t-test on patient safety climate 
scores after Module 3 of the MOREOB training 
   t-test for Equality of Means 
Factor F df Sig. 
(2-
tail
ed) 
Mean 
Differ-
ence 
Std. 
Error 
Differ-
ence 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
 Lower Upper 
Patient 
safety is 
everyone’s 
priority 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.536 1183 .079 .16204 .09203 -.01851 .34259 
Learning 
 
Equal 
variances  
assumed 
1.323 1183 .012 .24847 .09833 .05556 .44139 
Valuing 
Individuals 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.667 1183 .338 .07861 .07861 -.07887 .22960 
Open 
Communi-
cation 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.001 1183 .403 .07379 .07379 -.08301 .20655 
 
Therefore, on the one hand, the MOREOB training seems to have influenced 
patient safety climate at all participating hospitals; and on the other hand, since 
Hospital B’s patient safety climate was already better and continued to better than 
that at the other Early Adopter hospitals on one scale, there must have been a 
much stronger emphasis on Learning within the underlying cultural elements at 
Hospital B. Also, similar to the results at Hospital A, there was a lag in noting 
improvements in the patient safety climate scores. Thus, the argument—that 
participants needed to experience the changes in underlying assumptions, role-
modeling by leaders and key influencers, changes in workplace behaviors, 
effectiveness of new implementation mechanisms and incentives, and 
corresponding improvements in clinical outcomes before they would change their 
psychological response—still holds good.  
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Section 6.3.5 demonstrated a significant improvement in the participants’ 
knowledge after the MOREOB training modules. Since the patient safety climate 
also improved after MOREOB, it seemed reasonable to investigate whether there 
was any relationship between level of knowledge and strength of the patient 
safety climate. Two topics in the knowledge exam were directly linked with the 
patient safety climate: Communication and Patient Safety. Since both these topics 
were specifically covered and tested in the MOREOB training and subsequently 
measured as part of the Safety Climate Survey, it was reasonable to expect that an 
improvement in knowledge in these two areas would have a positive influence on 
the climate scores in  the corresponding areas; thus, they would be positively 
correlated. Figure 48 illustrates both the knowledge exam scores and the safety 
climate scores. The knowledge exam scores are referenced to the left vertical axis 
and the safety climate scores are referenced to the right vertical axis.  
 
  
Figure 48: Comparison of knowledge exam scores and safety climate scores after 
each MOREOB module 
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Pearson’s Correlations between the knowledge and climate about patient safety 
was low after the first module (r1 = .10), and progressively improved in direction, 
but remained moderate (r2 = .18 and r3 = .25). Correlations between knowledge 
and climate about open communication was reverse and moderate after the first 
module (r1 = -.29), and progressively improved in direction, but remained low (r2 
= -.18 and r3 = .11). Thus, patient safety climate scores and knowledge 
examination scores were low-to-moderately related. This finding further 
underscores the lead-lag phenomenon noted earlier: knowledge improvement 
tends to lead and climate improvements tend to lag. Also evident from this study 
is that success in improving clinical outcomes will fade when attention shifts to 
other priorities.  
6.3.7 Integrated Review of Culture and Climate with Respect to the MOREOB 
Training 
The four environmental factors discovered through the participant interviews 
were applicable at the provincial levels and thus they were applicable to all the 
hospitals in the Province. Thus, it was not surprising that they were mentioned by 
the participants from Hospital B as well. However, the emphasis on Lean 
methodology to address economic concerns and the need to be more engaged and 
responsive to the ethnic diversity came through more strongly in Hospital B’s 
interviews. Also, the role of legal factors was mentioned more repeatedly at 
Hospital B. At the shared experience level, the uniqueness of Hospital B was 
clear in the fact that they experienced supervisory oversight which resulted in a 
total change in senior management and strategic focus on quality and safety. 
Also, at an operational level, the Lean methodology resulted in integration and 
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streamlining of services. When the obstetrics team experienced that such 
integration would improve quality of care without compromising safety, they 
were in full support of further alignment between MOREOB and Lean. These 
experiences, along with several others reported by the participants, revealed the 
underlying shared values of Quality and Safety; Respect for the Individual; Open 
Communication; and Accountability. They also revealed some changes in 
unquestioned assumptions. For example, there was a shift in assumption from, 
“senior management would not be held accountable” to “senior management 
would be held accountable;” from “changes made during the supervisory control 
won’t last” to “our culture is totally transformed;” and from “organizational 
integration in the interest of efficiency would not work” to “the hospital has 
established a track record of successful integration of multiple services.” 
The espoused values of Integrity, Compassion, Accountability, and Respect were 
closely aligned with the shared values of Quality and Safety, Respect for 
Individuals, Open Communication, and Accountability as well as patient safety 
climate factors like Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority, Valuing Individuals, 
Open Communication, and Learning or Continuous Improvement. Hospital B 
performed significantly better on all four of these climate factors as compared to 
other Early Adopter hospitals, thereby indicating that Hospital B’s safety culture 
was stronger than that at the other Early Adopter hospitals.  
After each the MOREOB training module, there was a significant improvement in 
knowledge scores at Hospital B, and they were all better than those for the Early 
Adopter hospitals. With respect to the climate scores, after the first module, 
Hospital B’s climate scores remained higher than those at the Early Adopter 
hospitals on all four factors, but the difference in the Open Communication 
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scores was not significant, and the same was true after the second module. After 
the third module, only the difference in scores on Learning or Continuous 
Improvement remained significant. Thus, the MOREOB training was effective in 
narrowing the safety climate gap between Hospital B and all the other Early 
Adopter hospitals.  The relationship between knowledge gained through the 
MOREOB program and the improvement in safety climate was low-to-moderate, 
indicating that there was more to improving the safety climate than just providing 
knowledge training.  
The review of clinical outcomes indicated that Hospital B had performed better 
than the other Early Adopter hospitals in terms of the actual C-section rate and 
kept the C-section rate much lower than predicted; however, the other Early 
Adopter hospitals were also able to maintain their rate (albeit at a higher value) 
below the predicted value. With respect to Length of Stay, Hospital B was able to 
maintain its Length of Stay consistent since the conclusion of the MOREOB 
training, and lower than that at the Early Adopter hospitals; however, Hospital B 
was not able to bring the rate down lower than predicted.  
There were two key feedback mechanisms that played a significant role in 
reinforcing the shared organizational values: the Lean methodology and the 
SAFE program. The Lean methodology was pervasive across the organization 
and was being used as an integrated tool for management, communication, and 
reinforcement. The SAFE program was essentially an event reporting program 
that recognized both opportunities for system improvements as well as successes 
in stopping errors from reaching the patient.  
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In conclusion, the inherent cultural elements make a definitive impact on the 
influence of planned culture-change interventions. A summary of observations 
noted in conjunction with the MOREOB training implementation are as follows: 
1. All four of the shared values resonated well with the goals of the 
MOREOB program and the associated patient safety climate factors: 
Quality and Safety Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority; Respect for 
Individuals Valuing Individuals; Open Communication  Valuing 
Individuals and Open Communication; and Accountability  Patient 
Safety is Everyone’s Priority and Learning or Continuous Improvement. 
2. Leaders and influencers helped shape organizational values through two 
mechanisms: interpretation and operationalization. First, they committed 
to the MOREOB program and next, they adopted Lean methodology as 
their hospital-wide quality improvement tool, thereby institutionalizing 
many aspects of the MOREOB program across the hospital.  
3. Improved clinical knowledge among all participants, and consistency of 
the knowledgebase between obstetricians, nurses, and midwives were 
critical to implement evidence-based practice. 
4. Practice of teamwork, communication, and respect for individuals, as 
prescribed in the MOREOB training helped flatten the hierarchy within the 
obstetrics team.  
5. Improved clinical outcomes (particularly in reducing the C-section rate) 
resulted in improved support from management and heightened 
expectations from each other.  
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6.4 Conclusions from Study #3 
Two comparable hospitals were selected for longitudinal studies. Hospital A was 
one of the Late Adopters and Hospital B was one of the Early Adopters. Both 
hospitals were subjected to similar environmental factors. Prior to implementing 
the MOREOB program, Hospital A’s C-section rate was higher than that at the 
other hospitals in the Late Adopter group as well as all the hospitals in the Non 
Adopter group: 28.9 versus 25.4 and 27.5 per cent, respectively. However, the 
overall mean Length of Stay at Hospital A was 2.19 versus 2.43 days at the rest 
of the Late Adopters, 2.37 at the Non Adopters, and 2.45 days at the Early 
Adopters. Thus, the hospital seemed to be performing well on overall quality and 
efficiency, but there was some room for improvement in the C-section rate.    
Over the course of the MOREOB implementation, the obstetrics team discovered 
that there were clear opportunities for improvement and while compassion was 
important in healthcare, it was not a proxy for quality of care. The surrounding 
community’s sense of ownership of the hospital was leveraged to strengthen ties 
with the community and provide services reflective of the needs of the 
community. 
Hospital A’s espoused values were healthy community, safe and high-quality 
care, talent development, and accountability. Its shared values were compassion, 
patient safety, quality of care, inclusion, talent development, and accountability. 
MOREOB, as a training intervention, also served as an implementation 
mechanism, which reinforced all the shared values. The senior management was 
generally supportive of the MOREOB program because it was credible, successful 
at other hospitals, and promised safety and cost savings. In mentoring new 
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entrants, preceptors (influencers) played a critical role in transferring the shared 
organizational values and the MOREOB training became the baseline expectation 
from new entrants. 
Analysis of patient safety climate scores on four factors showed that Hospital A’s 
patient safety climate was better than that at other Late Adopter hospitals even 
before the MOREOB program was launched. Subsequent analysis of climate, 
knowledge, and clinical outcomes revealed that Hospital A performed 
significantly better than all the other Late Adopter hospitals. Also the gap in 
patient safety climate scores between Hospital A and the other Late Adopters 
declined after the third module of the MOREOB program. The finding regarding 
lack of a relationship between the knowledge scores and patient safety climate 
scores was surprising. Since the MOREOB program focused on improving the 
patient safety climate by improving the obstetrics team’s clinical and non-clinical 
knowledge, it seemed logical that an improvement in knowledge levels would be 
related to improvement in the patient safety climate. However, the data showed 
that there was no relationship between these two factors. Thus, the improvements 
in patient safety climate and clinical outcomes after the MOREOB program must 
be impacted by additional factors such as leaders and influencers, use of feedback 
mechanisms, and alignment of espoused and shared values—as evidenced 
through the qualitative analysis of interview data and supporting artifacts.   
Analysis of Hospital B’s shared experiences revealed two types of experiences: 
defining moments or the ones that had strategic impact and refining moments or 
the ones that had operational impact on a routine basis. The fact that Hospital B 
was placed under Supervisory control was most significant in its subsequent 
cultural transformation; whereas, the use of Lean methodology throughout the 
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hospital was most influential in routine improvement of efficiency, quality, and 
safety. 
Hospital B’s espoused values were integrity, compassion, accountability, and 
respect. Applying the hierarchical value mapping technique the participants’ 
shared experiences led to the following shared values: quality and safety, respect 
for individuals, open communication, and accountability.  A review of several 
artifacts revealed that the community’s perception of the hospital was positive 
and consistent with its shared organizational values. Three implementation 
mechanisms were noted as being most influential in reinforcing the shared 
organizational values: 
1. The Lean Methodology; 
2. Use of Multiple Communication Channels and Transparency with Data; 
and  
3. Structured Operational Communication and Escalation Process.  
The senior management played a distinctive role at Hospital B. They were highly 
consistent about their commitment to quality and safety through the Lean 
methodology overall and the use of the MOREOB program in obstetrics. Since the 
MOREOB program was implemented well before the Lean methodology, and it 
was consistent with the basic principles of Lean, it was regarded by many of the 
frontline personnel as “ahead of Lean.” As a result of the MOREOB program, the 
frontline personnel were already trained to look at systemic issues while reducing 
errors, and they were well-versed in the principles of high reliability 
organizations. These personnel served as role models and champions of key 
behaviors—such as evidence-based practice, assertiveness, structured 
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debriefings, regular review of clinical skills, etc.—and modeled the desired 
behaviors themselves. 
Overall, Hospital B’s pre-training mean patient safety climate scores for four 
factors were significantly higher than those of all other Early Adopter hospitals. 
Therefore, even before the MOREOB program began, the patient safety climate 
within Hospital B’s obstetrics team was significantly better than within the 
obstetrics teams from the other Early Adopter hospitals. Subsequent analysis of 
post-training patient safety climate surveys revealed that Hospital B’s patient 
safety climate scores remained higher than those at other Early Adopters for all 
four factors; however, the difference in the scores on Open Communication was 
not significant after the first module. After the third module, only one factor, 
Learning or Continuous Improvement, scored significantly higher. Thus, the 
differences in safety climates between Hospital B and all the other Early 
Adopters narrowed after the third module, indicating a positive influence of the 
MOREOB program on all the Early Adopters. However, Hospital B remained 
distinctively better at managing organizational learning or continuous 
improvement. 
Slightly different from the results of Hospital A, there was only a low-to-
moderate relationship between knowledge exam scores and patient safety climate. 
Thus, at Hospital B as well, MOREOB training—by itself—did not influence the 
patient safety climate. However, the MOREOB training appeared to have 
influenced clinical performance outcomes. For example, prior to the 
implementation of the MOREOB program, the C-section rate was on the rise. 
After the implementation of the MOREOB program, the actual C-section rate was 
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consistently lower than the projected rate (without any interventions). Also, the 
Length of Stay declined since the implementation of the MOREOB program. 
 
In summary, there were four broad levels at which interventions can impact 
organizational culture and climate: (a) Environment, (b) Organization, (c) Work 
Group, and (d) Individual. Training, as a planned intervention, can complement 
and even enhance the effectiveness of change programs across all four levels. 
This finding is consistent with Birdi and Reid’s Taxonomy of Training and 
Development Outcomes model (Birdi & Reid, 2013). On the other hand, if the 
culture-change intervention (training) is not complementary to the values and 
priorities of the extant mechanisms, it is not likely to succeed. A review of the 
two longitudinal cases presented in this study also provides insight into how these 
mechanisms could be used to cause a scalable and sustainable cultural change.  
1. Environment-level Mechanisms: Both subject hospitals experienced 
external environmental impacts that triggered systemic shocks or defining 
moments. The actions required for the hospitals to thrive beyond these 
moments were complementary to the MOREOB training intervention’s 
tenets and practices. Thus, these mechanisms supported the success of the 
MOREOB program. External influencers like the Society of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists of Canada also played a critical role in encouraging 
hospitals to adopt the MOREOB program. 
2. Organization-level Mechanisms: Internal to the organization, both 
hospitals designed and implemented a variety of programs, some of them 
were beyond obstetrics (like the Lean program), while others were within 
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obstetrics (like the debriefing program), but they were all complementary 
to MOREOB and therefore supported the success of the MOREOB program. 
3. Group-level Mechanisms: At the obstetrics group level, there was 
evidence of the use of incentives and disincentives, as well as coaching 
and mentoring that helped revise and reinforce the group’s shared values, 
which were consistent with the attributes of the MOREOB program. While 
the incentives were not part of the intervention, the group devised and 
used them in order to encourage and maintain the desired behaviors. 
4. Individual-Level Mechanisms: At the individual level, the nurses showed 
great pride in learning through the MOREOB program and high level of 
motivation to practice the skills taught in the program. Overall, they felt 
empowered by the new knowledge, and the MOREOB manual provided 
them with an objective performance standard that they could enforce 
within their team. The obstetricians were incentivized to reduce the 
number of C-sections in order to increase their total patient volume; 
MOREOB provided a proven path toward reduction in the number of 
planned C-sections. Thus, individual mechanisms also played a part in 
influencing the effectiveness of the MOREOB program in improving the 
patient safety culture in obstetrics.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This study developed a macro-level integrated theory of organizational culture 
and climate and focused it on the study of the ability of a training intervention to 
cause a cultural change in the context of patient safety in the obstetrics practice in 
Canada. The analysis of the data was organized into three studies: the first study 
was quantitative, the second study was qualitative, and the third study was 
mixed-methods. These studies responded to specific research questions and 
hypotheses and facilitated revisions to the emergent model.  
Overall, this study was set within the context of the Canadian healthcare sector 
because even advanced countries like Canada are challenged to improve quality 
and reduce costs (Baker et al., 2008; Thomson et al., 2013). Concurrently, there is 
a general belief that both quality and affordability could be addressed by 
improving efficiencies of various processes as well as improving the overall 
culture of patient safety (Baker et al., 2008; Thomson et al., 2013). Specifically, 
the focus was on obstetrics care in Ontario because (a) Ontario accounts for about 
37 per cent of total births in Canada; (b) both obstetrics trauma and Cesarean 
section rates are of great concern in Ontario; (c) the researcher had access to 
extensive qualitative and quantitative data related to a specific intervention (the 
MOREOB program); and (d) the effects of the MOREOB intervention had not been 
studied on a longitudinal basis.  This chapter reviews the results from chapters 4, 
5, and 6 in the context of broader implications to the advancement of theory as 
well as the practice of assessment and transformation of organizational culture. It 
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starts with a brief review of the emergent integrated model and how it differs 
from other integrated models as well as those focused on safety. 
The emergent integrated model of organizational culture and climate illustrated 
the relationship between three constructs: organizational environment; 
organizational culture; and organizational climate. The two broad propositions 
linking these constructs were as follows: 
1. The environment in which an organization operates has an influence on 
the culture of the organization and  
2. The internal organizational culture influences the organizational climate, 
which is the psychological response to the core cultural elements. 
Of the many potential starting points to build an integrated model of culture and 
climate, the researcher chose Schein’s model (1988, 2010, 2015)—culture as a 
pattern of shared basic values and assumptions based on shared experience—
because more of the recent studies on culture seemed to converge the definition 
of culture on three dimensions: artifacts, values and beliefs, and underlying 
assumptions (Ployhart et al., 2014). This approach resulted in the following key 
elements of organizational culture: 
1. Shared experiences and learning; 
2. Organizational values and unquestioned assumptions; 
3. Implementation mechanisms used to reinforce or renew organizational 
values; 
4. Leaders and key influencers;  
5. Individual-, group-, and firm-level performance outcomes; and 
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6. Feedback in response to individual-, group-, and firm-level performance 
outcomes; 
A variety of physical artifacts (e.g., checklists, kits, value/belief statements, etc.) 
and narratives (e.g., stories, corporate histories, interview transcripts, etc.) could 
be used to develop a rich description of organizational culture along the above 
listed cultural elements.     
Organizational climate, also a group-level construct, is the group’s psychological 
response to the shared experiences, values, and implementation mechanism, as 
well as individual-, group-level outcomes (Ostroff, 1993; Sammer et al., 2010). 
In spite of this general agreement among researchers regarding the overall 
construct of climate, numerous variations on climate measures have emerged: 
some have been based on molar studies (Ehrhart et al., 2014; L. R. James et al., 
2008; Ostroff, 1993) and many more have been based on focused studies (Flin, 
2007a, 2007b; Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000, 
2007; Jackson & Kline, 2014; Sammer, Lykens, Singh, Mains, & Lackan, 2010). 
Based on these studies, organizational climate could be regarded as an outcome 
measure (manifestation) of the underlying organizational culture, and it refers to 
members’ attitudes and perceptions about shared experiences, organizational 
values, and implementation mechanisms, as well as reactions to observed 
behaviors of fellow-employees, leaders and key influencers. Depending on the 
context in which the focused studies were conducted, a variety of factors have 
emerged. However, in the context of safety as a focus area, there seems to be 
agreement on the following nine elements (Flin, 2007b; Flin et al., 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Jackson & Kline, 2014; Sammer et al., 2010; Singer et al., 
2007):  
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1. Safety as an organizational value; 
2. Teamwork; 
3. Respect for individuals; 
4. Open communication; 
5. Learning from experience; 
6. Leadership or senior management commitment; 
7. Alignment/availability of resources; 
8. Mutual trust among colleagues/co-workers; and  
9. The nature of response to unintentional errors. 
The MOREOB safety climate survey included six of the above nine climate 
factors: 
1. Patient safety is everyone’s priority (Safety as an organizational value) 
2. Teamwork (Teamwork) 
3. Valuing Individuals (Respect for individuals) 
4. Open Communication (Open communication) 
5. Learning (Learning from experience) 
6. Empowering People (A combination of leadership commitment and 
resources)  
The integrated model of culture and climate organized the six cultural elements at 
the core and the nine climatic elements as psychological responses to the 
underlying core elements. Previously, Patankar et al. (2012) saw climate as one 
of the components of culture, but the model used in this study is consistent with 
Patterson et al. (2005) and Schneider et al.’s (2011) conceptualization, which 
essentially positions culture influencing climate. Thus, in comparison to Patankar 
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et al.’s pyramid model, climate is now separated out and presented as a 
psychological response to all the underlying cultural elements, including 
performance. Additionally, it also acknowledges and incorporates the influence 
of external business environment (Barney, 1986) and national and organizational 
environments (Ostroff et al., 2012). The integrative model developed and tested 
in this study fills the deficiencies noted in the earlier versions of integrative 
models by incorporating the influence of the external environment within which a 
firm operates, the role of shared experiences and learning in forming the core 
organizational values and unquestioned assumptions, and the role of feedback 
mechanisms that are used to interpret performance outcomes and create new 
meanings of shared experiences. It also acknowledges the bi-directional influence 
between values and practices and it highlights the role of leaders and key 
influencers in both influencing organizational values and being influenced by 
them, as well as in influencing various implementation mechanisms.  
7.1.1 Research Question #1: How did environmental factors influence the patient 
safety culture in the obstetrics practice in Ontario? 
Most integrative models/studies of organizational culture and climate focus on 
the characteristics or observations within an organization (e.g., Ostroff et al., 
2012; Patankar et al., 2012; Patterson et al., 2005; Schneider et al., 2011; Zohar 
& Hoffman, 2012). However, there have been claims to the role of external, 
environmental factors on the formation of internal organizational culture (Barney, 
1996; Ostroff et al., 2012). Thus, a qualitative approach was used to explore this 
question, and narrative and artifact data from two subject hospitals were used for 
analysis. In total, 41 individuals participated in this study (20 from Hospital A 
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and 21 from Hospital B). These individuals were asked to talk about their general 
experience of changes in Canadian healthcare sector, the local area, their specific 
hospital and finally their unit and describe “what has changed” and how these 
changes might have influenced the patient safety culture in the obstetrics practice 
at their hospital.  Based on the analysis of interview and focus group transcripts, 
the four factors were identified: economic, geo-social, legal, and professional. A 
summary of how each of these factors influenced the patient safety culture in the 
obstetrics practice at the participants’ hospital is presented below.  
1. Economic: Generally, most participants agreed that the economic model 
of healthcare in Canada had changed. The old assumption of receiving 
resources commensurate with patient volume alone was not true anymore 
and there was a much stronger emphasis on quality, patient safety, and 
accountability. With multiple years of flat budgets, hospitals were forced 
to be creative in identifying efficiencies within their existing budgets and 
providing continued or enhanced services to their communities.  
2. Geo-Social: The specific communities of the two sample hospitals had 
experienced growth in the total population as well as a sharp increase in 
diversity. Thus, their respective community’s needs had changed 
dramatically and they had to adapt by providing translation services, 
culturally-sensitive clinical support, and address different patient risk 
factors such as risks associated with late pregnancies.  
3. Legal: Two legislative actions influenced the patient safety culture at both 
hospitals. First, the Quality of Care Information Protection Act (QCIPA) 
of 2004 legislation protected from discovery any information that was 
shared in a critical incident review meeting. Over the years, the practice of 
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incident reviews under this protection made the clinical teams at Hospital 
B more comfortable with the general notion of non-punitive reviews. 
Second, the Excellent Care for All Act (ECFAA) of 2010 legislation 
required every hospital to develop a strategic plan with quality 
improvement goals and expected the respective governing boards to tie 
executive compensation to the accomplished quality improvement goals. 
Consequently, there was a clear alignment of performance goals from 
clinical frontlines to senior management.  
4. Professional: Concerted efforts from four professional bodies had a 
significant influence on the patient safety culture at the subject hospitals. 
First, the Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada (SOGC) 
endorsed the MOREOB program and therefore helped establish its 
credibility. Second, the Healthcare Insurance Reciprocal of Canada 
(HIROC) offered discounts in insurance premiums based on the 
implementation of the MOREOB program. This collateral endorsement 
and financial incentive further strengthened the credibility of the 
MOREOB program. Third, Accreditation Canada and fourth, Ontario 
Hospital Association created guidelines and requirements consistent with 
the ECFAA legislation and tied quality improvement expectations with 
certification of hospitals. Thus, the entire hospital team became firmly 
committed to quality improvements and MOREOB was seen as one of the 
quality enhancement initiatives. Finally, the Canadian Institute for Health 
Information (CIHI) made a number of datasets available to the general 
public, which resulted in webpages and news articles announcing 
improvements in specific safety and quality metrics such as the Low-Risk 
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C-section rate. Thus, there was public attention to these metrics and 
therefore there were several hospital-wide initiatives linked with the key 
quality and safety metrics.  
The pursuit of this research question and the resultant analysis led to not only the 
confirmation of the role of environmental factors in shaping internal 
organizational culture, but also to the development of a secondary coding 
scheme. Environmental factors can now be categorized further as either 
economic, geo-social, legal, or professional. In practical terms, one could 
consider a combination of these factors as levers for large-scale cultural 
transformation.  
7.1.2 Research Question #2: How did leaders and influencers shape shared 
organizational values at the subject organizations? 
The role of leaders in shaping organizational culture has been widely 
acknowledged in the literature (e.g., Erhart et al., 2014; Pettigrew, 1979; Schein, 
2010, 2015; Waterson, 2014). However, the role of key influencers, those not 
holding any formal management positions in the organization, is relatively under-
represented (Davenport, 2005; McDonald, 2005). Therefore, the emergent model 
used in this study specifically included both leaders and key influencers in the 
study and the research question sought to determine how both these groups might 
have shaped the shared organizational values within the subject organizations.   
Based on the hierarchical value mapping of the interview narratives, the 
following shared values were identified: Patient Safety; Quality of Care; 
Inclusion; Mutual Respect; Accountability; and Continuous Improvement. 
Formal leaders and informal influencers, within each of the hospitals, as well as 
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influencers from outside the hospitals played a critical role in shaping these 
values. When asked about how specifically leaders and influences might have 
shaped the shared organizational values, the participants shared several stories 
and anecdotes. For example, the Ministry of Health and Long-term Care took a 
leadership role when they placed Hospital B under supervision, changed all the 
senior management, and made patient safety and quality their priority. At that 
point Patient Safety and Quality was an aspirational value, but at the time of 
Study #2, it was clear that it had become a shared value at Hospital B. Also, the 
consistent use of the Lean methodology across the organization enabled 
operationalization of two key values: inclusion and accountability. Practice 
leaders such as obstetricians, nurses, and midwives, as well as risk management 
personnel served as informal leaders or peer leaders who supported and modeled 
the desired behaviors such as non-punitive critical incident reviews and open 
communication across the four professional groups (obstetricians, nurses, 
midwives, and family physicians). Externally, leading researchers like Dr. Ross 
Baker championed patient safety as a national concern and renowned 
obstetricians like Dr. Ken Milne developed specific programs to improve patient 
safety. Thus, there was a concurrent rise in awareness among clinical 
practitioners and hospital management as well as rising evidence of successful 
best practices in obstetrics. Taken together, the external leaders and influencers 
raised awareness among hospital leaders and practitioners and they also provided 
examples of best practices that could be adopted by the hospitals. The internal 
leaders, on the other hand, considered the broad environmental factors as well as 
guidance from the external influencers and professional organizations and 
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reframed them into the local context. Practice leaders and influencers then 
focused on modeling the desired behaviors and holding each other accountable.   
The pursuit of this research question and the resultant analysis led to not only the 
confirmation of the role of formal leaders in shaping internal organizational 
culture, but also highlighted the role of informal leaders or key influencers. The 
role of leaders and key influencers can now be categorized in accordance with a 
2x2 matrix with leaders versus influencers on one axis and internal versus 
external on the other. Thus, the internal organizational culture could be 
influenced by external influencers, external leaders, internal influencers, and 
internal leaders. In practical terms, one could consider a combination of these 
factors as levers for cultural transformation within workgroups or organizations.  
7.1.3 Research Question #3: How did shared experiences, through 
implementation mechanisms, help revise and reinforce organizational values at 
the subject organizations? 
The role of shared experiences is fundamental to the formation and maintenance 
of shared values (Schein, 1988, 2010, 2015); however, most of the empirical 
studies of culture and climate have not been explicit about the role of shared 
experiences as antecedents to value formation and maintenance (e.g., Clarke, 
2000; Cooper, 2000; Geller, 1994; Komacki et al., 1978; Krause, 1997; Patankar 
et al., 2012; Patterson et al., 2005; Zohar, 2014; Zohar & Fussfeld, 2008; Zohar 
& Hoffman, 2012). Therefore, the emergent model is centered around the role of 
shared experiences and this research question sought to determine how shared 
experiences might have shaped organizational values.  
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The analysis of interview narratives provided two types of shared experiences: 
defining moments and routine, refining moments. Defining moments were abrupt 
and impactful for the entire organization. For example, at Hospital A, almost 
every participant commented on the sudden population growth (and change in 
diversity) and how it impacted every aspect of the organization and also 
threatened its ability to maintain its original, deeply-held values. On the other 
hand, Hospital B was dramatically impacted by the appointment of an external 
Supervisor by the Ministry of Health—it resulted in a chain reaction of changes 
and brought into focus safety and quality as institutional priorities.  Routine 
shared experiences included non-punitive error reporting programs, the Lean 
methodology, and clinical debriefings or incident reviews. Both types of 
experiences led to shifts in unquestioned assumptions and revision or 
reinforcement of values. The implementation mechanisms included not only 
organizational policies, but also role modeling of the desired behaviors. Several 
artifacts or attributed, espoused, and shared values were noted. Generally, a 
synthesis of value statements, shared experiences, shifts in assumptions and 
accompanying artifacts consistently supported three fundamental values: 
Accountability, Inclusion, and Excellence. Thus, shared experiences—through 
implementation mechanisms—helped revise and reinforce organizational values.  
While the defining moments identified in this study were external to the 
organization or triggered by external actions, there was support in the literature 
for defining moments to arise out of seminal organizational outcomes such as 
accidents (Knowles, 2002; Patankar et al., 2012). Thus, the revised model of 
culture and climate should consider multiple pathways to a defining moment.  
Also, based on the findings regarding the role of leaders and key influencers, by 
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virtue of how the routine work is handled, leaders and key influencers have the 
opportunity to reinforce the desired values in practical terms. This finding is 
consistent with Clarke’s (2000) claim that safety behaviors are influenced by the 
safety climate at the workplace, as well as Zohar’s (2014) claim that symbolic 
interaction is an antecedent to workplace safety climate. 
7.1.4 Research Question #4: How does feedback from group-level performance 
influence learning derived from shared experiences at the subject organizations?   
Feedback mechanisms are widely acknowledged as fundamental to 
organizational learning (e.g., Senge, 1990), but their study in the context of 
organizational culture and climate has been limited. For example, there is no 
explicit mention of feedback mechanisms in most of the integrated models of 
culture and climate or those of safety culture and climate (e.g., Clarke, 2000; 
Cooper, 2000; Geller, 1994; Komacki et al., 1978; Krause, 1997; Patankar et al., 
2012; Patterson et al., 2005; Zohar, 2014; Zohar & Fussfeld, 2008; Zohar & 
Hoffman, 2012). Therefore, the emergent model sought to bridge this gap and 
incorporate the role feedback mechanisms in shaping organizational culture and 
climate.  
The fourth research question sought to determine the role of feedback from 
group-level performance in influencing learning derived from shared experiences. 
Based on the interview narratives, there were four types of feedback mechanisms 
on a 2x2 matrix consisting of either informal or formal and either external or 
internal. The external, informal mechanisms like the BORN database served as 
passive awareness tools that were available for the general public. On the other 
hand, the external formal mechanisms were mandatory processes that could have 
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an impact on the hospital’s operating status, budget, or patient volume. Senior 
management was well aware of these mechanisms and used them regularly to 
drive organization-wide improvements. The internal, informal mechanisms were 
active at the unit level and served as that community’s standards of practice. 
Although, they were informal, they played a critical role in establishing norms of 
acceptable behavior and thereby influenced organizational culture and climate. 
The internal, formal mechanisms had serious implications for individuals and/or 
groups. A typical internal formal mechanism would be a safety and quality report 
originating at the operating unit level and getting rolled up all the way to the 
Safety and Quality Committee of the Board of Directors.  These findings were 
consistent with the notions of organizational learning (Senge, 1990) and 
sensemaking (Weick, 1995); thus, to better represent the functional role of such 
mechanisms, their name was changed to “learning and sensemaking loops.” 
These findings are also consistent with the Reciprocal Safety Culture Model 
(Cooper, 2000) and behavioral safety culture models (Geller, 1994; Komaki et 
al., 1978; Krause, 1997; Zohar & Fussfeld, 2008). Furthermore, the formal versus 
informal and internal versus external functions of such loops provided new 
insights into how cultural transformation could be influenced. For example, when 
internal-formal feedback is consistent with the external-informal feedback, it is 
likely to produce a much more effective reinforcement or change in 
organizational culture. On the other hand, if the internal-formal feedback is 
inconsistent with the internal-informal feedback, the change efforts are likely to 
languish. 
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7.1.5 Research Question #5: How do inherent cultural elements influence the 
effectiveness of a planned culture-change intervention?   
There was strong support in the literature for the role of organizational 
culture/climate in the effectiveness of transfer of training skills to workplace 
behaviors (Alvarez et al., 2004; Birdi, 2007; Holton, 2005). If the goal of the 
training program is to change the organizational culture, and the extant culture is 
a likely barrier to the transfer of training skills, the research question was to 
determine how the inherent cultural elements influenced the effectiveness of a 
planned culture-change intervention. The emergent model identified seven 
elements of organizational culture: (a) Shared Experience, (b) Learning, (c) 
Organizational Values, (d) Implementation Mechanisms, (e) Leaders and Key 
Influencers, (f) Individual, Group, and Firm-level Outcomes; and (g) Learning 
and Sensemaking Loops. The goals of this research question were to first 
determine whether the subject hospitals performed any better than their peer 
group (to establish the preliminary evidence of differentiation between these 
hospitals and their peers) and then determine how the seven cultural elements 
supported or inhibited the culture change efforts promoted through the MOREOB 
training intervention.  
The findings from study #3 indicate that the obstetrics workgroups at both subject 
hospitals performed better than their peer groups on key measures such as 
knowledge gained after the MOREOB training, safety climate scores, and clinical 
outcomes. Further investigation of the role of various cultural elements revealed 
that (a) the attributes of the training intervention were well-aligned with the 
shared organizational values; (b) the training itself provided a distinctive shared 
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experience and the experience of changes in workplace behaviors in terms of how 
new policies and practices were implemented and supported created new shared 
experiences; (c) the participants learned not only from the training program, but 
also from their workplace experiences and feedback received in conjunction with 
their clinical outcomes; (d) other implementation mechanisms such as clinical 
reviews, safety reporting systems, and alignment of incentives played a 
complementary role in reinforcing the shared organizational values and 
expectations of the MOREOB training; (e) leaders and key influencers translated 
the broad external influences into local significance and they also supported 
appropriate incentive structures and served as role models for the desired 
behaviors; (f) individual-, group-, and firm-level outcomes were discussed with 
respect to the desired clinical and operational goals of the organization and 
transparency and mutual accountability were fundamental in this process; (g) 
learning and sensemaking occurred at all levels of the organization as increased 
awareness led to shifts in fundamental assumptions and an interest in behavioral 
change, the training intervention was consistent with the shared organizational 
values and its implementation created a new shared experience, a supportive 
leadership and role-modeling by key influencers led to successful transfer of 
training to workplace behaviors, positive outcomes from the new behaviors led to 
new shared experiences, and these shared experiences led to value-level changes. 
In summary, all the cultural elements were well-aligned with the goals of the 
training intervention. The antecedents for successful transfer of training were 
found to be essentially the same as those found by studies in other domains (e.g., 
Arthur et al., 2003; Birdi, 2007; Warr et al., 1999). Practically, this finding 
reinforces the need for a multi-level perspective in seeking alignment of goals, 
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processes, and incentives for a cultural change through training programs (Birdi 
& Reid, 2013; Cooper, 2000; Holton, 2005).  
7.1.6 Hypothesis #1: MOREOB training improves group-level outcomes.  
Since the MOREOB program was a training intervention aimed at improving the 
safety culture in obstetrics units, its effectiveness could be evaluated in terms of 
knowledge gained by the participants (Level 2), clinical outcomes and patient 
safety climate (Level 4) (Kirkpatrick, 1979, 1998). While Kirkpatrick’s model 
does not specifically include changes at the organizational level, Birdi and Reid’s 
model (Birdi & Reid, 2013) offers a multilevel perspective ranging from 
individual through societal levels.  
The first hypothesis was that the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention 
improved group-level outcomes. Aggregation of individual level knowledge 
exam scores after each of the MOREOB training module served as one measure of 
group-level outcomes, and performance on clinical outcomes after the MOREOB 
modules served as another measure of group-level outcomes. Before the 
MOREOB training began, the knowledge exam scores among both groups were 
normally distributed and the mean score of the Late Adopter Group was 
significantly higher than that of the Early Adopter Group. Both groups showed 
significant improvement after each module and thereby partially supported the 
hypothesis that training would improve group-level outcomes. Even after the 
third module, the mean knowledge exam score for Late Adopters remained 
significantly higher than that of the Early Adopters. The post-training knowledge 
exam scores for Hospital A were significantly higher than those for all the other 
Late Adopters; similarly, the post-training knowledge exam scores for Hospital B 
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were significantly higher than those for all the Early Adopters.  Thus, both 
Hospital A and Hospital B were leaders among their respective peer groups.  
With respect to group-level clinical outcomes, two metrics were chosen: C-
section rates and mean Length of Stay. Three groups of hospitals were used for 
comparison: Early Adopters, Late Adopters and Non-Adopters (Ones that did not 
implement the MOREOB program).  A comparison of actual versus projected C-
section rates was surprising: all three groups were able to demonstrate a lower-
than-projected C-section rate. Thus, it appeared that the MOREOB program may 
not have had any impact on reducing the C-section rate; yet, there was ample 
qualitative evidence to support genuine efforts at both subject hospitals (A&B) to 
reduce their respective C-section rates. Therefore, a secondary analysis of 
reduced-risk C-section rates was conducted. Since the qualitative evidence was 
more aligned with elective C-section rates, the comparison of reduced-risk C-
section rates was more reasonable. This comparison revealed that (a) both Early 
Adopters and Late Adopters were able to reduce their rates after the MOREOB 
training, while the corresponding rates at the Non-Adopters remained steady, but 
higher. The reduced-risk C-section rate at Non-Adopters was significantly higher 
than that at the Early or Late Adopters. A comparison of mean Length of Stay 
across the three groups revealed that the differences in the mean Length of Stay 
between the Non-Adopters (2.39 days), Early Adopters (2.36 days), and Late 
Adopters (2.31 days) were significant. When focused on the two subject 
hospitals, the C-section rate and the mean Length of Stay at Hospital A were 
lower than those at all the other Late Adopters. In the case of Hospital B, the C-
section rate was lower than both the projected and the comparative rate at all the 
other Early Adopters, but the mean Length of Stay, although lower since the 
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MOREOB program, was higher than the projected rate. The mean Length of Stay 
for all the other Early Adopters, however, continued to decline after the MOREOB 
program and remained lower than the projected rates. In conclusion, there was 
evidence to support that the reduced-risk C-section rate declined after the 
MOREOB program. With regard to the mean Length of Stay, there was evidence 
to support that the mean Length of Stay declined after the MOREOB program and 
stayed lower than project at all the other Early Adopter hospital. But the same 
cannot be said for Hospital B. Nonetheless, there was evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, improves group-
level outcomes. While the finding of improvement in individual-level knowledge 
is consistent with findings from a vast array of other studies, the lead-lag 
phenomenon noted between the improvements in knowledge (immediate) and 
improvement in outcomes (longer-term) is consistent with the studies on training 
transfer (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Warr et al., 1999). 
7.1.7 Hypothesis #2: MOREOB training improves patient safety climate.  
The literature on training and organizational climate generally supports the notion 
that safety-related training improves safety climate within specific workgroups 
(e.g., Patankar & Taylor, 2008; Singer et al., 2007). Therefore, the second 
hypothesis was that the MOREOB training, as a planned intervention, improves 
group-level patient safety climate. Over the past three decades, several multi-
factor models of patient safety climate have emerged; however, there seemed to 
be an agreement on nine elements (Flin, 2007b; Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 
2000; Jackson & Kline, 2014; Sammer et al., 2010; Singer et al., 2007). Of these 
nine elements, six were represented in the MOREOB patient safety climate survey: 
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1. Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority 
2. Learning  
3. Valuing Individuals 
4. Empowering People 
5. Open Communication 
6. Teamwork 
Of the 68 hospitals that implemented the MOREOB program as a training 
intervention to improve the patient safety culture in obstetrics, 39 were 
considered Early Adopters (because they implemented the program in the 2006-
2008 timeframe) and 29 were considered Late Adopters (because the 
implemented the program in the 2009-2011 timeframe). At the pre-training level, 
the Early Adopters performed significantly better than the Late Adopters on all 
six factors. Post training, Latent Growth Curve Modeling yielded slope ranging 
from a low of .058 for open communication to .507 for teamwork. Thus, there 
was sufficient support for the hypothesis that training, as an implementation 
mechanism, improves organizational climate.  In this case, it seems to have the 
greatest effect on teamwork. 
Two hospitals, Hospital A from the Late Adopter group and Hospital B from the 
Early Adopter Group were selected for a longitudinal analysis.  With respect to 
Hospital A, four shared organizational values mapped very well with four patient 
safety climate factors: Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority; Valuing Individuals; 
Empowering People; and Learning. A comparison of Hospital A’s performance 
on these four factors with that of all other Late Adopters  indicated that before the 
training began, Hospital A’s patient safety climate was stronger than that of all 
the other Late Adopters. After each of the first two modules of MOREOB training, 
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Hospital A outperformed all the other Late Adopters; however, after the third 
module, the gap seemed to narrow and Hospital A was stronger in only two of the 
four factors: Patient Safety is Everyone’s Priority and Learning.  
In the case of Hospital B a slightly different set of four shared values mapped 
with the four patient safety climate factors. Open Communication mapped more 
strongly than Empowering People; the remaining three factors were the same. 
Similar to Hospital A, Hospital B outperformed all the Early Adopter hospitals on 
all four factors before the MOREOB training began. After the first and the second 
modules, the differences in Open Communication scores were not significant. 
After the third module, only scores for only one factor— Learning or Continuous 
Improvement —was significantly different.  
Thus, the MOREOB training was successful in improving the patient safety 
climate scores at both Early Adopters and Late Adopters, and since the difference 
in the climate scores between the subject hospitals and their peer groups 
narrowed after the third module, there was evidence to suggest that over time, the 
MOREOB training could improve the underlying patient safety culture at all 
hospitals. Furthermore, the lag in improvement in patient safety climate is 
indicative of the role of organizational culture in mediating the transfer of 
training knowledge to workplace behaviors. The overall results of this analysis 
are consistent with safety climate studies across multiple domains (e.g., 
Guldenmund, 2000; Patankar & Taylor, 2008; Zohar, 1980, 2014). 
7.1.8 Revised Model of Organizational Culture and Climate 
Based on the results of the three studies presented in this thesis and learning 
derived from these results, a revised model of organizational culture and climate 
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is presented. See Figure 49 for the illustration and Table 84 for the rubric to assist 
in the interpretation of the illustration. As in Model 7, organizational culture and 
climate are presented as nested constructs with culture (represented by blue 
blocks) at the core and climate (represented by the black dashed box) as the 
psychological response to the underlying culture. Culture itself comprises of 
seven constructs: (a) Shared Experience; (b) Values, Beliefs, and Assumptions; 
(c) Leaders and Key Influencers; (d) Implementation Mechanisms;                     
(e) Workplace Behaviors and Shared Experience; (f) Individual, Group, and 
Firm-Level Performance Outcomes; and (g) Learning and Sensemaking Loops.  
Treating an organization as a system of interconnected constructs, one could 
describe how an organization reinforces and revises its culture from a 
longitudinal progression perspective as follows:  
At Time 0 (the hypothetical beginning of the process), the members of the 
organization have some baseline shared experience (say, the general 
nature of the healthcare industry in Canada based on their individual 
professional experience), which is depicted by the blue “Shared 
Experience and Learning” box at the bottom of the model (Box #0). This 
shared experience (the degree to which the group’s experience can be 
aggregated) contributes to the group’s shared values, beliefs, and 
assumptions (Box #1). In developing Model 7, there was theoretical 
support to focus on values alone rather than include beliefs and 
unquestioned assumptions; however, narrative analysis from studies #2 
and #3 demonstrated how external environmental factors as well as post-
intervention workplace behaviors and resulting experience shifted the 
beliefs and assumptions of the participants. Thus, in this revised model, 
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values, beliefs, and assumptions are presented together. Consistent with 
Model 7, Leaders and Key Influencers (Box #5) continue to both be 
influenced by the existing values, beliefs and assumptions, as well as tend 
to reinforce or revise those values, beliefs, and assumptions. In addition to 
influencing the Implementation Mechanisms and Incentives (Box #2), as 
presented in Model 7, results of studies #2 and #3 highlight the role 
played by leaders and key influencers in developing, maintaining, and 
role-modeling workplace behaviors, thereby influencing the workplace 
shared experience (Box #3). Thus, Model 7 explicitly incorporated the 
role of individual behaviors at the workplace. As presented in Study#1, 
the expected workplace behaviors have a direct impact on the individual, 
group-level outcomes. Thus, in this revised model, workplace behaviors 
and shared experience of those behaviors is explicitly identified. Two 
feedback loops (#3a and #4a) are used to illustrate the learning and 
sensemaking that was discovered to take place among the group as they 
experienced new workplace behaviors and improved outcomes. These two 
learning and sensemaking loops tend to influence organizational values, 
beliefs, and assumptions, as well as actions of leaders and influencers. 
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Figure 49: Revised model of organizational culture and climate 
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Table 84: Rubric to interpret the illustration of the revised model 
 
Furthermore, the learning and sensemaking loop arising out of seminal 
events (represented by #4b) has the potential to qualify as a defining 
moment. Thus, these two learning and sensemaking loops represent the 
essence of organizational learning and play a critical role in reinforcing 
and revising organizational values, beliefs, and assumptions. As depicted 
in this model, leaders and key influencers have direct impact on (a) the 
organizational values (Box #1) and (b) implementation mechanisms (Box 
#2) and workplace behaviors and shared experiences (Box #3), which 
determine how espoused values are enacted; they also learn from routine 
shared experiences and performance outcomes (Loops #3a and #4a). 
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Thus, leaders and key influencers bear the brunt of the responsibility for 
maintaining as well as transforming organizational culture.  
Organizational climate (depicted in the black dashed box) continues to be 
the psychological response to the underlying culture. Thus, it is a response 
of the group regarding their shared experience, their perception of their 
leaders and key influencers, the degree to which espoused values are 
enacted, the effectiveness as well as affective appeal of the 
implementation mechanisms, workplace behaviors of their group 
members and the degree to which desirable behaviors are rewarded and 
undesirable behaviors are discouraged, the affective reaction to the 
performance outcomes, and ultimately the overall learning and 
sensemaking—a measure of a general feeling of wellbeing at the 
workplace.     
This revised model presents planned interventions, such as training and 
process improvement programs, as well as external factors (depicted by 
the green blocks) as factors acting on the internal organizational culture. 
The MOREOB program, as a planned training intervention (Box #11), 
created a new shared experience (Box #9) in how the training was 
delivered, impacted the implementation mechanism (Box #2) by 
establishing enhanced performance standards (e.g., “41+3” on 
determination of eligibility for a planned C-section), and influenced 
leaders and key influencers (Box #5) regarding both the significance of 
the patient safety challenges in obstetrics as well as clinical and 
operational best practices. Learning (Box #10) derived from the MOREOB 
training influenced workplace behaviors created a new shared experience 
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(Box #3), and eventually impacted performance outcomes (Box #4).  
External factors (Box #7), on the other hand, have four parallel pathways 
(#7a, #7b, #7c, and #7d), albeit through shared experiences, to influence 
organizational culture. One pathway is through defining moments or 
shocks to the system (Box #8) such as those experienced by Hospital B 
when it was placed under supervisory control. The other three pathways 
are more subtle: path #7a could influence through training or process 
improvements; path #7c could create new shared experiences like 
exposing leaders and influencers to new paradigms or best practices from 
other industries; and path #7d could facilitate a gradual shift in the 
participants’ deeply held assumptions by virtue of living in the 
environment—e.g., declining budget allocations. Also, external factors 
could trigger particular planned interventions, such as the Lean 
methodology that was encouraged by Hospital B’s board or the external 
expectation that quality improvement plans be tied to executive 
compensation. 
This model is a macro-level integration of environment, culture, and climate, and 
it helps describe how, when, and why these elements interact with each other to 
maintain or transform group-level culture. Based on the scope of the empirical 
evidence presented in this study, this integrated model of culture and climate is 
bounded at the macro level by the following four factors: (a) geographic location; 
(b) professional practice; (c) safety focus; and (d) impact of training 
interventions.  
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7.2 Research Implications 
7.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
This research makes an integrative contribution by building on past research 
efforts from a broad range of disciplines and domains. There is a long history of 
such borrowing and building in organization and management studies (Corley & 
Gioia, 2011; Oswick, Fleming, & Hanlon, 2011). A fresh attempt at building the 
theoretical structure of organizational culture also presents opportunities for 
insightful contributions as a result of causal mapping proposed in the model (cf. 
(Whetten, 1989). The unique insight revealed through this model is about the 
nature of interaction amongst the various units of the theory. For example, while 
it may not be surprising that an organization tends to change when its survival is 
at stake (cf. Wheatley, 1999), the explanation about how various elements of the 
external environment as well as the organization’s internal culture might interact 
to produce a sustainable cultural transformation is different. From a practical 
perspective, this knowledge could be used develop more effective, sustainable, 
and scalable transformation programs. 
The core phenomenon under consideration in this research was that of cultural 
transformation. The integrated model of culture and climate, as illustrated in 
Figure 7, was used to conceptualize how three broad constructs—environment, 
culture, and climate—interact and contribute toward both maintenance as well as 
transformation of organizational culture. The specific elements within each 
construct could qualify as “units” (Dubin, 1969, Chapter 2) of the overall theory. 
Corley and Gioia (2011) classify theoretical contribution in the field of 
organization and management along two axes: originality and utility. Originality 
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is further stratified from incremental to revolutionary, and utility ranges from 
practical usefulness to scientific usefulness. This research contributes along both 
originality and utility dimensions. Specifically, it offers six theoretical 
implications:  
1. At the macro level, the phenomenon of cultural transformation is a 
function of the relationship between three broad constructs (units of 
theory): the external environment within which an organization operates; 
the internal organizational culture; and the organizational climate. Thus, 
there are two broad propositions describing the relationship between these 
constructs: 
a. External environment influences internal organizational culture 
and  
b. Internal organizational culture influences the participants’ 
psychological response or organizational climate. 
Based on the findings reported in this study, the environmental factors 
could be further classified as follows: (a) Geo-social, (b) Economic, (c) 
Legal, and (d) Professional. Of these four categories, the geo-social 
influence is most similar to the characterization of cultures by national 
boundaries—the national culture—in the landmark study by Hofstede 
(1984) and the subsequent groundswell of cross-cultural studies such as 
the Globe Project (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). 
However, most of these studies view individually-held values that can be 
aggregated at the national level as stable and latent influencers of 
organizational cultures within the defined national boundaries. On the 
other hand, the emergent integrated model of culture and climate reframes 
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environmental factors as active influencers or even drivers of 
organizational culture. Such a reframing was based on the interview data 
collected in studies #2 and #3; thus, this insight gained from case-level 
analysis opens new opportunities for the study of role of environmental 
factors, beyond national factors, in causing internal adaptation among 
organizations that thrive. From a systems perspective, this reframing 
changes the notion of organizational culture from a construct defined 
within the boundaries of the organization to a construct that is actively 
influenced by external factors, such as geo-social, economic, legal, and 
professional, within which the organization must thrive.  Alternately, it 
also presents a proposition that organizations that fail to convert external 
environmental changes into internal adaptation will fail. 
By positioning organizational climate as a symptomatic measure of the 
underlying culture, the emergent model seeks to advance the assertion that 
climate measures must be two-tiered: the molar measures must be linked 
with the underlying cultural elements at a general level and the focused 
measures must be clearly linked with the specific area of focus like safety, 
quality, service, or innovation. The extent to which the climate factors are 
consistent with the underlying cultural factors, they may be used as proxy 
measures for cultural assessment. Consistent use of this approach to the 
development of climate survey instruments will lend both scientific 
credibility as well as practical authenticity for the use of survey 
instruments to assess organizational culture. Also, sustained use of such 
instruments across multiple populations will likely generate a new set of 
climate categories focused on psychological responses to (a) the shared 
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experiences, (b) organizational values, (c) leaders and key influencers,  
(d) implementation mechanisms, (e) individual behaviors, (f) group-level 
performance outcomes, and (g) learning and sensemaking loops. Thus, 
this study contributes to the advancement of Schein’s (1988, 2010, 2015) 
theory of organizational culture by explicitly incorporating the influence 
of external environmental factors and positioning climate as a 
symptomatic measure of the underlying culture. Furthermore, this study 
positions artifacts as outcomes of culture rather than integral elements of 
culture, enabling study of artifacts to describe the underlying values and 
potentially the experiences that may have led to the development of those 
values. Such positioning of artifacts is different from that claimed in 
Schein (2015) and Rousseau’s (1990) models.  
2. Based on a number of studies on effects of training on culture or effects of 
climate on performance (Beus et al., 2010; Clarke, 2006; Pratt et al., 
2007), there was support for the general hypothesis that training could be 
used to influence organizational culture. However, if the core of an 
organization’s culture is represented by its set of deeply held values 
(Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Hofstede, 1984; Rochon, 1998; Schein, 
1988, 2010, 2015), then, it was not clear as to how a training intervention 
tends to influence individually-held and shared organizational values. 
Schein’s model of culture (Schein, 1988, 2010, 2015), which is rooted in 
shared experience, served as the starting point for the development of a 
comprehensive model of organizational culture and subsequent enquiry 
about the role of training in influencing values.  
 
 381 
 
Past models of training evaluation have not fully explored the relationship 
between training and organizational culture. On the one hand, 
Kirkpatrick’s four-level model of training evaluation (Kirkpatrick, 1998; 
Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 2006) has been used extensively to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of a variety of training programs in a 
number of domains (Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001), and meta-analytical 
studies in healthcare have noted that there is a sequential pattern among 
the various levels of training evaluation, which starts with reactions, and 
then moves on to learning, transfer, and results, and the relationship 
between these stages grows stronger along the sequence (Hughes et al., 
2016). On the other hand, comprehensive models of training evaluation 
like Alvarez et al.’s (2004) integrated model of training evaluation and 
training effectiveness as well as Spitzer’s Learning Effectiveness 
Measurement (LEM)  methodology (Spitzer, 2005) take a more active 
stance on transfer of learning into workplace behaviors and incorporate 
the role of extant organizational culture. However, even these models tend 
to consider various elements of organizational culture ranging from 
leadership to prevailing climate as enablers or barriers to transfer of 
training. The emergent model, on the other hand, focuses on the role of 
training in changing the organizational culture itself. Specifically, it seeks 
to identify the mechanisms by which training tends to influence culture. 
For example, the MOREOB training was designed to cause cultural change 
through change in participants’ knowledge, which was then expected to 
result in changes in their on-the-job behaviors and those changed 
behaviors, in turn, were expected to improve the individual-, group-, and 
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firm-level performance outcomes. If this influence trajectory was 
successful, then the participants had a higher probability of believing in 
the new behaviors, thereby contributing toward changes in their deeply 
held values and causing a value-level change in the long run. The pre-post 
assessment of knowledge clearly demonstrated that the training improved 
the participants’ knowledge, and the analysis of clinical outcomes 
revealed that there was improvement in some of the clinical performance 
measures. Interviews with the participants and hospital administrators 
revealed that new shared experiences at the workplace, role modeling by 
the leaders, and effective adherence to new policies and standards led to 
clinical performance improvements, which in turn influenced their 
confidence in the training program and caused a shift in their assumptions 
and impacted their shared values. Based on the lead-lag phenomenon 
noted in studies #1 and #3, it is acknowledged that the most proximate 
impact of a training program is the improvement in participants’ 
knowledge. Thereafter, it may take some time for the improved 
knowledge to result in behavioral changes. Furthermore, while transfer of 
training into workplace behavioral change is a function of the extant 
organizational climate (as supported by Birdi (2007) and Holton (2005)), 
a shift in participants’ behaviors, supported by feedback focused on task 
performance (Senge, 1990), can bring about a change in organizational 
climate and culture. There are three parallel, mutually reinforcing 
pathways to influence shared values through training interventions:  
a. Practice of knowledge gained through training creates new 
shared experiences;  
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b. Implementation of policies, procedures, and incentives, 
consistent with training goals, results in new shared 
experiences; and/or 
c. Training impacts the behaviors and expectations of leaders and 
key influencers.  
Thus, one could argue that this model takes a learning-in-working 
perspective (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000) on organizational culture and 
seeks to advance the knowledge about how organizations learn—to 
change or reinforce their shared values—through internal experiences or 
external influences (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004). The training intervention 
serves as a specially designed shared experience, which could employ 
Spitzer’s LEM, to identify specific operational goals as well as value-
based goals. Birdi and Reid’s (2013) Taxonomy of Training and 
Development Outcomes would be particularly helpful in formulating 
training outcome goals at the individual, group, organization, as well as 
the entire healthcare industry level. Therefore, the emergent model opens 
the door for development of large-scale culture change strategies that 
could be fully scalable from an obstetrics team (group or community of 
practice) level to the entire healthcare sector.  
3. Building on the previous research on shared experience, this study 
focused on the premise that shared experience could be engineered 
through training. However, shared experience is necessarily a group-level 
phenomenon and thus, the groups can be defined based on the type of 
membership. For example, there could be a work team (obstetrics), 
professional group (obstetricians, nurses, midwives, etc.), organizational 
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group (hospital level), and community (the region and nation within 
which the organization operates). The MOREOB training was engineered 
to shape the shared experience of the obstetrics work group, but the 
attributes of the training program were consistent with the values shared 
by the professional groups (e.g., the Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists of Canada), subject hospitals (as in the longitudinal case 
studies of hospital A and hospital B), as well as the local community (as 
the community’s demographics changed, the hospitals had to adapt to the 
new needs of that community). Thus, one could deduce that the capacity 
of a training program to have a long-term cultural impact increases if its 
attributes are aligned with the shared or aspirational values of the work 
team, professional group, organization, and the community. Furthermore, 
one could hypothesize that over time, the membership requirements for 
these groups will change and thus, what constitutes as acceptable standard 
of behavior or performance will progressively improve, thereby causing a 
cultural change over the long term. Thus, this study strengthens Birdi and 
Reid’s (2013) multi-level model of training outcomes by highlighting the 
need for value-level alignment in order for a training intervention to be 
successful at reaching its full potential of impact as suggested by Birdi 
and Reid. 
4. The concepts of transactional and transformational leadership were first 
introduced by Burns (1978), categorizing leadership as either 
transactional, which would be task-oriented and tied to personal 
motivations and interests of both the leader and the follower or 
transformational, which would necessarily focus on the higher moral 
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ground and tend to consider the broader organizational or societal 
implications and aligning ones individual behaviors and choices to seek 
outcomes that are in the best interest of the organization (Bass, 2010). 
There are many aspects of transformational leadership that are well 
aligned with the emergent, integrated model of culture and climate. For 
example, Bass (2010) characterizes transformational leadership as 
follows:  
a. Moves the followers forward through idealized influence, 
inspiration, intellectual stimulation or individualized 
consideration; 
b. Develops teams that are high-performing, promotes employee 
empowerment, practices creative flexibility, and builds espirit de 
corps; and 
c. Helps move along the leader-member-exchange continuum from 
transactional to transformational by progressively building trust, 
loyalty, and mutual respect. 
In this study, findings related to the role of leaders and influencers 
revealed four different mechanisms of influence: (a) External leaders tend 
to influence organizational cultures by setting performance standards and 
expecting public accountability; (b) External influencers tend to be at the 
leading edge of problem identification and definition, solutions 
development, and standardization of key performance metrics; (c) Internal 
leaders have a more direct influence on organizational culture through 
strategic interventions, policy development, and alignment of incentives 
in support of the desired behavioral changes; and (d) Internal influencers 
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are primarily entrusted with modeling of behaviors expected in 
accordance with the new policies or training—their daily actions shape 
the shared experience and therefore these internal influencers are most 
impactful in changing the organizational culture.  Thus, this study enables 
blending of organizational learning and leadership literatures. The internal 
versus external perspective enables the incorporation of organizational 
learning from either internal sources (endogenous) or external sources 
(exogenous); while the fuller range of leadership roles—from frontline 
practitioners (peers) to formal leaders (physicians, charge nurses, or 
administrators) within the organization as well as informal leaders outside 
the organization—enables the incorporation of transactional and 
transformational leadership styles. While most of the leadership literature 
is focused on formal roles, whether they are executed in the form of—
broadly speaking—transactional or transformational styles, (e.g. 
Pettigrew, 1979; Schein, 2010, 2015; Waterson, 2014), the role of 
external, informal leaders and leaders not just as individuals but leaders as 
standard-setting professional bodies has been left out or underdeveloped. 
In pointing at the future focus needed in the study of transactional 
leadership, Avilio et al. (2009) encouraged further studies in 
understanding the “underlying psychological processes, mechanisms, and 
conditions” through which transformational leaders motivate higher levels 
of performance. Specifically, with respect to the interaction between 
transformational leadership and organizational culture, Hartnell and 
Walumbwa (2011) claim that such interaction would advance leadership 
theory by raising the understanding of how leadership influences the 
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social context in which organizational effectiveness can be fostered. This 
study identifies the use of role modeling, mutual accountability for 
community-based standards of practice, and translation of broad national 
issues to local context as some of the mechanisms for the exercise of 
transactional leadership to effect the higher-level goal or organizational 
cultural change. Interestingly, Hartnell and Walumbwa’s framing of 
“transformational behavior affects culture, whereas, transactional 
behavior is affected by culture” (p.226) is consistent with the emergent 
model’s notion of mechanisms that revise shared values versus those that 
reinforce shared values. Since the transformational leadership style has 
already been demonstrated to be effective in the healthcare sector 
(Spinelli, 2006), this study opens new opportunities to further advance the 
understanding of the role of leaders and influencers, internal and external, 
in the healthcare sector and beyond. 
5. Majority of the literature on feedback is focused on evaluation of 
workplace behaviors of employees and aimed at correcting the behavior 
to align with the desired safety or operational performance goals (Clarke, 
2006; Freiberg & Freiberg, 1996; Putter, 2010; Reason, 1997; Senge, 
1990). On the other hand, learning can be mapped along the dimensions 
of cognitive, skill-based, and affective (Kraiger et al., 1993). Thus, if the 
intention of the feedback is to effect learning, it will aim at causing a 
cognitive, skill-based, or behavioral change, thereby making feedback a 
training mechanism. However, in order to reach deeper into an individual 
or group’s philosophical, social and cognitive makeup, the feedback must 
also make sense; i.e., it must become meaningful by making logical and 
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emotional connection of new information, including observation, with 
previously held values and unquestioned assumptions: it must follow the 
perception-cognition-action-memory process (Weick, 1995). Accordingly, 
the sensemaking process is triggered by perception of new information or 
observation, followed by cognitive analysis of its significance to previous 
knowledge held in the memory, followed by a cognitive, affective, or 
behavioral response in the form of an action (e.g., process the new 
information based on existing rules, modify the existing rules, make new 
rules, associate with previous positive or negative feelings, and/or 
generate a physical response), and concluded with a memory step (add to 
the memory or modify the previous memory in terms of data, rules, and/or 
emotional experience). While this process allows for consideration of new 
information or observation that is inconsistent with the previously held 
values, such a contradiction is likely to be rejected or at least treated as 
non-critical. Yet, from a culture-change perspective, the new information, 
experience, or observation is intended to change previously held values 
and unquestioned assumption. A few emerging studies are providing ways 
in which this paradox could be addressed (Luscher & Lewis, 2008). 
Specifically, there seems to be a growing interest in studying how 
managers can make sense of paradoxical information or observations in 
order to translate it into meaningful and lasting changes. This study 
advances such research by illustrating how leaders can adopt a learning 
orientation and treat the internal feedback mechanisms as sensemaking 
opportunities and also use external, informal feedback mechanisms as 
opportunities to explore innovation, particularly when the new 
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information is inconsistent with the previously held values and 
unquestioned assumptions (Coopey, Keegan, & Emler, 1997).   
 
In this study, findings related to the role of learning and sensemaking 
loops revealed four different mechanisms of influence: (a) External, 
formal feedback tends to influence organizational culture through changes 
in compliance requirements such as accreditation standards, legislative 
changes, and/or changes in funding models or budget restrictions 
(particularly if the organization is publicly funded); (b) External, informal 
feedback tends to come through publicly available databases and reports 
that may not identify specific institutions, but provide authentic trends of 
general interest and concern, thereby raising awareness among policy 
makers and formal leaders so that appropriate formal mechanisms for 
cultural change could be developed; (c) Internal, formal feedback tends to 
come most often in the form of individual or unit-level performance 
appraisals and quality/safety investigation reports, which could translate 
into positive or negative incentives; and (d) Internal, informal feedback 
tends to be delivered on a routine basis to maintain the community’s 
standards of practice. The incorporation of training in the integrated 
model of culture and climate enabled the identification of sensemaking as 
the critical link between training and cultural change. While sensemaking 
is triggered and influenced by a variety of routine and episodic factors 
(Battles et al., 2006), for training to be effective in causing a cultural 
change, it has to be both timely and make sense at individual and group 
levels (cf., Luscher & Lewis, 2008). Thus, from a theoretical perspective, 
one unique insight is that sensemaking—from frontline personnel to 
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management—should not only be viewed as an essential internal 
mechanism at the individual and group level, but also as an active skill for 
leaders to exercise as they receive and interpret external information and 
translate it to local situations and opportunities. This perspective on 
sensemaking advances the understanding of the role of feedback loops as 
sensemaking loops as well as the expectations from transformational 
leaders in effecting cultural change. 
6. Ehrhart, Schneider, and Macey (2014) provided a strong theoretical 
foundation for further development of the construct of organizational 
climate, particularly in the context of safety. According to Ehrhart et al., 
the construct of organizational climate is rooted in the experiences of 
workgroups as a result of their interaction with their environment, and the 
meaning attached to those experiences. Thus, they define organizational 
climate in terms of “shared meaning” (p.69). Although some scientists 
argued that climate was an individual level construct (Rousseau, 1990; 
Virtanen, 2000), this study demonstrated that individual-level survey 
responses could be aggregated at the group level and thus climate could 
be measured at the group level. Next, Schneider and Barbera (Schneider 
& Barbera, 2014b) classified organizational culture at two levels: molar 
and focused. Molar studies refer to general organizational climate and 
focused studies refer to climate in the context of specific performance 
outcomes such as safety, quality, and service. Since this study was 
focused on patient safety, the survey instrument used in this study 
provided a means to test the key components of both the molar-level 
organizational climate and focus-level patient safety climate.  
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Most safety climate studies use survey questionnaires that have been 
derived from other studies in High Reliability Organizations (La Porte & 
Consolini, 1991), differences in worker values based on national origin 
(Hofstede, 1984), differences in values and work habits based on 
professional or organizational differences (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998), 
differences in worker adherence to safety procedures in industrial settings 
(Zohar, 2002a, 2002b), differences in how safety-critical information 
flows through an organization and affects safety performance (Westrum, 
1995), and how an organization learns from undesirable outcomes (Senge, 
1990). In contrast, this study uses an integrated model of culture and 
climate and re-positions organizational climate as a psychological 
response to the underlying cultural elements. Such integration and 
repositioning is different from previous integrative models. For example, 
the integrated approach used by Patterson et al. (2005) in overlaying 
climate dimensions on the competing values framework of culture, 
focuses mostly on shared values, while the emergent model presents a 
more comprehensive perspective that not only includes shared values, but 
also includes psychological responses to other cultural elements such as 
leadership, communication, and teamwork.  The addition of these 
components is supported in the literature, (e.g. Guldenmund, 2000; 
Sammer et al., 2010; Singer et al., 2007); however, heretofore, it was not 
presented in the form of a consistent, comprehensive, and integrated 
model. Ultimately, the theoretical model used in this study provided for a 
six-element, generic structure of organizational climate, with additional 
focus-specific elements for patient safety. The nine elements of safety 
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climate are as follows: (a) Safety as an organizational value; (b) 
Teamwork; (c) Respect for individuals; (d) Open communication; (e) 
Learning from experience; (f) Leadership or senior management 
commitment; (g) Alignment/ availability of resources;  (h) Mutual trust 
among colleagues/co-workers; and (i) The nature of response to 
unintentional errors. This nine-element structure is supported in the 
literature (Flin, 2007b; Flin et al., 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; Jackson & 
Kline, 2014; Sammer et al., 2010; Singer et al., 2007). However, since the 
safety climate survey instrument used in this study was developed prior to 
the development of the above nine-element structure, the data from the 
administration of the survey instrument was analyzed from both 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. These analyses yielded a 
six-factor model for safety climate consisting of the following: (a) Patient 
Safety is Everyone’s Priority; (b) Learning; (c) Valuing Individuals; (d) 
Empowering People; (e) Open Communication; and (f) Teamwork. This 
six-factor model was consistent with the broader, nine-factor model 
developed earlier in the study and also consistent with  Singer et al.’s 
(Singer et al., 2007) model of safety climate. Therefore, this study 
confirmed a basic, six-factor model of safety climate and laid the 
foundation for the development of a more inclusive, nine-factor model 
that is strongly linked with the underlying model of organizational 
culture. 
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7.2.2 Methodological Implications 
This study has many methodological attributes: it is a quasi-experimental study; it 
is a case study; it is a mixed-methods study; and it is a longitudinal study. It also 
offers a pre-post comparison, as well as a control group versus experimental 
group comparison. In leveraging the strengths of qualitative methods, it uses 
narrative analysis and artifact analysis. While triangulation and corroboration 
through a mixed-methods approach has been recommended, developed, and 
supported previously (Creswell & Clark, 2007; Curry, Nembhard, & Bradley, 
2009; Driscoll et al., 2007; Jick, 1979), this study presents an insightful 
contribution toward the integration of qualitative and quantitative methods as 
well as incremental contributions toward the refinement of specific tools. Five 
methodological implications are presented: 
1. Since the theoretical model integrates culture, a construct generally 
studied by qualitative methods, and climate, a construct generally studied 
by quantitative methods, it was essential to use a mixed-methods 
approach, incorporating qualitative and quantitative methods, for this 
study. As a result, this study was able to leverage the strengths of each 
approach and seek corroborating evidence. Reflecting on the use of 
qualitative and quantitative data, it seems that the use of these data could 
be classified in terms of direct and indirect measures of cultural 
transformation. This approach would lead to the integration of interview 
narratives (qualitative) and knowledge exam scores (quantitative) as 
direct measures, and that of artifacts (qualitative), climate survey data 
(quantitative), and clinical outcomes data (quantitative) as indirect 
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measures of cultural transformation. In the future, corroboration between 
direct and indirect measures could serve as the standard for empirical 
validation of cultural transformation.  
2. Semi-structured interviews were conducted within the narrow context of 
the MOREOB program; however, they revealed four categories of 
environmental influences on organizational culture. In the future, these 
four categories could be intentionally incorporated in studies of 
environmental impact on organizational culture. This is a case of 
theoretical reframing resulting in opportunities for methodological 
contributions. In the future, interviews could be refined to further develop 
(a) the four categories of environmental influence on organizational 
culture and (b) mechanisms of influence associated with each 
environmental category.  
3. The use of training intervention in influencing organizational culture 
essentially followed Kirkpatrick four-level model and noted reactions to 
the training (Level 1) through interviews, improvements in knowledge 
(Level 2) through knowledge exam scores, changes in workplace 
behaviors (Level 3) through recollection of pre/post training experiences 
(in terms of participant stories), and clinical outcomes (Level 4) through 
external reports of clinical performance (Kirkpatrick & Kirkpatrick, 
2006). The integrated model of culture and climate, however, offers the 
potential for a fifth level of assessment: impact on group or organizational 
culture. Impact of training on organizational values could be used as a 
measure of the fifth level of impact. This is both a theoretical 
contribution—because it extends the traditional four-level model of 
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training assessment—as well as a methodological contribution because it 
suggests survey-based assessment of impact on the shared values.   
4. Artifacts, generally defined as human-made products and broadly 
inclusive—from items like logos and symbols to stories—can be used as 
indirect measures or representations of organizational culture. In the 
emergent model of culture and climate, artifacts are considered products 
or manifestations of culture and not culture itself. Artifacts could be 
categorized as addressing one or more of three qualities: instrumentality, 
aesthetic appeal, or symbolic significance. The examples of artifacts 
analyzed in this study were generally high on instrumentality or utility, 
moderate on symbolic significance, and low on their aesthetic appeal. 
Also, the possibility of a symbolic conflict between what is intended and 
what is perceived was raised in the literature. While no such conflicts 
were noted in this study, potential for such a conflict could be determined 
while designing new artifacts. Other tangible artifacts such as toolkits 
were found to serve a high utilitarian function and also aid in routine 
reinforcement of shared organizational values. Thus, the use of artifact 
analysis in studies of organizational culture is a methodological 
contribution.   
5. Over 200 survey-based organizational climate instruments were noted in 
the literature. In the future, a survey instrument that is directly aligned 
with the six-element structure of organizational culture would help 
standardize and authenticate the use of survey instruments as proxy 
measures of the underlying culture. Furthermore, additional questionnaire 
items could be developed to address the particular focus areas such as 
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safety, quality, service, or innovation. Such a tiered approach to 
organizational climate assessment would incorporate both molar and 
focused aspects of organizational climate. 
7.2.3 Practical Implications 
Considering that improving patient safety culture is an international priority, this 
study presents six practical implications ranging from national public policy to 
individual actions that healthcare practitioners can take to influence the patient 
safety culture in their practice unit.  
1. Overall, the alignment of professional standards and national policies with 
societal expectations is an important lesson for other countries and across 
other professional domains. For example, according to a May 3, 2106 
article in The Washington Post, in the United States, medical errors are 
now the third leading cause of death, “claiming 251,000 lives every year” 
(Cha, 2016). Yet, in response to such reports, the administration seems to 
be focused on replacing senior management like in the case of the 
National Institutes for Health Hospital (Sun, 2016). The Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals has already taken a leadership 
role in advancing the quality and safety agenda across hospitals in the 
United States, but that is not enough. Based on the Canadian approach 
reported in this study, at least two other drivers need to be considered in 
order to achieve a cultural shift in the U.S. healthcare system. First, the 
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 should be amended 
to require hospitals to demonstrate quality improvements and tie 
executive compensation to such improvement efforts. Second, the Center 
 397 
 
for Disease Control already collects data on patient safety metrics such as 
healthcare-acquired infections. These data should be made public similar 
to those made available by the Canadian Institute for Healthcare 
Information. Such transparency will raise both public awareness and 
internal vigilance about improving the overall quality of care. In the 
United Kingdom, the Healthcare Quality Improvement Partnership is a 
step in the right direction. Support from professional groups such as the 
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges and the Royal College of Nursing 
will help bring professional credibility to patient safety and quality 
initiatives like the SOGC did for MOREOB. Also, since April 1, 2016, 
patient safety has become part of the NHS Improvement group. At this 
early stage, the focus seems to be on collaborative awareness-type 
initiatives that rely on voluntary reporting systems and hospital-level 
improvement programs. The NHS would benefit from considering two 
critical elements: (a) transparency in clinical outcomes at hospital level 
and (b) regulatory expectation of quality improvements at each hospital.  
2. Emerging from this study, there is recognition of specific roles that 
different leaders and influencers might play in shaping organizational 
cultures. External, national-level policymakers and thought leaders have 
the opportunity and the responsibility to drive the safety agenda by 
expecting transparency of key performance outcomes. Internal leaders, on 
the other hand, have the responsibility to use the broad performance 
metrics as well as their discipline-specific metrics to drive internal quality 
improvements. Together, they can cause long-term systemic 
improvements, effecting transformational change. Thus, external 
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influencers can (a) define and validate the problem and (b) develop 
credible solutions. Internally, formal leaders have to translate the 
externally-defined problem into local significance. Additionally, 
insurance companies, who tend to be key stakeholders in any safety-
related program, could fund regional, national and international studies 
that focus on quantifying the scope of various patient safety challenges. 
Similarly, large hospital systems could fund internally-focused studies to 
develop and test best practices. Results from these types of studies will 
further enhance the ability of professional societies as well as hospital-
level leadership to advance the patient safety agenda.  
3. A meta-observation of the review of shared experiences and resultant 
values revealed a three-tiered priority system: the senior management 
seemed to be most interested in organizational reputation and financial 
success; the frontline management seemed to be most interested in 
operational efficiency; and the frontline clinicians seemed to be most 
interested in the quality of care and patient safety. Hospital A was 
relatively more successful at aligning these three interests, while Hospital 
B’s frontline staff struggled to align their patient safety interests with the 
hospital-wide Lean methodology, which seemed to be the core, top-down 
operational management and communication methodology. Ultimately, 
senior leadership has the responsibility to engineer shared experiences 
such that the desired organizational values will be intentionally 
reinforced, while frontline leaders and key influencers have the 
responsibility to serve as role models and enforcers of their professional 
community’s standards of practice.  
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4. In the future, fresh development of a safety climate survey instrument 
based on the nine overall climatic elements would serve both scientific 
and practical utility. The literature review noted that most safety climate 
instruments have not been psychometrically validated; thus, a more robust 
and appropriately validated (as illustrated in this research) instrument, 
would support scientific utility. Also, a standardized instrument would 
serve as a valid and practical diagnostic measure of cultural attributes.   
5. A comparison of knowledge scores, patient safety climate scores, and 
clinical outcomes revealed a lead-lag phenomenon. While an 
improvement in knowledge scores could serve as an early indication of 
the positive influence of a training program, the transfer of that training 
into workplace behaviors, group/firm-level performance outcomes, and 
organizational climate may take time. Thus, it would be essential for 
senior management to make a long-term commitment to the selected 
intervention program, ensure that appropriate metrics are tracked 
regularly, and strive to manage the organizational resistance to change.  
6. Finally, training alone is not sufficient in causing a cultural change; it has 
to be complemented with alignment between shared organizational 
values, implementation mechanisms, leadership support, and appropriate 
use of feedback mechanisms, including incentives. Thus, any attempts at 
changing organizational culture should not be partitioned-off from the 
core business. All levels of management and frontline personnel need to 
collectively and cohesively commit to the intended cultural change and 
remain open to changes in their own behaviors as well as changes in long-
standing corporate practices. 
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7.3 Limitations of the Study  
Overall, qualitative studies tend to be narrow and deep and quantitative studies 
tend to be broad and shallow. This research attempted to provide a combination 
of breadth and depth; however, there were limitations. First, the limitations with 
the quantitative data revolved around access and quality; and second, the 
limitations with qualitative data revolved around breadth and confidentiality. 
Also, since the quantitative data were collected by multiple entities, and for a 
different purpose, the researcher had to restructure the available data to suit his 
formatting and analytical needs. As a retrospective study, the researcher had to 
rely more heavily on the participants’ memory and their ability to isolate the 
impact of the training intervention versus other concurrent or subsequent factors. 
Nonetheless, this was a unique opportunity to apply one coherent case-study of a 
planned intervention across all aspects of culture and climate.    
7.3.1 Access and Quality of Data 
This research relied heavily on access to archival data. The clinical outcomes data 
(C-section rates, postpartum hemorrhage rate, length of stay, etc.) were provided 
by the Canadian Institute for Healthcare Information (CIHI). Since these data 
were collected and managed by CIHI, access had to be obtained and secured 
through a Canadian organization and the data had to be retained within Canada. 
The Salus Global Corporation worked closely with CIHI to convince them of 
both the need to conduct this research as well as their commitment to retain the 
data on a secure computer within Salus Global. Once the data were obtained, they 
had to be restructured to suit the analytical needs, which involved conversion of 
file formats; conversion from rows to columns; conversion from axial coding 
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(one, alphanumeric code representing multiple conditions) to discrete binary 
codes; and elimination of extraneous data fields.  With over 1 million cases 
across 10 years, the task of cleaning and customizing the available data was 
daunting.  However, the biggest issue with these datasets was that they were 
originally designed from a billing perspective and not from safety or quality 
perspective. Thus, there were two sets of coding schemes applicable in every 
case: one for diagnostic conditions and one for interventions. Every case had to 
be restructured to couple the diagnostic and intervention codes. Needless to say 
that this was a very laborious process and the scope of clinical outcomes analysis 
had to be limited. With a simpler, integrated coding structure, it would have been 
possible to analyze many more maternal health conditions as well as 
fetal/neonatal conditions and provide a more comprehensive report of the 
influence of the intervention on a broader set of clinical outcomes. 
7.3.2 Patient Safety Culture Survey data 
The Patient Safety Culture Survey (it should have been called a climate survey), 
was designed and administered by the Salus Global Corporation. Salus Global 
had collected over 12,000 individual surveys comprising of pre- and post-training 
responses. While this was a very strong dataset, it had to be scrubbed and 
structured in order to conform to the researcher’s analytical needs. There were 
two key limitations in using this survey instrument: first, it was pre-designed and 
therefore the researcher did not have any opportunity to revise or improve the 
design; and second, it aligned with only six of the nine desired climate elements. 
Given the opportunity to redesign the survey instrument, the researcher would 
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have been able to present analysis that was more consistent with the integrated 
model of culture and climate. 
7.3.3 Participation in the Interviews 
Initially, the Salus Global Corporation staff was quite confident that they would 
be able to provide access to ten hospitals (5 from the Early Adopter group and 5 
from the Late Adopter group) in order to conduct interviews and focus groups. In 
spite of numerous and varied attempts to recruit these hospitals in the study, only 
one hospital from each group participated to the full extent. If at least two more 
hospitals from each group had participated, the researcher would have been able 
to provide a more comprehensive qualitative analysis. Furthermore, considering 
that the interviews were conducted 3-6 years after the intervention, the 
participants’ memory regarding the intervention may have been jaded by their 
personal bias toward the program (those that liked the program are more likely to 
remember their positive experiences), and may have been confounded by other 
concurrent or intervening initiatives with similar goals and objectives. 
7.3.4 Confidentiality of the Participating Organizations 
Artifact analysis is an impressive technique to illustrate the underlying cultural 
attributes; however, it is almost impossible to present such analysis without 
compromising the confidentiality of the subject organization. Thus, although the 
researcher collected and analyzed additional cultural artifacts, he was not able to 
include them in this document. In the future, it would help to secure approval 
from the subject organizations to identify them and their artifacts. 
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7.3.5 Limited to a Single Intervention 
This research provided an opportunity to conduct in-depth research on a single 
intervention. Since the overarching theoretical model is not limited to any 
particular intervention or domain, it would have been useful to conduct studies of 
other interventions and/or in other domains to fully test the model.  
7.3.6 Limitations of the Interview Instrument 
One of the limitations of a semi-structured interview protocol used in Study #2 is 
that the questions were developed based on the integrated model of culture and 
climate; thus, information beyond the pre-developed questions was not easily 
accessible. Nonetheless, some questions enabled opportunities for open 
conversations and exploration of details. Thus, it was possible to add empirical 
context to the theoretical relationship between the constructs under review. 
7.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
7.4.1 Redesign and Validate a New Organizational Climate Survey Instrument 
One challenge in this study was that the researcher did not have the opportunity 
to design or improve the safety climate survey instrument. In the future, a new 
organizational climate instrument should be developed in accordance with the 
six-element, molar structure of organizational culture presented in this study 
and/or the nine-element safety climate structure. The three additional scales that 
need to be developed are as follows: (a) alignment/availability of resources; (b) 
co-worker trust; and (c) response to unintentional errors. 
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7.4.2 Integrate Robust Measures for Behavioral Change at Individual and 
Group Levels 
In the absence of robust measures for behavioral change at the individual and 
group levels, this study relied on stories and artifacts as means to draw out the 
participants’ experiences about changes in individual and group level behaviors. 
In the future, measures similar to the ones used in the Line Operations Safety 
Assessments (Thomas et al., 2004), those used by Holton (2005) or Cooper’s 
(2000) Reciprocal Safety Culture Model should be developed to collect robust 
measures of behavioral changes at both individual and group levels. 
7.4.3 Conduct Similar, Integrative Studies in Other Domains 
This study demonstrated how culture and climate studies, and their respective 
methodologies, could be integrated to produce more comprehensive 
understanding of the association between organizational culture and performance 
outcomes. The next step along this line of enquiry would be to conduct similar 
studies in other healthcare disciplines. For example, participants in Study #3 
noted opportunities to transfer best practices from obstetrics to neonatal care; 
similar opportunities exist in general surgery, orthopedics, cardiology, etc. 
Additionally, it would be important to conduct similar studies in other high-
consequence industries like aviation, off-shore oil exploration, and nuclear 
power, as well as across other shared values such as quality, innovation, and 
service. Such studies, over a period of time would produce a rich body of 
empirical evidence regarding the transferability of the integrated model of culture 
and climate and identify other potential limitations. 
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7.4.4 Conduct Studies of Non-Training Interventions 
Beyond knowledge or skills training, many other interventions such as planning-
based approaches or process-based approaches to organizational change have 
been attempted (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2016). While some of them have been 
successful, most organizational change efforts seem to fail (Beer & Nohria, 
2000). Thus, it would be interesting to use the proposed integrated culture and 
climate model to determine the capacity of other interventions to bring about a 
lasting cultural change or to compare and contrast the same intervention but one 
successful implementation and one unsuccessful implementation. For example, 
studies could investigate the impact of strategic planning (example of a planning- 
based approach) and Lean or Six Sigma (examples of process-based approaches) 
in achieving a cultural transformation. 
7.4.5 Disprove the Theory or Test its Boundaries 
In disproving a theory, one could attempt to disprove the theory in its entirety or 
certain parts of it. Since the proposed theory takes a macro-level systems 
perspective, interactions between each of the component constructs could be 
tested in different domains and with different interventions methods. Another 
aspect of trying to disprove a theory is to test its boundaries. For example, since 
this study was conducted in the context of a training intervention within 
obstetrics practice in Ontario, this context forms the boundaries of this model. 
Thus, some of the research questions could explore the applicability of this theory 
in different environmental contexts, professional disciplines, and non-training 
interventions. Some of the suggested research questions are as follows: 
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1. Is there a significant difference in the relative influence of various 
environmental factors with respect to different political or economic 
models of the region? For example, this model did not consider external 
political interference in organizational governance. In that context, it 
would be interesting to understand the role played by political parties, 
appointed agents, or elected officials on the internal organizational 
culture. Such an understanding would provide new insights into the 
feasibility of applying such a model to other regions of the world. 
2. This model assumes that the formal leadership of an organization is in 
complete control of their ability to change the organizational policies; 
however, such a control may not be possible. For example, in the case of a 
typical airline merger in the United States, union contracts play a 
significant role in determining how the employee groups are integrated in 
the merged entity. It would be interesting to explore how this model could 
be further developed to facilitate organizational unlearning and re-
learning under different labor-management relationships. 
3. This model presents environmental factors as factors acting on the 
organization, thereby placing the organizational culture in a reactive 
mode. On the other hand, one could study organizations that are known to 
lead their industry segment and serve as the influencers of the 
environment by creating an ecosystem of products and services. In this 
context, the goal would be to understand how internal organizational 
cultures of industry-leading organizations shape their external 
environment, which in turn leads to widespread cultural change across a 
particular industry sector. 
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7.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
The focus of this research study was on patient safety in the obstetrics practice in 
Ontario, Canada, because (a) the overall healthcare sector is faced with the dual 
mandate to improve quality of care and affordability; (b) Ontario represents 37 
per cent of the births in Canada; (c) the researcher had access to extensive 
quantitative data as well as key personnel for interviews and focus group 
discussions; and (d) there was a unique opportunity to develop and test an 
integrated model of organizational culture and climate. The underlying 
assumption was that an integrated approach to the study of organizational culture 
and climate might produce some unique insights that offer not only practical 
guidelines to improve the quality and affordability in healthcare, but also inspire 
innovative advances in the theories of organizational culture and climate.  
Collectively, the three studies provided a combination of etic and emic analyses 
and responded to all the research questions and hypotheses, generating a revised 
integrated model of organizational culture and climate. Ultimate, while training 
intervention can be effective in producing climatic changes, true cultural changes 
require alignment of shared values, implementation mechanisms, leadership 
commitment, role modeling by key influencers, consistent use of feedback from 
performance outcomes, and creation of a series of new shared experiences.  
This study offered six theoretical implications, five methodological implications, 
and six practical implications. Future studies should consider different domains 
and different types of interventions in order to test the validity of the proposed 
model and determine the limits its transferability beyond the narrow focus of 
obstetrics practice in Ontario.    
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Integrated Model of Organizational Culture and Climate  
Field Interview Schedule 
 
The goal of this interview is to understand the circumstances surrounding the 
implementation of the MOREOB program as well as your experience with its 
implementation and outcomes. Specifically, the questions will involve the 
following themes: 
1. Organizational values and unquestioned assumptions; 
2. MOREOB strategies, policies, practices, and the role of key leaders and 
influencers; 
3. Attitudes of various levels of clinical and management personnel that 
influenced the implementation of the MOREOB program; 
4. Specific clinical outcomes—what were the results of the MOREOB 
program on the obstetrics practice as well as the overall image and morale 
of the hospital; and  
5. Transfer of best practices across other units in the hospital or other 
hospitals. 
 
Your responses will be recorded (with your approval on the consent form) and 
used for research purposes only. You may stop this interview at any time or 
withdraw from participation without any negative implications. This project 
(Reference Number 003587) has been approved by the Ethics Committee at the 
University of Sheffield, United Kingdom. 
 
A. General Background 
1. For demographic purposes, please tell me about your background:  
a. What is your role and what are your responsibilities? 
b. How long have you worked for this hospital? 
c. What is your overall experience in the field?  
 
B. Environmental Factors 
1. Over the course of your tenure in this region, hospital, or your practice 
specialty, what changes have you observed or experienced that may 
have influenced what you do or how you conduct your practice? 
2. What are some examples of shifts in your assumptions regarding these 
environmental factors impacting the organization? 
3. What do you think were the reasons for implementing the MOREOB 
program? 
4. How was the MOREOB program implemented? What was the 
communication plan? What was the training schedule? How was it 
assessed?  
 
C. Shared Experiences and Learning 
1. What was your initial attitude about the MOREOB program? Why? 
2. Would you say that other people in your obstetrics group were 
generally receptive toward this program? Why? 
3. What are some illustrative stories about your experience before and 
after the MOREOB program? 
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D. Organizational Values 
1. What are your organizational values? [Espoused] 
2. How do you see these organizational values play out in practice? 
What are some illustrative examples? [Seek stories or tangible 
artifacts] 
E. Leaders and Key Influencers 
1. What role did leaders and key influencers play in reinforcing or 
revising the organizational values? 
2. If a dissonance was noted in the aspired or espoused values and the 
actual shared values, how was this dissonance addressed? 
F. Implementation Mechanisms 
1. What are some example artifacts (policies, procedures, other symbols) 
that illustrate the organization’s culture and commitment to its values? 
Can you show me some examples? 
2. How are incentives used to promote/inhibit certain behaviors? 
 
G. Stories of Lived Experiences 
1. What are some illustrative stories about the organization’s culture? 
[Alternate question: How do the current employees tend to describe 
the nature of work at this organization to prospective employees?] 
 
H. Feedback Mechanisms 
1. How is the feedback from individual or group performance as well as 
broader organization-level outcomes used to reinforce or revise 
organizational values? 
 
I. Performance Outcomes 
1. What were the anticipated clinical and/or financial outcomes of the 
MOREOB program and were they achieved (as far as you can tell)? 
2. Overall, do you think that the MOREOB program was successful? 
What could have been done differently to improve the success of this 
program? 
 
J. Other Factors 
1. Is there anything else that you would like to share about your 
experience with the MOREOB program? 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this interview. If you have any 
questions, please feel free to contact me via email or phone. 
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Appendix B: The MOREOB Safety Climate Survey Instrument 
ID Survey Questions 
1 My opinion/input is regularly sought. 
2 We know we can count on one another. 
3 We treat each member of our unit with equal respect. 
4 When a concern is raised there is an effort to act on it and/or feedback is 
received. 
5 We show appreciation for each other's contributions. 
6 We communicate with each other in a respectful manner. 
7 We are open to hearing each other's points of view. 
8 We value each other's knowledge base and skill sets. 
9 Staff suggestions for improving patient safety are seriously considered. 
10 We are encouraged to make decisions within our own area of expertise. 
11 We take the initiative to solve problems faced in our daily work without 
waiting to be told. 
12 We are encouraged to make decisions with the best interest of the patient in 
mind. 
13 I have the skills to manage an emergency safely until someone else arrives to 
assist or assume management. 
14 I have the knowledge to identify when someone is about to do something 
that might threaten patient safety. 
15 I am comfortable intervening if I see someone about to do something that 
might threaten patient safety, regardless of their level of authority. 
16 I feel free to question the decisions or actions of others, regardless of their 
level of authority. 
17 We are encouraged to report errors, even those that are caught and corrected 
before affecting the patient. 
18 I am asked for suggestions on how to improve patient care and safety. 
19 We participate in regular drills to prepare for common emergency situations. 
20 Caregivers, managers and administrators regularly discuss unit issues/patient 
care concerns and potential solutions together. 
21 Patient safety occurrences are investigated thoroughly. 
22 Learning from patient safety occurrences is shared with the entire unit staff. 
23 When a patient safety issue is reported it is acted upon in a timely manner. 
24 We review our safety procedures and protocols regularly. 
25 Our unit is actively doing things to improve patient safety. 
26 We overcome individual differences to pull together in the interest of the 
patient. 
27 Multidisciplinary meetings about patient care are a normal part of our 
practice. 
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28 I know there is support available whenever I need it. 
29 When things do not go well with a patient, we meet as a multidisciplinary 
group to discuss the issues involved. 
30 When things do not go well with a patient, we work together to identify 
ways to reduce or prevent the chance of recurrence. 
31 We keep one another appropriately informed about the patient's condition. 
32 Input from all disciplines regarding patient care is welcomed and respected. 
33 We take the initiative to offer assistance when needed without waiting to be 
asked. 
34 I am included in inter-professional meetings regarding patient care and 
safety. 
35 Information is communicated accurately between people and between shifts. 
36 We are able to communicate our points of view without fear of reprisal. 
37 I am comfortable sharing my observations or concerns in multidisciplinary 
patient review meetings. 
38 There is a feeling of openness and trust in our unit. 
39 If I don't understand something, I feel free to ask questions. 
40 Information is shared across disciplines on a regular basis. 
41 We are informed about changes that are made as a result of a patient safety 
occurrence. 
42 There is open discussion of the results of patient care reviews so that all 
members of our unit learn from the experiences of others. 
43 Patients are included in discussions and decisions regarding their care. 
44 Clinical errors and near misses are used as learning opportunities to improve 
and prevent recurrences. 
45 We receive in-service training to update skills and proficiency using the 
equipment and technology in our unit. 
46 The focus of patient care reviews is on identifying system problems and not 
on individual blame. 
47 Clinical management processes are examined to identify where errors might 
be made and how they can be prevented. 
48 We voluntarily share knowledge and experiences with one another. 
49 If we don't know something, we take the initiative to ask someone who does. 
50 We have made improvements as a result of our learning from near misses. 
51 We have made improvements as a result of learning from past clinical errors. 
52 We have a well-structured process to report unexpected events (errors, near 
misses). 
53 We have a well-structured process to report potential patient safety hazards. 
54 We are given time for professional development. 
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Appendix C: Justification for Level of Aggregation 
Table C-1: Individual to obstetrics group level aggregation of patient safety 
climate data 
Obstetric
s Group 
(n=68) 
rWG(J) (N=13,123) 
Factor 1 
(items=7
) 
Range: 
.80-.95 
Factor 2 
(items=5
) 
Range: 
.66-.94 
Factor 3 
(items=6
) 
Range: 
.85-.97 
Factor 4 
(items=2
) 
Range: 
.56-.89 
Factor 5 
(items=4
) 
Range: 
.84-.97 
Factor 6 
(items=4
) 
Range: 
.55-.90 
1 .88 .90 .94 .70 .92 .82 
2 .88 .85 .93 .71 .92 .72 
3 .85 .81 .93 .65 .92 .63 
4 .86 .82 .92 .70 .90 .67 
5 .91 .85 .96 .84 .93 .80 
6 .93 .93 .95 .82 .96 .90 
7 .94 .91 .97 .86 .95 .84 
8 .88 .85 .94 .64 .91 .76 
9 .88 .85 .92 .69 .90 .76 
10 .90 .89 .95 .74 .94 .77 
11 .82 .66 .88 .59 .84 .57 
12 .86 .85 .92 .70 .91 .68 
13 .88 .85 .92 .70 .91 .73 
14 .84 .80 .90 .68 .87 .65 
15 .85 .81 .93 .66 .92 .74 
16 .88 .88 .94 .72 .90 .76 
17 .87 .84 .94 .68 .94 .75 
18 .95 .94 .97 .84 .96 .87 
19 .91 .89 .95 .80 .92 .85 
20 .83 .75 .94 .64 .91 .64 
21 .87 .82 .93 .81 .94 .69 
22 .80 .85 .92 .71 .86 .76 
23 .80 .77 .95 .71 .93 .55 
24 .86 .84 .94 .70 .92 .75 
25 .89 .86 .93 .70 .93 .73 
26 .90 .88 .93 .75 .92 .71 
27 .91 .89 .93 .72 .91 .80 
28 .90 .89 .94 .72 .93 .78 
29 .91 .87 .94 .74 .94 .75 
30 .90 .86 .92 .70 .91 .75 
31 .92 .87 .95 .81 .92 .78 
32 .91 .87 .96 .73 .94 .76 
33 .86 .87 .96 .86 .92 .80 
34 .86 .79 .91 .65 .91 .67 
35 .90 .84 .92 .74 .91 .77 
36 .91 .90 .95 .78 .93 .79 
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Table C-1: Continued 
Obstetric
s Group 
(n=68) 
rWG(J) (N=13,123) 
Factor 1 
(items=7
) 
Range: 
.80-.95 
Factor 2 
(items=5
) 
Range: 
.66-.94 
Factor 3 
(items=6
) 
Range: 
.85-.97 
Factor 4 
(items=2
) 
Range: 
.56-.89 
Factor 5 
(items=4
) 
Range: 
.84-.97 
Factor 6 
(items=4
) 
Range: 
.55-.90 
37 .87 .83 .90 .60 .88 .72 
38 .85 .79 .93 .65 .91 .63 
39 .85 .82 .94 .71 .92 .73 
40 .90 .88 .94 .71 .94 .67 
41 .87 .81 .93 .69 .89 .71 
42 .94 .93 .96 .81 .93 .85 
43 .83 .83 .94 .69 .90 .72 
44 .84 .79 .89 .68 .88 .63 
45 .92 .88 .93 .67 .92 .79 
46 .87 .82 .95 .76 .94 .62 
47 .81 .80 .91 .69 .89 .63 
48 .83 .81 .94 .73 .91 .65 
49 .88 .89 .94 .72 .90 .82 
50 .90 .90 .86 .83 94 .67 
51 .87 .84 .97 .89 .97 .82 
52 .88 .87 .93 .75 .92 .78 
53 .88 .87 .96 .78 .95 .79 
54 .90 .87 .94 .78 .93 .72 
55 .87 .84 .94 .74 .92 .72 
56 .86 .87 .91 .69 .87 .79 
57 .91 .87 .93 .75 .91 .80 
58 .91 .89 .95 .72 .92 .82 
59 .86 .80 .90 .64 .90 .68 
60 .93 .84 .96 .71 .93 .83 
61 .90 .91 .95 .77 .94 .76 
62 .87 .84 .93 .71 .92 .76 
63 .89 .88 .93 .69 .92 .77 
64 .86 .84 .93 .75 .91 .79 
65 .87 .82 .92 .56 .91 .75 
66 .80 .87 .85 .73 .86 .56 
67 .82 .77 .92 .73 .91 .67 
68 .84 .78 .92 .65 .89 .63 
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Table C-2: Obstetrics group to adopter group level aggregation of patient safety 
climate data 
Adopter 
Group 
(n=2) 
rWG(J) (N=13,123) 
Factor 1 
(items=7) 
Factor 2 
(items=5) 
Factor 3 
(items=6) 
Factor 4 
(items=2) 
Factor 5 
(items=4) 
Factor 6 
(items=4) 
1 
(n=39) 
.86 .81 
.92 
.69 .91 .67 
2 
(n=29) 
.86 .83 
.93 
.71 .91 .69 
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Appendix D: Training Needs Analysis 
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